DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 415 536 CS 509 661

TITLE	Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Assocation for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (80th, Chicago, Illinois, July 30-August 2, 1997): International.
INSTITUTION	Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.
PUB DATE	1997-07-00
NOTE	477p.; For other sections of these Proceedings, see CS 509 657-676.
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Proceedings (021)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC20 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome; Agenda Setting; Copyrights; Foreign Countries; *International Communication; International Relations; Internet; Journalism; Mass Media; *Mass Media Effects; *Mass Media Role; Media Research; *News Media
IDENTIFIERS	Japanese People; *Media Coverage; Press Releases; Romance Novels

ABSTRACT

The International section of the Proceedings contains the following 16 papers: "A 'Pernicious New Strain of the Old Nazi Virus' and an 'Orgy of Tribal Slaughter': A Comparison of U.S. News Magazine Coverage of the Crises in Bosnia and Rwanda" (Melissa A. Wall); "Information Sources, Teenage Pregnancy, and Contraception Use in Kenya: Implications for HIV and AIDS Control and Prevention" (Isaac Obeng-Quaidoo, Cornelius B. Pratt, Charles Okigbo, and Waithira L. Gikonyo); "Re-Assessing America's Program of Media Assistance in a Fluid Democratic State: The Case of Zambia" (Folu Folarin Ogundimu); "Who's Setting the News Agenda on Sino-American Relations? Prestige Press Coverage from 1985 to 1993" (Robyn S. Goodman); "AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) as a U.S. Postwar Propaganda Program: A Hypothesis" (Jae-Young Kim); "The United States-China Copyright Dispute: A Two Level Games Analysis" (Krishna Jayakar); "Hegemonic Frames and International News Reporting: A Comparative Study of the 'New York Times' Coverage of the 1996 Indian and Israeli Elections" (Ritu K. Jayakar); "Development and Disjuncture on Television in India" (Divya C. McMillin); "Purchasing Involvement in South Asia: Its Relationship with Attitude toward and Beliefs about Advertising" (Jyotika Ramaprasad); "Western Romance Fiction As Urban 'English Popular Culture' in Postcolonial India" (Radhika E. Parameswaran); "Getting the News: How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Their Sources" (Beverly Horvit); "Fujimori Puts the 'PR' in Peru and PromPeru Leads the Way: How the President is Projecting His Administration's Neoliberal Policies" (Alan R. Freitag); "Terrorists on the Web: Propaganda and Pubic Diplomacy in Cyberspace" (Alan R. Freitag); "Television Viewing and Perceptions of the 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Cultivation Analysis" (Xueyi Chen); "Sold American: The Influence of U.S. News Consultants on Newscasts in Great Britain and Germany" (Craig Allen); and "Through the Dragon's Eyes: News of the United States in the Press Releases of the New China News Agency" (Charles Elliott). Individual papers contain references. (CR)

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INTERNATIONAL

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A 'Pernicious New Strain of the Old Nazi Virus' and an 'Orgy of Tribal Slaughter': A Comparison of U.S. News Magazine Coverage of the Crises in Bosnia and Rwanda

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A paper presented at the AEJMC Annual Convention, International Communication Division, Chicago, Illinois, July 30-August 2, 1997.

The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Nancy K. Rivenburgh and Gerald Baldasty on earlier drafts of this paper.

(For those wishing to cite this paper in future work, please be aware that this paper will appear in *Gazette*, vol. 59, nr. 6, Fall 1997.)

Paper Title:

A 'Pernicious New Strain of the Old Nazi Virus' and an 'Orgy of Tribal Slaughter': A Comparison of U.S. News Magazine Coverage of the Crises in Bosnia and Rwanda.

by Melissa A. Wall
University of Washington

Abstract:

This study compares U.S. news magazine coverage of conflict occurring in Bosnia and Rwanda. Bosnia's violence was characterized as an aberration for Europeans, while Rwanda's violence was presented as typical of Africans. Coverage suggests that in Bosnia, participants made a logical, albeit evil, decision to commit violence in an attempt to seek revenge for past grievances. In contrast, Rwanda's violence is depicted as having no logical explanation and is portrayed as irrational and so alien from Western understanding as to defy explanation.

5 Keywords:
ethnic conflict, frame analysis, Bosnia, Rwanda, international news coverage

Autobiographical Data
Melissa A. Wall is a doctoral student in the School of Communications at the University of Washington in Seattle, Washington. Her research interests include media systems of Africa and Asia and media images of those regions. She spent part of 1997 training journalists in Ethiopia and researching that country's privately-owned press.

A 'Pernicious New Strain of the Old Nazi Virus' and an 'Orgy of Tribal Slaughter': A Comparison of U.S. News Magazine Coverage of the Crises in Bosnia and Rwanda

In the early 1990s, both Bosnia and Rwanda were racked by violent conflicts. During the first nine months of 1992 in Bosnia, an estimated 128,500 people were killed or missing while 2 to 2.5 million others were displaced (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996). In the spring and summer of 1994 in Rwanda, an estimated 800,000 to 850,000 people were killed while 2 million others fled to neighboring countries (Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 1994; Prunier, 1995). This article analyzes U.S. news magazine reports about Bosnia and Rwanda to compare coverage of violence occurring in a European country with coverage of violence occurring in an African country.

The results reveal that overall the two conflicts were portrayed quite differently. The news magazines characterized Bosnia's violence as an aberration for Europeans, while Rwanda's violence was presented as typical of Africans. Coverage of Bosnia suggests participants made a logical, albeit evil, decision to commit violence in an attempt to seek revenge for past grievances. The news magazines suggest that while their actions make them inferior to the rest of the West, they should not be totally banished from the Western family of nations. In contrast, Rwanda's violence is depicted as unavoidable and so alien from Western understanding as to defy explanation. The Rwandans, too, are depicted as inferior to the West, but coverage evokes little understanding for those it portrays as a primitive, savage people.

Such a comparison is an important means of showing how news is not a mirror of reality but rather a selection and construction process, influenced partly by the norms and practices of newsworkers which in turn reflect larger bodies of social knowledge (Entman, 1991; Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979). How news events such as the Bosnia and Rwanda conflicts are portrayed reveals critical, interpretative choices being made by news organizations. Previous comparative studies of news coverage of similar events occurring in different countries often have focused on the influence of the Cold War as a mechanism for shaping the presentation of news (Entman, 1991; Peh and Melkote, 1991; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Other scholars have found that beyond foreign policy, issues such as race, religion or cultural perceptions about particular peoples and regions can influence media reports about foreign countries (Said, 1981; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1990; Fair and Astroff, 1991). Despite the end of the Cold War, this study found that U.S. government involvement with particular countries continued to influence coverage of them. In addition, cultural and racial perceptions about the countries experiencing the conflicts appear to have also affected how they were portrayed.

How foreign news is covered is important because most Americans have little experience with other countries and rely primarily on the media for their information. Thus the news media can influence the public agenda and help shape public opinion about events in foreign countries as well as perpetuate harmful and uninformative stereotypes (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1990). This influence is magnified as American news organizations send their news around the world, where their interpretation of events end up in local media outlets of distant countries (Hachten, 1992).

Coverage of International Affairs

Certain news values have been identified as influencing the coverage of international news. These include political, economic and geographic proximity, as well as the event's deviance from the perceived norm (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Shoemaker, Danielian and Brendlinger, 1991). In American reporting, the top influence usually has been identified as the event's relationship to U.S. interests (Gans, 1979; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1990). Cohen (1963) noted that the policy position of the U.S. government can be seen as a guide for how international news will be presented, while Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that the position of the U.S. government not only determines how a story will be reported, but also whether it gets covered at all. Related to this influence is the dominance of government sources found in the coverage of news, especially when the news is about other countries (Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; Hallin, Manoff and Weddle, 1993).

Another important criteria is the media's tendency to value conflict and crisis. News reports from non-Western countries in particular have been cited as focusing on the negative with no context or nuance (Lent, 1977; Righter, 1978; Rosenblum 1979). Critics have articulated these charges in various forums since the 1970s debate about the New World Information Order, which took issue with both the Western dominance of news flow and the negative images of the economically poor countries that are carried in that flow (Masmoudi, 1981). Reporting about non-Western parts of the world has often been portrayed through the East-West lens of the Cold War or has been shaped by the historical discourse that was a part of colonialism (Maloba, 1992; Hawk, 1992; Govea, 1992; Fair 1992; Said, 1981, 1978/1979, 1993; Mudimbe, 1988). These discourses reflect what Sreberny-Mohammadi (1990) calls 'cultural mythologies', which 'can be found in all media systems and are often at their most pronounced in international news reporting' (302).

Before the end of the Cold War, a country such as Bosnia most likely would have been viewed through an East-West frame, but today those frames are being dismantled (Hoge, 1993; Heuvel, 1993). Some observers note a tendency today to portray Eastern European countries as recovering communists struggling to catch-up with their more evolved capitalist neighbors (Halliday, Jansen and Schneider, 1992). News about Africa continues to follow a framework established more than a century ago, representing Africans as primitive and tribal (Brock, 1992; Fair, 1993; Wall, 1997).

Other influences on foreign news coverage involve logistical constraints which range from the dearth of foreign correspondents for most Western publications to the small number and uneven placement of foreign news bureaus, which are primarily located in the richer Northern countries (Hachten, 1992). Foreign news bureaus are more likely to be closed than opened today because of the costs of their maintenance (Hess, 1996). Thus, reporters lacking appropriate language and cultural skills often are parachuted into countries of which they have little or no knowledge where they are expected to cover rapidly breaking events (Rosenblum, 1979, 1993).

Methods

This article employs a comparative frame analysis of initial American news magazine coverage of the conflicts occurring in Bosnia and Rwanda. News magazines were chosen for the study because they tend to summarize the dominant American reading of a news event, and thus may more fully reflect the frames being used by all media (Buckman, 1993). Frame analysis examines *reasoning devices* used to explain the news event and *framing devices* used to characterize the event (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Entman, 1993). This type of analysis was chosen because it is believed to be particularly well-suited to comparative studies such as this one (Entman, 1991).

Comparisons of foreign news coverage tend to analyze differences between media organizations reporting the same news event or differences between countries reporting about the same events. Less research has been devoted to uncovering differences in coverage of similar events by the same media such as is the focus here. Among the this type of comparison are Entman's (1991) and Peh and Melkote's (1991) studies of the coverage of the downing of a Korean Airlines passenger jet by the Soviets in 1983 compared with coverage of the downing of an Iran Air passenger jet by the U.S. military in 1988. Both studies found the Soviet's involvement was presented as evil and malicious while the American involvement was not. Herman and Chomsky (1988) found that coverage of East Timor and Cambodia were quantitatively and qualitatively different, which they suggest was due to American foreign policy. In another type of comparison, Fair and Astroff (1991) analyzed coverage of black and white South Africans by American media, finding that portraits of black violence reinforced negative racial stereotypes. Comparison is crucial in detecting frames because frames often 'appear as "natural", unremarkable choices' in the presentation of news (Entman, 1991, 6). By analyzing two critical case studies of similar events, the choices being made in news selection become more obvious.

Every news story (editorials and briefs were excluded) appearing during the first year of intensive coverage of the conflicts (1992 for Bosnia, 1994 for Rwanda) was examined. The universe thus consists of 52 news reports about Bosnia and 38 about Rwanda from the magazines Newsweek, Time and U.S. News & World Report. Broken down by number of pages, Bosnia received 83.3 pages of coverage, Rwanda 79.3, or 5 percent fewer. Broken down by word count, however, the Bosnia story was told in 53,772 words, the Rwanda story in 53,439, or 1 percent fewer.

Each story was read to determine specific patterns found in the coverage, focusing systematically on dimensions that have been identified in previous studies as framing devices: sources, keywords, metaphors and agency (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Entman, 1991, 1993). Some of the data from the Rwanda coverage is original to this study, while some is drawn from the previous study of that conflict by Wall (1997). Stories first were analyzed by coding content for the following framing devices:

Keywords. These may be words that appear in a headline and are then repeated in the text, words that appear frequently in the body of stories, or words that have particular salience due to their placement within the text or their cultural resonance for the news audience (i.e. Rwanda is 'Ground Zero', etc.) These were open coded.

Metaphors. These often embody vivid visual images or hold strong cultural connotations for the news audience (i.e. the violence was the return of an 'old Nazi virus', etc.) These were open coded.

Sources. All people directly quoted in the text were coded by category. For the Bosnia coverage, the most frequently cited of the 272 sources was Western Officials who made up 31% (n=83) of the sources, followed by Ordinary Bosnians 19% (n=52); Serb Officials 11% (n=29); Ordinary Serbs 8% (n=23); United Nations 7% (n=20); Experts 5% (n=14); Bosnian Officials 5% (n=14); Other 5% (n=13). Other sources included Aid Workers 3% (n=8); Ordinary Croats 2% (n=5); Croat Officials 2% (n=5); Eastern European 1% (n=3); Middle East 1% (n=3).

In the Rwanda coverage, 215 sources were cited. The most frequently quoted sources were Rwandan Officials 23% (n=49) followed by Aid Workers 22%, (n=48), Ordinary Rwandans 21% (n=45); United Nations 13% (n=28); Western Officials 13% (n=28); Expert 5% (n=11).

Other sources that made up less than five percent of the total were African 2% (n=4) and Other 1% (n=2). (All numbers have been rounded.)

Agency. The agency was the person or group identified in each headline as causing or solving the problem. If no agent appeared in a headline, this was coded as No Agency. Agency results for Bosnia were: West (United States, Europe, or the West) 23% (n=12), No Agency 23% (n=12); United Nations 21% (n=11); Serbs 17%(n=9); Ordinary people 6% (n=9); Ethnic Cleansing 2% (n=1). Agency Results for Rwanda: No Agency 71% (n=27); French 10% (n=4); Tribalism 8% (n=3); Hutus 3% (n=1); Rebels 3% (n=1); Tutsis 3% (n=1); U.S., U.N. and country's leaders 3% (n=1).

The results from examining all of these framing devices were then analyzed for consistent patterns which suggested the *main* frame for each conflict. While other, smaller frames will occur within stories, the goal was to discover the overall frame for the two conflicts in order to make a comparison. The results were organized by posing the questions Entman (1993) says a frame will answer:

What is identified as the overriding problem? While each story may have smaller problems the goal here was to locate what is identified as the overall problem across the entire group of stories for both conflicts.

What is identified as underlying cause of the problem? While various causes were cited in the coverage, the emphasis in this study was on the underlying reasons that were identified as causing the problem.

What is identified as the primary solution to this problem? Again, each story may have a one-time solution to a specific problem, but upon examining the stories throughout a single year, what were the solutions to the overriding problem being offered, if any?

What are the moral claims made within the coverage? That is, in the ways that the articles are presented and framed, what sort of moral judgment is being made about the people involved?

Findings & Discussion

The problem. In both Bosnia and Rwanda, the primary problem is violence, yet the categorization of the violence differs for each conflict. In the Bosnia coverage, the violence was consistently categorized as *ethnic cleansing*, a phrase that appeared 57 times in the coverage (an average of at least once per story). This categorization also appeared in 3 headlines (my emphasis): ' "Ethnic Cleansing" Threatens to Unleash Another Holocaust' (Lief, Reisinger and Robbins, 1992, 41); 'Ethnic Cleansing: Shocking Images from Battered Bosnia' (Watson, Warner, Waller, Nordland and Breslau, 1992, 16); 'The Widening Yugoslav Civil War Enters a New and Ugly Phase of "Ethnic Cleansing" ' (Breslau, Stanger, Brand and Meyer, 1992, 36). A fourth headline also clearly references ethnic cleansing: ' "Cleansed Wound" '(Marlowe, 1992, 44).

In the Rwanda coverage, the violence is identified as *tribalism*, a categorization which appeared 30 times in the text (compared with 4 in the Bosnia stories) and in four different headlines (my emphasis): 'An Orgy of Tribal Slaughter Kills Thousands' (Hammer, Stanger and Sparkman, 1994, 32); 'Hundreds of Thousands Have Died or Fled in a Month of Tribal Strife' (Gibbs, 1994, 57); 'Tribal Slaughter Erupts in Rwanda' (Michaels, 1994a, 44); 'Tribal Bloodlust and Political Rivalry Turn the Country into an Unimaginable Hell' (Michaels, 1994b, 44-45).

These two characterizations of the violence represent an important difference because they present the nature of the violence as fundamentally different. For instance, the keywords 'ethnic cleansing' often appeared in conjunction or connection with words such as (my emphasis) ethnic cleansing 'scheme' (Nelan, 1992, 46) 'brutal policy of ethnic cleansing' (Post, Nordland, Brand, Stanger, Breslau and Warner, 1992a, 45); a 'ruthless campaign of ethnic cleansing' (Watson et al, 1992, 16); 'the process of ethnic cleansing' (Graff, 1992a, 37); and 'brutal practice of ethnic cleansing' (Lane, 1992b, 36). These words suggest that a purposeful, systematic act of violence, however evil, is being carried out. Tribalism, on the other hand, was often presented as simply an uncontrollable, anarchic urge for Rwandans. Thus the words tribal or tribalism tended to appear in conjunction with words that suggest a much less rational behavior such as (my emphasis) 'orgy of tribal slaughter' (Hammer et al, 1994, 32) 'tribal bloodlust' (Michaels, 1994b, 44) 'tribal slaughter' (Michaels, 1994a); 'tribal meltdown' (Gibbs, 1994, 62); 'tribal carnage' ('France: A Duty to Halt the Killings', 1994, 12). These word pairings suggest something less organized than ethnic cleansing, even though much of the Rwanda violence was in fact very carefully planned and executed by extremists.

Causes. One of the differences in the Bosnia and Rwanda coverage was that the underlying causes for the Bosnia violence were often linked to its immediate history. Thus, news accounts often explained the conflict as a continuation of events that began with World Wars I and II. The significance of this explanation is that it represents a linear and logical account for the violence. This is not to say the news magazines' coverage condoned or supported the violence, or that other less prominent causes were not evident but that, overall, readers could find an historical, understandable explanation for what was happening in Bosnia.

For the Rwanda crisis, however, no such clear, linear account of the violence was ever given. In fact, what was most striking in the coverage of the Rwanda conflict was that the cause of the problem was often the problem itself. That is, Rwanda's violence was caused by the Rwandan people's innate violence. This is significant because it reflects a circular pattern of reasoning, not a linear progression of events, and supports the notion that Rwandan behavior is irrational and incomprehensible to Westerners. Just as with the designation of the problem discussed above, this explanation is fundamentally different than that given for the Bosnia conflict. Such circular reasoning does not allow events to be portrayed as a choice made by certain Rwandans, or that a path of action was clearly followed by the people involved. The irrationalism this implies is supported by the coverage's tendency to link the causes to a mythical past of Biblical images and dimensions instead of to understandable reasons such as history of the World Wars presented in the Bosnia coverage.

Not only do these causes affect news audience understanding and comprehension of the crises, they also contribute to what Entman (1991) calls news audience identification. By explaining that the causes of the Bosnia conflict lay in the violence of World Wars I and II, the coverage may have encouraged American news audience identification by linking the current violence with a shared historical past. In contrast, by suggesting that the Rwanda conflict's causes are the same as its problems -- inherent violence characterized by irrationalism -- readers are distanced from those events and the people involved.

As noted above, the Bosnia coverage suggests that one of the primary explanations for the causes of the violence can be found in the events of World Wars I and II. To a lesser extent, other causes noted in the coverage include the region's communist history, or what is presented as a history of primitiveness in Slavic people. The primary cause is found throughout the coverage in which there were 20 different references to World Wars I and II, eight references to Hitler, and eight references to Nazis. The stories remind readers about Hitler's role in European violence and the parallels with Bosnia, noting in one story that 'the ghastly images . . . conjure up another discomfiting memory: the world sitting by, eager for peace at any price, as Adolph Hitler marched into Austria' (McAllister, 1992, 21). Ethnic cleansing was called 'a pernicious new strain of the old Nazi virus' (Lief et al 1992, 41) while readers were reminded that peace negotiations were 'like a 1992 version of Munich' (Church, 1992, 48). As one story noted, 'the West's response to this new holocaust has been as timid as its reaction to the beginnings of Hitler's genocide' (Lief et al, 1992, 41). Thus, the coverage characterizes the violence in this way: Some Slavs have a history of Nazi collaboration, others a history of victimization by those same collaborators, and neither group has forgotten or overcome that past. Bosnia is now being torn apart for historical reasons of vengeance and revenge.

A less common historical reason for the violence was the communist history of the country. Stories reported that 'constraints of communism gave way to long-suppressed emotions', (Graff, 1992a, 37) and that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was 'a former communist who clawed his way to the top' (Lane, 1992c, 51). Other reports explain that the conflict had 'it has roots in history: Ottoman Turks are said to have skewered Christian Slavs while conquering the Balkans in 1389' (MacFarquhar, 1992, 72). While these types of references to a more distant past represent an undercurrent in the Bosnia stories and have been noted in critiques of the coverage

('Mythmaking: the Balkans', 1994, Douglas, 1996), overall the reports appear to have made more of an effort to link the violence to events occurring in this century.

In comparison, Rwanda's violence was explained in different terms, ones that often did not attempt to provide a rational explanation for what was happening. One of the main patterns was simply to imply that tribalism was causing tribal violence. That is, coverage often gave no cause. For example, most of the Rwanda headlines (71 percent) gave no specific agency for events occurring there. Thus stories were topped with headlines such as 'Corpses Everywhere; Rwanda: Once More, Tens of Thousands Massacred' implying that the violence is an inevitable cycle which cannot be broken and has no known perpetrators (Masland, Hammer, Breslau, and Tanaka 1994, 33). This explanation provides no context for understanding the violence or its causes. In comparison, only 23 percent of the Bosnia headlines listed no cause for the violence.

Instead of a logical cause as found in the Bosnia coverage, the magazines suggest that incomprehensible, irrational behavior is behind the violence. This explanation fails to separate the problem from its causes and is unlikely to be understood by news consumers because it does not explain anything. One of the ways the news magazines reinforce this characterization is by likening Rwanda's crisis to images of a Biblical apocalypse that sometimes seems conjured from a Hollywood script. Stories note that the country is overcome with a 'Biblical array of pestilence' (Watson, Schofield, Sparkman, N'Kaoua, Chubbuck and Barry, 1994, 26), while refugees are described fleeing the violence in what constitutes an 'exodus of Biblical sweep' (Hammer, 1994a, 34). The August 1, 1994 Time magazine cover warns: ' "This is the beginning of the final days. This is the apocalypse" '. These inconceivable events were so alien to Western experience they could only be explained through ancient mythic tales from the Bible.

Other biblical references include the use of hell on the cover of Newsweek and as well as in four different headlines. The August 1, 1994 cover declared: 'Hell on Earth; Racing Against Death in Rwanda' while various headlines noted 'Tribal Bloodlust and Political Rivalry Turn the Country into an Unimaginable Hell' (Michaels, 1994b, 45). 'Hell Postponed' (Michaels, 1994c, 56). 'Escape from Hell' (Hammer, 1994a, 34). 'Descent into Hell' (Ransdell, Gilmore, Lief, Auster and Fasulo, 1994, 42). Only one headline in the Bosnia coverage referred to hell: ‘Peace Talks Won’t Save Bosnia from the Road to Hell’ (Post, Whitmore and Pedersen, 1992b, 44).

Within the text, hell or hellish appeared seven times in the Rwanda stories (my emphasis): ‘they [refugees] brought Hell with them (Gibbs, 1994, 56); ‘hellish exodus from Rwanda’s civil war’ (Hammer, 1994b, 14); [refugees] turned ‘eastern Zaire into hell on earth’ (Watson et al, 1994, 26); ‘Hutus stayed in their hellish surroundings’ (Watson et al, 1994, 26) ‘the hellish border region’ (Ransdell et al, 1994, 42); ‘the hellish throng’ (‘It’s too big’, 1994, 30). Hell or hellish is mentioned one third as often in the Bosnia coverage in connection with violence and its effects (my emphasis): the conflict was ‘five months of hell’ (Hackworth, 1992, 42) and ‘life turned to hell’ (McAllister, 1992, 20).

In addition, the Rwanda coverage also includes references to demons and devils four different times including within a pullout quote and on the cover of Time’s May 16, 1994 issue: ‘ “There are no devils left in Hell”, the missionary said. “They’re all in Rwanda” ’ (a quoted repeated within the issue’s main story). Other stories made similar attributions about the violence, noting that ‘Rwanda is helpless against its demons’ (Hammer et al, 1994, 32) and ‘Rwanda is tormented by its own implacable demons’ (Watson et al, 1994, 26). Similar comparisons are not evident in the Bosnia stories, which never used the word Biblical, Bible, demon or devil to describe the violence or the perpetrators of the violence.

Thus according to coverage, Rwandans are possessed by devils, driven to irrational extremes by forces outside the realm of Western understanding. Besides totally overlooking the clear documentation by human rights organizations made available at the same time as these stories were being published that the violence was carefully planned and executed by extremists, this characterization suggests that this awesome drama is taking place in some other time and in some other world that has little to do with our own modern lives. Because these events are alien to our existence, they could not be stopped.

What is not found in the coverage of either conflict are any in-depth explanations that take into account recent extreme economic difficulties that both countries were experiencing. By 1991 in Yugoslavia, wages had sharply fallen, social programs were in tatters and unemployment out of control. The industrial economy was quickly being dismantled as the country underwent Western-dictated economic reforms (Chossudovsky, 1996). During the early 1990s in Rwanda, the international market for country's main cash crop, coffee, had bottomed out. As part of the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment reforms, the Rwandan government was given large lump sums of money to convert its publicly-owned utilities into private ventures. This Western-conceived process did not require Rwanda to account for the money, which the president reportedly used to shore up crumbling political support, buying weapons and arming the youth wings of his party (Chossudovsky, 1995). Observers also have noted that it was the West's forced economic reforms that so disrupted both country's economies and laid the groundwork for the extremists to incite people to violence (Gervasi, 1992-93; Chossudovsky, 1995; 1996). These economic conditions were given little attention or explanation in the coverage, thus obscuring the West's complicity in the national and social disintegration, the violence and resulting anarchy.

Solutions. Various participants could have been presented as working to solve or cope with the problems facing Rwanda and Bosnia. Among these could have been local people, regional neighbors, the United Nations and a wider scope of world actors, including the United States and the West. However, overall, in the Bosnia stories, the solution to the problem is Western intervention, preferably by the United States, while in the Rwanda coverage, overall, there appears to be no real solution to the conflict.

In the Bosnia coverage, ordinary people are rarely presented as helping solve the problem, but are more likely to be presented as victims if they are presented at all. For example, ordinary Bosnians were mentioned only once as an agent in the Bosnia headlines. They make up 19 percent of the sources in the coverage compared with Western officials who made up 31 percent of the sources. While certainly many Bosnians were victims of violence, to characterize nearly all of them only as victims leaves no room for representing other important activities in which ordinary people engaged. Critics have pointed out that local civic organizations composed of women, peace activists and others have worked throughout the crisis to oppose the violence, and, in fact, were angered and dismayed that international media ignored their work. As Kaldor (1993) has noted 'the views of respected individuals, independent intellectuals, or civic activists' have gone unheard (22).

Nor do the stories consider a regional point of view. Eastern Europeans and Middle Easterners each made up a mere 1 percent of the story sources. The only regional agent found in any headlines was a single story about the Mujahedin coming to Bosnia to train soldiers. Critics point out that groups from other countries such as Polish Cities for Peace were concerned and trying to assist their neighbors (Kaldor, 1993). The other group that was involved in helping Bosnia was the United Nations, which was named as an agent in 21 percent of the headlines and quoted in 8 percent of the stories. Generally, however, the UN was depicted as unable to make a real contribution to problem solving, labeled 'feeble' (Warner, 1992, 48) and 'impotent' (Breslau, 1992a, 48).

Of all these groups only the 'West' was presented consistently as capable of solving the problem. (This refers literally to the magazines' use of the word, 'West', to designate the United States and European countries such as France, Germany and Great Britain.) Of the headlines listing agents who were solving or could potentially solve the problems, the most frequent answer appearing in 23 percent of the headlines was the West, while the most frequently cited source in the Bosnia coverage was Western Officials, who made up 31 percent of all sources.

The West was usually presented as either attempting to solve, thinking about solving or able to solve Bosnia's problems such as in these headlines: 'Specters of barbarism in Bosnia compel the U.S. and Europe to ponder: Is it time to intervene?' (McAllister, 1992, 21); 'The U.S. and Europe can no Longer Look Away' (Smolowe, 1992, 32). Within the text, the West is also presented as able -- if it wanted to -- to save Bosnia. One story notes that 'The West did not rule out a demonstration of sea or air' (Nagorski, 1992, 34) while a Bosnian is quoted as saying ' "We all fear that the West now thinks it has done enough" '(Graff, 1992b, 68).

The coverage sometimes distinguished the United States from the rest of the West as the country that could really make a difference. Thus headlines noted: 'Bush is finally ready to take action, and the Pentagon has a plan' (Post, Barry and Warner, 1992d, 36), 'Bosnia: Will America step in? The Pentagon thinks it may have to take charge', (Warner, 1992, 48) and 'At last a Balkan plan, but will a new U.S. strategy solve the crisis?' (Post, Barry, Waller, Warner, Nordland and Nagorski, 1992c, 46). Despite some ambiguity associated with U.S. involvement as suggested by the recurring use of questions in the headlines, coverage looks to the United States as the only real answer, referred to in a near nostalgic tone: 'unless the world's last superpower brought its military might to bear, a quarter-million people were in danger of starving to death' (Warner, 1992, 48).

What are the solutions for the Rwandan crisis? Certainly not Rwandans themselves, despite the fact that they were one of the most frequently quoted groups in the coverage, making up 21 percent of all sources. Wall (1997) found that they were most likely to be presented as passive victims rather than helping solve the crisis, although evidence from human rights groups showed that ordinary Rwandan put themselves and their families at great risk to protect relatives, friends and neighbors. Examples of Rwandans helping cope with the crisis are nearly nonexistent. When they appear in headlines, ordinary people are most often portrayed as helpless victims: 'Falling by the Thousands, Rwandans are Still Afraid to go Home' (Ransdell and Cooper, 1994, 39). Regional neighbors also are not to be found providing a solution to the crisis, even though regional groups such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) have been praised for their attempts at a diplomatic response (Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 1994). Yet the OAU is never quoted. The United Nations makes up 13 percent of all Rwandan sources, and it appears in one headline compared with the Bosnia stories in which the UN made up 8 percent of the sources and appeared as an agent in 21 percent of the headlines. While the UN seemed less prominent in the Rwanda coverage, this may reflect its lack of involvement in that crisis.

The West, too, plays a more limited role in the Rwanda coverage compared with the Bosnia stories. The 'West' appeared as an actor 30 different times within the text of the Bosnia stories but only three times in the Rwanda coverage. In addition, the West was named as a solution in 23 percent of the Bosnia headlines but only 13 percent of the Rwanda headlines. In the

Bosnia stories, Western government officials were the most frequent source (31 percent), in the Rwanda coverage, they made up only 13 percent of all sources. Only two groups were portrayed trying to help solve Rwanda's problems: the French, whose role was also questioned in the coverage, and Western aid organizations such as CARE, Doctors Without Borders etc. Notably, the Rwanda stories relied on aid workers to explain events (they made up the second most frequently cited source --22 percent compared to 3 percent for Bosnia). Ultimately, even though Wall (1997) found that Westerners were the only ones presented as capable of solving Rwanda's problems, comparison with the Bosnia coverage suggests that even Westerners cannot find permanent solutions to irrational African problems.

In addition to relying heavily on Western government officials (Bosnia) and Western aid workers (Rwanda), both conflicts' coverage lacked experts explaining political, economic, and cultural contexts. Of all the sources cited for each conflict, only 5 percent of the Bosnia sources and 5 percent of the Rwandan ones were experts. Without these sources explaining the background of the violence, readers will rarely have enough understanding of the crises to understand what solutions if any might resolve the crises. The lack of sources who know the background and perspective of those involved in the conflict contributes to the sense that events in Rwanda are not comprehensible or explainable.

This comparison of solutions for the two countries' crises may partially reflect the level of Western government involvement in the crises. Because the United States made Bosnia a foreign policy concern, coverage may have been following the government's lead. With Rwanda, the United States made clear that it would not get involved, going so far as to refuse to acknowledge the genocide occurring there because such an acknowledgment would have bound them to action through the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Yet it appears that coverage for both conflicts was not simply a mirror of involvement or lack of involvement by Western players such as the United States. The choice of how to characterize the problem, the choice of situating the Bosnia conflict in an understandable context while viewing the Rwanda crisis as a mythic event contributed to the idea that solutions may exist for the Bosnia crisis but not for the Rwanda one. This choice of frame was not necessarily forced upon the news organizations by governmental spokespeople. Certainly other sources of information were available (such as human rights groups) who could have been consulted. While the range of solutions for the Bosnia conflict regrettably is narrow and usually oriented toward military action, even those solutions are beyond consideration for Rwanda. If the conflict is beyond any knowable, familiar context (such as the World Wars), then solutions become unimaginable. This point of view is reflected over and over again in magazine coverage that never lets readers forget that events in Rwanda are inevitable and therefore unsolvable. As one magazine notes, the world had 'abandoned Rwanda to its fate' (Hammer et al, 1994, 32).

Moral Claims. For both conflicts, the violence is used to generalize about the inherent nature of the people involved in them. Within such choices the overall moral judgment is found: Bosnians and Rwandans are inferior to the more 'advanced' civilizations of the West. This judgment of both places as inferior to the West works so well as a major element in the frame because of long-standing notions of the 'Other' in Western thought (Said, 1978/1979). Critics previously have noted this trend in media coverage of the former Eastern bloc countries which have been presented as less evolved than their superior Western, capitalist neighbors (Halliday, Jansen and Schneider, 1992). Notions about the inferiority of Africans have been part of Western thought for centuries (Chabal, 1996; Fair, 1993; Mudimbe, 1988).

In comparison, however, the Bosnians are presented as more understandable and sympathetic and thus not as backward as the Rwandans who are presented as much more primitive. This can be seen in several ways, but particularly in the causes used to explain the conflicts. Bosnia is stuck in a World War II revenge match, while Rwanda's violence is likened to Biblical myths and thus not part of a rational, modern world that Westerners can understand. The Bosnia coverage demonstrates the inferiority of the country and the people but does invite some sympathy. The Rwanda coverage simply depicts Rwandans as incomprehensible, trapped in a cycle of violence begetting violence that has few recognizable causes and thus is unbreakable as far as the West is concerned. As one headline asks, 'Why is Rwanda Killing Itself?' (Ransdell, 1994, 46).

While the violence in Bosnia is condemned, coverage reminds readers of the recent historical past which not only helps explain the conflict, it allows the reader to share a common history with those involved in this conflict. The violence in Bosnia is a logical, though horrendous, reaction to this past. The people involved have made a conscious decision even though it is a bad decision. Coverage further suggests that since these actions are logical, however unreasonable, the West cannot completely distance themselves from events in Bosnia. Thus the conflict is presented as a regrettable regression for Europeans, as if describing a rogue relative whom other family members believe they must assist. This is seen in questions such as this one posed in a story: How could this 'primitive violence [happen] on the very doorstep of a postmodern Europe that had supposedly outgrown it'? (Lane, 1992a, 42) Coverage is tinged with a sense of disbelief and surprise that highly civilized Europeans could engage in such violence. As one story explains,

> Europeans were supposed to have learned from the last terrible war on their soil not to murder their neighbors. Educated people, on the verge of the 21st century, in a relatively prosperous country that is party to multiple human rights treaties, do not drive innocents from their homes, shoot orphans, build detention camps (McAllister, 1992, 21).

However shocked and disappointed the coverage implies other Westerners may be, it also never totally disowns the former Yugoslavia. One of the ways this is done by encouraging identification with the Bosnians, a tendency that is not found in the Rwanda coverage. Thus, keywords in some of the Bosnia headlines are clearly intended to summon a sense of shared cultural heritage for news audiences. Headlines reference Western culture, ranging from T.S. Eliot's poetry to the popular literature of Ray Bradbury to the prose of Proust: 'The Wasteland' (Hackworth, 1992, 42); 'Something Wicked This Way Comes', (MacFarquhar, 1992, 70); 'Remembrance of Things Past' (Ajami, 1992, 9), 'Lives of Quiet Desperation' (Knight, 1992, 38), 'Life Among the Ruins' (Breslau, 1992a, 48); 'Sleeping with the Enemy' (Breslau, 1992b, 52). Other headlines referenced 'Munich Again' (Church, 1992, 48), 'Europe's Trail of Tears' (Lief et al, 1992, 41). The Rwanda stories, in contrast, held only one reference that would associate the conflict with Western history: 'Rwanda's Trail of Tears' (Roberts, 1994, 10).

In comparison, the Rwanda conflict is used to generalize about the inherent irrationality and primitiveness of Africans. While the events in Bosnia are reported with surprise, as if the Bosnians have chosen a regretful path of action, those in Rwanda are presented as inevitable and not something that they can choose or not choose to control. 'Once more,' one headline reads, 'tens of thousands are massacred,' while within the story the reporter notes, 'For four centuries, hatred between the minority Tutsi tribe and the majority Hutus has been the curse of Rwanda' (Masland et al, 1994, 33). What is happening in Rwanda is only the 'latest' tragedy (Masland et al, 1994, 33). 'Once again Africa in general and the unfortunate nation of Rwanda in particular has beggared Western experience and imagination' (van Biema, 1994, 35). Such characterizations serve to distance the violence from Western observers. According to one report,

> These wars are not started by statesmen or fought by armies or ended by treaties. These tribal skirmishes recall the wars of the Middle Ages . . .Missing too is the hygienic, high-tech, buttons and bombs warfare that developed countries have spent 40 years refining. The chosen weapons are often far more crude (Gibbs, 1994, 62).

Rather than clarifying or explaining the violence in such a way that Western media audiences summon sympathetic identification, comparisons such as this merely emphasize a difference between us and them. One story sadly concludes, 'We may know how to feed people, but we don't know how to force them to stop killing each other. Almost 50 years after the founding of the United Nations, the veneer of civilization can seem very thin indeed' (Roberts, 1994, 11).

Conclusion

Various critics have speculated that American news coverage of violence occurring in other countries might improve with the end of the Cold War, which often served as a distorting and simplifying frame (Hoge, 1993; Heuvel, 1993; Hadar, 1994). The findings of this study suggest that media organizations have not become more insightful chroniclers of international conflict. News magazines provided shallow explanations, completely overlooking economic and other dimensions that may have significantly contributed to each country's destabilization. Coverage also failed to show the range of behaviors and opinions to be found among the people living through these violent events, tending instead toward presenting monolithic portraits of all who were involved. In sum, neither Bosnia nor Rwanda received the sort of coverage necessary to truly explain what was happening in either country.

This type of coverage suggests that even though the Cold War is no longer a frame for international stories, news gathering norms and routines have not changed significantly from previous patterns. News organizations have failed to fully create mechanisms for probing other sources of information about foreign events beyond government officials, perhaps reflecting a failure to see new global organizing patterns which are no longer based on the nation-state. Other actors such as grassroots civic organizations as well as international human rights groups are now central players in coping with and solving problems occurring around the world. By failing to fully report their perspectives, the news magazines have missed a major part of the 1990s story.

While coverage was not well done for either conflict, it is important to note that there were significant differences in how the two conflicts were presented. The Bosnia conflict was portrayed as an evil, yet rational choice of action, one that was linear in progression as it grew out of the hatreds and violence generated during the World Wars. This logical, historical explanation suggests a sense of a shared past between other Westerners and those involved in the Bosnia conflict. In effect, Bosnians continue to be part of the European family and thus can never be totally condemned or ignored, which is reflected in the fact that Western governments chose not to ignore Bosnia and to stay involved in the conflict at varying levels (limited military actions, UN peacekeeping, sponsoring peace talks, etc.).

In contrast, the Rwanda conflict was presented in much different terms. By suggesting that irrational tribalism was causing tribal violence, the magazines established a circular pattern of reasoning, quite different from the linear historical explanation found in the Bosnia stories. Instead of being portrayed as following a rational plan of action, Rwandans were portrayed as irrational, savages trapped in an unbreakable cycle of violence whose inner workings could not be explained but were sensationalized through Biblical imagery, which dehumanized the people involved and perpetuated American racial stereotypes. Just as with the Cold War frame, these differences in coverage suggest that the media portrayals of similar sorts of violence occurring in different parts of the world do not so much reflect reality as they do both American policy (or the lack of) and American attitudes and biases toward non-Western peoples and places.

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Running head: INFORMATION SOURCES, TEEN-AGE PREGNANCY

Information Sources, Teen-age Pregnancy, and Contraceptive Use in Kenya: Implications for HIV and AIDS Control and Prevention

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Presented in the International Communication Division, 80th annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Chicago, July 30-August 2, 1997.

Abstract

This two-phase study explores, within the context of socio-cultural dimensions of teen-age pregnancy, information sources for, and knowledge about, contraceptives among Kenyan teen-agers. Respondents rely more on health clinics than on any other source for information on sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), their most commonly cited health problems; however, those with high knowledge about contraceptives are significantly more likely than those with low knowledge to report that the mass media are information sources. The implications of these results for controlling and preventing STDs in sub-Saharan Africa are presented.

Keywords AIDS, HIV, information sources, Kenya, sexually transmitted diseases, teen-age pregnancy

Information Sources, Contraceptive Use, and Teen-age Pregnancy in Kenya: Implications for AIDS Control and Prevention

The purposes of this study are threefold. First, it examines socio-cultural factors that underlie teen-age pregnancy and coitally transmitted diseases in Africa. Second, it explores sources from which teen-agers in Kenya get information on health or health-related problems and on contraceptives that they could use to prevent sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and pregnancy. Third, it discusses the implications of those sources for AIDS control and prevention in Kenya in particular and in sub-Saharan Africa in general.

All three purposes are predicated on three overarching realities: (a) the endemic nature of STDs, particularly heterosexually transmitted HIV and AIDS in Africa (Quinn, 1996); (b) the high rate of HIV and AIDS on the continent, as a consequence of the high rate of STDs (Green, 1994; "Improved STD Treatment," 1995; Rushing, 1995); and (c) the importance of controlling STDs in the fight against AIDS in developing countries (Grosskurth, Plummer, & Mabey, 1993; Rushing, 1995; Williams, 1992).

Since Schramm (1964) published his classic on the mass media and national development, developing nations have formulated systematic policies to maximize the use of the media for economic and social development. The Schramm tome was an impetus for the subsequent application of public-communication campaigns to health issues worldwide (e.g., Hornik, 1997; Rice & Atkin, 1989; Rogers & Storey, 1987; Steckler et al., 1995).

Africa's health challenges are exceedingly taxing, as no region has been as consistently ravaged by diseases as has been that continent. And the pandemic[1] is yet to reach an epidemiologic equilibrium (Piot, Goeman, & Laga, 1994). Today, about 70% of all known cases of HIV and AIDS occur in that region. The cumulative incidence of HIV infections in Africa is more than 11 million, in contrast to Asia's more than three million (Bayley, 1996). AIDS is the leading cause of hospitalizations in Africa's major cities. Even though health-promotion and disease-prevention agencies implement campaigns to stem the tide of the devastating effects of the pandemic, HIV and AIDS pose widespread problems, not only to health practitioners on the continent, but to those worldwide.

A number of studies have investigated the reasons for Africa's pandemic (e.g., Bayley, 1996; Mann, Tarantola, & Netter, 1992; Rushing, 1995). Macdonald (1996), in studying its incidence and prevalence in Botswana, identifies three explanatory factors: (a) that it is culturally acceptable for men to have more than one sexual partner and for married men to have concubines; (b) that young women feel they are powerless in making decisions regarding condom use; and (c) that, culturally, young women should prove their fertility before marriage by becoming pregnant.

Another study raises questions about, and calls for more studies on, the validity of social theories that purport to explain the epidemiological patterns of the AIDS pandemic in Africa (Hunt, 1996). Still others have argued that the control of STDs is important in the fight against AIDS in developing countries (e.g., Grosskurth, Plummer, & Mabey, 1993).

Thus, even though a growing threat to controlling the pandemic is teen-age sexual practices, the latter have not been systematically investigated by Africa's public-health services. This exploratory study attempts to fill that void, by first ascertaining youths' health problems—as reported by them; it then explores their sources of information on those problems; and, it finally presents tentative implications of the results for controlling and preventing STDs.

Why Kenya?

We focus on Kenya—for three reasons. First, it is the world's youngest country: 52% of its 30 million people are younger than 15. People between the ages of 10 and 19 comprise about 25% of its population and are the fastest-growing segment in the country (Center for the Study, 1995). Those patterns justify the focus of this study on teen-agers.

Second, the country's adolescent fertility rates are among the world's highest. Njau and Radeny (1995) note that Kenya's "high teen-age sexual activity is reflected in the incidence of pregnancy, abortion, and STDs" (p. 2). One in five women aged 15 to 19 years has begun childbearing, either given birth or being pregnant with her first child. Seventeen percent had one child, and another 8.6% were pregnant, according to the Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys of 1989 and 1990. Illinigumugabo, Njau, & Rog (1994) reported in their study of four rural districts in Kenya that 81% of girls aged 15 to 19 years had at least one pregnancy, 14% two pregnancies, and 3.2% three. Ten percent became mothers before they reached age 16, more than 30% had at least one sister who had given birth out of wedlock, and 9% had more than two sisters with children born out of wedlock. Adolescents comprise as many as 35% of total obstetric cases in various parts of Kenya (Kenya Demographic, 1993; Lema, Makokha, Sanghvi, & Wanjala, 1991). Other studies have shown that by age 20, about 21% of Kenyan adolescents have had at least one child (e.g., Gyepi-Garbrah, 1985; Ojwang & Maggwa, 1994).

Third, Kenya is strategically positioned as the port of call en route to the trans-Africa highway. This makes it a reservoir of, and a conduit for, the spread of HIV and AIDS, particularly by long-distance truckers who cross the region from Mombasa (Kenya) on the East Coast through Lusaka (Zambia) in the central region to Beira (Mozambique), and to Zaire in the West Central region. This "truck town hypothesis" asserts that the geographic distribution of HIV and AIDS follows the major routes of truckers who patronize prostitutes, spreading the HIV virus (Smallman-Raynor & Cliff, 1991). (The HIV and AIDS prevalence rates for prostitutes in Kenya are as high as 88%.)

Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Teen-age Pregnancy

Zwi and Cabral (1991) argue that social situations place Africans at high risk for AIDS. Africa's traditional societies vary greatly, and indicate cultural differences in attitudes or reactions toward teen-age pregnancies. In the traditional societies of the Akan of Ghana, the Ganda of Uganda, and those of the Ibos of Nigeria, teen-age pregnancies are infrequent because sexual activities among unmarried teen-agers are discouraged. However, among the Tswana of Botswana, the Zulus of South Africa and Swaziland, and the Swazis of Swaziland, the phenomenon is more common and usually results in early marriage and the subjugation of women to men, since single-parenthood is abhorred.

The ever-increasing urbanization and exposure to international media and to Western education threaten the primacy of some of the traditional attitudes toward teen-age pregnancy in Africa. Among West Africans, for example, changes resulting from European influences have resulted in the widening of sexual networks in that individuals have more partners, and an overlapping of networks in that those partners are not local residents, as males patronize bars, night clubs and hotels (Caldwell, Orubuloye, & Caldwell, 1991). For the African, urbanization threatens traditional norms and institutions that regulate sex (Mann, Tarantola, & Netter, 1992). In many of Africa's urban centers, evolving uniform points of view and attitudes supplant traditional and ethnic-based value orientations. The situation in Kenya illustrates the strong influence of those emerging factors on attitudes toward teen-age pregnancy, which is increasingly prevalent.

Such prevalence results in high total fertility rates—that is, the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime—of a large number of African countries: 6.4 in Kenya, 6.6 in Senegal, 7.5 in Uganda, 7.6 in Mali (Lutz, 1994). Worldwide surveys showed that increases in the use of modern contraceptives were associated with decreases in adolescent fertility—that is, childbearing by women under 20 (Senderowitz & Paxman, 1985).

In Kenya, about 4% of teen-agers initiate coitus at the age of 10, although a mean age of 13.5 years for sexual initiation has been reported in some districts. In general, about 26% of single women aged 15 to 19 years report having had sexual intercourse (Kenya Demographic, 1993; Kiruhi & Simalane, 1993; Njau, 1993).

Although not all teen-age pregnancies are pre-marital pregnancies, many pregnant teen-agers are unmarried. Pre-marital pregnancies among Kenyan teen-agers are explained by "an interplay of individual and social factors within the context of the communities in which the teen-agers live" (Njau & Radeny, 1995, p. 4).

Early sexual activity in the absence of appropriate knowledge and the use of contraceptive devices are major contributors to teen-age pregnancy. Even when contraceptive awareness is shown to be as high as 76%, contraceptive use is reported to be as low as 4% (Kenya Demographic, 1989).

Only about 18% of sexually experienced adolescent girls use contraceptives (Okumu & Chege, 1994), while in the capital city of Nairobi, the proportion of users is as low as 5% (Njau & Radeny, 1995). That low use reflects a combination of factors that include disapproval, unavailability, lack of information, and the inconsistent nature of teen-agers' sexual behavior, among others (Njau, 1993; Njau & Radney, 1995).

Public-information campaigns that include the mass media are major sources of information for a variety of health problems and awareness about strategies for combating them (Allen et al., 1992; Wallack, 1990). Such mass media are complemented by interpersonal media (Njau, 1993; Njau & Radney, 1995; Obunga, 1989).

HIV and AIDS: Their Beginnings, Their Control, Their Prevention

The oldest known case that was strongly suggestive of AIDS occurred in 1952, when a 28-year-old male was diagnosed with "viral pneumonia" and admitted to a Memphis, Tennessee, hospital (Grmek, 1989/1990). In 1968, a 15-year-old African-American male was admitted to St. Louis City (Mo.) Hospital, where Chlamydia trachomatis was isolated from his lymph, serum, and prostatic secretion (Grmek). He died May 15, 1969. An autopsy showed lesions typical of Kaposi's sarcoma.

The beginnings of the disease in Africa may be traced to a Paris-based Portuguese cab driver who had served in the Angolan civil war, after which he worked as a truck driver between 1976 and 1979, plying the route between Angola and Mozambique, driving through Zaire (Grmek). He died in Portugal in 1979; his frozen serum later tested positive for HIV-2.

AIDS was first documented in Africa in 1983 (Hilts, 1994). David Serwadda, a pulmonary specialist at Mulago Hospital, Kampala, Uganda, observed patients who had symptoms of what were then called "the new American disease." In Zambia, Bayley (1983) noted that some of her patients who suffered from a voracious and an untreatable lesion died because this new version of Kaposi's sarcoma did not respond to medication. In October 1983, Peter Piot, a Belgian physician, found that 38 samples of sera from hospital patients in Kinshasa, Zaire, were infected with HIV.

In early 1984, Nathan Clumeck and his colleagues found AIDS in 21 Zairian patients. Since those early sporadic cases, HIV infections and AIDS have spread across Africa (Hilts, 1994), infecting people in the most productive years of their lives. In contrast to other continents, Africa, particularly its Western part, has a second pandemic: HIV-2.

During the first decade of the AIDS pandemic, South Africa was largely spared. Now the country has a prevalence similar to those of other African countries; it has been predicted that between 18% and 27% of its population will be HIV-infected by the year 2010 (McIntyre, 1996).

In Kenya, STDs, including HIV and AIDS, are prevalent among teen-agers, many of whom engage in unprotected sex and are largely misinformed or uninformed about the consequences of their sexual behaviors. The Kenya National AIDS Control Program (1992) reported that teen-agers aged between 15 and 19 constitute 35% of all reported AIDS cases in Kenya. It estimates that by the year 2000, about 41,000 young people will be infected with the AIDS virus—a significant increase from the 1985 figure of 2,365. Njau and Radeny (1995) reported that "the rising level of STDs [and] HIV/AIDS among adolescents (in Kenya) is related to misinformation concerning sexual behavior and AIDS" (p. 6).

AIDS in Kenya presents challenges for public-information management. From an initial denial of the pandemic by public officers who feared its adverse consequences on the tourist industry, there is now a campaign to direct both local and international attention to the unsubstantiated claims for a medical cure. Arthur Obel, a scientist whose work is supported by the Kenyan Government, has made confusing claims about inventing a cure for AIDS. While those claims have further generated a great deal of controversy, they have not provided the much-needed education on the need of teen-agers to take precautions against HIV, AIDS and other STDs.

Research Questions

Trends in the prevalence and incidence of HIV and AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in general, and in Kenya in particular suggest the following research questions:

1. What major health or health-related problems do Kenyan

youths report?

2. What social factors explain some of those problems?
3. How important are the mass media as sources of information for controlling and preventing those problems?
4. What are the implications of the results of this study for controlling and preventing some of those health or health-related problems?

Method

This study employs a two-phase method: interviewer-assisted questionnaires, that is, interview schedules (Phase I); and focus group discussions among teen-agers (Phase II).

Phase I

Sample. In May 1994, a systematic sample of Kenyans aged 15 to 19 years (N = 351) was selected from residents in three residential areas in Kenya's second-largest city: Mombasa, a coastal city whose Kilindini Harbor serves the maritime needs of Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan.

The areas from which the sample was drawn were Mombasa Municipal Estate, National Housing Corporation Estate, and Kizingo Estate. Households were selected from area sketch maps developed by interviewers. Mombasa, like most African cities, does not have an official list of households. They were selected partly because of their high proportion of (residential) teen-agers and partly because of their economic, social, and ethnic diversities.

Procedures. The questionnaire was administered by 25 participants of a course in audience research and segmentation for population, which was organized by the Regional Population Information, Education, and Communication Training Program of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), Nairobi, Kenya. The design and administration of the questionnaire were requirements of the training program.

Interviewer-assisted questionnaires. A 43-item questionnaire was developed by participants in the UNFPA course, pretested among Kenyan teen-agers, and modified. It contained questions on respondents' knowledge and practices regarding the use of contraceptives, their perceptions of the causes of pregnancy, their beliefs about adolescent reproductive health, their sources of information on health-related issues, and their demographic profiles.

Phase II

Focus-group meetings. In addition to the survey instrument (Phase I), six focus-group meetings (FGMs) were organized on six major themes: adolescent reproductive health, contraceptive use, family life education, family communication patterns, peer pressure, and access to health facilities and to health-related information. They were held in the three residential areas from which respondents were selected for Phase I of this study. Focus groups, a qualitative method, typically have an advantage over quantitative methods in that they enable the researcher to capture participants' diverse perspectives of their world without the presuppositions of predetermined categories (Hammersley, 1989). They are particularly useful in exploring questions on HIV and AIDS because they enable the researcher to understand how participants' understanding of AIDS was constructed—that is, the cultural construction of experience—and to explore a diversity of opinions rather than representative opinions (Kitzinger, 1994). Their use in this study provides a qualitative picture of youths' perceptions of adolescent sexual behaviors and their use of information sources about those behaviors.

In preparation for the focus-group meetings, pretest focus-group meetings were held with seven-student groups. All participants were provided introductory material on the teen-age pregnancy and STDs prior to the meeting. This, according to Morgan (1988), would stimulate their thinking and discussion of the subject of their meeting.

The selection of the eight participants in each FGM was purposive; the demographic profile of participants was comparable to that of respondents (Table 1). Respondents to the interview schedules did not participate in the FGMs. Each discussion, which lasted one hour, was moderated by a participant in the UNFPA training program and recorded (manually) by another.

Results

Phase I: Interview responses

Demographic profiles. Overall, there were 351 teen-agers, of which 38% (n = 133) were male and 62% (n = 218) were female. Their highest educational levels ranged from "none" to "completed secondary." More primary-school graduates than secondary-school graduates participated in both the survey and the focus-group sessions.

Table 1 about here

Research Question 1: What are major teen-age health-related problems? Respondents most frequently cited HIV, AIDS, STDs, malaria, dysentery, and insanitation as the major health problems of Kenya's youths. The others were pregnancy or abortion, menstrual irregularities, drug abuse, and others, which included allergy, fevers and ear-nose-throat disorders.

Table 2 about here

Teen-age pregnancy. About 79% (n = 277) of the respondents had heard of teen-age pregnancy and 84% (n = 295) knew of girls aged 15 to 19 years who had gotten pregnant. On being asked what pregnant teen-agers did on discovering they were pregnant, 61% (n = 215) said they had an abortion, while 52% (n = 181) said they gave birth. These results show that teen-age pregnancies, STDs, and HIV and AIDS were perceived as common health issues by the Kenyan youths interviewed in this study.

Research Question 2: What reported social factors explain teen-age pregnancy? A majority (70%) of respondents saw teen-age pregnancy as a national problem; the rest disagreed. The top four factors, in order of mention, that explained the reported prevalence of teen-age pregnancy were religion, lack of parental guidance, mass media exposure, and lack of contraceptives. The other factors were low-level education and peer pressure.

Table 3 about here

Research Question 3: To what extent are the mass media sources of information on contraceptives? Institutional sources such as hospitals, clinics, and the Ministry of Health were cited most frequently. The media were the second most important source of information on contraceptives. The importance of the media as sources of contraceptive information is more clearly evidenced in the relationship between knowledge levels and sources. When respondents' levels of knowledge—high or low—are cross-tabulated with media use, results indicate that those with high levels of knowledge about contraceptives tend to cite the media significantly more often than their counterparts with low levels of knowledge (χ^2 [1, N = 82] = 28.0, p <.001). High knowledge levels are also significantly associated with the school (χ^2 [1, $\underline{N}$ = 73] = 4.94, $\underline{p} < .05$) and the home (χ^2 [1, $\underline{N}$ = 47] = 9.38, $\underline{p} < .01$) as information sources. High knowledge levels are not associated with counseling, friends, and neighbors as information sources. Therefore, it appears the mass media have two contradictory effects on respondents: as contributing to the incidence of teen-age pregnancy (Table 3), and as distributing contraceptive information to them.

Tables 4 and 5 about here

Respondents indicated awareness of various kinds of contraceptives. Birth-control pills and condoms were the most commonly mentioned methods, followed by the loop and IUCD. The least-known methods were foam, jelly, natural mechanisms, and tubal ligation. The diaphragm and "injectables" were also fairly well-known by respondents.

Table 6 about here

Research Question 4: What are the implications of results for controlling and preventing AIDS? The reported incidence of pregnancy among the teen-agers, their familiarity with the problem, and acquaintanceship with teen-agers who had become pregnant suggest that a considerable number of youths tend to engage in sexual activities. Therefore, they tend to expose themselves to risks associated with contracting STDs, HIV and

AIDS, all of which were perceived as a problem by about 40% of the male respondents, and 34% of their female counterparts.

Asked to suggest what could be done about the problem, counseling was most frequently cited (40% of the time), followed by the use of contraceptives (17%). Other methods were abstinence (13%), education (12%), and parental guidance (11%).

Table 7 about here

About 70% of the respondents said that contraceptive use encouraged them to engage in sexual activities. Even though there were no specific questions on the incidence of HIV and AIDS among the respondents, the responses suggest strongly that unprotected sex was common.

Phase II: Focus-group responses

Complementing the survey research results were those of six focus-group meetings (FGMs), consisting of two male groups, two female groups, and two mixed groups. Audiotapes of the discussions were transcribed and analyzed according to the key words or phrases in the six themes that set the directions for the sessions. Even though we expected some gender differences in their responses to discussion items, we found hardly any difference in their responses. Therefore, the presentation of the qualitative responses to our questions will be presented without much distinction by gender.

Health-related problems. The discussions started by asking participants to identify some of the major health or health-related problems of Kenya's youths. They mentioned teen-age pregnancy, drug abuse, alcoholism and unprotected sex. "I can say some of them [the youths] do not protect themselves," one participant said matter-of-factly. "You find that they go with one man this day and another man another day. This is why I feel that the youths are responsible for spreading STDs."

On the prevalence of teen-age pregnancy—as a health problem—participants agreed that there were many instances of such pregnancies in their community. One female said: "We have young girls who give birth in school which I think is not nice . . . to have children while in school. They are not expected to have babies at that time."

On the use of contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, another female remarked: "The dilemma is on whether to use or not use . . . Some girls are not sure whether to use contraceptives or not . . . they are not sure on how to use them."

Controlling and preventing health problems. When participants were asked to discuss the prevention of HIV, AIDS, and STDs, they indicated that youths should be taught about the dangers of all three. One female said: "They should be taught by parents, teachers, and elders."

Condoms were cited as another solution toward preventing the spread of STDs among youths. This suggestion was opposed by some participants, one of whom admitted: "Some young people do not have enough knowledge about condom use. They may try to use them and end up contracting the infection."

Another commented: "Condoms are unreliable. They break if used wrongly."

One participant stressed the fact that one needs to have money to purchase condoms and the youths may not be given such money by their parents.

Another, however, claimed that early maturity is a factor that contributes to premature sex, with its consequent pregnancies and diseases. He said: "Nowadays, we young people, we mature early, especially girls are growing very fast, all their sexual organs are working fast."

On the use of contraceptives, a female participant said, "Girls should seek advice from older people." Another suggested: "Girls should seek counseling and avoid 'such things.'"

One male discussant questioned the meaning of 'such things' and the female explained that it meant sex, diseases, and pregnancy. She further explained: " . . . so the only alternative . . . before you know how to use contraceptives, you should avoid sex . . . because sex encourages the use of contraceptives."

Another female argued: " . . . instead of using these contraceptives of which we do not know the correct way of using them, it is better for us to avoid sex . . . sex brings us problems . . . pregnancy and STDs."

One male, however, disagreed with the females. He argued: "It is hard to restrain people from using contraceptives because some people are really fond of indulging in sex."

In response to the preceding remark, one male participant asked him how the problem of AIDS could be solved if youths were fond of sex. He replied: "By providing more information, people would be taught more about AIDS."

Implications of FGM results for controlling and preventing health-related problems. The participants mentioned condom most frequently as the method for preventing the spread of STDs, adding that boys use them with more frequency. One male participant commented: "You see, boys do not think about pregnancy. It does not come to their minds. They just think about themselves."

Three male discussants did not seem to understand the function of contraceptives. One said, "Pills are used to prevent diseases."

He was promptly corrected by a female who said, "The use of the pill cannot prevent diseases, but can prevent pregnancy." She quickly added, "It is condom that can prevent pregnancy, as well as diseases."

When participants were asked about their preferred contraceptive, most mentioned condoms. One said, "First, to us, it is the easiest method . . . condoms are good to prevent an unwanted pregnancy."

Some of the participants who disliked contraceptives argued:

"These pills, they pile up in your stomach when you get used to them and you may end up being sick."

"These condoms may cause infection."

"If one is introduced early to [contraceptives] the methods can affect their reproductive organs. They may be unable to reproduce."

"When you try to figure out the way this sex was brought about, it was brought about to the parents and to the people who are already married. For teen-agers, the repercussions of sexual activities are high."

Sources of information on contraceptives. Participants generally agreed that one main source of information on contraceptives is the health center. They saw the media as part of youths' health problems. A summary of three participants' opinions:

"You watch a movie, and just because you have seen it [sex] being done, you decide to do it."

"They do contribute [to sex]. Normally, if you visit schools, especially primary schools, you find the children are just discussing what they heard and saw on TV the previous evening. One such worst program is 'The Wild Rose' being shown on KBC [Kenya Broadcasting Corporation] because it encourages the youth in kissing and cuddling."

"To me, I feel the very sexy magazines are not good. They make you want to have sex feelings."

Some Tentative Implications——and Normative Prescriptions

This study provides preliminary data that suggest several implications for controlling and preventing STDs in Kenya in particular, and in the sub-Saharan region in general.

First, the dependence on formal institutions such as health clinics and the Ministry of Health for contraceptive information limits the exposure of teen-agers to vital health-related information. It is important that the media be used to increase familiarity with the risks of unprotected sexual intercourse. This implication is particularly borne out by the finding that having a high knowledge of STDs is a significant factor in determining one's media exposure. But such media must include the traditional media, which are more commonly labelled "oramedia." They include instruments such as drums, horns and gongs and settings such as plays, theaters, and the marketplace; they encompass the nature of African societies; and they reflect the dominant mores of African communication systems, the essence of interpersonal and inter-group exchanges, and the normative principles that guide those communications. This prescription is underscored by the results of a study designed to isolate the effects of a radio drama on AIDS in Zambia (Yoder, Hornik, & Chirwa, 1996). It concluded that, while the general population improved its knowledge about AIDS and its awareness of being at risk, those changes could not be linked to listening to radio drama alone. In fact, the population studied had at least five major sources of information: radio, television, government health services, a health-education project, and other non-governmental organizations.

Further, secondary-school curricula should offer more material on reproductive health, and do so in settings that encourage no-holds-barred discussions of the dangers associated with contracting STDs.

Second, because religion and socio-cultural practices exercise major influences on the seriousness with which Kenya's youths perceive the major health problems they confront and on how to address them, prevention programs must be culturally relevant. As Kiefer and Hulley (1990) note, "Every epidemic must be seen in the particular social context in which it took hold, in order to understand both its propagation and society's response to it" (p. 9). Thus, it is advisable that programs targeting youths co-opt such dominant social practices into their themes; for example, using promotional messages to restrict intercourse to a single partner and to empower women on their role in decision-making vis-à-vis protection during intercourse.

Third, HIV and AIDS are a part of a larger set of the health problems of young Africans. Because exposure to minor forms of STDs could make teen-agers vulnerable to more complicated diseases, intervention programs must integrate the complementary strengths of various media. In its integrated mode, such programs merge advertising, direct marketing, public relations, publicity, promotion, and personal selling into one managerial activity. Teen-agers in this study tend to think that being at risk for minor forms of STDs does not necessarily place them at risk for the more fatal forms.

Fourth, programs must address the pervasive sex-oriented stereotypes teen-agers hold; for example, that condoms themselves can cause AIDS, that the device is unreliable in preventing STDs, that the pill could also prevent STDs. Even though health clinics distribute free condoms, their frequent, let alone their consistent, use is in question. Kenya's National AIDS Control Program must strongly advocate a national policy on condom use. A study of the acceptance of innovative female condom shows that 84% of all females reported that they liked it as much or better than the male condom and that 55% of them would use it if it were available (Ruminjo, Steiner, Joanis, Mwathe, & Thagana, 1996). Few options exist in light of the cost associated with the long-term effects of infections from STDs.

Finally, as Ainsworth and Over (1994) wrote, "AIDS is fundamentally a development problem, not just a health problem" (p. 584). Health practitioners on the continent must, therefore, strengthen the links between HIV and AIDS control and prevention and the continent's national-development interest. Such links are particularly important in a nation where 52% of its population is younger than 15, and where 27% is between 15 years and 29 years. Because the effects of STDs are apparent beyond the health sector, the health and resourcefulness of African teen-agers could be at risk if health promotion and STD-prevention programs do not get the necessary policy-level support.

In conclusion, this exploratory study suggests that the reported sexual practices of teen-agers portend tragic consequences for millions of Africans. Therefore, strategic responses to the effects of STDs, HIV, and AIDS among Kenyan youths must include all-encompassing media campaigns targeting not only the young, but also adults whose lifestyles and social practices may be viewed by youths as model behaviors. The results of this study suggest that exposure to such media-based campaigns could be high if the youths' knowledge about contraceptives is high.

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Footnote

[1] Bayley (1996) distinguishes an _epidemic_ from a _pandemic_ by noting that the former occurs when "unusual numbers are ill from the same disease, at the same time, in one community" (p. 35); however, the latter occurs "[w]hen one infectious disease occurs in many different countries and spreads easily between them, so that it becomes global in extent . . . As AIDS is now global in extent, it is rightly described as 'pandemic.'"

Table 1

Demographic Characteristics of 15- to 19-year-old Survey Respondents (Phase I) and Focus-Group Participants (Phase II)

	Phase I		Phase II	
	Survey Respondents (N = 351)		Focus-Group Participants (N = 48)	
Characteristic	n	(%)	n	(%)
Gender				
Female	218	(62)	26	(54)
Male	133	(38)	22	(46)
Religion				
Protestant	221	(63)	18	(37)
Catholic	60	(17)	15	(31)
Moslem	36	(10)	9	(19)
None	1	(0.3)	2	(4)
Others	33	(9)	4	(8)
Highest Education				
None	10	(3)	1	(2)
Some primary school	7	(2)	7	(15)

(Table 1 continues)

(Table 1 continued)

Completed primary school	171	(49)	23	(48)
Some secondary school	97	(28)	10	(21)
Completed secondary school	19	(5)	5	(10)
Other	10	(3)	2	(4)
No response	37	(10)	—	—

Table 2

Respondents' (N = 351) Most Frequently Cited Health or Health-Related Problems

Health Problem	Frequency	Percent of Sample
HIV, AIDS, STDs	126	35.9
Malaria	117	33.3
Dysentery	76	21.7
Hygiene	53	15.1
Pregnancy, abortion	32	9.1
Drug use	25	7.1
Menstrual	9	2.6
Others	140	39.9

Table 3

Respondents' (N = 351) Most Frequently Cited Causes of Pregnancy

Cause	Frequency	Percent of Sample
Religion	140	39.9
Lack of parental guidance	126	35.9
Mass media exposure	117	33.3
Lack of contraceptives	76	21.7
Low level of education	53	15.1
Peer pressure	32	9.1
Broken homes	25	7.1
Early marriage	9	2.6

Table 4

Respondents' (N = 351) Most Frequently Cited Sources of Information on Health or Health-Related Problems

Cause	Frequency	Percent of Sample
Hospitals, clinics, Ministry of Health	122	34.8
Mass media	82	23.4
Teacher, school	73	20.8
Parents, home	47	13.4
Guidance, counseling	38	10.8
Friends	28	8.0
Neighbors	21	6.0
Others	21	6.0

Table 5

Respondents' Most Frequently Cited Sources of Information on Health or Health-Related Problems, by Level of Knowledge About Contraceptives

	Level of Knowledge					
	High		Low			
Source of Information	n	(%)	n	(%)	χ^2	p <
Hospitals, clinics, Ministry of Health	54	(44.3)	68	(55.7)	1.6	ns
Mass media	65	(79.3)	17	(20.7)	28.0	.001
Teacher, school	46	(63.0)	27	(37.0)	4.94	.05
Parents, home	34	(72.3)	13	(27.7)	9.38	.01
Guidance, counseling	2	(5.3)	36	(94.7)	30.4	.001
Friends	19	(67.9)	9	(32.1)	3.56	ns
Neighbors	13	(61.9)	8	(38.1)	1.18	ns
Others	19	(90.5)	2	(9.5)	13.8	.001

Table 6

Respondents' (N = 351) Most Frequently Cited Contraceptives

Contraceptive	Frequency	Percent of Sample
The pill	203	57.3
Condom	201	51.8
Loop, IUD	103	29.3
Diaphragm	96	27.4
"Injectables"	95	27.1
Vasectomy	81	23.1
Foam, jelly	79	22.5
Rhythm method	53	15.1
Tubal ligation	39	11.1
Others	75	21.4

Table 7

Respondents' (N = 351) Most Frequently Cited Strategies Against Teen-age Pregnancy

Strategy	Frequency	Percent of Sample
Offer counseling	141	40.2
Use contraceptive	59	16.8
Practice abstinence	45	12.8
Offer education	43	12.3
Provide parental guidance	39	11.1
Use legal measures	4	1.1
Others	111	31.6

Re-Assessing America's program of media assistance in a fluid democratic state: The case of Zambia.

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Presented at the International Communication Division
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Abstract

This paper examines a US media assistance plan designed for safeguarding freedom of the press and the establishment of an independent press in Zambia. The plan was part of a $15 million-dollar foreign aid package launched in 1992 for consolidating democracy in Zambia. The project was administered by the US Agency for International Development.

The paper applies interdisciplinary policy analysis to show AID's successes and failures, arguing that failures in its policy reform efforts notwithstanding, the media assistance program benefited Zambia greatly through manpower development and through the provision of much-needed communication equipment and technology.

"Re-assessing America's program of media assistance in a fluid democratic state: The case of Zambia."

Introduction

In 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development, (AID), launched a $15-million program to consolidate democracy in Zambia. The aid program followed multiparty elections which ended the 28-year reign of Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party, (UNIP). For 17 of those 28 years, Zambia had operated a single-party state, with UNIP serving as the sole, legitimate party.[1] The defeat of Kaunda and UNIP at the 1991 general elections, and the victory of former trade union leader, Frederick Chiluba, and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy, (MMD), was seen by many as an opportunity to consolidate democratic pluralism in Zambia.[2]

It was this vision of democratic pluralism that led the U.S. government, acting through its Agency for International Development, (AID), to embark on a bold initiative it termed the Democratic Governance Project (DGP). The central objective of this Democratic Governance Project was to render "public decision making more accessible and effective."[3] But five years after, AID is now winding the project down, uncertain about the future of democracy in Zambia. Part of the pessimism stems from the performance of the Chiluba government and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, (MMD) in the post single-party government era. Dogged by charges of corruption, economic mismanagement, and political intolerance throughout much of its first term, critics of the MMD government say that its record over the first five years is just as bad as that of the Kaunda regime it succeeded.[4] Others point to more systemic problems. As one scholar put it, Zambia is "caught in the contradiction of nurturing and consolidating plural democracy under very difficult socioeconomic conditions." The controversies over freedom of the press, and the failure to conduct free and fair elections at the end of Chiluba's first term in office, are perhaps the most significant emblems of the failure to so far consolidate democratic pluralism in Zambia despite initial high hopes. Regarding freedom of the press, one of the cornerstones of the democratic transition program, Chiluba's entire first term was marked by several tussles with the press, particularly the private-enterprise press. The tension in press-state relations were regardless of the merits of arguments against press performance, including observations that the reporting of some of the independent newspapers left much to be desired.[5] Regarding constitutional reforms, the government's failure at compromise with the opposition over several issues, including proposals for an independent judiciary, the need for an independent electoral commission, the procedure for adopting the constitution, and plans to include a Bill of Rights in the main constitution, seriously undermined the legitimacy of the constitution.[6] Worse still, the refusal of the Chiluba government to rescind a clause in the new constitution which forbade former president, Kenneth Kaunda, from contesting the elections as a presidential candidate because his parents were not of Zambian origin, seriously compromised the integrity of the democratic process. The subsequent boycott of the elections by Kaunda's UNIP, and the denunciation of the 1996 elections by several groups as unfair, and undemocratic, was one by-product of the failure at constitutional reforms.[7]

Significantly, two of the key components of AID's Democratic Governance Project initiative dealt with attempts at safeguarding freedom of the press, and at making constitutional reforms. It is no coincidence, therefore, that AID's current effort at scaling back the democratic governance project stems partly from dissatisfaction with how much commitment the Zambians have shown toward consolidating the lofty goals of democratic pluralism –as spelt out in the initial project design of the DGP.

This paper, therefore, examines how the AID initiative has fared so far, particularly in the area of safeguarding freedom of the press. Known as the "media independence" component of the Democratic Governance Project, this effort at safeguarding freedom of the press in Zambia was one of five key components of the effort at democratic pluralism in Zambia. The paper uses an interdisciplinary policy analysis framework to show whether project performance, where constrained, could be attributed to design failures or management failures. Furthermore, the paper examines how AID has made significant contributions to capacity-building in Zambia's mass media industry despite the cynicism about the fragility of Zambia's independent press and despite continuing tensions in press - state relations. By interdisciplinary policy analysis, reference is to policy analysis that extends the traditional focus of the discipline beyond politics and economics. Significantly, it combines observations obtained from extensive field interviews, with reviews of policy documents pertaining to the particulars under study. As Barry Bozeman says, interdisciplinary policy analysis commonly involves "a self-conscious focus on policy outcomes, and is often the careful study of substantive dimensions of certain policy domains…"[8] He argues that in this approach, politics is only one contributing variable, and often takes a back seat to economics. This is to say that whereas political processes and outcomes are important, emphasis is often placed on the economic calculus of decision-making, with careful attention given to the mix of inputs and outputs in the decision-making process.[9]

For this study, I will show how the mix of inputs and outputs were intended to attain specific policy objectives. I have used the following sources of information as means of gathering evidence and for making conclusions about the media independence component of the Zambia DGP: (a) reviews of AID's policy documents; and (b) field interviews in Zambia with key AID administrators and policy managers; officials of the Zambian government; editors and managers of public-enterprise and private-enterprise media; officials of the foreign aid donor community; administrators and teachers at Zambia's media training institutes; and reviews of newspaper publications and other ancillary documents which shed light on the status of Zambia's media and society.

Because the status of the project is still indeterminate, and because of the dynamic nature of the project, I will restrict much of my analysis to what has transpired since the project was launched in 1992. Where speculation is desirable, I will say why current changes in policy direction and in management at AID-Zambia is important for evaluating the future of the project. Three observations are particularly relevant in this respect. One, the final project assessment, now under review, makes a detour from earlier project evaluations and is a remarkable departure from project design assumptions on evaluation criteria. I will speak to these evaluation criteria, as codified in a logframe matrix that was included in the project design.[10] Two, harsh criticism of project management has already led to the unexpected retirement of AID/Zambia's long-time powerful resident director. The preference for a new director who is said to be less abrasive, appears a deliberate attempt by AID/Washington to mend fences with the Zambian government. Also, other key project officers, including the Democratic Governance Advisor, are being relieved of their responsibility and being replaced, partly because of the Chiluba government's unhappiness with AID over criticisms of the November 1996 multiparty election.[11] Three, AID's contract with Southern University, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), the lead institution for managing the Zambia Democratic Governance Project now appears to be in jeopardy as AID contemplates a scaled-down democratic assistance project in Zambia.[12]

Project design and Media Independence

The Democratic Governance Project had five key components: constitutional reform, civic education, media independence, legislative performance, and policy coordination. Known as main project components, they represented areas where AID was to provide specific assistance, collect performance indicators, measure them, and evaluate whether or not progress was being made toward "accessible and effective governance." In designing the project, AID had built-in performance indicators which were to ensure that a mix of inputs and outputs in these "five mutually reinforcing areas" would attain AID's principal project objectives of consolidating democracy in Zambia.

Specifically, the media assistance plan under the Zambia Democratic Governance Project had three specific objectives. One, they sought to fund policy studies that would serve as a basis for Zambian media law reforms and lead to the privatization of Zambian media industry, notably two national newspapers, a printing plant, the Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), and the Zambian Institute of Mass Communication (ZAMCOM). Two, the plan provided for short-term and long-term training of media specialists, in order to upgrade capacity and eliminate shortcomings in Zambia's media industry. Three, the plan provided for the establishment of a resource center for independent journalists, in the hope that such a center would consolidate the viability of a private-enterprise press whose survival did not depend on government monopoly of key media resources such as a printing press, access to international communication facilities, hardware and software for producing export-quality broadcast programming, desktop publishing, and other media technologies.[13]

Given the design of the media assistance plan, this project was unlike any other the US government had previously implemented. Most US overseas media assistance programs either take the form of bilateral exchanges that are supervised by the US Information Agency, or specific media assistance training programs such as those organized for the former Soviet states in the post-Cold War era.[14] Neither the bilateral exchanges, nor the largely skills-building activities organized by the USIA compare in scope and comprehensiveness to the AID media assistance plan under the Zambia Democratic Governance Project. Regarding scope and comprehensiveness for example, project emphasis was on the "complementarity of interventions to support 'demands' for accountable government from civil society and to enable a 'supply' of accountable government by the public service".[15] By "supply" of accountable government by the public service, project designers hoped to assist in bringing about reforms in constitutional reform, policy coordination, and legislative performance. By "demands for accountable government from civil society", the hope was that the project could provide assistance in the areas of civic education and media independence. As for media independence, the focus of this paper, the project specifically targeted media law reforms and capacity-building initiatives which included the funding of policy studies, training for media specialists, and the establishment of a resource center for independent journalists.[16] The thinking was that these conditions would enable the emergence of independent and professional journalism in Zambia.

Performance Indicators and Evaluation Criteria

To ensure that project objectives will be met, an elaborate logframe matrix was codified and included in the project paper, to provide evaluation criteria and standards for determining the overall outcome of the project. This logframe matrix provided what project designers hoped were *a priori* measures of cost-efficiency and project effectiveness. Under the "Media Independence" component, for example, the logframe matrix specified three sets of outputs: (a) improvement in the professional competence of journalists and media educators; (b) upgrades of independent media resources; and © identification and removal of legal and institutional constraints on media independence. Each of these outputs was accompanied by what were termed "objectively verifiable indicators"; "means of verification"; and "assumptions".

The magnitude of outputs for objectively verifiable indicators included improvements in journalists' knowledge of news, analysis, economic reporting, investigative journalism, professional standards, legal responsibilities, and press freedom at training courses which were to be held at the Zambian Institute of Mass Communication (ZAMCOM). ZAMCOM is one of two institutions designated as targets of US resource transfers for implementing the media component of the project. The other institution is the Department of Mass Communication at the University of Zambia (UNZA). Another verifiable indicator was the overseas training of journalists, media managers, and media educators at the University of Zambia. In all, the logframe matrix covered seven categories of verifiable indicators.[17]

Means of verification included use of project records, such as Project Implementation Reviews (PIRS) which were prepared twice yearly by the AID bureaucracy in Zambia. Additionally, other sources of data to be taken into consideration were: (a) ZAMCOM course reports (3 per year); (b) international resource persons departure reports; © participant grade reports; (d) participant graduation records; (d) participant trip reports; (e) equipment installation records; (f) library acquisition catalog; (g) user records; (h) list of publications; (I) content analysis of Zambian press; (j) consultant report; government (Zambian) legislative initiatives; and the Law Association of Zambia consultants report.

The "Assumptions" specified in the logframe involved five key demands by AID: (1) that the Zambian government fulfills a commitment to devolve ZAMCOM from government control; (2) that the Department of Mass Communication at the University of Zambia continue to sustain its program during the staff development phase of the AID project; (3) that journalists generate sufficient demand for media resources to sustain a fully-funded Media Resource Center --to be located at ZAMCOM; (4) that the Zambian government accepts study recommendations that are sponsored with AID project funds; and (5) that the privatization of Zambia's media industry is not pre-empted by other consultant reports (e.g. UNESCO).

The logframe matrix shows that AID's objectives were predicated on the economic principle of "supply" and "demand" -- whereby specific inputs were measured against observable outputs, in the hope that by so doing, Project objectives would be attained through the removal of perceived constraints. This is consistent with the logic of interdisciplinary policy analysis which was discussed earlier. To develop an independent and professional media in Zambia, three main constraints were identified: (1) shortage of professional skills among journalists and other media operators, especially in policy analysis; (2) excessive government control and ownership of media institutions; and (3) inadequate resources for a private-enterprise press, to counterbalance government ownership and control of the media.[18] To remove these constraints, the design team adopted a three-prong strategy of short-term and long-term training for journalists and media managers; the establishment of a media resources center; and the funding of policy studies that would ensure media privatization and the liberalization of media laws, for greater openness and freedom of the press.

Judging by project paper assumptions, and the careful attention to detail, including some attempt at micro-management –such as the requirement that Zambian journalists publish "a minimum 100 freelance reports in Zambian and international media"[19] – AID's Zambia Democratic Governance Project appears consistent with a US government strategic objective to encourage a worldwide movement toward multipartyism, structural adjustment, and free market systems in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire at the end of the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, the election of Frederick Chiluba's

Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, after 28 years of iron-clad one-man rule by Kenneth Kaunda, was seen by the AID bureaucracy as a "target of opportunity" for consolidating pluralist choice policies and western-type democratic accommodation in Zambia. Other less ambitious democratic governance projects were planned for African countries embarking on broad structural economic and political reforms. Moreover, ideas of democratic pluralism, the status of, and involvement of civil society in democratic processes, media law reforms, and the professionalization of journalists –all indicators included in the Zambia DGP--were beginning to find favor in other African countries not included in broad USAID effort at democratic governance.[20]

But as would be seen in this review, neither the careful attention to detail, nor project design assumptions regarding what was expected of the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) were sufficient to prevent undermining the strategic objectives of the US government in advancing the goal of democracy in Zambia. Although the project will record a number of impressive successes, notably in professional development for Zambia's media practitioners, and in resource transfers to targeted Zambian institutions, the economism which characterized project design may in the end have had the unintended consequence of micro-management and bureaucratic high-handedness on the part of the AID. As a result key project sub-components, including those under the media independence component, were poorly handled and badly managed for embarrassingly long stretches of time because of disagreements between AID/Zambia and the Zambian government over interpretations of project agreement, and because of bureaucratic inertia at AID/Zambia. The delays in aid procurement were inspite of the urgency for implementing several sub-components of the democratic governance project –given attacks against project ideals, including those pertaining to a professional and independent press. respect for at a time when many aspects of the project, including the status and professionalization of the press, assumptions. At the same time, the GRZ began to resent AID's insistence that it implement key project commitments, particularly those backed by several memoranda of agreement that were signed between the US government and the Zambia government. Known as *Conditions Precedent*, one of these key memoranda agreement concerned AID insistence that the Zambian government devolve control over ZAMCOM, a training institute established in 1980 by the government to provide short-term professional training to Zambian journalists and media operators. Although the Zambians initially went along with the memorandum of understanding, they later would balk on making ZAMCOM a private-enterprise institute, fearing that it could become captive to a foreign power.[21] After a long drawn-out stalemate during which AID forestalled crucial resource transfers to ZAMCOM, the GRZ eventually settled on a compromise, devolving control over ZAMCOM by establishing it as an independent Educational Trust by late 1996, and allowing AID to fulfill by March 1997 the last stage of resource transfers to ZAMCOM, scaling back significantly the scope of its earlier commitments. I will provide more detail about this in reviewing the specific accomplishments of the AID project.[22]

The impatience of the Zambians with AID and their reluctance to fully commit to the letter of project paper assumptions and *conditions precedent* had to do with increasing exasperation with a reckless, undisciplined, and unprofessional independent press whose excesses were an embarrassment to the AID and the diplomatic corps in Lusaka. Publicly, AID administrators and several members of the Zambia diplomatic community backed the independent press and put pressure on the Zambian government to respect freedom of the press, privately there was unhappiness with the reckless sensationalism of the independent press in Zambia, particularly the widely-acclaimed tabloid, *The Post* newspaper. Much of the worry had to do with the standard of reporting on this newspaper which ceaselessly attacked and "exposed" several of the corruption and ineptitude of Chiluba's MMD government. *The Post's* stories were often heralded by huge, sensational headlines; its reporting leaving much to be desired. Several of the reports were based on unidentified sources, single-source attributions, hear-say innuendoes, and occasional fabrications that the newspaper's reporters later conceded were not true. Three such reports that irked President Chiluba and the MMD, leading to arrests and court action against *The Post's* reporters and managing editor concerned stories of bribery in respect of the draft constitution and allegations of marital impropriety against President Chiluba.[23]

They were not the first cases of attacks against the MMD administration. Other sensational *Post* stories had alleged that the police failed to arrest a letter forger because of the intervention of the finance minister; quoted unidentified call girls as the sources of a story accusing the president's son of being high on drugs; and accused the State House of meddling in a domestic quarrel that was threatening the residency of an American diplomat in Zambia.[24] These attacks on the Chiluba administration had begun to wear thin on the patience of the government, leading President Chiluba to warn by the summer of 1995 that "liberal democracy leaves a thin line between anarchy and democracy" and that "newspapers must not be like guided missiles thrown by misguided people".[25]

There were some in Zambia, including members of the diplomatic community who thought President Chiluba had a good point. As one British diplomat put it, "not many western liberal democracies would tolerate such nonsense, such excesses." Added a U.S. diplomat, it [the conduct of the press] was the "sophomoric exercise of press freedom after 28 years of graveyard silence".[26] Moreover, the press attacks did nothing for the already battered image of the government, given the grave economic crisis Zambia was experiencing by 1995. The rising unemployment, wage stagnation, and inflation were already rapidly eroding the popularity of President Chiluba and undermining the constituency of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.[27] As Zambian scholar, Julius Ihonvbere noted, Zambians were increasingly restless because the "long awaited fruits of the restructuring agenda" had failed to materialize.[28] The high tension in press - state relations, and the continuing differences between AID and the Zambian government over interpretations of project agreements and over the Zambians' understanding of what they expected USAID to do in fulfilling promises made in respect of the Democratic Governance Project represented, therefore, the volatile context within which one must evaluate the media independence component of the project.

Policy Reforms and media independence

The policy reforms sub-component of the attempt to ensure independent media in Zambia was to take the form of three sets of policy studies that would lead to reforms in the structure and operation of the press in Zambia. The first of the policy studies was to address the legislative environment, specifically constraints on access to, and dissemination of, public information. The study was also expected to review laws that constrain freedom of expression and the performance of the media through excessive government regulation of the industry. An expected outcome was recommendations on which laws to repeal, amend or empower. A second study was to examine the privatization of Zambian media and its associated institutions, including the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and at least one of the two government-owned daily newspapers, the *Times of Zambia,* and the *Zambia Daily Mail.* A third study was to prepare specifications for a Media Resources Center (MRC) for independent journalists. As originally conceived, this media resources center was to be equipped with a printing press to mitigate the effects of government monopoly over printing resources in the country – the Printpak Limited—printers of the government-owned *Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail,* and the independent (private-enterprise) *The Post* newspaper, the largest-circulating newspapers in the country.

Several of the policy issues envisaged by the project paper were revised mid-way through the implementation of the project. The revisions were undertaken partly because AID/Zambia either underestimated opposition by the Zambians to some of the underlying assumptions contained in the different memoranda of understanding, or because of unhappiness with the perceived high-handedness of AID over project management. Also, many of the consultants hired by AID to work on aspects of the policy studies produced work that the agency said was grossly inadequate. Consequently, the project made several mid-course corrections which resulted in implementation delays or abandonment of parts of the media independence component. For example, the project-funded study on legal reforms was to be done by the Law Association of Zambia, with the study team consisting of legal experts and professional journalists who had extensive experience in media law and its application to developing world and developed democracies. This element of the study was deleted from the revised project description.[29] Although AID joined in funding the work of a media reform committee which arose out of a 1992 National Seminar on Democracy and Media in Zambia,[30] the work of this committee was never given any special consideration by the Zambian government, contrary to the expectations of AID, and despite the belief that this initiative was considered alongside other studies commissioned by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS).

One notable outcome of the Zambian government's attempt to reform its media laws was the tabling of a controversial media council draft bill after the 1996 general elections. After serious opposition by Zambian journalists, press associations, diplomatic representations, and other professional groups in and outside Zambia, the government withdrew the controversial bill from parliament in April 1997. If passed, the bill would have regulated media organizations, making the registration of journalists compulsory, and setting qualification standards for the practice of journalism in Zambia. Also, the media council would have instituted a disciplinary procedure and sanctions for media practitioners. The sanctions included the power of reprimand, suspension, and withdrawal of accreditation from offending journalists.[31] Judging by AID's support for the work of the media reform committee of the 1992 National Seminar on Democracy and Media in Zambia, the proposed legislation was clearly a radical departure from what AID intended or envisaged as part of its own policy reform for the Zambian press.

Similarly, the intended privatization studies were never fully commissioned according to plans included in the project paper for the democratic governance project. This was partly because privately and publicly, the Zambian government made it clear that privatization of the Zambia Nation Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) was unacceptable, although the government did not rule out options for making the corporation both commercially viable and insular from direct government control. The government did not rule out the privatization of its daily newspapers, although its program for doing so was ambiguous. Because the Zambians had the support of other donor countries on a number of the media law reform initiatives, AID initially curtailed its activity in this area.[32]Given the inertia and delay in acting on comprehensive media law reforms, and because of the rising tension over freedom of the press in Zambia, AID's project review team warned in 1995 that it was unwise for AID to completely cede to others, responsibility for fostering policy dialogue between the government, the media industry, the foreign donor community, and others interested in seeing media independence and democratic consolidation in Zambia.[33] Although the project review team noted that the Zambia government had shown considerable restraint in not cracking down on the opposition press by refusing to use extra-legal means, the project team warned that attempts by moderates to hold sway within Chiluba's administration was weakening, thus endangering

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Legal reforms issues aside, AID missed a target of opportunity for following through with studies that could prove vital to the survival of a free press in Zambia. For example, general market factors were hindering the viability of independent media in Zambia. A 1995 survey of The Sun, *The Post*, the *Times of Zambia*, the *Sunday Times of Zambia, the Zambia Daily Mail*, and the *National Mirror* revealed that all the newspapers were suffering from declining circulation despite rising commercial revenues from advertising. The weekly independent newspapers averaged about 15,000 copies. The circulation of the two government-owned dailies was down to 20,000 copies from a peak of 45,000 in the early 1980s.[35] Several factors could be attributed to this declining trend in circulation. One might have been the erosion of credibility of the press, judging by several negative comments by ordinary Zambians. But there were other substantive factors constraining the viability of the press. They included the inflation in the cover prices of newspapers, smaller disposable incomes, and massive retrenchment of workers from the public and private sector industries. The high cost of acquiring capital for expansion and technological improvements was another factor cited by newspaper operators as constraining their operations. A used tabloid printing press cost as much as $32,000, in addition to import duty charges which ranged from 45 percent to 50 percent. Interest rates for loans made by Zambian entrepreneurs cost as much as 80 percent with three-year maturity. Five-year loans were almost unheard of. These findings were partly responsible for recommendations that AID actively engage the resident Democratic Governance Advisor in policy dialogues, in addition to funding comprehensive studies on implications of market factors for the survival of independent media in Zambia.

Another study that was abandoned early on in project implementation without documentation on why the idea was jettisoned concerns the issue of funding a privately-owned printing press in view of the government's ownership of the only viable commercial printing press in the country. Given the high cost of acquiring capital for a printing press, the idea of possibly funding a commercially viable independent printing press seemed a good one when it was proposed. But the idea was abandoned without study. Partly because of strong opposition by vested interests in Zambia's public and commercial sectors. AID's mid-term review team said in its report that the oversight in not fully studying the issue of an accessible printing press prior to jettisoning the idea might prove costly in light of the "precarious access independent newspapers now have to limited printing facilities, notably *The Post's* access to the government-owned Printpak."[36]

Ironically, although the policy studies on the printing press and the implications of market factors were never done, the AID governance advisor apparently engaged actively in policy dialogues by late 1996, leading to charges of AID attempts at undermining the 1996 general elections. The fallout from press charges of the role played by the advisor is partly responsible for what is regarded as the termination of the advisor's 'contract and the search for a replacement Democratic Governance Advisor.[37]

Capacity-Building and Media Independence

The other major aspect of the AID plans for media independence in Zambia, as spelt out in the project paper on democratic governance, dealt with capacity building initiatives in five key areas. One, AID sought to fund higher degree studies in the United States for two staff develeopmentfellows of the Department of Mass Communication at the University of Zambia. Two, the department was to be equipped with desktop publishing equipment. Three, AID was to sponsor monthly short courses at the Zambia Institute of Mass Communication (ZAMCOM) for working journalists. Four, AID was to fund internships in the United States for two Zambian journalists and one Zambian media manager each year for the life of the project. Five, AID was to fund the establishment of a media resources center, open to independent journalists, at ZAMCOM.

For the first 18 months of the project, implementation of these capacity-building initiatives ran into serious difficulties, partly because of administrative confusion on the part of AID/Zambia, and partly because of dissatisfaction with the progress being made by the Zambians towards fulfilling the terms of *conditions precedent* spelt out in memoranda of understanding between the Zambian government and the U.S. government. The Project Implementation Review (PIR) prepared by AID for the period October 1, 1994 through March 31, 1995 said there were bottlenecks in implementing work plans, partly because of "shoddy work" on the part of consultants hired to carry out feasibility studies, and partly because of delays in getting an administrative unit for managing the project in place.[38] The contract for this project administrative unit was subsequently awarded in the Fall of 1994 to Southern University of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Much of the credit for finally getting the project off-ground must go to Southern University. By 1995, Southern had sent two candidates of the University of Zambia's mass communication department to the United States on staff development programs. One candidate enrolled in an M.A. degree program in broadcast journalism at Boston University. The other candidate in an M.A. degree program in print journalism at Louisiana State University. Also, AID had furnished by 1995, 22 units of desktop publishing equipment to the department of mass communication at the University of Zambia. Furthermore, two employees of the tabloid private-enterprise newspapers, *The Sun*, and *The Post*, had attended six-week internships at *The Advocate*, a local newspaper in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

The short-term program of courses aimed at upgrading the professionalism of Zambian journalists also began seriously in 1995. By mid-1995, the first eight courses held under the supervision of Southern were generally well-received by course participants and Zambian editors and media managers. Before Southern took over the administration of the project, the U.S. Information Service (USIS) had sponsored one workshop on ethics in media resources center, open to independent journalists, at ZAMCOM.

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1994. The Southern-administered workshops recorded the participation of 105 journalists for the eight courses that were held by mid-1995. The courses were (1) political reporting; (2) interviewing and reporting on camera; (3) investigative reporting; (4) radio magazine production; (5) editing and news thinking; (6) documentary and training films production; (7) radio news program production; and (8) current affairs for television. These workshops were conducted by consultants from US colleges, with local resource persons assigned to them as understudy. The workshops were credited with "diffusing more sophisticated techniques and skills at work places".[39] Media operators were generally appreciative of the workshops and in-house workshop evaluations were positive overall, with marks given to ZAMCOM officials and local resource persons. Asked to identify weaknesses of the workshops, participants often mentioned the need for more practical assignments, better coordination, better management of courses, and upgrades of broadcast equipment.

Implementing plans for a media resources center accessible to independent journalists at ZAMCOM was the most problematic of the AID media assistance plan in Zambia. The reasons for delays in implementing this sub-component of the project are complex and not easy to fathom. From a close reading of the politics of the aid program, one might conclude that delaying the implementation of this sub-component the project was a convenient scapegoat for expressing AID's displeasure over the Zambian government's attempts at pulling back from some of the guarrantees on the democratic process, including the government's crackdowns on the independent press. Also, ZAMCOM's case was not helped by the government's foot-dragging over the issue of devolving control over ZAMCOM to the status of an autonomous institution. A major condition for continued AID support of ZAMCOM was spelt out in a Memorandum of Understanding between the Zambian government –acting through its Ministry of Broadcasting Services—and AID, acting on behalf of the US government. According to this memorandum of understanding, AID agreed to fully fund the establishment of a media resources center at ZAMCOM upon evidence that ZAMCOM could operate as a viable independent organization. A further condition was that there was evidence of satisfactory progress toward autonomy from the Zambian government.[40] The proposed media resources center was supposed to be equipped with a media library, desktop publishing equipment pool, sound and video recording and editing facilities, a photographic unit, telex and facsimile equipment, and a printing press. Additionally, short-term technical assistance was to be provided for the installation of all equipment and for a two-year resident expert to train ZAMCOM staff to run the center and advise local journalists on such things as using the facilities to sell their stories abroad.

Initially, AID thought it might spend as much as $1.5 million for this center, although the basis for this estimate were unclear, given that nothing in project files suggested costing was done during the planning phases of the project. But project officials said during interviews that this was the generally understood figure among AID/Zambia governance managers. The longer it took the Zambian government to transform ZAMCOM into an autonomous institution, the longer AID delayed plans to provide the resource transfers for equipping the media resources center at ZAMCOM. Moreover, AID/Zambia also capitalized on the viability condition of the memorandum of understanding to delay resource transfers to ZAMCOM, insisting it needed good evidence that ZAMCOM was capable of operating viably as an independent training institute. However, AID could not agree on how to contract out, or determine ways of ascertaining ZAMCOM's viability for several months. When it finally got around to doing so, the recommendations of the viability assessment contractors were compromised by conflict of intrest charges. This led to a recommendation by the project assessment team that the contractor's recommendation on equipping ZAMCOM with low-end video and audio equipment be rejected in favor of fully funding the institute's media resources center with high-end video and audio equipment.[41] Furthermore, th assessment team advised AID to seriously consider the democratic governance advisor's plea that it was incumbent on AID to ensure ZAMCOM "floats rather than sinks".[42]

These recommendations, notwithstanding, it took AID almost one year to follow through on equipping ZAMCOM with a scaled down version of the media resources center. First, ZAMCOM had to show painfully, that it was really re-inventing itself through structural adjustments in its day-to-day operations. These adjustments include the restructuring of personnel services, cost controls, and the installation of a new budget performance and auditing system. A trade-off for ZAMCOM was a 57 percent drop in enrollment for ZAMCOM courses between 1995 and 1996, the period when ZAMCOM was undergoing the restructuring program. One consequence of this restructuring and the consolidation of its operation was ZAMCOM's loss of regional trainee participation in its workshops, as the institute increased efforts to court local non-government organizations, a market which was increasing its demand for ZAMCOM courses well beyond demand by the core, traditional media sector which ZAMCOM had previously courted.[43] ZAMCOM plans to return to courtship of the regional market by the end of 1997. The attempt at viability by ZAMCOM has also meant efforts at decreasing dependence on external donors. In 1995 and 1996, ZAMCOM's combined recurrent expenditure was $707,000, of which 81 percent was internally generated by the institute, and the remaining 19 percent was provided by way of subsidy from the Zambian government. During the same period, the budget for the institute's capital budget was $570,000, 27 percent of which was internally generated, the other 73 percent provided by USAID as foreign aid.[44] Whereas USAID was responsible for all of ZAMCOM's external support in 1995 and 1996, other donor agencies, notably those of those of the British, German, and Scandinavian countries provided support in the past. Now the institute says it was striving for donor independence because "donor support has tended to undermine our efforts aimed at strengthening our financial base."[45] One practice which the institute says limits its viability potential is the tendency by donors to award non-reimbursable fee scholarships to participants they sponsor to ZAMCOM workshops.

Significantly, AID assistance has enabled ZAMCOM to rapidly upgrade technical capacity and position itself as perhaps the best-equipped technical training institute for media professionals in Zambia, if not all of Southern Africa. Once project funds were made available by AID/Zambia, the institute was able to move rapidly into the electronic age of journalism and communication training. By early 1996, the institute had installed 16 Super Mackintosh computers at a cost of $145,000, thus meeting the desktop publishing needs of the institute. By the Spring of 1997, the institute had begun to publish its own newspaper, resulting partly from its training courses. Also, AID's release of $300,000 for the purchase of broadcasting equipment had enabled the first phase of installation of this upgrade of broadcasting services to begin in late Spring 1997, a major boost to ZAMCOM'S efforts at providing more sophisticated broadcast training.[46]

Conclusion

I have shown in this paper that the USAID media assistance plan for Zambia was perhaps the most comprehensive, and most integrated foreign-assisted media training program ever conceived by the US government in Africa, if not for any country ever. The impetus for the project arose out of a desire to consolidate democracy in Zambia following the multiparty elections that brought President Chiluba and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy to power in 1991. According to AID project paper, this transition from President Kaunda's authoritarian rule to the upstart Chiluba MMD party was seen as presenting a "target of opportunity" for democratic consolidation in way that could serve as a model for democratization in Africa. This notion served as the impetus for the careful attention to detail, particularly in conceptualizing the mix of inputs and outputs that would ensure project outcomes as intended. Despite the laudable objectives of the project and the careful attention to detail by the design team, I have also shown, however, that this attention to detail and the attempt by AID project administrators to ensure that US institutional transfers occur according to the preferences of AID led to major shortcomings in project implementation. The most serious of the shortcomings were delays in procurement for essential components of the project, and confusion over what exactly AID wanted the Zambians to do, and what the Zambians expected AID to do. The resulting inertia arising from this confusion led to gaps in perception between both parties, with AID suspecting the Zambians of foot-dragging over essential elements that were to ensure democratic consolidation; and with the Zambians suspicious of AID's motives, including suspicions that AID was helping undermine the legitimacy of the government and the sovreignty of the country.

Moreover, I have shown that delays by AID/Zambia in following through on recommendations of its own consultants, and in abandonning its own commitments on several key components of the project led unfortunately to charges of "high-handedness" in managing the democratic governance project. On the other hand, AID could argue that the delays were unavoidabe, given that the economism of project design --the careful attention to the balancing and precision of a mix of inputs and outputs--ensured that institutional transfers to Zambia had to occur within a specified menu of activities if the goal of democratic governance was to be achieved. Such arguments have merit, unfortunately, regardless of the observation that they also represented a convenient stalling mechanism for abandoning essential project commitments.

Furthermore, I have shown in this paper that the application of interdisciplinary policy analysis to the study of institutional transfers in a policy arena such as assisting in the establishment of freedom of the press or media independence in another country, provides a useful means of study in comparative and international communication. Notwithstanding the case study nature of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project, I have tried to show that some understanding of US foreign assistance programs for media training could be gained by the careful use of the method of interdisciplinary policy analysis. In this particular case, the procedure enables one to combine the careful weighing of evidence obtained from project files, with field interviews obtained in both Zambia and the United States, as well as with reviews of literature, press output, and observations of Zambia's political context. The logframe matrix attached to the project paper was an important starting point for evaluating evidence in this respect. I showed how careful consideration was given to matters involving the accountability of institutional transfers aw well as the measurement of project effectiveness. I utilized the same framework for measuring the outcomes of the project. Despite the ups and downs of implementing the project, I have shown that this project probably made its most significant contributions in the areas of providing critically-needed resource upgrades for the Zambians. These resource upgrades include high-grade computer equipment and software, broadcasting equipment, and perhaps more significantly, the human resource development needed for upgrading the standard of professionalism and the independence of the media in Zambia over the long haul. The disappointments with media law reforms and the privatization of some aspects of Zambia's media industry notwithstanding, Zambians are likely toenjoy for a long time yet to come, the fruits of AID's media assistance plan, long after AID winds up its act in Zambia in respect of the democratic governance project.

Endnotes

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[15] United States Agency for International Development. Zambia Democratic Governance Project Monitoring and Evaluation Studies Mid-Term Review. No. 623-0226-A-00-3024-00 (July 18. 1995).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Project Paper. 1992. ANNEX A. p.69: op.cit.
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[20] For some references. see: Celestin Monga. "Civil society and democratisation in Francophone Africa". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 33. 3 (1995). pp. 359-379.; Todd J. Moss. "US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: the limits of liberal universalism". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 33. 2 (1995). pp. 189-209; and Charles Manga Fombad.

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[32] Author's field notes: interviews include representatives of the British, Scandinavian, the European Community, and the US diplomatic missions; and Zambia's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, and the president's cabinet (State House).

[33] Mid-Term Review, op.cit, p.77. Since the report was written, several independent journalists, notably those of The Post newspaper were jailed and put on trial for criminal libel, contempt of court, and other violations of Zambia's press laws.

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[36] Mid-Term Review, op.cit.

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Who's Setting the News Agenda on Sino-American Relations? Prestige Press Coverage from 1985 to 1993

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This paper was presented to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication at the national convention in Chicago, August 1997.

ABSTRACT

Who's Setting the News Agenda on Sino-American Relations? Prestige Press Coverage from 1985 to 1993

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This study examined whether Sino-American news coverage was more government independent after the Cold War's collapse than during the Cold War proper. Content analysis of 1,177 New York Times and Washington Post articles and 399 government articles were compared via descriptive statistics and time series analysis. The study concluded that Sino-American press coverage from the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War era was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor.

Who's Setting the News Agenda on Sino-American Relations?
Prestige Press Coverage From 1985 to 1993

Introduction

Throughout most of the Cold War, many scholars argued that the media left Sino-American policy up to each Cold War administration and its experts (Chang, 1986, 1993). Such scholars argue that the press, instead of performing its watchdog function of critiquing each administration's China policy and objectives, simply played the role of government "guard dog" (Donohue, Tichenor & Olien, 1995). Since throughout the Cold War world peace and much economic prosperity have hinged on Chinese stability and cooperative Sino-American relations, professional journalists argue that such international relationships have been too important to leave to government experts (Heuvel, 1993; Hadar, 1994). Although scholars tend to agree that during the Cold War news coverage generally lacked government-independent characteristics, the few available research articles focusing on news coverage during and after the Cold War's break up indicate significant government-independent characteristics (Cheng, 1993; Huang, 1994; Goodman, 1994).

With the Cold War's demise came the first evidence that a more independent press might rise from the rubble. This evidence was discovered in studies focusing on press coverage of the spring 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic uprisings and resulting government crackdown (Cheng, 1993; Wang, 1992). Cheng and Wang found that press coverage of Tiananmen Square was predominantly government-independent. The 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement, combined with the dramatic collapse of many communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, helped set off strong democratic waves that toppled the Berlin Wall and the former Soviet Union and marked the beginning of the end of the global Cold War (Cherrington, 1991; Horvat and Szanto, 1993).

Ever since the Cold War's break up many media professionals have been claiming that post-Cold War news coverage possesses more government-independent characteristics than its Cold War counterpart (Hadar, 1994; Heuvel, 1993). These media professionals describe a brave new world emerging from the rubble of communism, a new, freer world that has been unraveling so quickly that the government and press are simultaneously grappling to make sense of it all. Many media professionals also argue that the press is rising to the occasion by forging ahead with its own coverage of this new political existence. They claim that unlike their traditional Cold War predecessors, who often relied too heavily on the government's paradigm of the world, these new era journalists are making up their own minds about American relations with other countries and covering the news accordingly.

Although the view that post-Cold War journalists are more self-reliant and less government dependent than their traditional Cold War predecessors is widely supported among media professionals, after an exhaustive literature review this researcher only found one empirical study partially supporting this claim. This study just happens to be Sino-American related and deals with the 1989 Tiananmen Square ordeal both before and after the government crackdown (Huang, 1994).

In hopes of filling this wide research gap, this study will investigate whether professional media claims of government-independent post-Cold War coverage is supported by empirical research.

Literature Review

Cold War Time Frames

Since the exact timing of when the Cold War ceased to exist is hotly debated in history, political science and communication scholarly publications, this researcher was forced to at least temporarily settle this controversy in order to determine which Sino-American coverage should be considered post-Cold War. After reviewing more than 100 such articles, this time frame question was settled by determining the two main time frames that most scholars agreed marked the Cold War's end and applying them to this study. These scholars argued that the Cold War officially ended with one of two major events: the destruction of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989) or the fall of the Soviet Union (December 8, 1991) and/or Gorbachev's resignation (December 25, 1991) (Rupieper, 1990; Steel, 1992; Zagoria, 1991; Hill, 1993; Garthoff, 1992; Talbott, 1991/92; Marshall, 1992; Mandelbaum, 1990/91; Sullivan, 1992; Lampton, 1991).

Since the Cold War did not just suddenly end on a given date — over several years a string of often turbulent and unpredictable events brought the Cold War crashing down —, this study will consider the official "end" of the Cold War a finale of events, not a singular episode. Accordingly, all Sino-American issues or events occurring from November 10, 1989, to December 24, 1991, will belong to a transitional period. Only Sino-American press coverage published beginning on December 26, 1991, up until the present will belong to the post-Cold War period.

According to the above two scenarios, the Cold War began wrapping up as early as the Berlin Wall's collapse in November of 1989. However, research indicates that Sino-American press coverage demonstrated government-independent characteristics at least six months earlier, during the spring 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement and subsequent government crackdown. Since the Cold War did not begin unraveling overnight, the Tiananmen example of independent coverage leads to the following question: Does independent Tiananmen Square coverage before the Cold War's break up represent some type of crisis-related fluke, or did Sino-American press coverage take on independent characteristics as early as when the Cold War first began to crumble? If Tiananmen Square and possibly even earlier coverage is found to be more independent due to a collapsing Cold War paradigm, this information would help support journalists' claims that post-Cold War coverage has been more government independent than its Cold War predecessor's. Accordingly, this study will not only focus directly on Sino-American transitional and post-Cold War coverage, but on what it will call Sino-American "Cold War demise" coverage, coverage of Sino-American relations as early as when the Cold War paradigm first began to unravel. In order not to miss the first signs of the Cold War's collapse, this study will begin examining coverage of Sino-American relations when Chang's (1986) premier study of the Cold War's impact on Sino-American coverage ends, on January 1, 1985, at the beginning of President Reagan's second term.

The Cold War's Aftermath: Sino-American Coverage

This study will examine the past decade's prestige press coverage of Sino-American relations from the

Cold War's demise through the transitional and post-Cold War eras and will compare it to corresponding government coverage in order to determine the government's possible impact on press coverage. Accordingly, this study will update what is considered to be one of the longest running longitudinal analyses of press coverage of a foreign policy issue: Chang's (1986) renowned study of prestige press coverage of Sino-American relations during 35 years of the Cold War era. This present study will then compare the degree of government independence found in press coverage during the Cold War's collapse through the post-Cold War era to its Cold War counterpart. In this manner, this study will shed light on its main inquiry: Is Cold War demise to post-Cold War Sino-American press coverage more government independent than its Cold War predecessor?

This researcher expects this study to be the first of its kind to determine that Sino-American press coverage from the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor. After all, ever since the global Cold War containment paradigm began crumbling during the Cold War's demise, each administration has appeared unable or unwilling to substitute the outdated Cold War paradigm with an adequate replacement. And, as pre-Cold War Sino-American press coverage suggests, administrations that are unable or unwilling to provide journalists with a clear cut, credible paradigm of foreign relations tend to have a limited impact on such coverage (Liebovich, 1988; Bibber, 1969). This researcher assumes that an apparent lack of government direction in helping journalists make sense of Sino-American relations after the Cold War's collapse has most likely forced journalists to become more self-reliant, to interpret events for themselves. As a result, Cold War demise through post-Cold War journalists probably covered Sino-American relations in a more successful watch-dog, independent fashion than their Cold War counterparts.

This researcher also expects to find that press coverage was most government independent during the Cold War's initial demise, second most government independent during this study's Cold War transitional period and least government independent during the post-Cold War period. The possibly more government independent coverage during the Cold War's demise and transitional periods could be largely attributed to the initial shock waves dispersed by the global community's first recognition of a suddenly approaching new world order. In addition, post-Cold War coverage may be less government-independent due to much less dramatic attention to the global Cold War's collapse and especially positive Clinton administration press-government relations.

Agenda-Setting Theory

The press and administration attempt to gain each other's attention and influence each other's views via agenda setting (Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Many studies have found a consistent correlation between media issue coverage and subsequent audience issue salience (Kraus and Davis, 1976; McCombs, 1983; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). The more the media focuses on certain issues, the more likely they are to transfer priority items from their agenda to other agendas, such as the public's and government's. In addition, the more the media focuses on favored topics, the more likely it is to affect its audience's views on such topics. As McCombs and Shaw (1993) explain:

> Bernard Cohen's [1963] classic summation of agenda setting -- the media may not tell us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about -- has been turned inside out. New research exploring the consequences of agenda setting ... suggest that the media not only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently, what to think" (p. 58).

Stories considered most important by journalists are emphasized by salience cues. Traditional salience cues are created by the manipulation of design elements, such as story placement, story length and issue frequency (Baskette, Sissors & Brooks, 1982). Newspaper readers are not only more likely to read stories emphasized via salience cues, but are more likely to consider issues emphasized with salience cues as the day's most important issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 1983; Eyal, Winter & DeGeorge, 1981).

Researchers have found that the following salience cues are accurate approximations of the importance newspapers assign to given stories and issues: individual story length and combined story lengths overtime and the number of times a source, channel or subject is mentioned in each story and over time (Chang, 1986; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Researchers have also found that articles often contain strong underlying contexts or conditions and views that can also act as important salience cues. Many of these less traditional salience cues, contexts or conditions such as crisis, conflict, deviance, violence or even attitude, are common in international news coverage in general and Sino-American coverage specifically.

Press vs. Administration: Who Sets Whose Agenda?

The prestige press has long been recognized as an essential component in the U.S. foreign policy-making process (Nimmo, 1979). However, researchers say it remains unclear how and to what degree the news media are able to influence and/or set the government's foreign policy agenda and vice versa (Nimmo, 1979; Bennett, 1980). While many scholars argue that in the foreign policy arena the press acts as an "independent agent," it critically assesses and challenges government policy and yields substantial agenda-setting influence over the government (e.g., Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad and Riffe, 1987; Lefever, 1974), other scholars argue the opposite: The press is nothing more than an "agent of power" that either consciously or subconsciously plays into dominant American cultural and socio-economic values by supporting government policies and allowing the government to set its agenda (Altschull, 1985; Gitlin, 1980; Hallin, 1987; Tuchman, 1974).

In between these two perspectives are many foreign-policy related conceptual models that attempt to explain how the press affects the government's agenda and vice versa (e.g., Chang, 1993; Allison, 1971; Berry, 1990; Cioffi-Revilla, Merritt & Zines, 1987; Cohen, 1963). Of these models, Allison's (1971) model is perhaps most inclusive. Allison's governmental politics model is based on Hilsman's (1967) view, illustrated via four concentric circles, that while the government possesses predominant power in foreign policy making, the press maintains a less powerful yet significant ad hoc role in the process.

Although Allison fails to explain in his model how successful the press is at influencing foreign policy makers and vice versa, Cohen (1963), who equates the agenda-setting influence of journalists and lower level bureaucrats in the foreign policy making process, suggests that the press is often quite successful in this venture. He argues that although the press obviously does not have the authority to make official foreign policy decisions, by focusing government and public attention on aspects of foreign policy most important, its influence is at times strong enough to set the government's foreign policy agenda.

Agenda-Setting Literature

Since the President is the country's key foreign policy maker and the State Department is technically in charge of maintaining foreign policy, the government possesses the constitutional and inside-knowledge advantage in influencing foreign policy making. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the President and State Department often set the press' foreign policy agenda (Berry, 1990; Nimmo, 1979; Bennett, 1980; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Dumbrell, 1990; Hilsman, 1971; Lin, 1985). However, although the government seems to more consistently set the press' agenda than vice versa, the press has also demonstrated its ability to set the government's foreign policy agenda by criticizing and/or challenging its policies (e.g., Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad and Riffe, 1987; Lefever, 1974).

The Cold War's Collapse -- Did it Empower the Press?

Once the government's Cold War paradigm began to crumble, did the press become more resistent to the government's Sino-American agenda-setting influence? Although more research is needed on this topic, the few studies available on it hint that it did. Although many researchers claim that Cold War administrations had been especially successful at setting the agenda for Sino-American policy coverage (e.g., Chang, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1989), evidence of government agenda setting in Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War Sino-American press coverage is limited (Liebovich, 1988; Hohenberg, 1968; Bibber, 1969; Goodman, 1994).

The apparently limited agenda-setting abilities of Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War administrations to influence U.S.-China press coverage may be best explained by each era's either deteriorating or non-existent government paradigm of Sino-American relations (Heuvel, 1993). The absence of a comprehensive, workable strategic framework operating as a foundation for Sino-American policy may have encouraged journalists to make more independent assessments of U.S.-China policy. Throughout this study, government-independent press coverage is defined as coverage that does not support and/or reflect Sino-American policy. A lack of support and/or reflection of Sino-American policy is illustrated by either criticism of Sino-American policy, limited or non-existent coverage of official Sino-American statements and/or activities, press coverage portraying or interpreting official Sino-American policy in a significantly different manner than the government, and/or press coverage focusing on different issues than the government.

The above literature review suggested the following three research questions:

(1) If Sino-American policy coverage is found to be more government independent in one Cold War time frame than another, when did more independent press coverage begin emerging? As early as the Cold War demise period, during the transitional period or the post-Cold War period?

(2) If Sino-American policy is covered more independently in one Cold War time frame than another, is this more government-independent press coverage free of government agenda setting and/or did more government-independent press coverage influence the government's agenda?

(3) How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage compare among the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras?

Method

Content analysis was conducted in a predominantly identical manner on two prestige press newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and three publications/records of U.S. administration documents, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and the U.S. Department of State Bulletin/Dispatch.

All New York Times and Washington Post front-page news, news, features and editorials focusing on Sino-American relations were included in this study. A combined total of 1,177 press articles, 647 New York Times and 530 Washington Post articles, were analyzed. The New York Times and Washington Post were chosen for this study since they are widely read by policy makers and for their significant influence on international politics (Cohen, 1963).

All government articles dealing with any aspect of Sino-American relations were included in this study. A combined total of 399 government articles, 156 presidential articles and 243 State Department articles, were analyzed. The three government publications were chosen since they consistently covered American foreign policy throughout the study's time frame, and they represent the best available historical record of official government foreign policy issues.

Newspaper and government articles dealing with Sino-American relations, not China domestic issues (such as earthquakes and unrelated Chinese domestic politics), were included in this study. Sino-American relations stories were defined as those dealing with any aspect of Sino-American affairs or interactions -- such as diplomatic and defense activities, cultural exchanges and general relations --, and/or American actions or comments regarding China or vice versa.

This study covered nearly 10 years of Sino-American relations coverage beginning on January 1, 1985, with President Reagan's second term of office, and ending December 31, 1993, after President Clinton's first year of office. This study picked up where Chang's (1986) Cold War Sino-American press coverage research left off and it ended with the most up-to-date material available when data collection took place. As explained in the literature review, this study examined press and government coverage in three Cold War periods: Cold War demise (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), transitional (November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991) and post-Cold War (December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993).

In this study, the units of analysis were defined on two levels: via each newspaper and government article and each month of press and government analysis.

Newspaper and government articles were analyzed in a nearly identical fashion for comparison's sake. For example, variables such as source and channel usage, deviation, violence, crisis, conflict, attitude toward Sino-American relations and perception of China were analyzed in a similar fashion in order to make news versus government comparisons possible.

Newspaper and government article variables coded in the same month were separately aggregated. Means were then calculated for each of these aggregated variables, and the resulting aggregated means were used to facilitate newspaper versus government variable comparisons. The monthly time frame was chosen since, according to many scholars, 30 days is the optimal time frame needed for one entity to influence the other's agenda (Gilberg, Eyal, McCombs & Nicholas, 1980; Chang, 1989). Newspaper variables were compared to government variables on a lagged monthly basis in order to determine whether newspapers set the government's agenda or vice versa.

The coding instrument used categories tested by previous research along with those suggested by the literature review (Chang, 1986). A primary coder and an independent coder analyzed this study's data. Ten percent of the study's 1,576 articles were coded for reliability test purposes and analyzed via Scott's pi. Intercoder percent of agreement ranged from 86% to 100% with an average agreement of 92%, while intracoder percent of agreement ranged from 90% to 100% with an average agreement of 96%. While the strongest reliability scores were recorded for variables such as subjects, sources, non-administration attitude, description of China, conflict and U.S. norms deviance, more moderate but still strong reliability scores were recorded for variables such as channels, China status quo deviance, crisis, attitude toward Sino-American relations and violence.

Data were coded onto scantron sheets and transferred onto computer discs for SPSS analysis. In order to answer all of this study's research questions, SPSS analysis ranged in complexity from simple frequency distributions to time series analysis.

In order to compare means over time, this study's time series analysis aggregated each variable over a relative time frame, calculated the means for each aggregated variable and used the resulting aggregated means, representing newspaper versus government variables, in order to facilitate comparisons over time. Pearson r-squared statistics and regression analysis were then run on these aggregated means in order to determine the strength and nature of relative correlations. Correlations closest to zero are considered weakest, while those closest to 1 or -1 are considered strongest. Correlations were deemed statistically significant if they produced a T value greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and a probability score less than .05.

Since this study operated on the premise that it would take at least one month before agenda-setting effects took place, a given month of press coverage was generally compared to the next month's government coverage and vice versa. In the first scenario if a significant correlation was found between press and government coverage, the press appeared to set the government's agenda. In the second scenario a significant correlation would suggest that, vice versa, the government set the press' agenda. If as a result of either scenario no significant correlation was found, then the press did not influence the government's agenda or vice versa. And finally, if significant correlations are not normally appearing during the above one-month lagging procedure, but when identical months of press and government coverage are compared they result in significant correlations, a third factor, such as breaking international events, may be setting both the press and government agenda.

Finally, since control of extraneous variables is beyond this study's scope, causal relationship tests between the variables were exploratory. Accordingly, interpretations of these findings will be made with caution.

Preliminary Findings.

Preliminary content analysis subject findings are briefly discussed in this section in order to offer a general overview of this data before research questions are answered.

Subjects

During this nine-year study (1985 to 1993), the prestige press drew attention to many Sino-American topics, ranging from military affairs to the pro-democracy Tiananmen Square ordeal. From the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period, Sino-American press coverage predominantly grew steadily, with the exception of a dramatic upward spike largely due to Tiananmen Square coverage. This spike in coverage began with the 1988 democratic incidents that led to the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement, culminated with the 1989 Tiananmen Square government crackdown and rapidly dropped during the post Tiananmen Square period. However, in the Tiananmen Square aftermath the amount of overall Sino American coverage did not rapidly decline to pre-Tiananmen coverage levels. After the Tiananmen Square government crackdown, most topics, with the exception of Tiananmen Square itself, were covered more heavily than before the Tiananmen Square democratic protests began. In addition, coverage of these topics mostly remained consistently higher after the Tiananmen Square government crackdown than before it (see figure 1, p. 12).

Figure 1 : Subjects in U.S.-China Coverage



During the Tiananmen Square ordeal, all but one major Sino-American subject received the heaviest coverage: immigration. Immigration issue coverage spiked up after the Tiananmen Square incident mostly due to Tiananmen Square activists seeking political asylum in America.

According to agenda-setting theory, topics receiving the heaviest coverage have not only drawn the most press attention, but have influenced the press to consider such topics among the most important in Sino-American relations. Throughout this study the press' most consistently predominant topics, in order of heaviest to lightest press coverage, consisted of military affairs, diplomacy, human rights, MFN, economy/business and Tiananmen Square. In addition, Chinese immigration to America was the heaviest covered topic during both the transitional and post-Cold War time frames -- especially the latter. Even though the 1989 Tiananmen Square ordeal was viewed as an extremely important Sino-American development, in the larger scheme of Sino-American relations military affairs were most often emphasized by the press from 1985 through 1990, while immigration was most emphasized from 1992 to 1993.

Findings and Discussion

This section reviews each specific research question and its findings.

1) *If Sino-American policy coverage is found to be more government independent in one Cold War time frame than another, when did more independent press coverage begin emerging? As early as the Cold War demise period, during the transitional period or the post-Cold War period?*

Research question #1 focused on determining during which time frame press coverage was most government independent. First, it found that press coverage was most government independent during the Cold War's demise. Cold War demise press coverage differed from government coverage in a significant manner (a minimum tau-c of .10 or -.10, a t-score greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and a probability value less than .05) via all of the following nine variables: China status quo deviance, U.S. norms deviance, crisis, clarity of conflict, violence, American non-administration attitude toward U.S.-China relations, China description, economic change (see table 1, p. 14) and story length (Tau-c = -.38;T=-9.89). Second, it also found that press coverage appears to grow less independent as time goes on. This significant finding is best

Table1 : Cold War's Demise Press Coverage

Variable	Press Cov.	Government Cov.	Tau-C	T
China Status Quo Deviation (a great deal)	28.1	8.3	-.26	8.75
U.S. Norms Deviation (a great deal)	42	18.2	-.26	-7.55
Crisis (a great deal)	24.2	7.2	-.22	-7.86
Conflict	70	26	-.34	-10.36
Violence	31.7	10.5	-.16	-6.66
American Non-Adm. Attitude Toward China	positive		.43	13.51
	24.2	75.1		
	negative			
	41.2	6.1		
	neutral			
	34.5	18.8		
China Description	positive		.29	9.
	6.7	32.6		
	negative			
	35.1	11.6		
	neutral			
	58.2	55.8		
Economic Change	13.9	37.6	.18	5.87

illustrated by the following two variables: China status quo deviance and China descriptions. During the Cold War's demise, the press and government demonstrate the most significant disagreement on the extent to which certain issues represent a threat to China's status quo and whether they view the Chinese government in a more positive, negative or neutral light. From the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period the degree of government versus press disagreement between China status quo and China description significantly decreases. Since the press and government disagree most on these issues during the Cold War's demise and disagree least on these issues during the post-Cold War era, press coverage appears to grow less independent overtime.

As for Cold War demise press coverage being most independent, transitional coverage being second most independent and post-Cold War coverage being least independent, the significant differences between press and government perceptions toward China status quo threats and the Chinese government itself (measured by the China description variable) support this finding.

For example, during the Cold War demise period 28.1% of press articles indicated there was a great threat to China's status quo versus 8.3% of government articles (tau-c=-.26;t=-8.74), compared to 18.5% of press articles to 3.5% of government articles in the transitional period (tau-c=-.10;t=-3.71); and 8% of press articles and zero government articles in the post-Cold War period (tau-c=-.13;t=-5.42).

In addition, during the Cold War demise period 7% of press articles gave positive descriptions of China (Chinese government) versus 33% of government articles (tau-c=.3;t=9); compared to 8% of press articles to 30% of government articles in the transitional period (tau-c=.18;t=5.51). By the post-Cold War period, significant relationships between press and government descriptions disappeared -- 17% of press articles gave positive descriptions of China versus 19.4% of government articles (tau-c=.06;t=1.2).

2) If Sino-American policy is covered more independently in one Cold War time frame than another, is this more government-independent press coverage free of government agenda setting and/or did more government-independent press coverage influence the government's agenda?

Research question #2 dealt with whether the press set the government's agenda or vice versa. Since agenda-setting literature claims it takes one month for one entity to set another's agenda, this question was answered by using time series analysis to compare each month of government coverage to press coverage one month later and vice versa. Throughout this study's Cold War time frames, when press variables were compared to identical government variables one month later, no significant relationships resulted. Accordingly, this analysis determined that neither the press nor the government set each other's agenda during any of this study's Cold War time frames. However, when government and press coverage were considered during identical months throughout different Cold War time frames, this coverage was often significantly correlated. In other words, the government and press not only appeared to focus on many of the same issues at the same time, but also covered many of these issues in a similar manner. This finding may suggest that breaking Sino-American events set both the government and press agenda.

Cold War Demise Period

Although during the Cold War demise era neither the government nor the press set each other's agenda, in many instances the two entities' opinions and stances were significantly and positively correlated. In other words, the government and press not only seemed to emphasize Sino-American coverage during the same monthly time frames, they also tended to focus on many of the same issues at the same time. This finding was determined by comparing government and press coverage variables during identical months. Examples of these significant results are represented by the following five variables: democratic mentions (r-squared=.714;t=13.53); Tiananmen Square coverage (r-squared =.774;t=16.63); amount of paragraphs (r-squared= .297;t=5.18); amount of articles (r-squared=.31;t=4.64) and human rights coverage (r-squared=.149;t=3.11). All of the above relationships were deemed statistically significant due to t-scores greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and p-values less than .05.

Simply put, the press and government tended to emphasize, during the same monthly time frames, the following: democratic mentions, Tiananmen Square coverage, human rights coverage and overall Sino-American coverage (according to the amount of paragraphs and amount of articles variables). Although this study was not set up to determine which, if any, third party set both the government's and press' agenda, these results suggest that breaking Sino-American news may have set both the press and government agendas.

Transitional Coverage

The press' tendency to maintain some degree of independence from government influence by side-stepping government agenda setting was also evident during the transitional era. As in the Cold War demise period, transitional period press coverage did not appear to influence the government's agenda or vice versa. However, as was also indicated in the Cold War demise period, that did not mean that the press and government never shared similar views and stances during the transitional period. On the contrary, examples of shared, similar perspectives are demonstrated by significant correlations demonstrated by the following two variables: amount of Tiananmen Square coverage and China description, specifically the tendency to describe the Chinese government in a negative fashion. When press and government coverage during this time frame were compared on an identical month-by-month basis, the press' and government's respective focus on Tiananmen coverage was strongly correlated (r-squared=.774;t=3.71). In addition, every negative press description of the Chinese government was accompanied by .39 of a negative government description (r-squared=.29;t=2.68). In other words, for approximately every two and one-quarter times the press described the Chinese government in a negative fashion, the government followed suit once.

3) *How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage compare among the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras?*

While research question #1 found that press coverage was most government independent during the Cold War's demise, second most government independent during the transitional period and least government independent during the post-Cold War period, research question #3 acknowledges that even though some Cold War time frames were more government independent than others, after the Cold War began to collapse all Cold War time frames possessed some degree of government-independent coverage. Accordingly, research question #3 tried to discover, via time series analysis and cross-tabulations, more about the amount and nature of government independent coverage by placing it in the context of general news coverage being played up across all three Cold War eras.

Cold War Demise Coverage

For example, during the Cold War demise period the press tended to emphasize human rights issues and the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and ordeal (see table 2, p. 19). According to agenda-setting theory the press emphasizes issues that are high on its agenda of priorities. Accordingly, during the Cold War demise period the press seemed especially concerned with these issues. This finding is not surprising since the press tends to view human rights abuses and Tiananmen Square as especially important concerns. In addition, since during the Cold War's demise the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and crackdown took place — on top of the more ordinary, common Sino-American human rights issues, such as forced abortion and Chinese government crackdowns on Tibet — there were perhaps more human rights abuse issues to cover during this time frame than in other in this study.

The finding that Cold War demise coverage concentrated on human rights issues and Tiananmen Square coverage is illustrated in the attached time series model (see table 2, p. 19). This significant finding is extremely strong (R-squared = .862). However, before the relevance of this finding for more government-independent Cold War demise coverage is discussed, the time series model itself should be understood.

In this model, number of press articles, the dependent variable, was regressed on each of the following independent variables: human rights coverage, violence coverage, Tiananmen Square coverage, MFN coverage and U.S. norms deviance coverage. As a result, it was found that these variables explain 86% of the variation in the number of articles written across Cold War periods. This finding also indicated that the press' interest in these topics and type of coverage varied during different Cold War periods. In other words, 86% of the time when press coverage of these variables increased during specific Cold War periods, the overall amount of general Sino-American press coverage also increased during the same Cold War periods. Since none of the five variables prompted increased general coverage during all three Cold War periods, the attached model illustrates specifically which variables during which Cold War period/s tended to

Table 1 : Amount of Press Articles

Variables in the Equation:

R-squared= .862

	Beta	P	Mean (articles per month)
Tiananmen			
*Cold War Demise	.87	.00000000	1.8393
Transitional			3.5769
Post-Cold War			.2083
Violence			
*Cold War Demise	.20	.01839100	.1202
Transitional			.2084
Post-Cold War			.1584
Human Rights			
*Cold War Demise	.21	.00000057	.7321
*Transitional	.20	.00006366	1.0769
Post-Cold War			1.5000
U.S. Deviance			
Cold War Demise			24.2326
*Transitional	.50	.00000982	34.3762
Post-Cold War			38.9196
MFN			
Cold War Demise			.1964
*Transitional	.21	.00000460	2.1154
*Post-Cold War	.17	.00019771	1.7500

Cold War Demise period = January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989
Transitional period = November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991
Post-Cold War period = December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993

do so. In this model, all five variables are represented via Cold War period, and those Cold War periods in which each variable prompted increased overall coverage are starred and include betas and p-values. While the R-squared statistic measured the strength of the combined variables' impact on the amount of overall coverage, beta statistics are stated for each variable during the Cold War period/s in which the variable had a significant impact on overall coverage. The beta statistic measured the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable. The beta statistic is defined as how many standard deviations the dependent variable moves for one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The p-value determines statistical significance if it is less than .05, if there is less than five chances in 100 that the given results occurred by chance. Although the model's five variables did not prompt increased general coverage during all Cold War time frames, the monthly means of the amount of stories dealing with each variable within each Cold War period are given in order to describe each variable's amount of story coverage over time.

According to this time series model, Cold War demise coverage not only concentrated on human rights and Tiananmen Square coverage, but when such issues arose, Sino-American press coverage increased. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that during this time period the press was especially concerned with covering these Sino-American topics.

How do such press concerns during the Cold War demise period shed light on more independent coverage during this time frame? The press' special concern with human rights and Tiananmen Square seem to have driven its more government-independent coverage during the Cold War's demise. In question #1, nine variables illustrated the press' tendency during the Cold War's demise to cover the news in a more government-independent fashion. Six of these variables were covered in a predominantly negative fashion: China status quo deviance, U.S. norms deviance, crisis, clarity of conflict, violence and American non-administration attitudes toward Sino-American relations. In addition, Tiananmen Square coverage was covered in an especially negative fashion. Views toward China and Sino-American relations were much more negative during the Tiananmen Square incident.

Predominantly negative views toward China regarding Tiananmen were supported by the following variables: conflict (Tau-c=.11;T=7.41); media attitude (Tau-c=-.19;T=-8.22), description (Tau-c=-.17;T=-7.58), China status quo deviance (Tau-c=.2;T=7.69), U.S. norms deviance (Tau-c=.15;T=6.13) and crisis (Tau-c=.23;T=8.88).

Since the press' more government-independent coverage of Sino-American relations during this time frame echoes the press' special concern with human rights abuses and Tiananmen Square, it seems that more independent press coverage was driven by respectable press concerns.

Transitional Coverage

Transitional coverage did share its Cold War predecessor's concern for human rights. In addition, transitional coverage was concerned with U.S. norms deviance issues and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) controversy (see table 2, p. 19). Since the Tiananmen Square incident evokes all of the above transitional era concerns, and the negative impact of the Tiananmen Square ordeal was at least mentioned in most transitional stories, Tiananmen Square also seemed to remain a major concern for China reporters. For example, the Tiananmen Square ordeal was extremely inconsistent with U.S. norms, it represented a serious human rights abuse and it was one of the main reasons that Congress and many Americans fought feverishly, yet unsuccessfully, with President Bush to revoke China's MFN status.

How do such press concerns during the transitional period shed light on government-independent coverage during this time frame? The press' special concern with U.S. norms deviance, human rights and MFN coverage seem to have driven its more government-independent coverage during the transitional period. This independent press coverage, described in research question #1, was illustrated by coverage of the following two variables in a predominantly negative fashion: China status quo deviance and descriptions of China. After all, a press interested in issues that deviate from U.S. norms should also be interested in issues that threaten China's status quo since they are often related. For example, the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and crackdown both strongly deviated from U.S. norms and threatened the Chinese status quo by endangering the Chinese government's stability. In addition, general and MFN-related human rights concerns often led to negative coverage of the Chinese government during the transitional era.

As was the case with press coverage during the Cold War's demise, transitional coverage seemed based on both newsworthy and respectable journalistic concerns. In addition, in both time frames Sino-American coverage tended to be predominantly negative.

Post-Cold War Coverage

Post-Cold War coverage, unlike its Cold War demise and transitional predecessors, did not emphasize Tiananmen Square or U.S. norms deviance coverage. However, post-Cold War journalists, like their transitional predecessors, did concern themselves with MFN coverage (see table 2, p. 19). In addition, post-Cold War press coverage tended to emphasize economic matters. Since during the post-Cold War period Sino-American trade was booming, and journalists tend to share basic American business values, it is not surprising that journalists became more concerned with business-related issues.

At first glance it may seem as if post-Cold War journalists did not share their Cold War demise and transitional predecessors' concerns about topics such as the Tiananmen Square ordeal, human rights abuses and issues that deviate from U.S. norms and threaten the Chinese status quo. But since by the beginning of the post-Cold War era much debate over the Tiananmen Square issue had died down and human rights abuses were less prevalent than during the Cold War demise or transitional periods, the post-Cold War press should not have been expected to focus on concerns that were not as prevalent during the post-Cold War time frame. After all, the fact that the press seemed most concerned with the MFN issue during the post-Cold War era suggests that the press remained dedicated to human rights issues. Although the MFN issue is predominantly economic, the re-occurring controversy over renewing it in light of China's human rights record makes it a strong human rights issue as well.

Did such press concerns during the post-Cold War period shed light on more government-independent coverage during this time frame? Research question #1 found that post-Cold War press articles covered

Chinese status quo deviance in a statistically different manner than the government (tau-c=-.13;t=-5.42). Since the connection between post-Cold War reporters' concerns with economic and human rights issues and Chinese status quo deviance is not clear, these concerns did not appear to shed additional light on the post-Cold War era's limited government-independent coverage.

However, post-Cold War period journalists' economic concerns do help describe post-Cold War coverage and its often limited government independence. For example, economic development is an area where journalists have expressed more positive attitudes toward U.S.-China relations than in other topics. However, in covering this technical subject journalists tend to rely on official sources and, in so doing, do not necessarily use more unofficial sources and channels. Since Sino-American relations experienced much less controversy during the post-Cold War era than in this study's previous two Cold War time frames, and the press seems to agree more with President Clinton's Sino-American policies than with either administration from these time frames, the post-Cold War press appears much less government independent than its Cold War demise and post-Cold War counterparts.

The finding that the post-Cold War press has a tendency to cover economic development with a positive attitude is based on the following statistically significant cross-tab results. When economic change is covered, 54.2% of the time press attitudes toward Sino-American relations are positive, versus 19.2% positive coverage when economic change is not covered (tau-c=.24;t=4.26).

Accordingly, in the post-Cold War era the press seems optimistic about the prospects of economic change. However, this does not mean that more government-independent economic coverage is a result of this concern. Since economic change is a technical subject, journalists rely less on unofficial channels for information on this subject and more on official channels and sources. When economic change is covered, the most unofficial channels (5 or more) are used 6% of the time versus 12% of the time when economic change is not covered (tau-c=.10;t=1.96).

Finally, it would be misleading to conclude that since this study only found limited evidence of post

Cold War government-independent press coverage that post-Cold War Sino-American coverage was covered in an inferior manner compared to its Cold War demise and transitional predecessors. This study's post-Cold War era contained much less dramatic events than during either the Cold War demise or transitional eras. Accordingly, this study's limited post-Cold War events did not seem to give the post-Cold War press an equal opportunity to challenge government policy, let alone to establish much of a government-independent streak. Until post-Cold War journalists covering Sino-American relations are faced with more challenging issues, it remains to be seen just how government independent post-Cold War coverage may become. In the meanwhile, the post-Cold War press' concern with economic and human rights issues seems both professional and respectable

Conclusions

This study's results can be summarized with two major findings. First, during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years the press covered Sino-American policy in a more government-independent manner than its Cold War predecessor. And second, the press covered Sino-American relations during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years in a culturally biased yet responsible, watch-dog fashion.

This study's findings can also be interpreted on a broader scale, one that places this study into context with current, related communication literature. Accordingly, this study sheds additional light on the following two topics: the Cold War's collapse and Sino-American reporting and the amount of time necessary for the government to impact the press' agenda and vice versa.

The Cold War's Collapse and Sino-American Reporting

Did the Cold War's collapse affect the independence level of Sino-American reporting? This study suggests that it did. After all, Cold War collapse through post-Cold War coverage was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor

How did the Cold War's collapse lead to more independent coverage? As explained throughout this study's theory section, once the Cold War began to crumble and government administrations failed or were unwilling to substitute the Cold War paradigm with an adequate replacement, the press was forced to become less complacent. The Cold War's collapse seemed to act as the press' wake-up call. As the Cold War crumbled, the press seemed to begin realizing that the government was not doing an adequate job of developing Sino-American relations and making it understandable to the American public. Accordingly, in order for the press to fulfill its double duty of keeping the government on track and informing the public, it was forced to become more self-reliant, more actively involved in digging up Sino-American news and emphasizing its own views and the views of others on the meaning of Sino-American relations. Cold War time frames clearly had an impact on Sino-American coverage. In addition, this study suggests that a third factor/factors, such as real-life indicators, also influenced Sino-American coverage.

The Time Gap: Its Impact on Agenda Setting

Although much print journalism research suggests a one-month time frame is optimal for agenda setting to take place, the advent of the Internet, e-mail and instantaneous satellite hook-ups between the government and the press seem to question these previous findings. In today's computer-friendly, interactive world, a reporter needs nothing more than a computer, modem and telephone line to contact government leaders anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. Accordingly, if reporters and government officials are e-mailing each other on a daily basis, if the computer revolution is leading to substantially increased government and press communications, is it still safe to conclude that it takes an entire month for the government to influence the press' agenda and vice versa?

In this present study when government Sino-American coverage was compared to Sino-American press coverage one month later and vice versa, the government did not appear to influence the press' Sino-American agenda and vice versa. In addition, this study also found that when government and press coverage were compared during identical monthly time frames, when no lagged comparisons took place, the government and press often covered Sino-American relations in a similar fashion. Accordingly, although comparing government to press coverage one month later and vice versa does not result in evidence of agenda setting, the fact that the government and press are often taking similar approaches to Sino-American relations during identical time frames suggests that both entities are experiencing agenda setting at the same time, whether it is the result of influencing each other's agenda on a quicker than monthly basis and/or the result of one or more third party influences on both entities' agendas. Third party influences might include real-world incidents affecting Sino-American relations such as the Tiananmen Square ordeal, third party influences that focus both the government's and press' attention on breaking Sino-American events at the same time.

For example, during the Clinton administration press coverage was least government independent, government and press Sino-American agendas and attitudes appeared most similar. This increased similarity between government and press Sino-American views may have been partially due to increased government and press usage of e-mail and the Internet during this time frame. Perhaps less formal, increased computer contact may have at least partially led to improved, more friendly reporter-government relations and thus increased agreement between both entities on Sino-American policy. In addition, the fact that Sino-American economic growth tended to be highlighted by the press in a positive fashion throughout most of Clinton's post-Cold War era, a great turn-around from the predominantly negative press coverage of Sino-American relations during the Bush administration, suggests that both government and press contacts with the Chinese government were much more frequent and friendly during Clinton's administration than Bush's. Accordingly, friendlier press and government relations with the Chinese government may have made both entities susceptible to possible Chinese government agenda-setting influence. For example, when the Chinese government introduces a trade initiative or decision that would lead to increased and/or improved Sino-American trade, both the U.S. government and press may be more willing to consider such actions at face value than to search for ulterior motives.

In addition, when the U.S. government and press both view real-life indicators as having a positive effect on Sino-American relations, such as Chinese government decisions to increase Sino-American trade, their agendas may be more easily, more quickly set by each other and the Chinese government due to friendlier relations not only with each other, but the Chinese government as well. After all, increased friendliness may lead to less agenda-setting resistance. Accordingly, during the Clinton administration the U.S. government, press and Chinese government, partially as a result of new technologies and substantially improved, positive Sino-American trade, may have all influenced each other's agenda within a much quicker time frame than a month. As a result, since a shorter than one month agenda-setting time frame would not have been detected in this study, it is possible that the agenda-setting influence of either the U.S. press or government may have been overlooked.

This study contributes to the literature by suggesting that the amount of time in which it takes for the government to set the press' agenda and vice versa needs to be re-examined and updated to include the possibility of the impact of new technologies on the agenda-setting process. In addition, this study also suggests that in order to understand the true nature of how the government influences the press' agenda and vice versa, confounding entities such as third party contributors, real-life indicators such as the Chinese government's latest Sino-American initiatives, should be considered.

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AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) as a U.S. Postwar Propaganda Program: A Hypothesis

International Communication Division
80th AEJMC Convention
Chicago, Illinois
July 30-August 2, 1997

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This study examines the historical implications of American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) in terms of U.S. postwar information program. It proposes a hypothesis that AFKN is a cultural propaganda medium extended from U.S. international policy after World War II.

AFKN is a unique foreign medium that has existed in Korea for almost 50 years. It is an affiliate of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS),[1] and the second largest of five networks managed by the Army Broadcasting Service (ABS).[2] ABS is a congressionally mandated, Field Operating Activity of the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army.

According to Browne (1982), AFRTS "has a longer history than does the Voice of America, by three months" (p. 129). On May 26, 1942, the War Department, recognizing its powerful hold, built a worldwide AFRS to provide American programs through shortwave for troops overseas, wherever stationed. Since then, "virtually all United States military installations abroad had AFRTS outlets" (p. 219).[3]

AFKN began operating in 1950, the first year of the Korean War, and broadcast its first television program in 1957. AFKN-TV has been broadcasting for 40 years as an information and entertainment medium for 55,000 United States military personnel, civilian employees, and their dependents. However, as its signal reaches the entire nation through a sophisticated cable and microwave system, AFKN has become one of the most popular entertainment media, among younger Koreans in particular.

Despite the relatively long history and the unusual nature of AFKN, most broadcast scholars have not the slightest idea of its existence. Research of AFKN as an unknown medium first needs to be explained -- What is AFKN and how has it evolved in Korea?

To understand the historical significance of AFKN, it is necessary to examine the aim of U.S. postwar foreign policy and the activities of U.S. occupation forces in Korea, that landed in 1945. One of the premises of this study is that U.S. military forces' occupation of Korea after World War II has had a significant effect not only on current Korean society but also on the beginning of AFKN.

By positing AFKN as an extension of U.S. postwar international propaganda program, this study attempts to contribute to an understanding of American military broadcasting as a cultural imperialist institution. The concept of cultural imperialism, in general, refers to the process of cultural dominance and dependence between nations. The AFKN case is especially significant because "by law, foreign nationals are not allowed to own and operate news media in Korea. An exception is the U.S. military-run broadcasting system, AFKN" (Lee, 1982, p. 589).

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[1] Originally established during World War II as the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS), AFRS changed its name to AFRTS with the advent of television. Vietnam era anti-militarism in the early 1970s brought about change its name again to the American Forces Radio and Television Service. In 1982, the Pentagon decided to revert to the name, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. See Craig (1986), p. 44, n. 4.

[2] Currently, ABS operates four AFRTS broadcast networks: American Forces Network in Europe (AFN) in Frankfurt, Germany; Southern Command Network (SCN) in Panama; Central Pacific Network (CPN) in the Marshall Islands; and AFKN. In addition, the ABS staff directly manages the radio affiliate, Armed Forces Radio Station (AFRS), at Fort Greely, Alaska.

[3] Today, AFRTS has more than 450 land-based outlets in more than 140 foreign countries and U.S. territories. In addition, more than 30 U.S. Navy ships at sea receive AFRTS programming when deployed.

Research Problem and Questions

The research problem of this study is: to what extent was the establishment of AFKN related to the U.S. postwar information program? This problem has three basic research questions and some sub-questions:

1. What was the U.S. occupation forces' policy in Korea within a context of U.S. postwar planning?
   a. What was the aim of U.S. postwar foreign policy?
   b. What were the activities of U.S. occupation forces in Korea?
2. How has AFKN evolved in Korea?
   a. How is AFKN operated?
   b. What is the programming of AFKN?
3. What were the factors to be AFKN conceived?
   a. What was the mission of AFKN?
   b. How was the decision made to create AFKN?

Justifications

One of the mass media that is little studied but probably is of great significance is the American armed forces broadcast service. When researchers examine the external broadcasting voices of the United States, as Craig (1988) pointed out, "they invariably dwell upon the traditional services such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Radio in the American Sector" (p. 307). Hence, "the role played by U.S. military broadcasting . . . has been underemphasized" (p. 307).

The works on AFRTS are mostly either the descriptive study, giving historical accounts of the networks, or the shadow audience research, based on 'cultivation theory' or 'uses and gratifications model.' Browne (1982) provided a detailed account of the early years of U.S. armed forces radio station. Barnouw (1968), Bayless (1968), and Craig (1986; 1988) published descriptive analyses of AFN, the military's largest and most complex overseas system. While Craig's earlier article described AFN, its audiences, and the dilemma it faces in trying to serve military interests without losing credibility, his later one examined AFN's postwar programming, the military's influence over the network, and the shadow audience of Europeans who tuned in during the postwar era.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, as stations in Vietnam came under attack mostly from military staff for censoring the news, Bayless (1969), Moody (1970), and Moore (1971) dealt with the American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN)-related issues. Although their works provided the context of establishment of AFRTS, they did not mention AFKN at all.

Meanwhile, some scholars paid particular attention to the impact of AFKN. Kang and Morgan (1988) examined the impact of American television programs on Korean viewers. They, in particular, explored the relationships between exposure to U.S. programs and conceptions of social reality among 226 college students in Korea. In the research, they focused on AFKN "because it broadcasts nothing but U.S. programs and because Korean officials play virtually no role in its programming" (p. 433).

In the similar vein, Choi (1989) centered on the question, 'who views what on AFKN-TV for what reasons with what impacts?' in his dissertation. While the critical framework of media imperialism provided a macro-level perspective for the study, a few other audience-centered micro-level perspectives provided a conceptual framework. However, these works on AFKN mostly focused on its audiences without examining the historical and political meanings of AFKN for Koreans.

Likewise, although the U.S. Army has been operating a network of powerful broadcasting station in Korea for more than 45 years, AFKN has received little attention from the broadcast scholars. Furthermore, even though AFKN as an external medium has had a significant role in Korean society, no work on this broadcasting service has been studied from the perspective of cultural imperialism. This area remains a blind spot in the field of international communication.

On the other hand, this study mostly relies on the revisionist or New Left historians in the United States to contextualize the U.S. occupation of Korea in the postwar construction. Since the late 1950s, the historians have made efforts to unravel the dynamics between politico-economic interests and public policy in international affairs, challenging the traditional progressive-liberal historians, who adopt the official version that the U.S. occupation originally had a good intention to assist the Korean people in establishing a free state. McCune's (1950) work can be classified as a representative work from the libertarian perspective on the U.S. occupation of Korea.

Many revisionist scholars have produced significant works concerning the history of occupied Korea. Above all, Cumings (1981) is well known for his monumental work on the history of the U.S. occupation of Korea. He, following up the process of revolution and counter-revolution in occupied Korea, argued that the U.S. occupation forces planted the seeds for Korean War by pursuing a counter-revolutionary policy. Kolko and Kolko (1972) also produced insightful work concerning the imperialist nature of the U.S. occupation of Korea. Their work covered U.S. imperialist maneuvers worldwide during the early postwar period.

Although the revisionist point of view provides a historical framework for this study, its historians overlooked U.S. occupation forces' activities in the cultural domains, only concentrating on the intervention of the forces into the economic and political structures of Korean society. In this respect, both Cha's (1994) and Youm's (1991) works are worthy of attention.

Cha analyzed the history and origins of a case of cultural imperialism through examining media control and propaganda activities during the 1945-1948 United States' occupation of Korea. Meanwhile, Youm, concentrating on press policy of the U.S. military government, examined how it was evolved in the transitional era of Korea (1945-1948) and how it had affected the development of the Korean press.

Nevertheless, they failed to extend their problematics to the creation of AFKN and to shed light on it from the perspective of U.S. international propaganda program in the postwar era. It is also a blind spot in the history of Korean-American relationship. Consequently, this project deals with two parts of the blind spot: U.S. forces activities in the cultural domains in Korea and historical implications of AFKN. There is not any comprehensive work connecting the U.S. postwar plan to the establishment of AFRTS including AFKN. Thus, by analyzing the historical implications of AFKN in terms of U.S. postwar propaganda program, this study tries to give a new point of view on this network.

Finally, I hope this historical work would be constructive for setting up broadcasting policy in Korea. Many Korean scholars and government officials insist that AFKN is producing cultural and social side effects in Korean society. In face of criticisms, AFKN's usage of the VHF-line (regular over-the-air electric wave) was switched to UHF-line in April, 1996. The historical analyses from the various points of views will be useful for Korean broadcasting policy-makers to figure out the future status of AFKN.

U.S. Postwar Activities in Korea

The common theme of revisionist historians starts from the observation that the aim of the U.S. participation in World War II was to create a free world market that would guarantee free trade and investment for U.S. business. In the postwar era, the single element that was affecting U.S. foreign policy was "the concern over the rival power represented by Communist countries, especially the Soviet Union" (Freedman, 1974, p. 416). Schonberger (1985), in particular, put the U.S. postwar aims in Asia rather well:

> 1) integrating the region into the American-dominated world capitalist economy; 2) thwarting the power and influence of the Soviet Union; 3) channeling the revolutions sweeping the European and former Japanese colonial empires away from communism or, alternatively, repressing them (p. 140).

To pursue these general goals, the U.S. occupation forces in Korea functioned as part of the U.S. postwar plan to incorporate Korea into the capitalist world system under U.S. hegemony. Korea in this process became a testing place for the Truman Administration's containment policy in the postwar era.[4] The de facto efforts at containment in Korea were to minimize the Soviet influence by running counter to the indigenous leftist forces in Korea as well as the Soviet Union.

From the early days of occupation, U.S. forces tried to control the Korean media. They confiscated the Seoul Broadcasting station and the other 10 local stations of Korean Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which the leftists tried to take, in less than a month after Korea's liberation from Japan. After that, the U.S. military government tightened its control of all the media through the promulgation of military ordinances.

For instance, the U.S. military government enforced the "Broadcasting Regulation Rule"[5] in 1946, prohibiting stations from broadcasting unverifiable, defamatory false, and titillating, obscene, or blasphemous reports. Neither were stations allowed to broadcast advertisements which were not registered with the military government in compliance with Ordinance 55. Furthermore, programs to be aired had to obtain prior permission from the military government. The enactment of the rule, as Kim et al. (1994) pointed out, resulted in "further restrictions of Korean broadcasting which was already under strict control of the U.S. Military Government" (p. 42). As a consequence, it became next to impossible for leftists to broadcast their ideas. According to *G-2 Periodic Report* on August 7, 1947, eleven workers at a station were arrested on August 4, 1947, because they tried to broadcast left-wing ideas, undermining the radio transmission of programs containing right-wing propaganda (United States Army Forces in Korea, 1990, p. 6).

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[4] For a detailed discussion of U.S. containment policy in Korea, see Matray (1983).

[5] For a full description of the articles of this regulation, see Korean Press Research Institute (1992), p. 359.

In June, 1948, the U.S. military government returned the broadcasting stations to the Chosun Broadcasting Committee under the Ministry of Information of Korea and withdrew from Korea. The major role of the stations under the control of government was centered around the enlightenment of the public and governmental propaganda. Meanwhile, the stations suffered from a shortage of funds. Two years later, U.S. forces came back to Korea to fight the Korean War and started radio broadcasts in the name of AFKN in Seoul.

Institutional History of AFKN

The first military radio stations appeared in Panama and Alaska just prior to World War II. They started out with a temporary, low-power unauthorized transmitter, which tried to bring domestic radio fare to soldiers. During the first days of U.S. participation in the War, a military radio station started on Bataan and Corregidor in the Philippines. The success of these early radio stations paved the way for AFRS. In 1942, the armed forces officially established AFRS with the mission of bringing American programs to U.S. military locations overseas.

AFKN started radio broadcasts in Seoul in September 1950 as an extension of Far East Network in Tokyo, Japan, which controlled the first radio stations in Korea.[6] Lead elements of the network came ashore during the Inchon landing and set up broadcasting facilities in the old bombed out American embassy in Seoul. This station signed on October 4, 1950, at 12:41 with a newscast. The lead story was General Douglas MacArthur's demand for Kim Il-Sung, commander in chief of the North Korean forces, to surrender.

In the 1950s, AFKN affiliates were recognized by call signs. However, the network currently settles into fixed locations with the headquarters in Seoul and affiliates in Pusan, Taegu, Kunsan, Osan, Tongduchon, and Munsan. In addition, AFKN Camp Humphreys signed on July 4, 1986, establishing greater service to the Pyongtaek area as its newest affiliate.

Four years after the Korean War and four years ahead of Korea's first state-run television station, the U.S. forces started their own television broadcasting in the capital area of Korea on September 15, 1957, using VHF channel 2. AFKN had relied mostly on the International Telecommunication Satellite (INTELSAT), an organization that provides a global satellite service, for live broadcasts on an occasional use basis. The launch of SATNET, the U.S. Department of Defense Satellite Network, on October 4, 1983, brought about a revolutionary change, offering "AFKN a privilege of full-time satellite use, uninterrupted and fully dedicated to the American Armed Forces broadcasting in the

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[6] On September 27, 1950, the Japan Logistical Command General Order No. 84 officially created the Armed Forces Radio Service Army detachment which evolved into the present day AFKN. See Army Broadcasting Service's Website (http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/abs/).

Far East and its viewers" (Choi, 1989, p.22). Today, news, sports, and other time-sensitive programs are transmitted via three AFRTS satellites, whereas most radio and television entertainment programs are still sent by mail.

Even though the service AFKN provides is solely intended for military personnel use, various surveys showed that many Koreans are exposed to the network.[7] For example, Kim (1985) reported about 65% of the respondents surveyed regularly watched AFKN-TV during weekdays, and the percentage increased up to 82% during weekends. Kang and Morgan (1988) also found that about 52% of the Korean college students watched AFKN-TV for more than an hour a day.

Then, what do Koreans watch on AFKN-TV? The AFRTS Broadcast Center, located on March Air Reserve Base, Riverside, California, selects and obtains programs for the worldwide AFRTS system. Its representatives negotiate with program suppliers to acquire specific shows. Through the generous cooperation of performing guilds, unions, and federations, tracing back to World War II, each program distributor supplies its programs to AFRTS at no cost or for a nominal administrative fee. AFRTS exercises no control over the content of program material except deleting commercials.[8] Instead of commercials, AFKN-TV presents Department of Defense internal information, information programs prepared by military and civilian personnel, and other public service announcements.

However, the most distinguishing feature of AFKN-TV programming is compelling proportions of entertainment programs. According to an examination of the March 1990 Korean *TV Guide*, AFKN-TV aired about 140 hours weekly, of which 110 hours consisted of entertainment programs. Today, AFKN-TV broadcasts its programs around the clock everyday. The current programming is characterized by two major categories: news and entertainment programs. For a week from June 2, 1997, straight news such as *CNN Headline News*, *ABC News*, and *AFKN News* and news magazines like *60 Minutes*, *ABC 20/20*, and *48 Hours* were broadcast. Though, the entertainment programs such as *Guiding Light*, *General Hospital*, *Wheel of Fortune*, *The Oprah Winfrey Show*, *Melrose Place*, *Frasier*, *ER*, *Saturday Night Live*, and *Late Show with David Letterman* overwhelmed the entire programming.[9] Choi (1989) also concluded that entertainment programs were the most prevalent forms of AFKN-TV programming by classifying sitcoms, crime-adventures, soaps and prime-time drama, game shows, music varieties, adult comedies, and a variety of late night specials on music and movies as entertainment programs (pp. 23-24). Kim et al. (1994) asserted that "there is no doubt that AFKN-TV provides entertainment to Koreans" (p. 132).

As a natural consequence, the concern over the negative cultural influence of AFKN programs on young Koreans was raised by civic groups in Korea. In particular, these apprehensions "have intensified since the Korean government in 1983 approved the connection of AFKN with SATNET" (Kang and Morgan, 1988, p. 433). It was combined with anti-American feelings brought about in the late 1980s.[10] In addition, the proliferation of local television stations in the early 1990s leading to overcrowded frequency spectrum forced the U.S. Forces in Korea and the Ministry of Information and Communication of Korea to agree on the AFKN-TV channel transfer in 1991. Though the channel conversion into UHF 34 was originally to have taken place in 1992, technical problems and other related matters delayed the process until April, 1996. The switch, however, does not affect the cities of Pusan, Taejon, and Chinhae, where AFKN-TV still occupies the VHF channel 2.

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[7] In a similar manner, Head (1972) mentioned that "AFRTS brings American-style domestic programming within reach of many foreign viewers and listeners" (p. 17).

[8] U.S. Department of Defense Regulation 5120.20R prohibits commercial advertising on AFRTS stations.

[9] For the AFKN-TV programming schedule, see Korean *TV Guide*'s Website (http://www.seoul.co.kr/tvguide/i_t.htm).

Making a Hypothesis: AFKN as a Propaganda Medium

In using the term, 'propaganda,' this study, for the most part, relies on the definition of O'Donnell and Jowett (1989). They, assuming propaganda as a unique subset of communication composed of information and persuasion, maintained that the aim of one type of propaganda, informative communication, is to promote mutual understanding between sender and receiver. Propaganda appears to be informative, especially when ideas are shared or something is explained. However, in the process, the sender does not attach great importance to the well-being of the receiver, because the real purpose of propaganda is not to promote mutual understanding but rather to advance institutional or partisan objectives (pp. 59-63).

The U.S. occupation forces' consistent broadcasting control indicates that they considered broadcasting an essential communication channel not only to prevent revolutionary groups from having access to it but to familiarize the Koreans with the American culture. To attain these objectives effectively, the forces made American staff write the scripts of most radio programs in English and translated them into Korean to be broadcast. The Radio Subsection of the KBC, which was confiscated by the U.S. occupation forces in September 1945, also arranged the Korean-language program of the short-wave Voice of America (VOA)[11] to be rebroadcast for one half hour every morning beginning in January 1946. About a year later, the programming was moved to an evening time slot to attract more listeners.[12]

In addition to these direct attempts to instill U.S. official messages into Koreans, U.S. forces succeeded in making a foundation for diffusing American culture to Koreans. From the early days, Koreans were barraged with U.S. popular music through the KBC, because its stations were forced to put U.S. popular music on the airwaves at least for an hour a day (Cha, 1994, p. 215).

The exposure of Koreans to American culture has been accelerated since the introduction of AFKN in 1950. As noted earlier, entertainment programs have overwhelmingly occupied the overall programming of AFKN-TV, provoking some debates from various walks of life in Korea. The controversy, in general, has revolved around both potential effects of content on the viewers' psychological and sociological orientations and the cultural sovereignty issue.[13]

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[10] See the *New York Times* article by Kristof (1987).

[11] American overseas broadcasting generally takes two forms: broadcasts intended for American troops abroad such as AFKN, and the explicit propaganda efforts of VOA.

[12] See United States Army Forces in Korea, "History of the Department of Public Information (An Outline)," Held in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group No. 332, Box No. 41.

The objections about AFKN-TV programs are classified in three respects. First, AFKN-TV programming has caused cultural and social problems for the Korean public, because "entertainment shows which are inappropriately sexual or too exploitative for Korean tastes make up a large percentage of the programs" (Chung, 1986, p. 8). Second, as Nam (1978) pointed out, the presence of AFKN itself has become "a contributing factor toward the Americanization of South Korean programming" (p. 51). Finally, by being exposed to incessant American programs, Korean people have grown familiarity with the American way of life.

The last type of impact is the most profound one on Korean society and the most relevant one to this study. Also, it should be noted that this impact was not unintended by U.S. forces. The memorandum from President Roosevelt to James L. Fly, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, on November 16, 1943, called attention to the importance of postwar international broadcasting by saying that:

> if the principle of freedom to listen is to help in providing the basis for better understanding between the peoples of the world, it seems to me important that we lay the proper foundations now for an effective system of international broadcasting for the future years (MacMahon, 1945, p. 46).

The U.S. forces' endeavor to transmit American culture was carried out as part of or in the name of "mutual understanding." These activities can be considered as part of cultural propaganda in terms of O'Donnell and Jowett's usage. By forcing Koreans to be familiar with American culture, U.S. forces tried to create favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and, ultimately, help secure the support for its policy.

In playing this kind of role, direct international broadcasting including then AFRS was considered appropriate because of its ability to reach persons in other countries despite the opposition of their governments. It is identified by the Special Committee on Communications' approval the following statement prepared by the Department of State on February 19, 1945: "direct short-wave broadcasts originating in the United States should be continued after the war on a daily basis" (MacMahon, 1945, p. 53).

As the statement suggested, U.S. armed forces decided to maintain their networks after World War II by transforming them to permanent facilities. According to official documents, AFRTS was established to keep American forces informed and entertained. On July 4, 1943, while addressing the AFN staff in London, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said,

> A soldier who is well-informed and knows this country's national goals has good reason for being motivated and that gives him a fighting edge. It makes him a better soldier (http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/abs/absman.htm).

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[13] Debates on these matters had captured the high ground of public concern with the advent of SATNET in 1983. See the bulk of articles of Korean newspapers around that year.

General Eisenhower's remark was reflected in AFRTS' statement of purpose as it was. AFRTS plainly expounded that its mission is to deliver radio and television programming services which provide "a touch of home" to Department of Defense personnel and their families serving overseas.[14] The mission of AFKN is also apparently the same. It is to provide radio and television information and entertainment for all U.S. military personnel serving in the Republic of Korea (American Forces Korea Network, 1983). These broad statements describe the reason for the existence of AFRTS and AFKN.

For this reason, Craig (1986) maintained that AFN, an affiliate of AFRTS, "is not a propaganda service in the image of Voice of America or Radio Free Europe" (p. 34). However, it can be easily refuted in that, as discussed above, the shadow audiences of AFKN are considerably composed of the indigenous people and U.S. information program in the postwar era intended to make them acquainted with American way of life. This point, however, does not always imply that propaganda has been conducted by AFKN in the manner "intended." Rather, AFKN may unwittingly be contributing to facilitating the reception of American cultures in many aspects in Korea.

Conclusion: Remaining Issues

It is impossible to understand the actual purpose of the establishment of AFKN without historical hindsight into U.S. armed forces' activities after World War II in Korea as well as U.S. postwar information program in general. For this historical work, this study needed, above all, both official records concerning the activities of U.S. occupation forces in Korea and proceedings, memoranda, dictates, and so forth on the creation of AFRTS and AFKN. Most of the records relating to U.S. occupation after World War II are held at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, DC, and the Washington National Records Center (WNRC) in Suitland, Maryland.[15] The documents specifically relevant to this study are scattered in various record groups. Nevertheless, early records on AFKN are incomplete because there is no official U.S. military recognition of the network as far as I could find.

This study has flaws because it did not identify and scrutinize relevant documents enough. Instead, it intended to throw a new perspective on American military broadcasting networks, especially AFKN, by contextualizing U.S. international information program in the postwar era and by providing limited circumstantial evidence. Therefore, future studies on this issue will need to incorporate germane documents towards placing American military broadcasting as an extension of U.S. postwar propaganda program.

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[14] See AFRTS-Broadcast Center's Website (http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil:80/afrts_bc).

[15] While the NARA holds the Modern Military Branch (MMB) and the Diplomatic Branch (DB), the WNRC holds the General Archives Division (GAD). The records on Korea in the MMB and the DB emphasize the development of U.S. military and diplomatic policy toward Korea in the postwar era; in GAD they emphasize the implementation of that policy. Saunders' (1983) article provided excellent guidance for the records in the archives relating to Korea from 1945 to 1950.

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The United States-China Copyright Dispute: A Two Level Games Analysis

Submitted to

The James W. Markham Competition,
International Communication Division
The 1997 AEJMC Convention,
July 30-August 2, 1997.

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(March 31, 1997)

The United States-China Copyright Dispute: A Two Level Games Analysis

In recent years, a confrontation over copyright issues has become an annual feature of diplomatic and trading relations between the United States and China. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) has alleged that its members lost $2.3 billion in potential sales due to piracy in China in 1995, up from $866 million in 1994,[1] and $827 million in 1993.[2] Forty percent of all pirated CDs worldwide come from China alone, a large part of which is derivative of U.S. works.[3] The U.S. has come several times close to imposing trade sanctions on China under its Special 301 law alleging insufficient protection for copyrighted material like audio and video cassettes, computer programs, and video games. China too has repeatedly announced retaliatory sanctions. But skilful diplomacy and mutual compromise have succeeded till now in pulling both countries back from the brink of an all out trade war.

The recurrence of this confrontation is inexplicable at first sight. The U.S. today is China's largest trading partner, importing $45.6 billion worth of merchandise from China in 1995 and exporting $11.7 billion of goods in return.[4] In 1994 alone, U.S. investors poured in $2.5 billion worth of investments into China's booming economy, making the U.S. the third largest foreign investor in China and the largest from outside the Greater China region.[5] The U.S. Department of Commerce has identified China as one of the most important of the ten big emerging markets (BEMs) of the 21st century.[6] Despite temporary "glitches" like Tiananmen, human rights and Taiwan, China and the U.S. have evolved an enduring and mutually beneficial partnership. Within this context, a persistent copyright dispute should be unacceptable for both nations.

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[1].. *China Defends its Piracy Pact Record*, Apr. 11, 1996 (LEXIS, News library, Curnws file). The IIPA represents the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), National Music Publishers' Association and other media-related industry bodies.

[2].. Goldstein, *Pirates' Lair: U.S. Pressures Beijing over Copyright Protection*, FAR E. ECON. REV, May 19, 1994, at 55.

[3].. Clark-Meads, *IFPI: '95 Piracy Stable, Russia and China Cited*, BILLBOARD, May 18, 1996, at 8.

[4].. OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 1996 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT (1996). Though a $33.8 billion trade deficit does indicate why the U.S. is keen to restore a more favorable balance of trade with China through better protection for its products, it makes the Chinese inability to find a solution to a potentially destabilizing confrontation with a major trading partner all the more inexplicable.

The U.S.-China copyright dispute raises several questions. Over the last five years, there has been marked improvement in the Chinese copyright regime, but this progress has been coeval with a rising trend in piracy statistics. Why has the United States Trade Representative (USTR) repeatedly withdrawn the threat of trade sanctions even as piracy continued to flourish in that country? On the other hand, why does China appear willing to engage in a recurring confrontation with an important trading partner over an unorganized underground industry whose contribution to the overall Chinese economy is negligible? Why are China's CD pirates proving to be so resistant to international and domestic pressure?

To address these questions, I adopt the theoretical framework of two-level games.[7] This approach has been used in several studies to analyze the connection between domestic politics and international relations.[8] To summarize, two level games theory argues that national governments are not unitary actors capable of taking independent decisions. Rather, there are many interest groups at the national level who seek to influence international decision-making according to their own agendas. Principal negotiators are thus engaged in simultaneous negotiations at two levels; an international level where their counterparts are the principal negotiators of the other nation, and a domestic level, where the negotiations are carried on with domestic constituents such as parliamentary groups, industry associations, labor unions and political parties. Any agreement reached at the international level remains tentative until ratified, either formally or informally, by a coalition of powerful interests at the domestic level. The 'win-sets' of the negotiations at the international level include those agreements that can win ratification at the domestic level. Negotiations lead to agreement when there is an overlap of the 'win-sets' of the two international negotiators. The two-level games approach makes explicit the connection between domestic politics and international negotiations and provides a powerful framework for the discussion of complex issues like the U.S.-China copyright dispute.

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[5] Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, China-Mongolia (2nd Quarter, 1995). The Greater China region is understood to include China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.

[6] INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., THE BIG EMERGING MARKETS: OUTLOOK AND SOURCEBOOK (1996).

[7] Putnam, *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*, 42 International Organization 427 (1988). See also DOUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (P. Evans, H. Jacobson & R. Putnam 1993).

[8] See, e.g., A. GEORGE & D. RAPKIN, GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE OPENING OF JAPAN'S RICE MARKET: A TWO-LEVEL GAME APPROACH (Australia-Japan Research Center, Pacific Economic Paper No. 215, 1993); Li, *Trade Negotiations between the United States and China: Interest Structures in Two-Level Games*, 34 ASIAN SURV. 692 (1994); see generally DOUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (P. Evans, H. Jacobson & R. Putnam 1993).

To lay down the legal foundations for this analysis, the first two sections discuss the salient features of the international copyright regime and the provisions of the U.S. Special 301 law. In the third section, I discuss several case studies of Special 301 negotiations to identify some of the reasons why states accept or resist U.S. demands on copyright issues. The fourth section summarizes the evolution of the Chinese copyright regime from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. In the fifth section, I apply the two-level games approach to study the U.S.-China copyright dispute. Based on this analysis, the summary and conclusions section discusses the prospects of Special 301 and implications for future copyright enforcement actions.

I. International Law on Copyrights

Copyrights, along with patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and plant breeders rights are part of a general bundle of property rights vested in the creators of various types of intellectual property. Copyrights have traditionally been awarded to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, which includes *inter alia* literary, musical, scientific, dramatic and artistic works and sound recordings."[9] Copyright is interpreted as the owner's exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, publish, or perform publicly any form of the copyrighted work, and to prohibit others from such use without the owner's permission. These laws apply to a variety of media products like sound recordings, audio-visual products, films, television and radio broadcasts, as regards their reproduction, broadcasting, translation and adaptation, and to computer software.

Copyrights are generally governed by national law. They are either granted to nationals of a country, or to the nationals of other countries with whom the jurisdiction has treaty relations for the reciprocal protection of copyright.[10] Though reciprocity is thus made the basis for the international protection of copyrights, problems arise in practice because the terms of protection offered by different jurisdictions may not be the same. For example, there is some variance in the duration of protection offered by different countries.[11] Also, rights admissible for protection under one jurisdiction may not be available under another.[12] Due to this non-uniformity in the levels of copyright protection in various jurisdictions, international copyright treaties have become necessary under which the signatories commit themselves to a minimum standard of copyright protection.

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[9].. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)

[10].. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104 (b) (1) (1994)

[11].. For example, France grants protection for life of author and seventy years for musical compositions and for life of author and 50 years for all other works [Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property of March 11, 1957, Art. 21, 2 Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (BNA) Supp. 1984-89, (1992)]. At the same time, the former U.S.S.R. offered protection for life of author and 25 years [Fundamentals of the Copyright Laws of the Soviet Union of December 8, 1961, Chap IV, Art. 105, 5 Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (BNA) Supp. 1981-83 (1992)]. Compare this to the life of author and fifty years offered under U.S. law [17 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (1994)].

[12].. For instance, French legal tradition recognizes the moral rights of the author (*droit d'auteur*), which are not recognized under the common law tradition. The moral rights of the author are interpreted as the right of the author to preserve the artistic integrity of the work, and it survives the transfer of the other rights to a different entity.

The major international copyright conventions are the Berne Convention of 1886,[13] and the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952.[14] The Berne Convention offers a relatively longer period of protection,[15] covers a larger number of rights[16] and imposes no pre-conditions like registration or deposit for recognition of copyright.[17] These conventions seek to harmonize national laws with respect to the time period for which rights are granted, the types of rights covered, specific remedies for copyright infringement and so on. They lay down standards that signatories have to reproduce in their own national law. Copyright conventions are based upon the principle of reciprocity, whereby a work that secures copyright in one country simultaneously secures it in other countries.[18] International conventions also seek to ensure that all countries extend the same protection to foreign nationals that they provide to their own citizens.[19]

Since copyright is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state, international actors seeking to improve national protection for copyright have to work through the state government.

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[13].. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, of September 9, 1886 as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 18,338 [hereinafter Berne Convention].

[14].. Universal Copyright Convention of September 6, 1952 as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 13,444 [hereinafter UCC].

[15].. Protection is granted for life of author and 50 years in the Berne Convention (Art. 7); in the UCC, it is life of author and twenty-five years (Art. IV. 2.(9)).

[16].. The 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention recognizes 10 rights, the publishing (or reproduction) right, translation right, adaptation right, public recitation right, public performing right, broadcasting right, recording right, film right, moral right of the author, and the author's *droit de suite*. In contrast, signatories to the UCC are bound to protect just three rights: the reproduction right (including publication right), broadcasting right, and public performance right. See MADDISON, COPYRIGHTS AND RELATED RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND TRENDS (The Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report No. 153, 1983)

[17].. Art. 5(2) of the Berne Convention states that the "enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality". At the same time, Art. III. 2 of the UCC states that a contracting state is not precluded from "requiring formalities or other conditions for the acquisition and enjoyment of copyright in respect of works first published in its territory, or works of its nationals wherever published".

[18].. Art. 3 of Berne Convention; Art. III. 1 of UCC.

[19].. Art. 5(3), Berne Convention; Art. II. 2 of UCC.

Typically, pressure is brought on national governments to harmonize their laws with international conventions, or to agree to a minimum standard of reciprocal protection through bilateral treaties. Both multilateral and bilateral approaches have been used by the U.S. At the multilateral level, the U.S. got intellectual property included as an agenda item under the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. It also joined the Berne Convention in 1989.[20] At the bilateral level, laws were created enabling the U.S. to retaliate against foreign countries which afforded inadequate protection for intellectual property. On the whole, the U.S. has preferred to rely on bilateral means to improve intellectual property protection abroad, due to a perception that multilateral adjudication procedures were too time-consuming, politicized, and entangled in bureaucratic red-tape. The next section briefly discusses the laws enabling the U.S. administration to take bilateral enforcement actions.

II. Special 301 and Trade Negotiations

Under the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. could take retaliatory action against any country that denied the U.S. rights owed to it under a trade agreement, or which unfairly restricted U.S. commerce.[21] The Trade and Tariffs Act of 1984 extended the definition of unfair trade paractices to include intellectual property violations, and empowered the USTR to undertake an annual review of problem countries.[22] The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 added further to the powers of the U.S. to retaliate against foreign trade barriers.[23] It stated that a principal negotiating objective of the U.S. was "to seek the enactment and effective enforcement by foreign countries of laws which recognize and adequately protect intellectual property, including copyrights, patents, trademarks, semiconductor chip layout designs and trade secrets."[24]

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[20].. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat 2853; 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (1994). Though the U.S. had been a signatory of the UCC, it was believed that joining the tougher Berne Convention will give the U.S. more credibility while negotiating with other countries on copyright issues.

[21].. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 2041, 2042-43 (codified at U.S.C. §§ 2411-20) (1994).

[22].. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3002.

[23].. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).

The Omnibus Act introduced detailed procedures through which the USTR could identify, investigate and take action against foreign countries that had inadequate or ineffective safeguards against intellectual property violations.[25] The Act empowers the USTR to undertake an annual review of problem countries. Within thirty days of the publication of the National Trade Estimate Report, the USTR has to name priority foreign countries which have the "most onerous or egregious" policies that deny intellectual property protection or market access to U.S. rights holders. Once the priority list is announced, the USTR has to implement a time-bound program for the initiation and conclusion of negotiations and the declaration of sanctions, if necessary. Sanctions could involve the imposition of tariffs on the foreign country's exports to the U.S., or the withdrawal of benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).[26]

The Omnibus Act tightened the USTR's investigation process by introducing deadlines for the conclusion of negotiations, and "bench-mark" expectations that a foreign country had to fulfill before the threat of trade sanctions would be withdrawn. The USTR and her foreign negotiation partners had to work towards specific objectives within a given time-frame. The Omnibus Act also allowed the cross-sectoral imposition of sanctions.[27] The USTR could target sanctions at such industries that would have the maximum effect on the foreign country, while minimizing the effects on the U.S. economy. Armed with these new powers, the USTR initiated a number of bilateral negotiations over copyright issues beginning in the mid-1980s. While significant improvements in copyright protection were noted in several cases, the results were not uniform. The next section discusses several case studies of Special 301 negotiations, with countries in the Asian region.

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[24] .*Id.*, § 1101; 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).

[25] .. *Id.*, § 2242.

[26] .. Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the U.S. provides preferential duty-free entry for approximately 4,500 products from designated beneficiary countries and territories. Initiated under the Trade Act of 1974 for a ten year period, it was renewed till 1993 by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Thereafter it was renewed annually until it expired in 1995. See Office of The U.S Trade Rep., Exec. Off. of The President., A Guide to The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (1996) (http://www.ustr.gov/reports/gsp).

[27] .. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c (1)).

III. Negotiations under Special 301: Case Studies.

The consensus in the U.S. policy establishment is that unilateral trade retaliation is a very useful tool for the U.S. administration to secure better intellectual property protection and the removal of trade barriers abroad. This assessment is generally supported by the record of Section 301 and Special 301 actions undertaken by the USTR. Some of the factors that contributed to the success of bilateral enforcement actions can be identified.

The status of the foreign country as a recipient of GSP benefits from the U.S. is an important factor.[28] This was particularly evident in the case of Singapore.[29] In the mid-1980s, Singapore was named by the IIPA as the world capital of piracy. Initial attempts by U.S. and British governments and business groups to persuade Singapore to reform its copyright system were futile. The turning point was the passage of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, which threatened to withdraw GSP benefits from copyright offenders. Singapore was keen to retain the $730 million of benefits it received from GSP in 1985, and took quick action to curb piracy. A new copyright act was passed, and a bilateral agreement was signed with the U.S., both in 1987. Piracy rates plummeted from $358 in 1984 to less than $10 million in 1988.[30]

A second factor is the importance of the U.S. as a major export market and source of foreign investment for the targeted country. In the case of Taiwan, for example, the U.S. was able to secure most of its negotiating objectives because of the excessive reliance of that country on exports to the U.S., and its need for U.S. political and diplomatic support against mainland China. Under Special 301 pressure, Taiwan modified its domestic media laws to prohibit the cable retransmission of American films without permission, prohibited the parallel import of copyrighted goods, and instituted a pre-export inspection system for computer software and some trademarked goods to ensure that all components have been legitimately licensed from copyright owners.[31]

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[28].. Sykes, *Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301*, 23 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 263 (1992).

[29].. This case is discussed in detail in UPHOFF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND U.S RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AND THAILAND (1991).

[30].. *Id.* Ironically, though Singapore managed to retain its GSP benefits following the anti-piracy actions, GSP itself was withdrawn for all Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) the following year in a routine review of the system. Singapore complained about the U.S. "double-cross", but continued to crack down on piracy.

A third factor is the desire of countries to upgrade their local technology competence. Supporters of better intellectual property standards argue that it gives an incentive for domestic research and development and attracts foreign investment in high technology. From a two-level games perspective, national players in favor of better copyright protection may use international pressure to bolster their own positions. For example, in the case of Singapore, the state would probably have made the required improvements in its intellectual system on its own, but U.S. pressure led to speedier action.[32] In Malaysia too, copyright reform owed more to the government's desire to develop a local computer and software industry and protect the country's highly active music business than to pressure from the U.S. government.[33]

Fourthly, domestic political factors can sometimes make otherwise unpalatable options viable for a state. In Taiwan for instance, the government was willing to take action against unauthorized cable channels which were broadcasting unlicensed American movies because the cable networks were also being used by opposition parties for political propaganda against the Kuo

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[31] .. Comment, *Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting United States Intellectual Property in Foreign Countries*. 15 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 206 (1994) (authored by Y. Kurt Chang); see also Liu, *A Review of Intellectual Property Laws in Taiwan: Proposals To Curb Piracy and Counterfeiting in a Developing Country*, 3 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REV. 619 (1988).

[32] .. See Uphoff, *supra* note 29.

[33] .. Uphoff, *supra* note 29.

Ming Tang government.[34] In Malaysia, an added incentive for the Islamic government to reform copyright laws was to check the proliferation of pornographic and uncensored videocassettes.[35]

Domestic political factors can sharply circumscribe a government's freedom of action too. This is most dramatically illustrated in the case of Thailand.[36] In spite of being a long-term U.S. ally and major GSP recipient, U.S. demands for a bilateral copyright treaty ran into unexpected opposition. The discussion of the proposal in Parliament precipitated a crisis in the ruling coalition that led to the dissolution of Parliament and the announcement of elections. The U.S. persisted with its calls for a bilateral copyright treaty, and also demanded that the Thais drop their move to give *sui generis* protection to computer software. In November 1988, the Thai government agreed to sign a bilateral treaty. However, it could not guarantee that no legislator would introduce a separate bill for computer software protection. Finally in December 1988, the U.S. dropped this demand. Though the U.S. achieved most of its negotiating objectives, its perceived "bullying tactics" were resented in Thailand. Some have argued that Thailand's first civilian government after decades of military rule was too weak to push unpopular policies through Parliament.[37]

These four factors—receipt of GSP benefits, the importance of the U.S. as an export market and source of investment, local industrial and technology policies, and domestic political equations—are important determinants of a state's vulnerability to international pressures. We will return to them in the analysis section. The next section discusses the development of a copyright regime in China under the influence of domestic and international factors.

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[34].. Brewer, *The 'fourth network'*, CABLE & SATELLITE EUROPE, Oct. 1991, at 38.

[35].. Uphoff, *supra* note 29.

[36].. The U.S.-Thailand copyright negotiations are discussed in detail in Uphoff, *supra* note 29. See also McDorman, *U.S.-Thailand Trade Disputes: Applying Section 301 To Cigarettes and Intellectual Property*, 14 MICHIGAN J. OF INT'L LAW 90 (1992), and Note, *The Thai Copyright Case and Possible Limitations To Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Actions Taken Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, 23 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 725 (1992) (authored by Chris Shore).

[37].. Uphoff, *supra* note 29.

IV. U.S.-China Copyright Relations

In this section, we discuss the evolution of the Chinese copyright regime from the 1970s to the 1990s. The discussion spans more than two decades and considers several laws and international agreements that incrementally advanced the copyright system in that country. I propose to examine the evolution of the Chinese system in terms of four activities that normally occur in the development of a national legal system for copyright. They are as follows:

Definition: Recognition of copyrights and other intellectual property rights in a nation's legal system, with definition of works covered and the duration of protection;

Facilitation: Creation of enforcement mechanisms, like copyright registration bureaus and courts to hear copyright cases, and legislation enabling law enforcement agencies to take investigative and preventive actions;

Internationalization: Extension of protection to foreign rights holders through bilateral agreements or accession to multilateral conventions, and harmonization of the terms of copyright protection with generally accepted international norms;

Enforcement: Actual enforcement actions leading to a decrease in the incidence of piracy.

In proposing these activities, I do not argue that they fall into a sequence which is typical is of the development of national copyright systems, nor indeed that China followed this sequence. In fact, several laws discussed in the following case study contributed to two or more activities, and several occurred "out-of-sequence." Also, enforcement actions can be expected to take place concurrently with any of the other activities, after the domestic laws have been created. These activities are only used as convenient milestones against which developments in the Chinese copyright system can be assessed. However, they are useful analytical devices because the efficacy of the later activities depend on the prior performance of the earlier ones.

Diplomatic relations were established between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China in 1972. In 1979, the U.S. and China concluded a Bilateral Trade Agreement granting each other

Most Favored Nation status (MFN).[38] As part of the agreement, the two countries made a commitment to protect each other's intellectual property. Art. VI of the agreement declared that both parties will "recognize the importance of effective protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights"[39] and take appropriate measures "to ensure to legal and natural persons of the other Party protection of copyrights equivalent to the copyright protection correspondingly accorded to the other Party."[40]

The principle of reciprocal copyright protection was thus incorporated into U.S.-China bilateral relations. In terms of the schema laid out above, U.S.-China copyright relations were leap-frogging into the internationalization stage, bypassing the first two activities. China at that time did not have a copyright law, nor any enforcement mechanisms.[41] Nor was China a signatory to any of the multilateral conventions on copyright that could have guaranteed minimum standards of protection for foreign copyright holders in the Chinese legal system. At this stage therefore, the Bilateral Trade Agreement's commitment to protect U.S. copyright in China was empty and premature. Though this was the first agreement between the U.S. and China to discuss copyright, it was irrelevant to the future development of the Chinese copyright regime.

The initial development of the Chinese copyright system occurred largely uninfluenced by international factors. In the early 1980s, China was yet to develop into the miracle economy it was to become later, and international concern about the domestic legal regime was low. But there was growing awareness in China itself that closer integration with the global economy necessitated the reform of domestic laws to conform to international standards. Beginning in the early 1980s, China took some initiatives to reform its copyright system. In 1985, a National Copyright Administration was set up under the State Council to implement copyright laws, investigate cases of infringement, administer copyright agencies and manage copyright affairs with foreign countries.[42] The General Principles of the Civil Laws of the People's Republic of China, which entered into force in January 1987 gave legal recognition to copyright,[43] and created a civil liability in tort for copyright infringement.[44] But the definitional phase was still incomplete because the General Principles did not fully specify either the works covered or the terms of protection.

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[38].. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, Presidential Proclamation 4697 of October 23, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,161 (1979).

[39].. *Id.*, Art VI (1).

[40].. *Id.*, Art. VI (5).

[41].. Some protection for patents and trademarks was offered by the Regulations on Awards for Inventions, 1963, and the Regulations on the Administration of Trademarks, 1963 respectively. BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM OF CHINA, (WIPO), Pub. No. 686/CN(E) (1993), at 16-17.

The next significant definitional advance occurred in 1990. The Copyright Law legislated that year guaranteed the rights of publication, authorship, alteration, integrity, exploitation and remuneration.[45] Copyrights covered written works, films, television and video productions, musical works, engineering designs and computer software, as well as traditional Chinese arts and performances.[46] The duration of protection for the rights of publication, exploitation and remuneration were fixed at life of author and fifty years.[47] However, the rights of authorship, alteration and integrity were guaranteed for an unlimited period of time.[48] The 1990 Copyright Law effectively concluded the definitional phase of the Chinese copyright system, though later laws and agreements continued to refine the basic framework.

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[42] BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL, *id.*, at 117.

[43] "Citizens and legal entities enjoy authors' rights (copyright) {in their works}; they have in accordance with the law, the rights to claim authorship, to disclose or publish {their works}, and to receive remuneration." General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China of April 12, 1986, Chap. 5, § 3, Art. 94, 1 Copyright Laws And Treaties of the World (BNA) Supp. 1989-1990 (1992).

[44] "Citizens and legal entities, where that authors' rights (copyright) or rights to patents, trademarks, discoveries, inventions or other fruits of scientific or technological research are infringed, shall have the rights to demand that the infringement be stopped, its effects be eliminated, and any loss be compensated." *Id.*, Chap. 6, § 3, Art. 118.

[45] Copyright Law of China of September 7, 1990, adopted at the 50th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th National Peoples' Congress, 1 Copyright Laws And Treaties of the World (BNA) Supp. 1989-1990 (1992).

Chap. 2, § 1, Article 10 defined the following personality rights and property rights.

(1) the right of publication, that is, the right to decide whether to make a work available for the public;

(2) the right to authorship, that is, the right to claim authorship and to have the author's name mentioned in connection with the work;

(3) the right of alteration, that is, the right to alter, or authorize others to alter one's work;

(4) the right of integrity, that is, the right to protect one's work against distortion and mutilation;

(5) the right of exploitation and the right of remuneration, that is the right of exploiting one's work by reproduction, live performance, broadcasting, exhibition, distribution, making cinematographic, television or video production, adaptation, translation, annotation, compilation and the like, and the right of authorizing others to exploit one's work by the above-mentioned means, and of receiving remuneration thereof.

The 1990 Copyright Law contributed to facilitation as well by describing the general conditions under which copyrighted works could be licensed and laying down penalties for unauthorized use. Penalties for copyright infringement included cessation of the act, the elimination of the effects of the act, public apology, and compensation for damages; additional penalties could involve the confiscation of unlawful income and the imposition of fines.[49] The Implementing Regulations for the Copyright Law were published in May 1991 [50] and stated that "remuneration for the exploitation of copyrighted works will be established by the copyright administration department under the State Council;"[51] however, payments could also be contractually fixed. The Implementing Regulations added to the punitive actions, including warnings from the copyright administration department, injunctions on the production and distribution of copies, confiscation of unlawful gains, and seizure of infringing copies as well as equipment used for illegal activity.[52]

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[46].. *Id.*, Chap. 1, Art. 3.

[47].. *Id.*, Chap. 1, Art. 21.

[48].. *Id.*, Chap. 2, § 3, Art. 20. The rights of authorship are evocative of the *droits d'auteur* from the French legal system. It is not clear whether the legislative intent of the Chinese lawmakers was to synthesize the two major copyright traditions, or the implication arose out of the inadequacy of the English translation on which this information is based.

[49].. *Id.*, Chap. 5, Art. 46.

[50].. Copyright Implementing Regulations of May 24, 1991, reprinted in BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL, *supra* note 41, at 113.

[51].. *Id.*, Chap. 3, Art. 27.

The 1990 Copyright Law began the internationalization of the Chinese copyright regime too by enabling foreigners to enjoy copyright protection in China under two categories: (1) if the copyrighted work was first published in the Peoples' Republic, the term of protection will be the same as that for Chinese works;[53] and (2) if there exists a bilateral treaty between China and the foreigner's native country, or a multilateral treaty to which both countries are a party.[54]

Till this time, advances in the Chinese copyright regime were basically the result of domestic concerns, primarily the desire of Chinese policy makers for integration into the world economy. But by the early 1990s, China was becoming a lucrative market and destination of investment for international business and interest in domestic developments was high.[55] Initially, the concern was with the internationalization of the Chinese copyright system—the extension of full protection to foreign rights holders, and the harmonization of Chinese law with international agreements, with regard to the works covered and terms of protection. Later, the locus of foreign concern was to shift towards enforcement.

The initial manifestation of international concern about the Chinese copyright regime was dissatisfaction with the 1990 Copyright Law. First, foreign copyright holders complained that the first publication requirement in the law was unreasonable, and increased their risk of doing business in China. Secondly, though computer software was included in the Copyright Law as a protected work,[56] the regulations for the protection of computer software were to be established separately by the State Council.[57] This raised concerns that computer software would be offered *sui generis* protection under terms less favorable than those assigned to general copyrighted works.[58] Third, the period immediately following the passage of the 1990 Copyright Act was marked by the emergence of CD factories in southern China, which came to symbolize Chinese piracy through the 1990s.

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[52].. *Id.*, Chap. 6, Art. 50.

[53].. The Copyright Implementing Regulations, *id.*, defined first publication for foreigners as follows:

Rule 25: Works of foreigners first published in the territory of China means that unpublished works of foreigners are first published in the territory of China by lawful means; and any work by a foreigner first published outside the territory of China shall be deemed to be first published in the territory of China, provided that it is published in the territory of China within 30 days after its first publication.

[54].. Copyright Law of China, *supra* note 45, Chap. 1, Art. 2.

[55].. For an account of the increasing importance of China to the world economy, see Lardy, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1994).

In the late 1980s, China had acquired the technology for the large scale manufacture of compact discs. Taiwan- and Hong Kong-based pirate operations which were facing increasing prosecution at home entered into joint ventures with entrepreneurs mainly in China's southern provinces and transferred the funds and technology needed to set up factories. These factories used cheap digital recording equipment to pirate compact discs, ranging from pop classics to the latest computer software from the U.S. The number of these factories grew from three in 1990 to about thirty by the mid-1990s.[59] By 1994, it was estimated that China was producing about 75 million pirated compact discs per year.[60] This represented tremendous over-production for the Chinese market; the surplus was exported to third countries where it competed with legitimate products.[61]

Confronted with the loss of a potentially lucrative market to copyright theft, a number of industry groups including the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) petitioned the

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[56] *Id.*, Art. 3.

[57] *Id.*, Art. 53.

[58] Significantly, the Implementing Regulations did not include computer software as a protected work. See list of protected works in Copyright Implementing Regulations, *supra* note 50, Chap. 1, Art. 4.

[59] Pride, *WIPO ups ante on CD Piracy, Seeks Mandatory Source Codes*, BILLBOARD, Feb. 12, 1994, at 3.

[60] Senser, *Will China Kick the Habit?*, COMMONWEAL, May 5, 1995 at 7.

[61] Watson, *A Little Fight Music*, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13 1995, at 38.

USTR in 1991 to initiate a Special 301 investigation of China. While China had figured in the Priority Watch List of countries in 1989 and 1990, its status was upgraded to that of a Priority Foreign Country in May 1991, making it eligible for trade retaliation.[62] The ensuing consultations led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and China, under which the latter undertook to improve its patents, copyrights and trademarks regimes.[63] With regard to copyrights, the Chinese government agreed to accede to the Berne Convention by October 15, 1992 and the Geneva Phonograms Convention by June, 1993.[64] The MOU committed China to modify the 1990 Copyright Law and its Implementing Regulations to bring them into conformity with the above international agreements.[65] Finally, computer programs too were to be protected as literary works for a period of fifty years.[66]

Through the Memorandum of Understanding, China and the U.S. agreed to extend copyright protection for all works including sound recordings and computer programs to each other's nationals on a reciprocal basis.[67] On its part, the U.S. agreed in Article 7 of the MOU to revoke China's designation as a priority foreign country. The designation was officially terminated on January 17, 1992.[68] In October 1992, China joined the Berne Convention and for good measure, the Universal Copyright Convention. The International Copyright Treaties Implementing Rules, which entered into force in September 1992 declared that the provisions of the Berne Convention would overrule all pre-existing administrative regulations with respect to copyright.[69]

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[62].. Notice of Countries Identified as Priority Foreign Countries, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,060 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991).

[63].. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Peoples' Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America on the Protection of Intellectual Property, January 17, 1992, 34 I.L.M. 677, at 680 [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].

[64].. *Id.*, Art. 3 (1) & (2).

[65].. Interestingly, China agreed to explain in its amended copyright laws that the "right of distribution includes making copies available by rental and that this exclusive right survives the first sale of copies." [Memorandum of Understanding , Art. 3 (4)]. Compare with the First Sale Doctrine in the U.S.

[66].. *Id.*, Art. 3 (6).

[67].. *Id.*, Art. 3 (9).

With these developments in late 1992, the internationalization of China's copyright system was complete. On paper, the Chinese legal system was comparable to that of any other country in the world. Temporarily at least, U.S. government seemed satisfied with the pace and direction of progress. The USTR's priority designations for 1992 reflected this changed perception, with China designated only as one of eighteen watch list countries.[70]

But several months later, copyright violations continued unabated in China. Having achieved the internationalization of the Chinese copyright regime through the Memorandum of Understanding, U.S. copyright industries and the USTR were now recognizing enforcement as the new battleground. In the USTR's announcement for 1993, China was back on the Priority Watch List. On June 30, 1994 the USTR again put China on the list of priority foreign countries.[71] To avoid trade sanctions, the Standing Committee of the National Peoples' Congress adopted a decision in July 1994 for the enforcement of copyright laws.[72] Copyright infringement was taken off the civil statute and made a criminal offence. The new law penalized not only the producers but also the distributors of illegal material.[73] Article 4 declared that punishment could be up to seven years imprisonment for producers and up to five years for retailers and distributors, with additional fines in cases where the illegal income has been great. The decision allowed copyright administrations to confiscate illegal copies, the revenue from infringing activity, and the equipment and tools used for copyright infringement.[74] Finally, the Decision provided for the payment of compensation to copyright holders.[75] Factories producing compact discs would henceforth have to be certified by the government, so that the products could be tracked down to their point of origin. The Chinese government also undertook to prohibit new factories from coming up.

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[68].. Termination of Section 302 Investigation: Intellectual Property Laws and Practices of the Peoples Republic of China and Revocation of Priority Foreign Country Designation, 57 Fed. Reg. 3,084 (1992).

[69].. International Copyright Treaties Implementing Rules of September 25, 1992, Ordinance No. 105 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 1 Copyright and Neighboring Rights Laws and Treaties (WIPO), Pub. No. 616 (E), at CN. 4-01. Art. 19 of the Implementing Rules states that "Where pre-existing administrative regulations relating to copyright may conflict with these rules, these rules shall apply. Where these Rules may conflict with international copyright treaties, the international copyright treaties shall apply."

[70].. Notice of Trading Partners Identified as Priority Foreign Countries, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,329 (1992).

[71].. Identification of Priority Foreign Country and Initiation of Section 302 Investigation, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,558 (1994).

Following these actions, the USTR decided to postpone the imposition of sanctions for a six-month investigative period during which the implementation of the new regulations would be monitored. By the end of the year, the USTR remained unconvinced about progress on the ground. On December 30, 1994 a preliminary determination was made that China's lack of copyright rights enforcement was "burdensome and unreasonable," and a retaliation list covering $ 2.8 billion worth of Chinese exports to the U.S. was announced.[76]

Hectic negotiations followed in the next one month, but not much progress was made. On

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[72].. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding Criminal Sanctions for Copyright Infringement, Adopted at the 8th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on July 5, 1994, [hereinafter Decision of the Standing Committee], 1 Copyright and Neighboring Rights Laws and Treaties (WIPO), Pub. No. 616 (E), at CN. 5-01.

[73].. *Id.*, Decision of the Standing Committee, Art. 2.

[74].. *Id.*, Decision of the Standing Committee, Art. 4.

[75].. *Id.*, Decision of the Standing Committee, Art. 5.

[76].. Extension of 301 Investigation of the Peoples Republic of China's Protection of Intellectual Property and Provision of Market Access to Persons Who Rely on Intellectual Property Protection; Proposed Determination; Request for Public Comment; and Notice of Public Hearing, 60 Fed. Reg. 1829, and Fed. Reg. 3032.

February 4, 1995, the USTR announced the imposition of 100 percent tariffs on $ 1 billion worth of Chinese exports, giving the Chinese a three-week grace period before sanctions would take effect.[77] China immediately announced counter-sanctions, and the situation threatened to rapidly escalate into a full-scale trade war. Finally, in a pattern which was by now typical of U.S.-China copyright relations, the two countries concluded an agreement on February 26, the day the sanctions were supposed to take effect. The USTR and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) Wu Yi concluded the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Agreement, 1995 [78] which ended the Special 301 investigation in return for a Chinese commitment to take concrete steps to improve copyright protection.[79]

Minister Wu's letter to USTR Kantor which formed the text of the agreement stated that China had already closed down seven factories producing illegal CDs and revoked their business licenses, and seized and destroyed more than 2 million illegal CDs. The Chinese government stated that it would complete an investigation of all production lines suspected of producing illegal CDs by July 1, 1995, and institute a unique source identifier system for CDs, CD-ROMs and laser discs to make it easier to identify the producers of illegal material. An Action Plan attached to the agreement announced the formation of Working Conferences on Intellectual Property Rights at the national and provincial levels.[80] A six-month long nationwide copyright enforcement campaign was announced beginning in March 1995 under the direction of the national Working Conference on Intellectual Property. Task forces comprised of police, customs and federal and provincial copyright administrations were set up as part of the effort.

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[77].. Determination of Action Concerning the Peoples Republic of China's Protection of Intellectual Property and Provision of Market Access to Persons Who Rely on Intellectual Property Protection, 60 Fed. Reg. 7230 (1995).

[78].. China-United States Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights of February 26, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 881 (1995); see also Termination of Section 301 Investigation and Action Regarding the Peoples Republic of China's Protection of Intellectual Property and Provision and Market Access to Persons Who Rely on Intellectual Property Protection, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,582 (1995).

[79].. *Id.* Better copyright enforcement was not the only condition: the others were better border enforcement against export of pirated products to third-country markets, and increased access for U.S. firms to the Chinese audiovisual and computer software markets.

[80].. 34 I.L.M. 887 (1995).

Initially, there were some signs that the piracy of CDs in China may be decreasing. News reports in May 1995 said that the price of CDs in Taipei, Hong Kong and Bangkok had increased by 30 percent, because the steady supply of pirated CDs was finally drying up. In March and April 1995, China closed down 13 illegal CD factories and the remaining ones were put under a legal obligation to register their output with the government, making the monitoring process easier.[81]

However, this period of raised expectations too proved short-lived. In late 1995, it became clear that progress in enforcement was not up to U.S. expectations, in spite of the special enforcement periods and task forces, and numerous meetings between Chinese and U.S. officials at every level of government. The 1996 National Trade Estimate noted that China had made significant efforts to eliminate the retail distribution of pirated sound recordings and computer software, but action against the producers of this material was lacking.[82] In pursuance of these findings, a press release from the Office of the USTR on April 30, 1996 announced that China had again been designated as a priority foreign country under Special 301 "because of its failure to implement the 1995 Intellectual Property Enforcement Agreement."[83] On May 15, the USTR published a preliminary list of $ 3 billions of Chinese exports targeted for retaliation.[84]

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[81].. Levin, *Pirates Losing Battle*, BILLBOARD, May 20, 1995, at 29.

[82].. The result of this was counter-productive from the U.S. point of view, because it diverted a larger share of illegal Chinese production to foreign markets, where pirated music and software was priced at higher levels than in the Chinese domestic market. This would have generated greater losses for U.S. copyright owners, especially when combined with inadequate border enforcement.

[83].. Identification of Countries That Deny Adequate Protection or Market Access for Intellectual Property Rights Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,969 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1996).

Even before this preliminary retaliation list was made public, Chinese officials had gone on record announcing their intention to respond immediately with an even longer list of counter-sanctions. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed that U.S. criticism of China, in spite of its "great achievements" since the 1995 IPR Agreement were "unfair."[85] In Washington too, Administration officials were expressing concern that the imposition of trade sanctions on China could compromise other vital U.S. interests.[86] The reaction from sections of the U.S. industry too was predictable and not long in coming. Major corporations, some of them with vast investments in the Chinese market, requested the U.S. government to avoid confrontation with China, and to make efforts to ensure that a trade war, if unavoidable, would not widen to include other sectors of the economy.[87] On June 17, 1996, the USTR announced that "China had reached a critical mass of enforcement actions", and that the "core elements of an operational intellectual property rights enforcement system" were in place; hence sanctions would not be imposed.[88] Another trade war had been averted, and this time without any major Chinese concessions.

To summarize, the Chinese copyright regime has been considerably transformed from the mid-1980s to the present by a number of national and international legal instruments. Till 1991, most of these developments were impelled by domestic factors, primarily the desire of the Chinese policy establishment for a closer integration with the global economy. By 1991, copyrights were recognized in the Chinese legal system and basic enforcement mechanisms had been defined, though implementation left much to be desired. After 1991, international factors began to play a more important role. Under their influence, China acceded to international agreements on copyright, extended copyright protection to foreign rights holders and harmonized the terms of protection with international standards. But enforcement remained weak or non-existent. The latest battleground between the Chinese and U.S. governments has thus shifted to the enforcement activity. Figure 1 represents this case study schematically.

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[84]. USTR Press Release No. 96-42; see also Request For Public Comment and Notice of Public Hearing: Determination Involving Expeditious Action; Proposed Determination Concerning What Further Action to take Under Section 301 (a) in Response to the People's Republic of China's Unsatisfactory Implementation of the 1995 Agreement on Enforcement of Intellectual Property and Market Access, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,000 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1996).

[85].. *China says it will retaliate if U.S. imposes trade sanctions*, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, May 10, 1996, at A9.

[86].. *U.S. Warns China over violations of trade accord*, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Feb. 4, 1996, at 1.

[87].. *Tread carefully with China, business leaders urge U.S.*, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, May 11, 1996, at 5.

[88].. USTR Press Release 96-53, "Statement by Ambassador Barshefsky", June 17, 1996; See also, Notice of Determinations and Further Monitoring: People's Republic of China's Implementation of the 1995 Agreement on Enforcement of Intellectual Property and Market Access, 61 Fed. Reg. 33,147 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1996).

(Figure 1 here)

In the next section, I return to the questions stated at the beginning of this paper. As we saw in the case study, the outcome of each round of negotiations between the U.S. and China was a legal document—an international agreement or a domestic law or administrative regulation. Repeatedly, the USTR has ruled that this was sufficient proof of the Chinese government's intention to protect copyright, in spite of sharp increases in the quantum of copyright piracy in China during the same period. Why has the USTR repeatedly ignored these statistics, and preferred to cite the creation of new laws as evidence for improvements in the Chinese copyright regime? On the other hand, why have the Chinese proved so obstinate in their inaction against an illegal industry, even when threatened with reduced access to a $45 billion a year market? An analysis based on two level games provides some of the answers. This approach has been briefly summarized in the Introduction. Additional theoretical elements are introduced where required.

V. Application of the Two Level Games Approach

Any game theoretic analysis of a negotiation needs to separately examine the players in the game, the action choices available to them, the payoffs (or benefits) associated with particular actions, and the strategies used by the players.[89] The two level games approach introduces an additional degree of complexity by tackling games that take place simultaneously on two levels. In this section, I examine the players, action choices, payoffs and strategies of the players involved in the U.S.-China dispute at two levels of analysis: the international and the domestic, in that order.

Level I (international): At the international level, a brief description of the game is as follows. The two players are the U.S. and China. The U.S. places a demand for the improvement of copyright protection in China. China has two options: either agree or disagree to the U.S. demands. If China agrees the U.S. does not impose trade sanctions, and if China disagrees the U.S. will impose trade sanctions. Since China is sure to impose counter-sanctions, the outcome of U.S. sanctions is a reduction in mutual trade. The order of play is assumed to be simultaneous.[90] T_C and $T_{U.S.}$ denote the gains from mutual trade to China and the U.S. equivalent to the trade lost when sanctions are imposed. I will shortly explain why these two figures are assumed to be different. P denotes total quantum of piracy in China, which is a net gain for China and a net loss for the U.S. in case China disagrees to enforce copyright laws, and the reverse if China agrees to enforce copyright laws. Based on these action choices and payoffs, the payoff matrix given in Figure 2 can be constructed. The first expression in each bracketed set is the payoff of the row player (in this case, China) and the second expression is the payoff of the column player (in this case, the U.S.). The arrows signify the direction in which the players are likely to move based on their preferences. We will discuss preferences in more detail shortly.

(Figure 2 here)

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[89].. Much of the analysis in this section is based on standard game theory. For a good treatment, see E. RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (1994).

[90].. It may be argued that the U.S. decision to impose or not impose sanctions is taken consequent to the move of China to agree or disagree to U.S. demands, and so the game is better classified as sequential. But this would not be accurate, because the U.S. decision on trade sanctions is taken on the basis of a Chinese promise to implement (or not implement) U.S. demands, and the U.S. has no prior knowledge about this future action. The Chinese too face uncertainty about U.S. actions because sanctions can be announced at the end of "review periods."

According to the USTR's procedure, the quantum of trade sanctions are fixed at a level that would cancel out the benefits from continued piracy. That is, T_C is fixed equal to P. China too has announced counter-sanctions equivalent to the sanctions announced by the U.S. In practice, it is possible for the USTR and her Chinese counterpart to target the most vulnerable industries of the other side, and thus maximize the effects of sanctions beyond the dollar value of the consequent reduction in trade. Also, trade sanctions of even limited nature increase the possibility that a trade dispute in one industry may escalate into an all-out trade war with each country targeting the other's most vulnerable industries. This is a possibility that neither country can afford to ignore. Thus in practice, both T_C and $T_{U.S.}$ are more than P.

In two level games, comparative negotiating strengths are dependent on the relative costs of no-agreement to either side. In other words, the side with the lower cost of no-agreement is in a more advantageous negotiation position. In the U.S.-China case, a preliminary analysis based on the size of the U.S. annual trade deficit with China would suggest that the latter had much more to lose from a break-down of trading relations than the former.

But a more sophisticated analysis suggests the contrary. Though privatization has proceeded to a large extent in China, the major investor in the Chinese economy continues to be the national government and other elements of the official establishment like the Communist Party, the provincial governments and the military.[91] In case sanctions are actually imposed, the Chinese establishment will absorb most of the shock, while in the U.S. the effects of a trade war will be felt mostly by a large number of privately owned businesses. Given the differences in the two countries' political systems, the Chinese can afford to contemplate a trade war, while it carries tremendous political costs for any U.S. administration. The U.S. has to confront an additional political cost of trade sanctions in addition to the economic costs common to both sides. Based on the above argument, and including both the political and economic costs of trade sanctions in the calculations, we need to assume that $T_{U.S.} > T_{C}$. In effect, the outcome associated with (Disagree, Sanctions) is more unacceptable to the U.S. than to China.

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[91] .. Sixty one percent of the value of national properties in China belongs to state-owned enterprises. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, China-Mongolia (4th Quarter, 1996), at 22.

Given the payoff matrix given in Figure 2, it can be seen that a Chinese rational decision-maker has the incentive to defect from Agree to Disagree, and a U.S. rational decision-maker has the incentive to defect from Sanctions to No Sanctions. Thus, the preferred strategy for the Chinese is not to enforce copyright laws, while the preferred strategy for the U.S. is not to impose trade sanctions. Since the outcome (Disagree, No Sanctions) results from the preferred strategies of the two sides, it can be considered to be quite robust.[92]

This analysis suggests that agreement in the U.S.-China copyright dispute is not very likely, which is contrary to our experience. Though the U.S. has failed to realize its ultimate objective of reducing the quantum of piracy in China, the two sides have agreed on policy measures and China has shown some willingness to accede to U.S. demands. This is explained by the existence of side payments.[93] Placing the U.S.-China copyright dispute in the overall context of relations between the two nations allows us to elucidate the complicated role that side payments have played in this case study.

Under the "comprehensive engagement" policies followed by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, a deliberate attempt was made to promote relations with China on as many fronts as possible. The aim of these policies was to give China a stake in the global political and economic system, in order to secure Chinese "good behavior" on issues crucial to U.S. interests like nuclear non-proliferation, human rights and the security of Taiwan. A working relationship with China was expected to have a positive effect on these areas of U.S. concern.[94]

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[92]. Preferred strategies are the action-sequences that maximize the payoffs to a player irrespective of the actions of the other players. In Figure 2, we can see that China is better off with Disagree, whether the U.S. chooses Sanctions or No Sanctions. Therefore, Disagree is the preferred strategy for China. Similarly, No Sanctions is the preferred strategy for the U.S. The preferred strategy equilibrium is considered robust because neither player has an incentive to defect from it.

[93]. Side payments can be defines as a transfer of resources from one player to the other unrelated to the outcome of the game, which favorably change the payoffs for the latter and increase the chances of cooperation. See Rasmusen, *supra* note 89.

Vital Chinese interests too hinged on a harmonious relationship with the U.S. Since the 1980s, China has been trying to modernize its domestic technology sectors, for which it needed investment and high technology from the U.S. Though China was not a GSP beneficiary like Singapore (See Section III), it was still interested in a continuing MFN relationship with the U.S. Finally, China needed U.S. support for entering the World Trade Organization (WTO). These potential side payments made the Chinese more keen to avoid a break-down of trade relations with the U.S. In this respect, China's situation was similar to that of Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia discussed in Section III of this paper.

To summarize the Level I discussion so far, the preferred strategy outcome of the Level I game indicates that agreement is unlikely at the international level. But the existence of side payments changes the payoff structure and gives both sides an incentive to come to some form of agreement.[95] The contours of this agreement, however, are determined at Level II of the two level games. At Level II, the principal negotiator has to win ratification for the agreements negotiated at Level I. Those Level I agreements that can win ratification at the domestic level constitute the 'win-set' of the principal negotiator at the international level. We can now look at the outcomes included in the win-sets of the two negotiating sides.

Level II (U.S. domestic): For the U.S., the most desirable outcome in this negotiation was the full protection of U.S. copyright in China. Associations of U.S. copyright owners like the

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[94].. A different argument with substantially the same result could be as follows. Market access itself has been used as a side payment by the U.S. to secure Chinese compliance with the former's strategic designs. Having already used market access to influence Chinese behavior on these issues, the latitude of the U.S. government to use it further in the area of copyright protection was limited. This makes the U.S. more willing to seek agreement with China.

[95].. The effect of side-payments is to alter the payoffs associated with the outcome (Agree, No Sanctions) by an additional benefit S_p to either side, so that China now prefers (Agree, No Sanctions) to (Disagree, No Sanctions). The alteration of China's preference makes (Agree, No Sanctions) the new equilibrium outcome.

RIAA and the MPEAA have consistently advocated this position with Congress, the White House and the USTR. Because copyrighted material has become an important component of U.S. exports in recent years, these demands have attracted a lot of attention in U.S. policy circles.[96]

But U.S. copyright industries are not the only pressure group at the U.S. domestic level. Two other groups are relevant for this case study, the U.S. State Department and the manufacturing industries like the big three U.S. auto-manufacturers. In the U.S.-China copyright dispute, these two domestic players have advocated a position that conflicted with that of the copyright industries. The State Department, for example has argued that a trade war with China would endanger vital U.S. interests like the security of Taiwan, the termination of the sale of Chinese missile and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and the Middle East, and improving China's human rights record. As already mentioned in the case study, the State Department was a vocal advocate of a "soft line" towards the Chinese in the copyright dispute.[97] The big three automakers too have voiced their opposition to any measure that could upset U.S.-China relations.[98] At stake for them were considerable investments in joint ventures in the short run, and a potentially huge market in the long run. The Chinese too have proved to be astute at exploiting the differences in the opposition camp. At a delicate stage in the 1994-95 negotiations for example, the Chinese hinted that certain joint ventures with the U.S. car companies would be canceled unless the trade sanctions were dropped. They suggested that negotiations would be initiated with the Japanese instead, playing on the deepest fears of the U.S. car companies.[99]

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[96] .. For data on the rising trends of U.S. exports in media-related products like recorded music, films, videocassettes and television programs, see NAT'L TELECOM. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA, NTIA SPECIAL PUB. 93-290 (1993).

[97] .. *U.S. Warns China over violations of trade accord*, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Feb. 4, 1996, at 1.

[98] .. *Tread carefully with China, business leaders urge U.S.*, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, May 11, 1996, at 5.

[99] .. Watson, *A Little Fight Music*, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 38.

In two level games theory, the concepts of homogeneity and heterogeneity address factional conflict at the domestic level.[100] In the U.S.-China copyright dispute, conflict at the domestic level was clearly heterogeneous because all the three domestic constituents mentioned above had their own objectives to achieve. In addition, the Special 301 process itself contributed to the heterogeneity of the domestic coalitions in the U.S. The petition process at the initiation of the USTR's annual investigations gives domestic constituents an opportunity to raise complaints about trade barriers and other anti-competitive actions they face in foreign countries. But at the same time, it reduces the homogeneity of the U.S. negotiating position. As the number of interested parties increases, the principal negotiators of the U.S. have a larger set of constraints placed upon them. Though this effect cannot be questioned on normative grounds, it does place a strategic burden on the USTR which came out clearly in negotiations with China.

Given the heterogeneity of the domestic coalitions at the U.S. domestic level, an outcome that obtained its desired objectives for any one constituent and left the others dissatisfied would not have won ratification, because no one constituent commanded sufficient clout to win ratification on its own. But this gave the U.S. administration an opportunity to put together a "package-deal" that would apparently advance the agendas of all the groups without satisfying any one completely. The outcomes of the annual Special 301 negotiations were such "package-deals." China changed its copyright laws as demanded by the copyright industries, trade sanctions were averted much to the relief of the manufacturing sector, and the State Department added one more success to its policy of comprehensive engagement. In each episode of international negotiation, the U.S. obtained concessions from China not large enough to fully satisfy the copyright industries, but sufficient to show Congress and the general public that progress was being made and avoid imposing trade sanctions.

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[100]. Domestic politics is said to be homogeneous when there is agreement between interests groups about the outcome of negotiations. Then, the crucial trade-off will be between the expectations of the domestic constituents and the negotiable outcome. Putnam calls this a boundary conflict. But when there is no agreement on the outcome at the domestic level, or when constituents advocate multiple outcomes, domestic politics is said to be heterogeneous. The problem here is to put together a winning coalition at the domestic level, which can ratify a multi-issue outcome. See Putnam, *supra* note 8, at 442-446.

Level II (China domestic): A similar analysis of the domestic level in China is possible, but harder due to the lack of transparency in Chinese decision-making. We can only infer the shape of domestic coalitions in that country from the reported activities (or inactivity) of various constituents. First of all, a number of actions of the Chinese government lead us to infer that there was a section of the policy establishment that favored improvement of the copyright regime. It should be remembered that the Chinese had already established the National Copyright Administration in 1985 and legislated the 1990 Copyright Law before the initiation of the first USTR Special 301 investigation in 1991 (see Section IV and Figure I). I do not argue that this was done for purely altruistic reasons. As we saw in Section III, states have improved intellectual property laws in a conscious attempt to attract foreign investment and technology transfer, and promote domestic research and development. A section of the Chinese government, most likely concentrated at the national level, evidently advocated copyright reform independently of international pressure in order to gain the above objectives.

Provincial administrations present a sharp contrast. Most pirating activities have been concentrated in the southern provinces of China, where much of the country's free market economic activity too is located. In the boom-town atmosphere of these provinces, the local governments possibly viewed pirating industries as lucrative businesses rather than illegitimate activities. Also, there is reason to suspect that pirate entrepreneurs were well connected politically to provincial administrations. As news reports point out, Chinese military and civilian government agencies were involved with at least a few of the twenty-nine factories producing pirated CDs. The involvement of some influential Communist Party officials was also not ruled out.[101]

This contrast between a faction at the national level interested in improving copyright protection and provincial administrations keen on maintaining the status quo partially explains the anomalous situation in which copyright laws multiply even as the quantum of piracy increases. A common argument the Chinese federal government officials have put forward is that they are doing their best by reforming copyright laws, but that they have little control over implementation because enforcement is a provincial responsibility. The federal government itself may be reluctant to take strong action against any powerful faction, especially in the context of the power politics accompanying the transition to a post-Deng era.

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[101] . Senser, *Will China Kick the Habit?*, COMMONWEAL, May 5, 1995, at 7.

Still, it would be wrong to suppose that the Chinese government is totally ham-strung in its dealings with the provinces. A parallel with the Thai case discussed in Section III does not apply here. The Chinese have always idealized the strong center, and the federal government has repeatedly proved itself capable of strong action when the situation demanded it. But in the copyright case, the advocates of better copyright protection have not been able to muster the political capital necessary to convince other domestic constituents that long-term Chinese interests depended on a strong domestic copyright regime.

The existence of domestic constituents in China interested in better copyright protection presents an opportunity for the U.S. As we have already seen, these sections might be government agencies interested in attracting foreign investment and technology to China, or domestic copyright industries. Once these groups begin to profit from a stricter copyright regime in the country, they could form the nucleus of a domestic coalition advocating further reform. Thus, it is in U.S. interests to help local industries develop a vested interest in better copyright protection. This can be done, for example, by distributing a larger share of music, computer software and videocassettes through local distributorships and investing the profits in local production. The resulting transnational alliances between domestic constituents on either side with identical interests can do more to reform domestic copyright regimes than unilateral pressure from the U.S.

In the preceding paragraphs, we examined the configuration of Level I and Level II of the U.S.-China copyright dispute. But these configurations only determine the framework for the game. Within the limitations imposed by this framework, players can still employ creative negotiating strategies that maximize their own payoffs. International negotiations, like all adversarial interactions, often hinge on the psychology of the players. In the rest of this section, we will examine the negotiating strategies used by the two players.

The negotiating strategy used by the USTR was largely set down in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which created the Special 301 procedure. Earlier, negotiations under Section 301 had a tendency to drag on for ever without resolution, during which U.S. exporters would continue to be disadvantaged in foreign markets. The Special 301 procedure intended to change that and substitute a well-defined, time-bound program for the investigation of copyright disputes and imposition of sanctions. Legislators hoped that this would put pressure on foreign trading partners to deliver on specific promises within a given time-frame. As we saw in Section III, this expectation was mostly vindicated in copyright negotiations with countries like Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand.

With China too, the U.S. followed the same "tested" procedure expecting similar results. The Chinese however managed to utilize an apparent procedural disadvantage to further their own interests. Acting on the assumption that the USTR herself was reluctant to impose sanctions, the Chinese delayed negotiations until the last moment on most occasions. With the dead-line looming and no agreement in sight, the psychological advantage of the USTR was replaced by an eagerness to find some common ground that could eliminate the need for trade sanctions. The USTR had no alternative but to accept Chinese guarantees of better copyright enforcement.

The negotiation strategies used by the Chinese give us further insight into the dynamics of two level games. A proposition of two level games theory is that the size of the win-set is inversely related to the strength of a player's negotiating position. The more narrowly defined a player's win-set, the fewer options she gives her opponent and the tougher her negotiating stance. But a smaller win-set increases the chances of no-agreement too, in which case both sides have to bear the costs of no-agreement. As we saw in the Level I analysis, the existence of side-payments made the Chinese willing to agree to U.S. demands. But the configuration of the domestic level in China limited the size of the win-set, and made agreement more difficult. This presented a tactical dilemma for the Chinese principal negotiators. On the one hand, they could present a narrow win-set at the international level reducing the chances of agreement, in which case the side payments too could be lost. Alternatively, they could present a broader win-set and tackle the chances of no ratification at the domestic level. In two level games the latter situation is labelled involuntary defection.[102]

As the case studies reveal, the Chinese consistently chose the second option. By presenting a larger win-set, the Chinese improved the chances of agreement, but portrayed poor enforcement actions as something over which they had no effective control. They thus converted an action they were reluctant to perform into a case of involuntary defection. Interestingly, theorists of two level games would argue that the chances of involuntary defection are reduced in iterated games.[103] In this case, the U.S.-China copyright dispute went through several iterations, in each of which the Chinese promised to improve copyright protection and later failed to deliver on the promise. This "involuntary" defection apparently did not affect the chances of agreement at the next iteration. This can be explained only by the robustness of the U.S. preferred strategy of No Sanctions, discussed in the Level I analysis.

VI. Summary and Conclusions

Since the 1980s, there has been a lot of change in the Chinese copyright regime. While the initial impetus for these changes came from domestic factors, international pressure has played an important role in the reforms especially after 1991. In that year, the USTR initiated the first of several annual Special 301 investigations of China for insufficient copyright protection. Trade sanctions were averted only by the Chinese acceptance of some U.S. demands. China joined the Berne Convention, extended copyright protection to foreigners, and established enforcement mechanisms. But actual enforcement remained poor. Statistics collected by associations of Western copyright industries showed huge losses due to copyright piracy in China.

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[102].. Putnam defines voluntary and involuntary defection as the two modes by which a player may renege from a contract. Voluntary defection is the decision of a rational actor not to comply with an agreement in the absence of enforceable contracts. Involuntary defection, on the other hand, arises when a principal negotiator is not able to deliver on a promise because of non-ratification at the domestic level. See Putnam, *supra* note 8; at 438.

[103].. Involuntary defection has "reputational constraints." A principal negotiator who fails to deliver on a promise made at Level I due to non-ratification at Level II loses credibility and weakens her position in the next round of negotiations. See Putnam, *supra* note 8, at 439.

To explain this contradiction, I used the two level games approach. An examination of the U.S.-China copyright negotiations from this perspective allows us to see why the Special 301 process failed to achieve the outcomes desired by the U.S. At the international level, a game theoretic analysis revealed that China could maximize its gains by refusing to succumb to U.S. pressure, whether the U.S. decided to impose sanctions or not. This would indicate that agreement would be particularly difficult to achieve at the international level. However, both China and the U.S. have several strategic interests that could be furthered through mutual cooperation, and this provided them with an incentive to cooperate in copyright relations as well. The nature of that agreement was determined by the domestic political configurations in the two states.

Three major interest groups were active in the U.S.-China copyright dispute at the U.S. domestic level: the copyright industries, the manufacturing sector and the foreign policy establishment. Because of the divergent demands of these interest groups, the USTR had to evolve "package-deals" that would satisfy some of the demands of each group without alienating the others. This process by its very nature produced incomplete solutions to the main problem, which was better copyright enforcement in China. On the Chinese side, we can infer that a section of the federal government was in favor of better copyright protection, but they were unable to overrule the political support that the pirate industries enjoyed at the provincial level. But the Chinese were able to portray their reluctance to improve the copyright protection as "involuntary defection," or the inability of the principal negotiators to deliver on a promise made at the international level.

So how strong are the prospects of Special 301 to solve international problems like the U.S.-China copyright disputes? As we have seen, Special 301 is a powerful tool to bring foreign governments to the negotiating table to discuss issues of interest to the U.S. In this case too, the Chinese may not have been willing to discuss copyright issues without the threat of trade sanctions. However, the success of Special 301 is based on the assumption that the effects of trade sanctions will be larger on the adversary than on the U.S. domestic economy. Three factors negated this assumption in the Chinese case: the sheer size and growth potential of the Chinese economy, and the relative imperviousness of the Chinese government to the political consequences of trade sanctions, and the globalization of the U.S. domestic economy. Because of these factors, trade sanctions were an option the U.S. could not afford to exercise. The Chinese realized this and capitalized on it.

With the increasing regionalization of world trade, future adversaries of the U.S. in Special 301 actions are likely to be large trading blocs. It is possible that the threat of trade sanctions in the future will not work as effectively as they did with smaller and relatively more vulnerable trading partners. In that sense, the U.S.-China Special 301 case is symptomatic of the new problems U.S. trade policy is likely to face in the future. The creation of transnational alliances between domestic constituents on either side with identical interests is an option the U.S. could investigate.

Secondly, a prominent feature of the Special 301 process was its time-bound procedure for the identification and investigation of copyright violations and imposition of trade sanctions. We saw in this case study how the Chinese were able to manipulate this time-bound program to secure U.S. acceptance of their promises of enforcement actions, which were not delivered in most instances. It could be argued that the time-bound nature of the Special 301 process contributed to the piece-meal nature of progress in China's copyright regime, while a more sustained process could have achieved more concrete progress. On a tactical level too, the USTR had to concede at the end of every year's trade negotiations that substantial progress had been made in copyright enforcement in China, to avoid the necessity of imposing sanctions. In an effort to defend her decisions, the USTR was in effect becoming an advocate of Chinese good intentions before the U.S. Congress and the general public. This too could have been avoided if the Special 301 process did not have a requirement to bring negotiations to an annual closure.

Finally, the U.S.-China trade dispute exposes a fundamental dilemma in U.S. international trade policy. Much as the U.S. would like to encourage sunrise industries like electronics, computers and entertainment through aggressive market-opening actions abroad, it is still not willing to expose its vulnerable labor-intensive manufacturing sector to the effects of counter-sanctions. Ultimately, the fate of the compact disc pirate in Guangzhou is linked to that of the assembly line worker in Detroit. This is an irony no country can escape in our globalizing world.



Figure1: Chronology of Chinese copyright laws and agreements


U.S. :
No Sanctions
Sanctions
China :
Agree
Disagree
$-P, +P$
$-T_c - P, -T_{u.s.} + P$
O, O
$-T_c, -T_{u.s.}$

Figure 2: Analysis of Level I game.

Hegemonic Frames and International News Reporting: A Comparative Study of the New York Times Coverage of the 1996 Indian and Israeli Elections

Submitted to
Markham Competition (student papers)
of the International Division ,
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Conference
Chicago, July 30 - August 2, 1997

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Hegemonic Frames and International News Reporting: A Comparative Study of the New York Times Coverage of the 1996 Indian and Israeli Elections

In 1996 two Asian democracies, India and Israel went to the elections to choose a new parliament. The polls were regarded as crucial turning points in both countries. In Israel, it was generally perceived that the future of the Israel-Palestinian negotiations and the West Asian peace process depended on the outcome of the elections. In India too, the fortunes of the historic Congress Party and the continuation of the economic liberalization program initiated by the Rao government hinged on the election results. It was therefore natural that the elections in these two countries attracted a lot of international media attention.

Historically, the media in the United States have not given much importance to the coverage of foreign news (Hess, 1996). A study of sixty newspapers in nine different Western countries showed that U.S. newspapers ranked last in the coverage of international news and current affairs (Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977). There have been periodic changes in the attitude of U.S. print media towards international news. Till the second World War, the U.S. print media's attitude towards the rest of the world was one of indifference. Once the U.S. became a world power after the war, the U.S. media came to view the world through the cold-war prism. International news developments were depicted as episodes in an ongoing east-west struggle. Countries as small as Cuba and Nicaragua got prominent coverage in the U.S. media because of their perceived association with world communism. After the disintegration of the USSR in 1989, the focus shifted to issue-based stories and emerging economic competition (Dennis, 1993).

In spite of the general indifference of the U.S. print media to international news, larger national newspapers like the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune have established a reputation for quality international reporting. The 1996 elections in India and Israel too received coverage in these national newspapers. However, the available literature on the determinants on international coverage in the U.S. print media leads us to expect that the quality and quantity of the coverage on these two elections would be substantially different. This difference is the subject matter of this paper.

Even when compared to metropolitan newspapers like the Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times, the New York Times was found to be most attentive to foreign news and cosmopolitan in its coverage of international news (Semmel, 1976). The New York Times has also devoted a larger proportion of its space to international coverage; for example, international stories represent 44 percent of all stories on the front page (Haque, 1983). Since the New York Times is the exemplar for international reporting which all other newspapers seek to emulate, both in this country and abroad, I chose to study the coverage of the two elections in this newspaper.

In this paper, I study the quantitative and qualitative differences between the New York Times coverage of the 1996 elections in India and Israel. These two countries are poles apart in geographical area, population, economic development and socio-cultural background. Some differences in news coverage would be natural, arising out of these differences. But the main argument in this paper is that the differences in news coverage do not arise out of these factors alone, but are also colored by the political preferences and strategic perceptions of the United States. In the following sections, I seek to demonstrate the influence of these factors on the New York Times' coverage of the two elections.

Differences in election coverage are expected I on both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions. On the quantitative level, I employ several measures like the duration of coverage, the total number of articles, total column length of all the stories published, placement of the article and others to assess the difference in coverage. These terms and the way they are employed in the study are explained in the methodology section. While the quantitative measures indicate the relative importance placed by the New York Times on the coverage of the two elections, it is the qualitative analysis that most effectively supports the central thesis of this study. To analyze the qualitative aspects of the coverage, I employ framing theory. I study the major themes and motifs running through the coverage of the two elections, and arrange them within a narrative framework that communicates not just factual information about the elections, but also a set of attitudes and evaluative approaches towards the two events.

To set the context for the study, in the following section (Section I) I discuss some important studies dealing with the determinants of international news coverage in the U.S. In Section II, I introduce the main ideas of framing theory. The next section (Section III) deals with methodological issues. Quantitative results are presented in Section IV, after which I discuss the qualitative aspects of the election coverage in Section V. The final section summarizes the discussion, and presents the major conclusions of the study.

Section I: Determinants of International News Coverage in U.S. print media

It is a truism in journalism research that not all events receive similar coverage. Events and individuals have to compete for scarce space in the media, and the events that do get covered are filtered through the gate-keeping function of journalists and editors. International news coverage is no different. Several studies have tried to determine the characteristics of international media events that get coverage in the U.S. press. Most of these studies agree that there are distinct differences in coverage depending on the national origin of the media event.

Chang et al. (1987) mentioned seven determinants of the news-worthiness for international news: normative deviance of the event (defined as oddity or uniqueness of the event which if occurred in the US would break the norm), relevance to the U.S., potential for social change, geographical distance (with closer countries preferred in news coverage), language affinity, level of press freedom and similarity in economic systems. Hester (1973) found that news coverage of a country overseas is dependent upon its geographical size, population, economic development, and the duration of its status as sovereign nation. On these measures, Hester arranged the countries of the world on a hierarchy. In addition, he argues that cultural affinity and economic association between nations are important determinants of news coverage. Culture affinity here includes the social-historical connection between the two countries such as a common language, travel, migration of population and mother country-colony status. Economic association includes trade, investment, and financial aid between countries.

However, the single major determinant of the coverage a foreign country gets is the involvement of U.S. itself in the affairs of that country (Chang et al. 1987, Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977). This ethnocentric attitude is also shaped by the foreign policy priorities of the U.S. and its economic interests. For example, Chang et al. (1987) studied the coverage of international news and current affairs on network television and in the New York Times and concluded that relevance to the United States and the normative deviance of the event were equally important as determinants of coverage. Events with greater potential for social change got more attention from the New York Times, whereas geographical nearness drew the attention of television news. Any event in which U.S. was involved diplomatically or was related to U.S. got much better coverage than an event of comparable importance that did not involve the U.S.

Many studies have also been done on the coverage accorded to Third World events in the U.S. press. These studies concluded that there was imbalance in the volume, direction and content in the global flows of news and information (Masmoudi, 1979; Smith, 1980; Varis, 1984). Not all countries from the five continents get proportionate coverage in U.S. (Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977). These authors observe that third world countries do not receive as much coverage in the media of the developed world as the developed countries do in the media of the third world. They also point out the excessive emphasis on "bad news" from the Third World. The focus of U.S. media had been on crisis-oriented news from the Third World, like famine, civil war, political and economic instability and disease (Riffe & Shaw, 1982). Smith (1980) says that a reason for this imbalance might be that ownership of communicative resources, like news agencies, audiovisual production companies, telecommunications companies and so on, is concentrated in the West.

Based on the above arguments, it is reasonable to expect that there will be quantitative and qualitative differences between the news coverage of events in India and Israel in the U.S. press. Historically, Israel has enjoyed a close relationship with the U.S.; thecreation of Israel itself in 1948 owed a lot to U.S. influence. The U.S. protected the new nation diplomatically, exercising its veto power in the United Nations Security Council numerous times on behalf of that country. For its part, Israel has been a key ally of the U.S. in the middle East, whose rich oil deposits make the region economically and strategically important for the United States. America today has multiple foreign policy stakes and economic commitments in Israel.

India on the other hand, has not been historically allied with the political or economic agenda of the United States. As a non-aligned state, India has championed the cause of the developing nations in world fora, which often placed it in opposite camps with the United States. There was also a widespread impression that India leaned towards the former Soviet Union, in spite of its non-aligned ideology. Also, India's socialist industrial and economic policies proved to be a barrier to U.S. investment and trade with that country. In India too, there was prevalent disappointment and anger with U.S. arms sales and support for a succession of military dictatorships in neighboring Pakistan[1].

Relations between the world's largest democracy and its most powerful democracy were never cordial, but recent years have witnessed a transition. In 1991, India initiated an ambitions liberalization program that welcomed foreign investments into vital technology sectors, and removed many of the restrictions on trade and manufacturing put in place by years of socialism. American investors and businessmen have responded enthusiastically to the liberalization. A breath of fresh air has recently energized Indo-U.S. relations, which languished during the cold war.

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[1] William Safire (1996), in a column in the New York Times, discusses some of the reasons for the mutual mistrust of India and the United States.

To summarize, important factors that influence the coverage that a foreign country receives in the U.S. media are the perceived economic, political and diplomatic relevance of that country for the United States. Based on this, the historically close ties that Israel has enjoyed with the U.S. and the on-again-off-again nature of the Indo-U.S. relationship suggest that the elections in Israel would receive more extensive coverage than the Indian elections.

Section II: Hegemonic Frames

The preceding section discussed the major determinants of the coverage that different nations receive in the U.S. media. But there may also be differences in the narrative tone of the news coverage, like the major themes and trends isolated for presentation. The editorial function of the media permit not just the selective communication of information, but the transmission of particular ideological or cultural approaches for the analysis of that information. The theory of hegemonic frames permits the closer examination of these narratives.

Gamson (1989) defined the concept of frames as a "central organizing idea or story-line that provides meaning to events related to an issue." Entman (1991, 1993) highlighted two different aspects of frames: they constitute both the sense-making processes and textual attributes of the news story. They arise in the normal process of news writing as both a lingusitic and sense-making device that enables communication from journalist to reader. According to Entman, the cold war provided a frame to make sense of international events in the post-war years, just as the horse race provided a popular frame for electoral campaigns. Gitlin (1980), in his analysis of the students' movement of the 1960s, explained framing as the "persistent selection, emphasis and exclusion" of events and issues by media. Through the suppression of unnecessary detail, and the elaboration of elements that can communicate ideas to the reading public in terms of their own culture, the journalist constructs news as a narrative within the frame. "The media frame is largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organizes the world both for journalists who report it, and in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports" (Gitlin, 1980, p.7).

While media frames are applicable in all forms of news reporting, they are especially so when the readers have no direct experience of or contextual information about the subject matter of the news reports. Under these circumstances, the readers make sense of the event based only on the news frame. For most of international reporting, this is indeed the case not just for the readers, but for the journalists as well. In international news reporting, most journalists have neither the experience nor the background information necessary to comment intelligently on events in a foreign country. In many cases, international news reporters cover large territorial zones, for example, a journalist based in New Delhi may cover the entire South Asian region, or even South East Asia as well. They seldom have the time to develop expertise in any one nation's internal affairs. Under these circumstances, international news reporters come to rely on the "digested wisdom" of their national foreign policy establishments (Berry, 1990). Some scholars argue that reporters often rely excessively on their national foreign policy because they lack political wisdom/prudence. Berry (1990) states that reporters are not analytical scholars but accept the assumptions and consensus of the foreign policy establishments in their news coverage.

Another way in which national foreign policy exerts its influence on international news reporting is through the hegemonic affiliations of the journalists. Being the part of the elite group in their national societies, journalists too share in the hegemonic ideology. Both Gitlin (1980) and Rachlin (1988) believe that journalists absorb the hegemonic assumptions which provide the frames for the selection and presentation of news by media. The result is that the media "do not let the 'counter-hegemonic' realities penetrate the press" (Rachlin, 1988). In other words, journalists come to accept the frames provided by national foreign policy establishments as the appropriate lenses through which to view developments in a foreign country. The narrative tone of the news remains tied to country's ideology (Rachlin, 1988).

The discussion so far seems to indicate that hegemonic frames, once internalized by the journalist and reader, are so effectively camouflaged in our thought processes, that they become impossible to uncover. "(F)rames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of the framing devices can appear as 'natural', unremarkable choice of words or images" (Entman, 1991, p. 6). These effects are not achieved through the one-time usage of a metaphor or visual image. They are created, sustained and reinforced through repeated usage, until the way of thinking advocated by the frame has been effectively internalized. "Through repetition, placement, and reinforcing association with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render the one basic interpretation more readily discernable, comprehensible, and memorable than others" (Entman, 1991, p. 7).

If frames are so inaccessibly buried in our thought processes, their use as analytical devices is sharply constrained. Entman (1991) suggests that frames can be revealed through a comparison of the coverage for news events that could have been covered similarly. By juxtaposing contrasting textual choices, the similarities and differences in the news frames are revealed and the frame exposed as an artifact of our sense-making processes. "Comparison reveals that such choices are not inevitable or unproblematic, but rather are central to the way the news frame helps establish the literally "common-sense" (ie., widespread) interpretation of events" (Entman, 1991, p. 6). This paper follows Entman's suggestion in comparing the New York Times coverage of the Israeli and Indian elections of 1996.

Section III: Methodological Issues.

In this study, our attempt is to see if framing conditioned the relative amounts and qualitative aspects of the news coverage given to the 1996 Indian and Israeli parliamentary elections by the New York Times. All the stories covered in New York Times about the Indian and Israeli election till the final declaration of results were included in the analysis. I excluded the post election coverage because the immediate aftermath of elections saw a series of dramatic developments in both countries, like a short-lived minority government in India and the revival of

Israel-Palestine tensions in Israel.[2] All these developments contributed to increased coverage beyond normal post-election levels. Stories not related to the elections but published during the pre-election period have also been excluded.

To obtain a list of articles, I searched two on-line databases - the Expanded Academic Index and the National Newspaper Index and consulted the hard copy New York Times Index. I analyzed all the articles on a number of quantitative and qualitative variables. Though it is difficult to measure qualitative attributes of stories, qualitative analysis was included because it is potentially far more revealing than considering the quantitative data alone (Shoemaker et al., 1991).

Quantitative variables included the duration of coverage (defined as the total elapsed period from the appearance of the first pre-election article to the last, which in both cases was election day), the total number of articles, total column length of all the stories published, placement of the article (on front page, back page, editorial page, international section, letter to the editor, special supplement or other, and whether a related story highlighting the facts discussed in the main story is placed alongside), size of head-line in columns (like placement and length of article, the size of the headline measures in number of columns also might be an indicator of the importance the editor gives to the news item), source of coverage (whether article has a correspondent byline, or is an agency report), and the presence of illustrations (like accompanying photos, maps, text-boxes and charts/graphs) These elements together will highlight an association of word-image-narratives in the stories.

For the qualitative analysis in this study, I gave particular attention to the salience and the choice of news contexts in which stories about the Indian and Israeli elections were placed. It is our argument that the news reports collectively tell a story, which is reduced to its most elementary form in order to make them understandable to the general public.

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[2]. In India, neither the Congress nor the opposition alliances could get a majority in parliament. The rightist Bharatiya Janata Party was invited to form the government, but could not establish a parliamentary majority. After two weeks of uncertainty, the leftist United Front came to power backed from the outside by the Congress. In Israel too, the ruling party lost to the Likud Party. Benjamin Netanyahu, the new prime minister soon began to adopt a hard-line stance towards the peace process, resulting in heightened tension in the entire region.

For a comparative analysis of election coverage for both the countries, I have considered the five month period preceding the declaration of results, divided into five 30-day measurement units. For Israel, election results were not declared till May 31, so the 30-day measurement periods for Israeli election were counted backward from May 30. The Indian election results came on May 9, therefore the 30-day measurement periods for it starts backward from May 8. This way, I have five measurement points for both cases, at which the frequency of coverage can be measured.

Section IV: Quantitative Findings

In summary, the major quantitative findings were as follows: the Israeli elections had 37 stories with a total column length of 729 inches (average length per story, 19.7 inches). The total headline columns were 104 (average length of headline, 2.7 columns) and 13 stories had accompanying illustrations (35% of total number of stories). The first story appeared on January 19, 1996, thereby indicating a duration of coverage of 131 days. The number of stories in the subsequent months were 5, 2, 3, and 26 respectively (See Table 1 in the Appendix).

The Indian election had a total of 20 stories with total column length of 458 inches (average length per story, 22.9 inches). About 50% less lengthy than that of Israel. The total headline columns were 56 (average length of headline, 2.8 columns) and 13 stories had illustrations along (65% of total number of stories). The first story appeared on February 25, 1996, indicating a duration of coverage of 72 days. The number of stories in the subsequent months were 1, 2, and 17 respectively (See Table 2 in the Appendix).

Stories about the Israeli election started appearing in the newspaper five months before the election, whereas the Indian elections began to receive coverage only about three months before the election. The most prominent difference in the number of the stories come in the month of election itself. Against 26 stories on the Israeli elections, only 17 stories of the Indian election appeared in the month immediately preceding the elections in the two countries. The use of photographs, illustration and maps was the same for both India and Israel, but since India had fewer stories, the use of graphic elements was more intensive in the case of India, when measured as the number of stories with accompanying illustrations.

In terms of source of coverage, Israel had only one agency report and rest were correspondent bylines. For India, there were three agency news items in the world news section, as well as two op-ed pieces and one editorial. The same correspondent, John F. Burns, covered all the stories. Apart from the number of stories, it is the placement that shows how much importance the editor attaches to a news event. There were six front page stories for Israel, 16% of all stories on the Israeli elections. In contrast, only two stories on the Indian election figured on the front page (10% of total stories). The average length of a story on Indian elections (22.9 column inches) was more than that for Israel (19.7 column inches). This is partly explained by the fact that a larger proportion of Indian news stories had an accompanying graphic which typically occupies more space.

A comparison between the duration of India and Israel coverage appears in Figure 1. I have taken the five-month period preceding the Indian and Israeli elections, counting backward from the day the first results were announced in the two countries. The y-axis shows the number of stories that appeared in each one-month period. The initial coverage of the Indian election was delayed and in the last month there was a large difference in the number of stories that appeared.

(Figure 1 here)

Section V: Qualitative Findings.

As we saw in Section II, news frames are a form of communicative short-hand employed by journalists to communicate simplified and easily understood versions of complex events. They are especially useful in international news reporting because most newspaper readers do not have experience or contextual information about foreign countries to aid in the sense-making process. Also, frames are most effective when they are in conformity with the readers' existing belief structures and prior knowledge. Frames that contradict the little snippets of information readers have about foreign countries are thus studiously avoided in international news reporting. This is most clearly revealed in the news frames used in the New York Times reports on the Indian elections.

In the past, India had often been regarded as the exotic and mysterious east, differentiated from the west in every possible way. In Rudyard Kipling's famous words "West is west, and East is east, And Never the Twain Shall Meet." In modern times too, the same impressions persist, reinforced partly by India's own tourism promotion literature. Witness the famous Indian "Maharaja" the mascot of the Indian state-run airline. These stereotypes are evident in the New York Times coverage of the Indian elections too. In the next few paragraphs, I discuss the following themes of the news frame employed in the Indian election coverage: royalty, caste, superstition, and corruption. All these themes work together in a news frame to confirm and reinforce India's traditional image as a backward and mysterious region. This news frame presents no surprises to the average newspaper reader in the U.S., and helps make sense of a society and nation that is as vast, diverse and complex as any continental landmass.

An example of the action of this news frame is a report on a prominent Indian politician, who also happened to belong to a former royal family. The New York Times (4/25)[3] headlined the article "Maharaja on hustings in India's elections," in spite of the fact that India abolished royal privileges a half century ago, almost at the time the said politician was born. The lead of the article talks about the politician's grandfather (who happened to share the same name) to reconstruct the splendor of the bygone era of kingship in India, when democratic elections were not even the way of civic life! The lead sentence reads: "Among Indian maharajahs, Madhavrao Scindia's name is legendary. Seventy-five years ago, he led the Prince of Wales later King Edward VIII on a tiger hunt so elaborate that it entered Indian folklore. At a banquet, liquors and cigar were served from a solid silver electric train that circled the table, pausing by each guest" (4/25). The ambience evoked by this article and the associations it seeks to establish have hardly any relevance to the current political situation. But in terms of news frames, this coverage is indeed appropriate because of the seamless continuity of the stereotypes of India as an exotic country of maharajahs and tiger hunts. In a pointless exercise, the article goes on to list all candidates in the election with ties to former royal families, some of them candidates of minor political parties or eccentrics with no chance of winning at the hustings.

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[3] All references to New York Times articles are available in Table 1 and 2. To save space and spare the reader periodic interruptions, the articles are referred to in the text only by the date on which they appeared in the newspaper.

The West has also shared a fascination for the Indian system of caste, probably because there are no parallels to that form of social organization anywhere else in the world. In the New York Times coverage of the 1996 elections, this factor was definitely overplayed. "The key to the politics of . . ., a hamlet of mud-faced homes about 50 miles from the capital city of Uttar Pradesh state, is that all 25 families who live there, clustered about a single well, share the surname Yadav . . a cow-herding clan" (4/10). Though the caste system still exists in India, it is no longer the oppressive social institution it once was, and the rigid association of profession with caste membership is fast disappearing. In spite of this, caste does play a part in Indian elections and the New York Times cannot be faulted for reporting on it, had not several other articles too referred to the practice. During the period of coverage, three other headlines had a reference to caste: "Lower Castes Hold the Key As India Gets Ready to Vote" (4/10), "Caste Loyalties, Democratic Promises" (4/7), "India's 'Avenging Angel': Candidate of Low Caste" (5/6). All these stories are accompanied with the photographs, in fact, one (4/7) shows the caricature of a poor man shabbily dressed, being led by a portly, prosperous-looking man dressed in traditional attire towards a carpeted polling booth. There are other stories that referred to the institution of caste in the text of the articles. This over-emphasis on a medieval practice which Indians themselves are rejecting helps to confirm prevailing stereotypes of India, especially when redeeming counter-examples of the country's modernization and progress are unavailable.

The third element of the news frame on the Indian election coverage was superstition. One news story (5/8) mentioned that India's prime minister was turning to prayer as the votes were being counted. Another was on a religious leader who had been indicted on fraud charges, whose alleged connections to the prime minister had appeared in some Indian newspapers in the run-up to the elections (5/4). The article had a photograph of the holy man too, in long flowing beard and hair. The caption read: "The Hindu holy-man Chandraswamy, a confidant of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, was held yesterday on fraud charges."

The last news item mentioned above segues neatly into the next dominant theme of the news frame: corruption and criminalization of politics. One article (5/6) focused exclusively on Phoolan Devi, a reformed criminal who was running for parliament. It mentioned that the candidacy of Phoolan Devi in the parliamentary elections was an example of the ever-growing number of politicians with criminal records. Another set of articles referred to a corruption scandal that had led to the resignation of several ministers from the Rao government just months before elections were announced.

It was mentioned in the quantitative results that a larger proportion of Indian news stories had an accompanying graphic, typically a photograph, though other graphic elements such as locator maps, portraits of politicians and cartoons were also used. Of these, locator maps aid the reader to process the information in the text, and do not present much scope for semantic manipulation. Curiously there were two photographs of Prime Minister Rao's cut-outs. Cut-outs are huge portraits of national leaders fashioned out of canvas and bamboo scaffolding, which are erected on street corners during elections in India. One front page photograph in the New York Times (3/26) showed a cut-out of Prime Minister Rao being carried to a election rally at New

Delhi. The captions read that "the promise Mahatma Gandhi held out to millions of poor is a distant dream and the capital city is 'rife with slums.'" The author seems to be associating the poverty of the people, the "larger-than-life" leaders who hold sway over them, and the failure of the state to deliver on promises made decades ago. A more devastating critique of India's efforts to maintain its democratic traditions cannot possibly be found.

Prime Minister Rao and his election campaigns and statements receive lukewarm coverage. He is referred to as an "unimpressive campaigner" and compared unfavorably to charismatic predecessors like Rajiv Gandhi and Indira Gandhi (3/5). "Apologetically, Rao tells voters that his name is not Gandhi" (3/5). The reporter's subjective perception seeps through his description of Rao: "Aged 74, with a rambling monotone, a countenance that seems frozen in a frown and a stature that leaves him virtually hidden behind banks of microphones at election rallies, Mr Rao has become a cartoonist's dream" (3/5). The focus remains on the corruption scandal that rocked the Rao Government early during the election year. The mood of the election was portrayed as one of general despondency and exhaustion, the incumbent government described as "bracing for setback", and opposition parties in "disarray" (3/5). The world's largest electoral exercise involving more than 500 million voters was described as "boring", "desultory", "dull", and strangest of all "sanitized" (5/7). These statements convey a general mood of hopelessness about India's democratic future.

Framing works not only through the presentation of information, but through the suppression of contradictory ideas and images. For example, there was very little mention of the economic liberalization program initiated in 1991, which had helped avert a grave foreign exchange crisis and boosted growth rates from barely 2% in 1991 to 7% in 1996. Where the reforms were mentioned, the reporting emphasized a negative angle: an early report (3/5) said that economic reforms could 'accrue benefit only to 150 million middle class city dwellers bypassing 600 million mostly poor villager." Another example is from an editorial (3/30): "Like others around the post-cold-war world, Indians are not yet convinced that capitalism and the creation of wealth will do more than socialism to ease economic disparities and violent ethnic and religious conflicts." The reforms are portrayed as a general opening-up of the economy, but as last-ditch efforts to avoid the effects of "creaky socialism" (5/8).

There were other serious omissions too. Most of the coverage was on the politics of north India, with the south and the economically important west being almost totally neglected. International coverage is often based on idiosyncratic criteria like the home-base of foreign correspondents. In the case of India, most foreign correspondents prefer to stay on in the capital New Delhi, which is in the north. One amusing example (3/26) is a story datelined from the south of India but the accompanying photograph was undoubtedly taken in northern India. Any reader familiar with India would have realized that south Indian women do not veil themselves the way the women in the photograph do. Key issues like employment, economic growth and the historic elections in the terrorism-affected northern province of Kashmir received practically no coverage. The issues to get repeated attention were of corruption, poverty, caste, violence, downfall of Congress party and rise of lower caste leaders.

None of the New York Times stories were factually incorrect. But in the absence of stories on other aspects of the elections, like the use of a sophisticated satellite-based computer network to keep track of electoral results, or the economic issues confronting the electorate, or the sheer logistics of getting half a billion voters to the polling booths, this coverage perpetuates stereotypes of India as a tradition-bound, backward, and superstition-ridden country.

By contrast, the coverage of the Israeli elections was framed almost exclusively in terms of the Israel-Palestinian peace talks. Three major themes can be perceived in the New York Times coverage of the Israeli election. At the most abstract level, the news frames emphasized "Peace in Palestine," a theme already familiar to readers through well-known religious beliefs and cultural associations. Secondly, there was support for the position of the U.S. foreign policy establishment in the coverage of the elections and the peace process in general. The New York Times was consistently supportive of the U.S. interest in the reelection of Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who was crucial to the Israel-Palestinian peace talks. Thirdly, the U.S. constructed a personality conflict between the main candidates based upon their perceived attitudes towards the peace negotiations. The construction of the two candidates a polar opposites, hero-villain or good-bad, was based upon their known positions but refined and unified through selection and suppression of all conflicting information. I will discuss these three themes in the following paragraphs.

The theme "Peace in Palestine" dominated the New York Times coverage of the Israeli elections. Headlines read "As Israelis Prepare to vote, the World Watches Closely" (5/28), signifying the world community's interest in the West Asia peace. Many headlines proclaimed that fact that the fate of the peace process depended on the election results: "Key issues among voters will be debate over peace" said one headline; "Israelis can choose peace or paralysis" said another (5/12). The New York Times was not inaccurate in portraying the peace negotiations as the single most important issue confronting Israel and the West Asian region today. The peace process had received a set-back with the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in November 1995, and the violence-weary nation was searching for ways to end the tension with its Arab citizens and neighbors. Most observers considered the 1996 elections to be crucial for the peace process, because it would choose Israel's principal negotiator for a lasting peace in the region.

The U.S. too has very clear interests in a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in West Asia for reasons already stated. As Steven Erlanger wrote the Israeli elections were "a democratic exercise of vital importance—not only for Israelis in the first place, but also for the rest of the Middle East and thus for American foreign policy (5/26)." Early in the electoral process, the U.S. Foreign policy establishment determined that the peace process would be best served by a reelection of Shimon Peres in the 1996 elections. Peres was a known quantity for the U.S. and he had already made his commitment to the peace clear. On the other hand, Benjamin Netanyahu was untested in power, and his support base included political parties bitterly opposed to the surrender of land in return for peace. The U.S. decided to extend as much help as it could enable Peres to win reelection. This interest of the U.S. government was clear when President Clinton himself campaigned for Peres.

A close parallel existed between the objectives of the Clinton administration and the editorial line of the New York Times. The last three years of Labor party rule in Israel were described as "lifetime of change" in which economy boomed and peace was made with Jordan and PLO (editorial, 5/26). A column by Thomas L. Freidman (5/12) talked of Israel's economic prosperity under Rabin and Peres. Peres himself as portrayed as the best bet for peace. One headline proclaimed: "Peres and Peace in Many Tongues" (5/28), and "Give Shimon Peres and Peace a Chance." Throughout the closely contested run-up to the election, Peres was repeatedly reported to be in a slim but consistent lead. One headline said "Peres maintains a slim lead in Israeli polls as election nears" (5/24). Columnist Anthony Lewis wrote "why Peres still looks like a winner in Israel" (5/3). On the other hand, the opposition Likud party was generally portrayed negatively. One article said that it has not come up with a "realistic platform that takes the account of the new reality" (5/29).

It is evident that reports of Israel's economic growth under the Rabin-Peres governments was largely a media creation. Freidman's article (5/12) on Israel's economic growth under Rabin and Peres was contradicted by a letter to the editor a few days later (5/19), which pointed out that there had actually been a decline in Israel's economic growth rate and that the country had been running up an import-surplus repeatedly. Israel's average national growth rate for 1990-93 was 6.4% and this rate came down marginally to 5.7% in 1993-95. The inflation rate had declined from 12% in 1992 to 10% in 1995. The import surplus had mounted from $3.5 billion in 1989 to $11.1 billion just before elections. This is a mixed bag of economic results, and requires some selective interpretation before a clear case for economic growth during the Labor government can be made.

Yet, the New York Times was willing to manipulate the facts to closely reflect the priorities of the U.S. government. Berry's (1990) observation that reporters are often driven by national foreign policy objectives instead of providing objective coverage seems to be confirmed in this case.

The third theme in the New York Times news frame for the coverage of the Israeli elections was the personality clash between the two principal candidates. The coverage consistently stressed Peres's experience and wisdom and the unfitness of Netanyahu for office. "Mr. Netanyahu's image as a smooth operator and slick talker made him unworthy compared with Mr. Rabin's old-fashioned decorum and soldierly reserve", read one front page story. Another front page headline declared that "Peres is winning the heart of non-voting students" (5/23). Peres was portrayed as a man of experience, decorum and vision, "a more serious candidate with real background" and Netanyahu as the one who is "young, and energetic but driven by fear" (5/27). In the report on a television debate which Netanyahu clearly won, the New York Times interviewed a typical Israeli family. The woman of the household was quoted as dismissing the 30-minute debate format as inadequate for articulating something as complicated as a vision for peace (5/27).

On the other hand, all Peres decisions, no matter how controversial have been justified by the U.S. government and the New York Times. One example was Peres's decision to submit the final pact with the Palestinians to a referendum in Israel (3/2). The announcement was criticized by the Palestinian authority as yet another obstacle for peace and dismissed by Netanyahu as an election gimmick. But the New York Times' editorial (3/3) endorsed it unconditionally. "A referendum is good policy as well as good politics."

In contrast to the Indian election coverage which stressed caste, regional and religious differences, the Israeli election coverage only infrequently referred to the multi-cultural population of Israel (5/22, 5/19). Though the article aired the apprehensions of the minority Arab group, it concluded that thought the Arabs had ample reasons to be displeased with the Peres government, they would favor it in the elections so that a Likud victory would not slow down the peace process.

Another headline stated that "Israeli candidates vie for 'ethnic vote'" (5/19). The point of the article was the crucial role that minority groups and orthodox religious groups play in the electoral outcome. This stands in sharp contrast to the depiction of India's voters profile, where disadvantaged groups are portrayed as marginalized and irrelevant.

Summary and Conclusions

At the beginning of this study, I had expressed the expectation based on the determinants of international news coverage in the U.S. press that the Israeli elections would receive substantially more coverage in the New York Times than the Indian elections. This was confirmed from a quantitative analysis of the news coverage. The pre-election coverage of Israel began at an earlier period, included a larger number of articles, and were consistently better-placed in the newspaper than stories on the Indian elections were.

In terms of qualitative variables, both the Israeli and the Indian coverage display evidence of news frames. In the Indian case, this is the "exotic east", full of superstition, feudal royalty, impoverished masses and god-men. In Israel, the general theme of the news frame was "Peace in Palestine." There was close correspondence between the New York Times' editorial line and the foreign policy objectives of the United States. The electoral conflict was cast in terms of the personalities of the two major contenders. Peres symbolized peace, the stability of experience and the reliability of the old soldier, while Netanyahu represented the threat of instability, the uncertainty of youth, and smooth-talking guile.

Nevertheless, coverage of the Indian elections were much better than my initial assumptions would have led me to expect. In the month immediately preceding the elections, fully 17 stories on the Indian elections appeared in the New York Times, a frequency of better than once every two days. By any standards, this is pretty good coverage for an international news event. In spite of the reservations I express about the qualitative aspects of the coverage, and support for the general hypothesis that Israel will receive more coverage than India, the quantitative data indicate that the New York Times did a better job than expected of covering the Indian elections. An explanation could be that India has become an important market and destination of investments for U.S. industries in the post-liberalization period. Consequently, U.S. press and readers are more interested in developments in that country. Even then, the qualitative aspects of the coverage continues to be in the mold of well established stereotypes about the "exotic east."

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Fig. 1: Monthly Coverage of India and Israel Elections In Five Months Preceding The Elections



Table 1:Coverage of Israeli Election in New York Times

S. No.	Date	Length of Story (inches)	Illustrations	Length of headline (column)	Byline/Agency	Placement
1	19-Jan	16	_	4	Steven Erlanger	International
2	5-Feb	12	_	4	Serge Schemann	International
3	8-Feb	2	_	1	Reuters	World Brief/intl
4	12-Feb	24	_	3	Serge Schemann	International
5	14-Feb	11	_	2	Editorial	Editorial
6	22-Feb	12	_	4	Serge Schemann	International
7	14-Mar	17	_	2	William Safire	Op-Ed
8	30-Mar	60	two photos	2	Serge Schemann	Front/Intl
9	2-Apr	20		2	Joel Greenberg	Front/Intl
10	3-Apr	11	_	2	Editorial	Editorial
11	3-May	16	_	1	Anthony Lewis	Op-Ed
12	9-May	25	_	6	Serge Schemann	International
13	12-May	18	_	4	Thomas Freidman	Op-Ed
14	16-May	23	_	4	Serge Schemann	International
15	17-May	16	_	2	Anthony Lewis	Op-Ed
16	18-May	17	_	3	Serge Schemann	International
17	19-May	16	_	3	Serge Schemann	International
18	19-May	3	_	2	letters	Editorial/letter
19	21-May	30	photo	4	Serge Schemann	International
20	22-May	19	photo	3	Joel Greenberg	International
21	23-May	25	photo	4	Serge Schemann	International
22	24-May	13	_	4	Serge Schemann	International
23	25-May	28	photo	4	Serge Schemann	International
24	26-May	17	photo	4	Joel Greenberg	International
25	26-May	17	_	2	Joseph Berger	International
26	26-May	11	_	1	Editorial	Editorial
27	26-May	33	photo	2	Steven Erlanger	other
28	27-May	30	photo	3	Serge Schemann	Front/Intl
29	27-May	17	_	3	Joseph Berger	International
30	28-May	20	photo & map	1	Joel Greenberg	International
31	28-May	28		2	Serge Schemann	International
32	28-May	19	_	2	Thomas Freidman	Op-Ed
33	29-May	19	photo	2	Joseph Berger	Front/Intl
34	29-May	30	infograph	4	_	International
35	29-May	8		2	Serge Schemann	International
36	30-May	28	photo	4	Serge Schemann	Front/Intl
37	30-May	18	_	2	Joseph Berger	International

Table 2: Coverage of Indian Election in New York Times

S. No.	Date	Length of Story (inches)	Illustrations	Length of headline (column)	Byline/Agency	Placement
1	25-Feb	24	photo	3	John F. Burns	International
2	20-Mar	2	_	1	Reuters	World Brief/intl
3	5-Apr	32	photo	4	John F. Burns	International
4	10-Apr	40	photo & map	4	John F. Burns	International
5	25-Mar	20	photo & map	4	John F. Burns	International
6	26-Apr	48	photo & map	2	John F. Burns	International
7	26-Apr	6	photo	2	_	Front
8	28-Apr	58	photo & map	4	John F. Burns	International
9	30-Apr	6	text-box	2	_	International
10	30-Apr	11	_	2	Editorial	Editorial
11	1-May	2	_	1	Reuters	World Brief/intl
12	2-May	2	_	2	Reuters	World Brief/intl
13	2-May	17	_	2	William Safire	Op-Ed
14	3-May	26	_	4	John F. Burns	Front
15	4-May	20	photos	2	John F. Burns	International
16	5-May	46	photo & map	2	John F. Burns	International
17	6-May	18	photo & map	4	John F. Burns	International
18	7-May	20	caricature	4	Amitav Ghosh	Op-Ed
19	7-May	20	_	1	John F. Burns	International
20	8-May	40	photo	6	John F. Burns	International

Development and Disjuncture on Television in India

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Running Head: DEVELOPMENT AND DISJUNCTURE ON TELEVISION IN INDIA

Student Paper Presented to the International Communication Division of the Annual AEJMC Convention, July 30 - August 2, 1997, Chicago, IL.

Abstract

Using narrative theory, this study detected ideologies embedded in 18 documentaries, serials, and song-based programs on Indian television, and explored the possibilities of integrating educational issues within entertainment programs. The author concludes that even the best-researched and produced documentary on women or minority welfare is futile if it reinforces dominant ideologies that identify the oppressed as the cause of development problems and as recipients of development solutions.

Introduction

Television in India in the 1990s is a site for the intersection of global, national, and regional programming. In the context of economic liberalization, the viewer is no longer limited to the "two-parts education, one-part entertainment" formula of the nation's government-owned Doordarshan television network. The nation has around 50 million television and 15 million cable households (Velloor, 1995). Although national television reaches more than 85 percent of India's 900 million while only 2 percent have access to cable programming (Doordarshan, 1995), this latter proportion is fast increasing.

Indian television has been examined as a tool for education and development beginning with the SITE experiment in 1976. However, the medium has failed to foster sustainable social change because it is still viewed as an extension of the film industry and as a medium of entertainment (Rao, 1987).

Rogers (1976) defines development as a "widely participatory process of social change in a society, intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including greater equality, freedom, and other valued qualities) for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment" (p. 133). This definition assumes however, that a participatory process is possible through consensus among the majority of people and that development of all is for the greater good of society. Unfortunately, many societies are structured according to hierarchical structures that define the domination of some and the suppression of others.

The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate programs on Indian television at the global, national, and regional level to detect the ideologies embedded in them and to explore the possibility of integrating developmental and educational themes within various genres of programming.

From their analysis of programs on Doordarshan, Krishnan and Dighe (1990) have shown that development programs such as *Ghar Bahar*, *Mahilaon Ke Liye*, *Kanooni Salah*, and *Jan Hai Jahan Hai*, while well-conceived, failed to interest audiences for their rigid formats and boring content. Brown and Singhal (1990) state that education for the viewing masses may be conveyed through prosocial television which combines entertainment television with educational television. The authors define entertainment television as a set of "televised performances intended to capture the interest or attention of individuals, giving them pleasure and/or amusement." On the other hand, "Educational television refers to a televised program of instruction and training intended to develop an individual's mental, moral or physical skills to achieve a particular end" (p. 260). Singhal & Rogers (1988; 1989) have shown that telenovelas and soaps which are received by enthusiastic audiences, have been used to effectively integrate entertainment and education.

In the age of globalization where the primary objective is to reach the largest number of consumers (Morley and Robins, 1995), development news can no longer be confined to its documentary format or limited to inclusion in soaps and telenovelas. Thus, for this study, the following research questions are posed: What ideologies (if any) are embedded in programs from global, national and regional networks in India? And, how may genres such as serials and song-based programs be appropriated to integrate development themes?

The study is a textual analysis of programs randomly selected from one month's worth of global (STAR TV and ZEE TV), national (DD-1 and DD-2) and regional (SUNTV, Udaya TV and AsiaNet) network programs[1] (See Appendix). The programs were chosen such that they spanned one week of prime time programming and were subsequently taped for one random week in Bangalore, India.[2] Using narrative theory and discourse analysis, the programs were each analyzed according to such categories as level (global, national, regional), network, language (English, Hindi, Kannada, Tamil, Malayalam), genre (serial, news show, variety show, song-based program), schedule (day and time), story (existents, i.e., characters and setting), and discourse (explained later), to explore the integration of development news in alternate genres of programming.

While narrative theory has been criticized for being "formalist" in that it concentrates on the structure of the text and thus is limited to the text, this study goes beyond the constraints of narrative theory and discusses the ideology embedded in program messages and the organization of the broadcast network from which they are conveyed. It is hoped these lessons will be useful for Doordarshan, a major player in India's television arena, which in turn can stipulate the integration of development news at all levels of programming so that the focus is on the audience development rather than on audience consumption.

Colliding Networks, Allied Images

Price (1995) writes that central control over the mass media within a nation has been recognized as a crucial strategy to sustain national narratives and suppress oppositional discourses. He says, "If one looked at the world's radio and television systems, an essential, almost ever-present feature would be their rootedness in a single place and their exclusive relation to that place" (p. 11). This pattern is evident in the Indian broadcast media. Radio and television have been under government control ever since their establishment in the 1950s.

Gramsci proposed a theory of hegemony through which he saw media as a tool of the ruling classes through which these classes organize consent by constructing and sustaining a system of alliances through political and ideological discourses. To Althusser, the media formed a part of the ideological state apparatus with such institutions as religion, education, law, family, politics and culture, and is seen as a vehicle of the ruling class for the promotion of their ideology (Thompson, 1990).

These theories of the media receive resonance among Indian media scholars. Television in India has been criticized for its reinforcement of class and gender hierarchies (Krishnan and Dighe, 1990). Pendakur (1995) writes that Doordarshan "simultaneously (serves) its own propaganda needs as well as the demands of indigenous and transnational capitalists, along with the entertainment prerogatives of the middle/upper middle classes... there is no evidence that the state television policy is either designed for, or even accidentally related to, social improvements for the vast majority of Indian people". Doordarshan is accused of primarily providing a space for advertisers to reach middle class consumers and for the ruling party to disseminate nationalistic discourse to construct a national culture that supports its position in power (Mankekar, 1993).

Doordarshan: A space for national narratives

In 1975, sixteen years after the first experimental telecast from Delhi to community centres within a 25 km radius, Doordarshan came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting. The Ministry uses television as a centralizing agency to promote national integration, social development, and communal harmony.

India comprises 25 states, 7 union territories, 3,609 towns and 580,702 villages, and has a population of almost 900 million. With an official language for each state, each with several dialects, the task of educating the nation about development issues through the mass media is a complex and formidable one. The country has a literacy rate of 44.7 percent in rural areas and 73.1 percent in urban areas (Doordarshan, 1995). While the print media is a private enterprise, the broadcast media, i.e. radio and television, are government-owned, and hence are used as vehicles of social development and national integration.

The development of satellite television and the establishment of transnational video networks in the mid 1970s gave rise to concerns of cultural imperialism and taste transfer which were vehemently argued at the New World Information and Economic order debates (Masmoudi, 1990; Varis, 1990). The cultural imperialism discourse has been criticized for its simplistic assumptions of the coherence of national cultures (Tomlinson, 1991). In fact, Appadurai (1992) notes, such rhetoric conveying fears of homogenization may be exploited by national elites for their own purposes. They may position global capitalism and commodification as an immediate threat to national culture to distract from their own hegemonic intentions. Wallerstein (1992) points out that culture itself serves as an ideological battleground where ideologies of universalism, racism and sexism are used by dominant groups to sustain power differentials within society.

Development ideology in particular, constructs lines of difference between the urban and the rural, the healthy and the diseased, the rich and the poor, and so on. To live in the city, be healthy and rich is desirable. Such an ideology marginalizes the rural, sick and poor. And indeed, Doordarshan has been criticized by media scholars to be a vehicle for the propagation of the master narratives of patriarchy and Brahmin supremacy through its development programs, sitcoms and educational news shows which are directed at middle and upper class intellectuals rather than the rural people who form a majority of the population (Pendakur, 1995; Mankekar 1993; Krishnan and Dighe, 1990).

In 1982, color television was introduced, and in 1984, a second metro channel (DD-2) featuring more entertainment was added to the metropolitan centres of Delhi, Bombay and Madras. With the installation of the second satellite INSAT - 2B (in addition to INSAT - 1D and INSAT - 2A), several more cities received these programs (Doordarshan, 1995). The tremendous audience response to Mexican telenovela-inspired *Hum Log* (Singhal & Rogers, 1988) attracted advertisers in the mid-1980s. Recognizing the potential for additional capital, Doordarshan encouraged sponsorship for subsequent soaps like *Buniyaad* and *Khandhaan,* and epic series like *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*. Doordarshan still resists complete commercialization however, and persists in its public service programs on national integration and social development despite their miserable ratings of less than 2 percent viewership (Pathania, 1995).

Doordarshan's primary social objectives are national integration, national development, and the creation of appreciation for Indian artistic and cultural heritage. Even programs for children strongly focus on an "enrichment by inculcating moral values, good habits and national consciousness" (Doordarshan 1995, p.26) In addition to news programs, dances and plays representing various regions of India and the theme of national unity, Doordarshan telecasts several public service announcements between programs which run from 5 - 10 minutes each. The main objectives of these echo the objectives of the network as a whole: communal harmony, social development and national integration.

Competing networks: The arrival of cable

Cable TV in 1984 meant little more than mere hookup of the television sets of a local community to a single enterprising VCR owner who would play, for a nominal fee, Indian films for the community. Cable television took on new meaning during the Gulf War in 1990 when the Taj Hotel in Bombay installed a satellite dish on its rooftop to receive CNN's signals of the war. Bypassing legislation preventing them from laying ground cables, innovative entrepreneurs wired rooftops to bring people foreign programming for a small fee of Rs. 100 - 150 (around US $2.6) a month for access. Although no formal regulation controls these operators, they are required to register and pay a 40 percent entertainment tax to the state (Crabtree and Malhotra, 1996).

The lack of government restraint and the availability of slick alternate programming has led to the increase of cable homes from about half a million to 15 million in just two years (from 1992 to 1994), and is expected to pass 50 million by the year 2000 ("General Instrument targets India", 1995). These cable channels uplink to private satellites because the government does not allow uplinking to the Indian satellites, and bring global and regional programming to audiences in India.

The establishment of STAR TV in 1991 in Hong Kong by Li Ka-Shing of Hutchison Whampoa coincided with India's June 1991 economic liberalization policy. Realizing the potential of the Indian market in the liberalized environment, Rupert Murdoch purchased 64 percent of STAR TV which uplinks to ASIA SAT-1, and entered the Indian communications arena in 1992. In keeping with its policy of encouraging open investment and liberalized trade, the Indian government did not curb the flow of STAR TV channels such as MTV, Prime Time Sports and BBC World Service (Shields and Muppidi, 1996). Murdoch acquired 49.9 percent of the Hindi channel ZEE TV, which uplinked to ASIA SAT-1 in 1992. The network provides an exhaustive menu of Hindi films and film songs to Asian audiences as a strategy to subdue accusations of western cultural imperialism.

STAR TV and ZEE TV not only provide alternate channels of entertainment, but also attract advertising away from Doordarshan. In 1993, the two satellite channels were estimated to enjoy a combined 20 percent of total television advertising in India. Advertising on these channels is five times less expensive than on Doordarshan and advertisements appear at intervals of 10-15 minutes during programs (Pathania, 1995).

Although global networks provide slick and attractive programming, a report of audience research published in a leading Indian magazine stated that Indians "feel that American films and television cast an undesirable influence on their culture. Interestingly, while foreign television programmes, including those from the US did very well initially as they offered welcome relief from the drivel dished out by Doordarshan today, Indian programs, whether on Indian or foreign television channels - have a significantly higher viewership because of a marked improvement in variety and quality" (Jain 1995, p. 43). Thus, Doordarshan faces its biggest threat from regional networks which carry extensive indigenous programming.

Private entrepreneurs in various states recognized the potential for regional programming under the liberalized economy. Regional production centres cropped up in various state capitals in 1993 as for example, SUN TV in Madras, Udaya TV in Bangalore, and AsiaNet in Trivandrum. Prevented from uplinking to government satellites, these networks uplink to RIMSAT (Doordarshan, 1995), and provide a wide variety of programming in regional languages, from Indian films and variety shows for entertainment to serials and documentaries for education and development. At present only a small percentage of the Indian population have access to cable channels. However, lower cost of hookups and attractive menus of films and programs in regional languages are leading to the increase of cable homes (Velloor, 1995).

Strategies for resistance

The Ministry for Information and Broadcasting has developed several strategies to battle the satellite invasion. In 1993, the *Cable TV Networks (Regulation) Bill* was introduced in Parliament. It was promulgated as the *Cable Ordinance* on September 1994 and required all cable television networks to be registered. It stipulated a "must carry" rule in that all cable operators should re-transmit, unaltered, at least two Doordarshan channels. Cable operators must use standardized equipment and program content must keep up with the national objective of communal harmony (Doordarshan 1995). The *Ordinance* condemns objectionable content yet does not prohibit it. Thus, satellite and cable channels have ample room to negotiate around this ordinance. The *Indian General Rules of Conduct for TV and Radio Advertizing* also urges advertisers to not offend morality, decency and religious sentiment, but does not require them to do so (Pathania, 1995).

The Ministry has also changed the face of Doordarshan to keep up with attractive programming from the satellite channels. Similar to those of STAR TV, Doordarshan now carries the "Entertainment Channel," the "Music Channel," the "Business and Current Affairs Channel," the "Enrichment Channel," and the "Sports Channel" (Pathania, 1995; Shields and Muppidi, 1996). Doordarshan also broadcasts such serials as *Dallas, Dynasty* and *Carry on Behind* to regain its lost viewership (Crabtree and Malhotra, 1996). Another innovation is the "Movie Club," similar to HBO. By purchasing rights to Indian films, Doordarshan is establishing its leadership in the movies-on-television arena (Velloor, 1995).

Thus, although in serious competition with one another, the networks carry similar programming through documentaries, serials, and song-based programs to snag the largest share of audience-consumers. In this context, criticism against Doordarshan has increased for its compromises on programing content to keep up with its global and regional competitors (Pathania, 1995).

Uncovering Ideology Through Narrative Theory

Narrative theory has been used by semiologists, anthropologists, folklorists, literary critics and film theorists to analyze the intrinsic formal structures of a text (Kozloff, 1992). Developed by Vladmir Propp in the late 1920s and modified by A.J. Greimas in the 1960s, narrative theory is seen as a way to improve the criteria for classifying folk and fairy tales by comparing their content and the function of their elements (Alasuutari, 1995).[3]

Narrative theory provides a useful framework for analyzing television programs because it requires an understanding of the real author, the implied author, the narrator, the narratee, the implied reader and the real reader of the text. Using the rules of narrative theory, the programs in this study were analysed according to story (narrative of the sequence of events)[4] and discourse (how these events are told or conveyed).[5] Kozloff (1992) adds a third dimension: schedule, to understand "how the story and discourse are affected by the text's placement within the larger discourse of the station's schedule" (p. 69). Thus the schedule of all programs were also noted (See Appendix).

The preliminary analysis of the 18 prime-time shows selected from one random week of global, national and regional programming in India showed that only three shows carried overt development themes. *Ret Par Likha Naam*, a Hindi serial on the DD-2 network focused on AIDS, while *Mindwatch*, a Hindi documentary from DD-1 and *Anveshanam*, a Malayalam documentary from AsiaNet focused on scholastic backwardness and on *adivasi* (outcaste) development in Kerala respectively. All the other programs were either song-based or fantasy-based (for example, DD-1's *Alif Laila* was based on the Arabian Nights) shows. The programs that most saliently reflected the observations made from the analysis are discussed in this paper and are classified as documentaries, serials, and song-based programs.

Subdued voices in prime-time serials

van Zoonen (1994) writes that feminist critique focuses on the media and its portrayals of society. Following from the narrow discourse of traditional science which "ignores women's themes and experiences (and) also denies the validity of women's ways of knowing" (p. 14), television "symbolically annihilates women ... and tells society women are not very important by showing an overwhelming majority of men in almost all kinds of television output" (p. 16). van Zoonen goes on to say that the women who do appear on television are invariably young and pretty. Their roles are defined in terms of their relation to their husbands, fathers, sons, and bosses, and are represented as passive, submissive and indecisive.

These traits were all too evident in the serials selected from prime time television for analysis: *Ghutan* (Hindi) from DD-1, *Ret Par Likha Naam* (Hindi) from DD-2 and *Sailaab* (Hindi) from ZEE TV. All three serials focussed on upper middle class people and revolved around their foibles. While *Ret Par Likha Naam* was clearly an educational serial, the protagonist was an urban young woman.

Sailaab is the story of Shivani who has given up her love because he is a poet and is not economically successful. Shivani's brother threatens to commit suicide if she marries her love and hence she marries Avinash, a successful man, while her boyfriend marries her friend Gayathri. The two couples are reasonably happy with their partners. Shivani and her old boyfriend meet when a common friend's wife and son are involved in a car accident (in which the son dies), and realize that their love for each other is still strong. DD-1's *Ghutan* is very similar to *Sailaab*. In Ghutan however, it is Mrinalini the passive mother, who has had to give up her love (Gautam Bedi, now a businessman in Zambia) for similar reasons. She is married to an aggressive, arrogant man who treats her as if she is a doormat. Ignorant of Mrinalini's connection to Gautam Bedi, Mrinalini's husband fixes an alliance between his daughter Shyamili and Gautam Bedi's son Neel. However, Shyamili is in love with her classmate Avinash, and she discusses this with Gautam Bedi. Gautam Bedi realizes Shyamili is Mrinalini's daughter and does all he can to unite Shyamili and Avinash despite her father's wishes.

In the episode analyzed of *Sailaab*, both Shivani and Gayathri are portrayed as patient listeners while their husbands express their torment and anguish that their friend's young son has died in the accident and that his wife is in a critical condition at the hospital. Gayathri blandly tells her husband as he talks of his grief, "Here, drink this tea and don't think too much about it." Thus, the women are excluded from the complexities of human emotion and are supportive bystanders to the drama. The two women meet in the hospital and once again, take on the role of caretakers, providing food for their friend and relieving him of his vigil over his wife.

A social message is conveyed when the doctor tells Shivani as she goes to buy the prescribed medicines, that she should take careful note of the expiry date on the medicines because stale medicines are dangerous.

Shivani and her husband have a manservant, Samson. Samson is a simple-minded Christian. Thus, the serial provides a menial role for the minority Christian which he performs with unquestioning acceptance.

In the episode of *Ghutan* analyzed, Mrinalini is seen as a woman whose freedom is severely curtailed. She is admiring yet uncomfortable with her daughter's extroversion. Shyamili is representative of the younger, headstrong generation with her short hair, western clothes, loud voice, and brash behaviour. Mrinalini is amused and disturbed by her outgoing daughter. Her confinement to the private sphere of the home is further evident in her extreme apprehension when she realizes her husband is home and dinner isn't ready yet.

The real authors who are the writers and producers of the serials seem intertwined with the networks themselves. The presence of the networks was evident in their logos which stayed on the screen right through the show. The ZEE TV logo occupied its position on the top right of the screen while DD-1 and DD-2's logos were displayed on the top right and top left of the screen respectively. Thus, the viewer is reminded of the centre from which the program originates. The narrators of *Sailaab* and *Ghutan* are Shivani and Mrinalini respectively. The stories revolve around them and the events that occur because of the decisions made for them. Both women are not critical actors, but passive recipients of their destiny. Thus, Shivani and Mrinalini are homodigetic narrators in that their world is embedded within the world of the larger frame of the story. Through their embededdness, the stories of these women achieved a certain realism.

Singhal & Rogers (1988) studied the popularity of *Hum Log*, the first Indian soap opera in the mid 1980s. They noted that the soap allowed audience identification with the characters. However, the authors acknowledge that the effects of *Hum Log* in promoting women's welfare, family planning and family harmony are yet unknown. It is hoped that audiences identifying with Shivani and Mrinalini realize they have to work their way out of their oppressive situations and not accept them as these protagonists do.

Krishnan and Dighe (1990) analyzed various programs on Doordarshan from soaps such as *Khandaaan* and *Buniyaad* that followed *Hum Log* to such development shows as *Anganwadi* and *Krishi Darshan* and concluded that a hegemonic pattern was evident: light-skinned actors were preferred over dark-skinned, male narrators over female, and middle class protagonists over working class. This was evident in *Sailaab* and *Ghutan*. The primary characters were light-skinned and belonged to the upper middle class. The working class were dark-skinned hospital attendants and house servants.

In *Ret Par Likha Naam* , Seema, the protagonist, is working on a film about AIDS. Her research is based at a hospital where she goes on rounds with Dr. Salim and meets various AIDS patients. In the episode analysed, the two ride in Shekhar's (who is HIV positive) taxicab. Dr. Salim tells Shekhar he needs to start treatment immediately and Seema follows this by a line in English: "The earlier you start the treatment the better". It is odd that this crucial lesson is not delivered in Hindi. It immediately positions the serial as one directed to the middle class.

Later, as Seema talks to an AIDS patient in the hospital, she learns that the man is a truck driver who stopped at a wayside brothel and was tempted into sleeping with a prostitute who infected him. In constructing the lesson that people with AIDS should not be outcast (later demonstrated when the doctor hugs the truck driver), the episode identifies the woman as the cause of AIDS.

From an analysis of *Newstrack's* (a private video production that provides an alternative voice to mainstream Indian television) coverage of AIDS in India, Bardhan (1996) shows that doctors in several prominent hospitals were shown to be ignorant of AIDS and as avoiding contact with their patients. Interviews with prostitutes in *Newstrack* squarely framed this ostracized group as the primary carriers of AIDS. In *Ret Par Likha Naam*, the male doctor is redeemed by his compassion for the AIDS patient demonstrated by his physical contact and kind words to the patient, but the prostitute is still framed as the malevolent perpetrator of AIDS. No space is provided for the understanding of the complex realities that define her position as a prostitute.

Seema, as the narrator, is more heterodigetic than Shivani and Mrinalini in *Sailaab* and *Ghutan* respectively. Although she is a primary character in the serial, she is distanced by her intellect, independence, and activism in educating people about AIDS. However, her tale is embedded within the larger frame of the story, and thus she occupies an important position as a concerned and educated individual. She takes on the role of the implied viewer as well, in her fervour to reach out to people and document their stories. Through doctor-patient interactions, a few lessons emerge in the episode: that HIV positive mothers may give birth to healthy babies and that women should not shun their HIV positive husbands.

Although Seema is more independent than Shivani or Mrinalini, she is again a listener, learning about AIDS from Dr. Salim. These roles reinforce the stereotypical and patriarchal values about women. Such roles run contrary to development objectives of elevating the welfare of women and the less privileged.

Development hierarchies in documentaries

The documentaries *Mindwatch* (Hindi) and *Anveshanam (*Malayalam) of DD-1 and AisaNet respectively, are designed to deal with such themes as child rearing, AIDS, women's welfare, and environmental and ecological balance.[6]

The episode of *Mindwatch* analyzed focused on scholastic backwardness. The program taped in English, was dubbed in Hindi. The dubbed voices were monotone and seemed to be read from a script, thus denying the speakers any natural expression.

A male narrator introduced the topic and was followed by clips of children in various contexts shown shunned by parents, peers, and teachers. The purpose was to identify factors that could lead to scholastic backwardness. The topic was well-researched and the program included views from various scholars from institutions all over the country. However, the program was limited to talking heads and it was obvious that the program was taped as a series of individual interviews which were later edited and spliced to give the program coherence.

Ten males and 10 females were interviewed for the program. The males enjoyed a total of 26 sound bites while the females were given only 16 sound bites.

The narrator commented that alternatives for economic viability were available for scholastic backward individuals and that formal schooling was not a necessity. However, five alternatives were shown for men in such occupations as weaving, carpentry, candle-making, cobblery, and printing, while only one was shown for women: sewing.

Ramu (1989) conducted an extensive survey on four samples each comprising 245 individuals to understand the women-work-marriage dynamic in urban India. He writes, "it is not as though men are unaware of the economic significance of their wive's non-domestic labour, but they need constant reassurance that traditional household arrangements will not be disturbed. It is obvious in such a situation that the normative system which gives precedence to male demands concurrently undermines the female's right to exercise her will in matters in which she has, in law, a right. In matters pertaining to the rights of women, it is custom, not law, that takes precedence" (p. 61). Scholastically backward women through this clip were shown as having extremely limited choices outside the private sphere of the home. This perpetuates the myth that women do not contribute as much as men do to the economic well-being of the household. Thus, they were in a doubly-discriminated position being women *and* scholastically backward.

Visuals employed to point out parenting tips focused on the mother. For example, one clip showed a mother was wrong in scolding her daughter for disturbing her with a homework question while the mother watched television. Another clip showed a wife berating her husband, while their two small children watched, for not spending enough time with her. Thus the authors of the show (the producers of the program) and the narrator, constructed a narrative that defined its implied viewer as the mother of scholastically backward children and relegated minimal responsibility to the father. A positive feature of the program was that all visual clips depicting professional counselling included female doctors, acknowledging their role in this professional arena.

The narrator's position in this episode clearly rooted him in the institution. He remained heterodigetic to the problem discussed. All the speakers joined him in this heterodigetic plane in their intellectual discussion of the problem. The narrator and speakers as sub-narrators related the whole narrative of the problem and solution of scholastic backwardness. With the exception of a brief sound bite from a female student, none of the scholastically backward children or adults were interviewed, confining them to the margins of the discourse. They were spoken for and spoken about, but not spoken to.

The narrator and sub-narrators exhibited a great degree of distance in terms of place by their positions in the studio, behind their office desks and in front of the institution building itself, and thus were clearly removed from the world of the scholastically backward children and their parents. This distance was amplified by the dubbing of the program in Hindi. The voices lacked expression and seemed to be merely belting out instructions to the audience. The narrator and sub-narrators all exhibited a great degree of self-consciousness of their positions as authoritative speakers. The narrator displayed a high level of omniscience in that he appeared between sub-narrators, summing up their points and moving the program forward, aware of its structure of problem, problem development, and solution. Kozlof (1992) writes that a great distance between narrator and text and a strong emphasis on institution serves to distance the real viewer and the text although the intention of the real author (the producers of the show) may be to bind the implied viewer (expected to be an individual spurred to action by the text) to the narrative.

The focus of AsiaNet's *Anveshanam* was the tension between environmental protection in the Kerala Biological Park and the development of *adivasis* (outcaste) residents in the Park. The documentary incorporated several long shots to show the scenic beauty of Kerala and of the Biological Park. A male voice-over described the extent of the Park and the efforts to establish an *adivasi* colony within it. While the narrator was physically absent from the documentary, his presence was imposed through his voice-over describing the problem and summing up the perspective of the *adivasis* and the government officials in charge of the project. Subjects directed their gaze to the narrator who stayed off-camera. Thus the narrator remained heterodigetic to the narrative and established his distance though commentary and through the gaze the interviewees in the documentary directed to him.

Fourteen people were interviewed for this documentary: five male government officials, four female social workers, three male *adivasis* and two female *adivasis*. The government officials enjoyed a total of nine sound bites while the social workers were given one sound bite each. The *adivasis* were also given one sound bite each and their comments were limited to one or two sentences while the government officials spoke at length about the problem. Although the institutional voice was not as apparent in *Anveshanam* as it was in *Mindwatch*, the former did seem to focus more on the comments of the government officials than the *adivasis* themselves. However, this documentary was more interesting to watch for its filming in the Park and its balance of commentary with interviews.

Krishnan and Dighe (1990) note that male narrators and voice-overs contribute to the patriarchal "male as technical expert" (p. 81) discourse. The male narrators in both documentaries and their clear distances from the text served to create a hierarchical narrative with the males as controllers and designers of the program, and with females, scholastically backward individuals and *adivasis* at the receiving end of male knowledge. Thus, scripts, sound bites and visual clips may perpetuate hegemonic discourses if not carefully chosen, and may threaten the spaces of development for women and the less privileged.

Song-based programs as frames for development

Film songs are immensely popular with the Indian public and Doordarshan caters to popular demand through such shows as *Chayageet* and *Chitrahaar* where songs from various movies are selected such that they are linked by a common theme or language. These half-hour programs receive the highest ratings in almost all the Indian states. For example, average ratings in 1995 for song-based programs were 40 percent in Jalandhar, 40 percent in Bombay, 80 percent in Madras, 70 percent in Bangalore, 70 percent in Hyderabad, and 75 percent in Trivandrum. In states where song-based programs did not rate first, they were overtaken only by the regional language feature film (Doordarshan, 1995).

Krishnan and Dighe (1990) note that "the extreme popularity of these songs is witness to the possibility that they meet a deeply felt psychological need" (p. 45). They cite Jayomane (1981) who says "(film) songs have a crucial function to perform, since it is in songs that hopes and desires which cannot be realized are quite often expressed; the music expresses and contains the energy which the narrative is often incapable of articulating" (p. 45). In their analysis of 31 song-based programs, Krishnan and Dighe (1990) observed that the common themes were man-woman romance (where lovers invariably pined for each other), male-female polarities (where men were portrayed as aggressive and domineering and women were submissive and dependent), male-worshiping (where women worshiped their husbands, and young girls dreamt of future lovers), and sadism-violence (where men were shown enjoying the imposition of their strength on women). These themes were echoed in the song-based programs analyzed for this study: ZEE TV's *Kal Bhi Aaj Bhi* (Hindi), SUN TV's *Pepsi Ungal Choice* (Tamil) and Udaya TV's *Top 10* (Kannada).

These programs differed most significantly from Doordarshan's song-based programmes in their use of the narrator. The narrator, (female for *Kal Bhi Aaj Bhi* and *Pepsi Ungal Choice* and male for *Top 10*), introduced the program, appeared between songs to link them to the common theme, and concluded the program.

The songs on *Kal Bhi Aaj Bhi* reflected the theme of *Raksha Bhandan*, a Hindu festival which celebrates the relationship between a brother and sister. The narrator's comments and the songs reaffirmed traditional Indian beliefs that a girl is abundantly blessed if she has a brother (in two songs, the girls were shown almost in mourning because they did not have brothers. Their devotion to God results in a miracle where a brother suddenly appears before them); it is the brother's duty to protect his sister (usually at the verge of being raped by a rich landlord); it is a brother's duty to get his sister married, and so on. The implied authors, or the actors within the songs themselves, reinforce the problematic beliefs of son preference and not-so-subtly affirm the string of social evils that follow: sex-determination as a prelude to female infanticide, dowry death, and general abuse of females in the domestic sphere (Luthra, 1994).

The narrator was heterodigetic to the narrative and delivered her comments from the studio. Although she established her extranaiety from the narrative of the songs through her distance in time and space from the songs, she conveyed her participance in the larger narrative of *Raksha Bhandan* by talking about the love that "we Indian girls" have for "our brothers" and by discussing ways in which sisters could send *raakhi's* (a thread bracelet given by a sister to her brother as a symbol of the bond between them) over long distances to their brothers.

Udaya TV's *Top 10* was similar in format. The program used the signature tune from *MTV Countdown* to introduce the top ten Kannada film songs. The narrator, a young male, introduced the show from a schoolyard and was surrounded by children as he narrated his way through the show. The rationale behind having children with the narrator was clear at the end of the show when the narrator philosophized that children are the future of the state and that Kannadigas should be proud of belonging to such a noble state as Karnataka, home of famous artists and writers. His philosophy and his comments between songs however, had nothing to do with the songs themselves. The themes in the songs were female bondage, male aggression over female passivity, and female imbecility and beauty (this seemed to be a common theme in almost all the songs where the women were beautiful, but displayed extreme stupidity in their antics such as crawling across the floor in a room of uniformed men, or slinking across a bannister to seduce a seemingly pious and strong-willed man). The narrator was heterodigetic to the narrative and exhibited his distance through his place in the schoolyard, a world apart from the context of the songs.

Pepsi Ungal Choice differed from *Kal Bhi Aaj Bhi* and *Top 10* in that it was a call-in request show. The female narrator stood before a large screen which showed images of Pepsi being poured from a bottle, of larger than life white skiers whizzing down a slope, and of the Indian Cricket team's World Cup victory at Lord's, England. Thus the real authors were a complex matrix of the writers and producers of the songs, the network, and Pepsi which presided over the show with its sensuous images almost distracting from the shy yet very pleasant narrator in the foreground.

The narrator took calls from various viewers (a format adopted from popular radio shows) and seemed a little uncomfortable when she had difficulty in hearing the caller or in making herself understood to the caller. Yet she smiled for the camera and established her heterodigetic role as the narrator in her ability to take requests, provide viewers with their choice of songs, control the conversation between her and the invisible callers, and guide the conversation to a close when she was aware that the song requested was ready for telecast. The studio settings and the Pepsi screen in the background rooted the narrator in the studio and thus distanced her from the world portrayed in the songs themselves.

While the female narrators smiled and said they were delighted to present film-songs to the viewers, the male narrator pretended to be bored (he even let himself be caught between songs napping on a school swing) in an obvious attempt at humor. It was only at the end that he stated his pleasure in hosting the show. The male narrator was more omniscient than the female narrators by his location in various areas of the schoolyard and by his comments that ranged from politics to film affairs as opposed to the formal studio location and the program-specific comments of the female narrators. The difference in the degree of omniscience between the male narrator and female narrators supports the patriarchal discourse where the male is allowed greater freedom and flexibility of style while the female follows the instructions of the producers and conforms to the format of the show.

Although all narrators were heterodigetic and may be considered more objective and authoritative than the homodigetic narrators of the serials, they were less so than those of the documentaries. This is of course a factor of the content of the shows. It is also a factor of the informal style of the narrators. In his or her position as an arbitrator of entertainment, and as a semi-authoritative voice of the network, the role of the narrator in a song-based program rises in importance. This role can be usefully exploited to reinforce development themes and raise salient issues about the welfare of women, the well-being of children and the development of the less privileged.

The analysis of song-based programs shows that class and gender differences prevalent in

Doordarshan programming (Krishnan and Dighe, 1990) is prevalent on the cable networks as well. The obvious reason is that all networks are drawing from the same resource: the Indian film industry. Thus, the responsibility to provide fair representation of women and minorities and to target their welfare is extended to the Indian film industry as well as all other media production centers that contribute to network programming.

Conclusions

The purpose of this study was two-fold: to detect the ideologies embedded in documentaries, serials, and song-based programs on Indian television, and to explore the possibilities of integrating development issues within serials and song-based programs. In the context of globalization, this required a study of programs from global, national, and regional networks. Thus an analysis using narrative theory and discourse analysis was conducted on a random sample of 18 prime-time programs from all three levels of networks. Of these, two documentaries, three serials and three song-based programs that most saliently reflected the observations of the analysis were discussed in this paper.

A broad conclusion is that the networks imitate the formats of each other in order to compete for the largest share of audience-consumers. ZEE TV, an offspring of STAR TV, offers extensive Hindi film based programming while Doordarshan has expanded its program menu to include more serials, soaps, business news and so on. However, embedded in all the programs analyzed, regardless of the network from which they originated, were ideologies of class and gender. Light-skinned people were primary actors, religious minorities and dark-skinned people occupied marginal roles, women were portrayed as carriers of AIDS, as examples of bad parenting and as passive doormats, sacrificing their love in order to conform to the pressures of society. By exposing the ideologies prevalent in programs of various genres from various networks, this study posits that even the best-researched and produced documentary on women or minority welfare is futile if it reinforces dominant ideologies that identify the oppressed as the cause of development problems and as recipients of development solutions. While welfare of women and minorities is only one aspect of development and other areas such as animal husbandry, farming, and environmental protection require urgent attention, the first step is to bring about equality in society so that the oppressed are empowered through greater number of choices and therefore have greater control over their environments. Television certainly has an important role to play in their empowerment.

The choices of the average viewer are increasing in the age of globalization. With a variety of channels and programs for entertainment, it is logical to assume that the already meagre audiences for development news presented in uninspiring documentary and news show formats will dwindle. Development news no longer has to be confined to documentaries or public service announcements. Serials and sitcoms are far more popular than boring documentaries shown during the daytime. Therefore, these genres provide powerful sites for the inclusion of educational messages. More critical thinking and careful planning can lead to portrayal of women as strong, capable professionals, as healthy, independent and innovative housewives and as strong-willed and responsible citizens. Husbands and wives may be portrayed as equal partners, nurturing and respecting each other.

The role of the narrator is especially important in song-based programs because of his or her neither-authoritative-nor powerless position. Comments between programs, instead of reiterating themes conveyed in the song, may raise important questions that will help the audience rethink issues of son-preference and female subjectivity. The role of the narrator as voice of the institution in documentaries, on the other hand, would benefit from being subdued to avoid the impression of a top-down "we know what's good for you" approach.

A major criticism to the incorporation of educational and developmental messages in entertainment genres such as sitcoms, serials and song-based programs could be that these messages may be lost in the larger frame of entertainment. However, these genres have an advantage in that they reach a large number of viewers as compared to the documentaries. It is the responsibility of the producers and scriptwriters to innovatively integrate messages of birth control, health and hygiene, and female validation within these genres.

Besides exploring various genres for the integration of development news, Doordarshan would benefit from exploring these genres for the inclusion of themes of national identity. The regional network channels SUN TV, Udaya TV, and AsiaNet offer a similar variety of programming, yet use regionally specific themes and regional languages to more narrowly define their regional audiences and reinforce a regional identity. Although the proportion of cable homes is as yet marginal, their increasing numbers is not to be taken lightly as the current political climate of regional differences, combined with programs centering on themes of regional identity from these networks may lead to the reinforcement of a regional identity that may be in tension with a national Indian identity. Thus the development of regional networks and the propagation of a regional identity may undermine Doordarshan's efforts at national integration. A study which examines parallel discourses of global, national, and regional identity as carried by these networks will be useful to understand the role of the media in sustaining or fragmenting the Indian nation-state in an age of globalization. Audience analysis is crucial to understand meanings viewers of global, national, and regional programming, and the author hopes to conduct such an analysis in the near future.

APPENDIX

Programs selected from global, national and regional television networks in India

NETWORK	PROGRAM	SCHEDULE*
Global		
STAR TV	NYPD Blue	Wednesday 9:00-10:00
Language: English	(Travel Plus - Tahiti)**	
	Bold and the Beautiful	Wednesday 10:00-11:00
	(Travel Plus - San Juan)	
	Santa Barbara	Wednesday 11:00-12:00
	(Indian Snapshots)**	
	Baywatch	Saturday 8:00- 9:00
	(Travel Plus - American presidential memorabilia)	
	Sirens	Saturday 9:00-10:00
	TVS Saregama	Monday 8:00-9:00
ZEE TV	Sailaab	Tuesday 8:30-9:00
Language: Hindi	Kal Bhi Aaj Bhi	Thursday 5:30-6:00
National		
DD-1	Alif Laila	Monday 9:30-10:00
Language: Hindi	Ghutan	Thursday 9:30- 10:00
	Mindwatch	Friday 6:00- 6:30
	Parliamentary Quiz	Friday 7:30- 8:00
DD-2	A Mouthful of Sky	Tuesday 11:00-11:30
Language: Hindi	Ret Par Likha Naam	Wednesday 11:00-11:30
	CNBC Int'l Business News	Thursday 7:00- 7:30
Regional		
Udaya TV (Bangalore)	Adarsha Dampathigalu	Monday 7:30- 8:00
Language: Kannada		Saturday 6:30- 7:00
SUNTV (Madras)	Pepsi Ungal Choice	Thursday 8:30- 9:00
Language: Tamil		
AsiaNet (Kerala)	Anveshanam	Sunday 10:00-10:3
Language: Malayalam		

* All programs were taped from evening, prime-time shows on all networks.

** Travel Plus and Indian Snapshots are STAR TV's fillers between programs.

Endnotes

1. A preliminary analysis was conducted on all programs. Those that did not offer the possibility of integrating development themes relevant to the Indian context were discarded (as for example, the serials on STAR TV). A second, detailed analysis was then conducted on the rest of the programs, and the ones most pertinently reflecting the findings of the analysis are discussed in this paper.

2. The author would like to thank Professor Susheela Punitha and Deepa Ganesh of Seshadripuram College, Bangalore University, for the taping and monitoring of the programs in Bangalore, India. The author would also like to thank Shuhua Zhou of Indiana University for his assistance with the conversion of the tapes from PAL to NTSC format for analysis.

3. For a detailed description of the contributions of Propp and Griemas to narrative theory, see Silverman, D. Interpreting Qualitative Data (pp. 72-79). London & New Delhi: Sage.

4. Under story analysis, each program was analyzed according to its existents which comprise the characters and setting of the program.

5. For discourse analysis, the programs were examined according to:
i. Digesis which is the relationship between the narrator of the story to the world constructed by the story. Thus, the narrator was classified as homodigetic (situated within the world constructed by the story), or heterodigetic (external to the world constructed by the story).
ii. Whether the narrator related the whole tale or whether the tale was embedded in a larger story.
iii. The degree of distance in space and time between the story's world and the narrator's world.
iv. The degree of distance in terms of transparency, irony and self-consciousness as portrayed by the narrator.
v. Whether or not the narrator is reliable. Reliability is judged by the discrepancy between what the narrator tells the audience and what the audience intuitively think the implied author believed.
vi. The narrator's degree of omniscience. This may involve one or more of the following: the narrator's knowledge of the story's outcome, his or her ability to enter the hearts and minds of the characters and his or her ability to move freely in time and space.

6. A detailed synopsis of all the shows were provided by Deepa Ganesh who taped the shows.

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Purchasing Involvement in South Asia: Its Relationship with Attitude Toward and Beliefs About Advertising

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Abstract

A survey of 825 university students in five South Asian countries measured the relationship of social, economic, and hedonistic beliefs, media use, and attitudes to advertising with purchasing involvement. All three beliefs, AG, and media use significantly predict purchasing involvement. However, economic beliefs and media use have a negative relationship with purchasing involvement. High purchasing involved consumers may be less critical of advertising for its influence on values, they may even enjoy it and evaluate it positively, but because they are careful shoppers they do not credit it as a source of information or an economic necessity. Possibly for that reason lower levels of media use are associated with higher levels of purchasing involvement.

Submitted for review for presentation to the International Communication Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, National Convention, Chicago, July 1997.

Purchasing Involvement in South Asia: Its Relationship with Attitude Toward and Beliefs About Advertising

Introduction

The attention marketing researchers have focused on the construct of involvement is historically long, conceptually wide, and operationally diverse. While advertising attitudes and beliefs have not been quite the same "blue-eyed boy" of marketing researchers, they have received a fair share of attention. This study is positioned at the crossroads where these strands of research meet. It assesses the relationship between involvement and attitude to and beliefs about advertising. Given the importance of international study in advertising, the study is set in South Asia.

Involvement

In the marketing/advertising literature, the construct of involvement occupies a central place. Its multidimensional nature is evident in the many referents it has: advertising message and execution (Krugman 1966-67; Lutz 1985), brand (Cushing and Douglas-Tate 1985), product (Bowen and Chaffee 1974; Vaughn 1980), and purchase (Zaichkowsky 1985), to name a few. Though it is an issue of some debate, involvement is sometimes conceptualized to reside in the referent (object) itself. For example, some products may be more involving than others simply because they are more expensive or a higher risk is associated with making a poor choice for these products. More often, however, involvement is seen as a link or tie between a person and an object, i.e., involvement is not an intrinsic feature of an object rather it is a condition of an individual with reference to the object. For example, an ad is not more or less involving in itself, rather an individual is more or less involved with the ad.

If the presence or absence of this link in a person with regard to any one of the objects is enduring in nature, the type of involvement might best be described, borrowing Muehling, Laczniak, and Andrews' (1993) terminology, as a trait, i.e., a characteristic of an individual. If the link, however, is temporarily activated, the involvement might best be defined as a state, i.e., a condition an individual is in for a limited period of time.

This (trait and state) involvement or lack thereof is likely to affect a person's reactions towards the object or towards related objects. For example, if a person is highly involved with a product, it is likely to affect the way he/she responds to the product as well as to advertising about the product. These responses or processing states of individuals have often been used as a third (apart from trait and state) way to define involvement (Batra and Ray 1983; Greenwald and Leavitt 1985); according to some (Andrews, Durvasula, and Akhter 1990), they are however more precisely consequences of involvement rather than involvement per se. In describing and measuring involvement, however, it is difficult and in fact may not be necessary to keep the "effects" of involvement separate from the involvement trait or state.

Purchasing Involvement

This study conceptualizes involvement as a link between a person and a referent. It is particularly interested in purchasing involvement, as an enduring trait. Following Tashchian and Slama (1984) and Slama and Tashchian (1985), purchasing involvement is defined as a person's personal link with the task of purchasing, i.e., a "general measure of the self relevance of purchasing activities to the individual" (Slama and Tashchian, 1985, p. 73). Purchasing involved persons are not necessarily interested in a particular product class, brand, or purchase situation; rather they have a general interest in purchasing across all situations.

While several researchers have worked on the periphery of this concept [for example, Thorelli, Becker and Engledow's (1975) "information seekers"], Tashchian and Slama (1984) were the first to systematically address it. Earlier, Kassarjian (1981) had discussed consumer involvement as a personality trait independent of product involvement and, while he did not call it purchasing involvement, the concept was similar. In 1985, Zaichkowsky (1985) developed the Personal Involvement Inventory (PII) as a context neutral scale, i.e., it can be use to measure involvement with advertising, products, or purchase decisions. In 1987, Feick and Price (1987) suggested that the kind of person described by Kassarjian and Slama and Tashchian could also be a marketplace influencer or a "market maven." A market maven is a person who has information about products, marketplaces, and such and initiates discussion and responds to consumers about this market information. Market mavens are people with general marketplace expertise. In 1989, Mittal (1989) developed the Purchase Decision Inventory (PDI), but stated clearly that the PDI is "the extent of interest and concern that a consumer brings to bear upon a purchase decision task" and is not to be confused with the purchasing involvement that Tashchian and Slama (1984) and Slama and Tashchian (1985) define and measure. The PDI comprises four items: degree of caring, perceived brand differences, importance of right brand selections, and concern with the outcome.

Involvement Research

Scale development has therefore preoccupied researchers in purchasing involvement research. In involvement research in general, researchers have moved beyond this step: the theoretical literature has proposed and the empirical literature has tested the direct and indirect effects of involvement on consumers. The study of direct effects has focused on variables deriving from the hierarchy of effects (recall, attitude, intention to purchase, and such) and the study of indirect effects has focused on Petty and Cacioppo's (1985) Elaboration Likelihood Model and MacKenzie and Lutz' (1989) attitude toward the ad model. In Petty and Cacioppo's (1985) Elaboration Likelihood Model, the more involved the respondent is, the more likely he/she will follow the central route to persuasion with a resulting attitude change which is more enduring in nature than if the respondent had followed the peripheral route as a result of being less involved. MacKenzie and Lutz' (1989) attitude toward the ad model posits that involvement moderates the relationship between beliefs, attitude toward advertising in general (AG), attitude to the ad, and brand attitude; i.e., antecedents such as beliefs and AG are stronger influences on ad/brand attitude when ad involvement is low.

The concept of involvement and the accompanying research on it have played a central role in advancing the understanding of people's responses to advertising. However, except for a few studies reviewed below, most of this research has dealt with ad, product, and situational involvement rather than purchasing involvement.

Tashchian and Slama (1984) measured the direct effect of purchasing involvement on ad recall, sponsor evaluation, and behavioral intention and found a relationship for recall and behavioral intention. This research dealt with purchasing involvement's effect on consumer response to a particular purchase situation rather than the general effect of purchasing involvement on associated behaviors such as information search, brand awareness, price consciousness, and the like. Hunt, Keaveney and Lee's (1995) research was along the lines of the latter type of research. They measured and found a relationship between purchasing involvement and consumers's response to rebates. High purchasing involved consumers were more likely to use rebates, more likely to be satisfied with a shopping experience which includes rebates, and more likely to make internal rather than external attributions for satisfactions with a rebate shopping experience. High purchasing involved consumers are "effortful" consumers (Hunt, Keaveney and Lee, 1995, p. 285). They approach purchasing with a lot more seriousness and expend a lot of energy and time in the activity to ensure value for their money. Kassarjian (1981) describes this "involved consumer" as one who may pay more attention to advertising, may be more price conscious, more alert to brand differences, and such. A consumer's decision making from before the market search until after the purchase is made could be influenced by the level of purchasing involvement.

Yet another line of research is to understand factors which explain purchasing involvement--demographic, psychographic, cognitive, attitudinal and such. Kassarjian (1981) suggested such links in addition to the particular effects of purchasing involvement in a purchase situation and the more general behaviors associated with purchasing involvement. Research on differences in purchasing involvement by demographics and psychographics provides useful information to marketers for targeting their audience and tailoring their strategy. Tashchian and Slama (1984) studied target market characteristics--stages of the family life cycle, gender, working status of women, education, income, and race--that might be related to purchasing involvement. They found that women who have children, moderate incomes, and relatively high educations tend to be more involved in purchasing. Interestingly, while they measured respondents' demographics and radio listening habits, they included these questions to minimize the possibility of sensitizing them to the true purpose of the research. Feick and Price (1987) did not find any distinctive demographic characteristics for market mavens, but found that women and African Americans were more heavily represented. They also found general media use for market mavens to be higher than average.

Beyond demographic and psychographic characteristics of purchasing involved individuals are the possible cognitive and attitudinal profiles of such individuals. Establishing such profiles would be useful for the development of a body of literature on the role of purchasing involvement in consumer behavior. Of particular relevance would be beliefs about and attitudes towards advertising. Beliefs about advertising are said to underlie attitude to advertising in general (AG) which in turn is posited as an antecedent to attitude to an ad and brand attitude (Lutz 1985; MacKenzie and Lutz 1989). If purchasing involvement is related to ad beliefs and AG, it might help predict ad and brand attitude too. Highly purchasing involved consumers may be more positive in their attitude toward advertising in general and their beliefs about advertising.

Advertising Beliefs and AG

Research on beliefs, particularly social and economic, about advertising in the United States and, to some extent, in other countries is common. Bauer and Greyser's (1968) benchmark scholarly study in the United States found that the "public as a whole endorses advertising's basic economic aspects, is critical of its social aspects, and questions the content and tone of advertisements themselves" (p. 110).

The research which followed not only traced attitudes towards advertising over time, but also clarified several issues: social versus economic aspects of advertising (Greyser and Reece 1971; Haller 1974; Larkin 1977; Reid and Soley 1982; Dubinsky and Hensel 1984; Petroshius 1986; Muehling 1987; Triff, Benningfield and Murphy 1987; Andrews 1989; Pollay and Mittal 1993), attitudes towards the institution of advertising versus towards its instruments, e.g., content, practitioners, etc. (Sandage and Leckenby, 1980; Reid and Soley 1982; Triff, Benningfield and Murphy 1987), personalized (projective to self) versus generalized (projective to other people) responses to advertising, attitudes of different population groups (Greyser and Reece 1971; Haller

1974; Larkin 1977; Reid and Soley 1982; Dubinsky and Hensel 1984; Petroshius 1986; Andrews 1989), and measurement of beliefs versus attitudes.

Studies of attitudes towards advertising in other nations, while fewer in number, more or less addressed the same issues: social and economic beliefs (Reader's Digest Association, 1970; Thorelli, Becker and Engledow 1975; Anderson and Engledow 1977; Anderson, Engledow and Becker 1978a and 1978b; Kwan, Ho and Cragin 1983; Ho and Sin 1986; Semenik, Zhou and Moore 1986), advertising as an institution versus its instruments (Andrews, Lysonski and Durvasula 1991), and differences by group (Ryans and Wills 1979; Lysonski and Pollay 1990).

One of the criticisms leveled at attitude to advertising studies is that they do not always make a distinction between beliefs and attitudes; in many cases, as Muehling (1987) points out, it was beliefs about advertising rather than attitude towards advertising (AG) that was measured. A belief attaches a descriptor or an attribute to an object. It refers to information (based on fact or opinion) that a person has about an object, person or issue. An attitude, on the other hand, is a (negative or positive) evaluation of or "feeling about" (p. 7) an object, person, or issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).

As mentioned earlier, social and economic beliefs about advertising have received the most attention from researchers. Few studies have focused their attention on other beliefs (Muehling, 1987; Pollay and Mittal,1993). Pollay and Mittal (1993) added hedonistic beliefs, among others, in their study of advertising beliefs.

This Study

This study asks whether purchasing involvement is related to respondents' beliefs about and attitude toward advertising (AG). The beliefs refer to the economic and social information (based on fact or opinion) respondents have about advertising (Petty and Cacioppo 1981) as well as their hedonistic beliefs, i.e, the pleasure value of advertising.

Most of the involvement literature has come from marketing scholars rather than media scholars. As a result, media use and its potential relationship with involvement have not been explored. As mentioned earlier, Tashchian and Slama (1984) measured respondents' radio listening habits but did not use the variable in their analysis. This study includes a look at the relationship between purchasing involvement and media.

The research questions are:

1. What are the social, economic, and hedonistic beliefs about advertising, the attitude towards advertising, and the purchasing involvement level among South Asian students?

2. Do these differ by country? By gender?

3. Do South Asian students' beliefs about advertising, their attitude toward advertising and their mass media use explain their purchasing involvement?

The study is set in South Asia for several reasons: 1) South Asian economies are transiting from socialist to capitalist economies and advertising activity and expenditure has grown exponentially in these countries; 2) Foreign advertising agencies are entering these countries; 3) Incomes have traditionally been low in these countries making the study of purchasing involvement particularly relevant in South Asia; and 4) South Asia has been understudied.

South Asia

After years of protectionism, many South Asian countries have recently adopted free market policies. As Harding (1993, p. 44) suggests, "Progress is tangible. There is increasing awareness of the benefits of market-oriented economies." Each of the five South Asian countries included in this study has adopted these progressive economic policies, but variations in growth rates, amount of openness, and types of control do exist (Harding, 1993). Still, as a result of the market reforms, the region has become increasingly important economically and advertising is on the rise—in some cases explosively. (Kilburn and Giges, 1993). In turn, Western advertising agencies have expanded their operations into these countries.

Literature on the smaller South Asian countries included in this study—Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—is not as readily available as it is for India and Pakistan.

Since its independence in 1947, India has been democratic politically and socialist economically. About four years ago, however, the government instituted economic reform and opened up to outside investment. As a result, India's reserves from foreign investment were $20.5 billion in 1995, and the Reserve Bank of India predicts the economy will grow by 5.5% in 1995-96 (Khan, 1995a). India is extremely attractive to foreign investors because even with a 74% rural population, its middle class of 200 million people (with rising incomes) presents a sizable market for consumer products (Bhandarkar, 1995). In fact, Malik (1995, p. 32) suggests that "India will be one of the major markets of the 21st century" with potential that "extends well into the future."

The growth in foreign investment has led to an exponential increase in advertising. In general, the advertising industry has been growing 30% each year in the 1990s and is expected to continue along similar lines for the next three to four years at least (Kemp, 1995). In 1993-94, the advertising industry grew 37.4% and had billings of $708 million (Khan, 1995a). In 1995, it grew by 35% (Sidhva, 1995). This increase in advertising has been aided by the tremendous growth in television penetration in India (Srikandath, 1991).

The presence of foreign companies and the growth in advertising have led to some societal dissonance and political jockeying (Khan, 1995b). Consumer protest takes the form of burning of foreign products for example, and political parties jockey for power by attacking Western presence and threatening to expel multinationals. The argument generally centers on the effect of foreign products and of increased advertising on traditional Indian values. For example, a recent campaign for condoms created quite a stir among the public and in Parliament (for its "indecency") even though it would be considered tame by Western standards (Alexander, 1992). One of the few studies done on Indian advertising found that television advertising promotes the values of high technology, modernization, and consumerism (Srikandath, 1991).

In Pakistan, the turn of the decade brought democracy and with it market reform, new confidence in trade and industry circles, foreign investment ($2 billion in 1990), foreign products, and collaboration with foreign advertising agencies (Pakistan Advertising Scene 92). Growth in media was also large and was spurred by economic liberalization and increasing press freedom.

A "big turnaround" is also happening in Bangladesh (Kamaluddin, 1996). Between July and November of 1995, foreign investors made proposals for $850 million in projects. For 1995, they had proposed a total investment of $750 million, a figure in sharp contrast to the $53 million registered in 1993. Also, Bangladesh unlike India does not submit these proposals to lengthy review and this results in only a brief time lag between proposed and actual investment. Bangladesh's economy grew 5.1% in 1995.

Method

The method for this study was survey; the design was cross-sectional. The data collection instrument was a paper questionnaire administered (in the tradition of many of the above studies) to a sample of students at 10 geographically dispersed higher educational institutions in five South Asian countries[1]. The questionnaire was finalized after several iterations based on pretests. It was administered in 1995 in English because English is the medium of instruction at each institution used in this study.

The questionnaire measured the demographic variables, gender, age and year in college. Four questions measured use of television, radio, magazines, and newspapers over the previous seven days and scores were summed across the four questions to obtain the media use variable.

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[1] Of the 852 completed surveys, 216 were from two universities and a mass communication institute in India, 258 were from three universities in Pakistan, 187 were from two universities in Bangladesh, 102 were from one university in Sri Lanka, and 87 were from one university in Nepal.

The statements used in this study to measure beliefs and attitude were drawn from the literature reviewed earlier (see appendix). Both personalized (using "I") and generalized statements about the social, economic, and hedonistic beliefs about the institution of advertising (not its practices) were measured using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (higher scores equal more positive). Items were collapsed into three indexes according to their use in previous research. All items in the survey were included.

The social beliefs scale was made up of 10 statements and had a reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of .76. Conceptually, it measures advertising's impact on social relations and cultural values. The economic scale comprised 14 statements and had a reliability of .61. It is conceptualized as a scale measuring economic (including information) impacts at both the social and the individual level. That is, it measures beliefs respondents had about the economic value of advertising to society in general as well as its information value for consumers. The hedonistic scale comprised three statements and had a reliability of .52. It measures the entertainment value of advertisements at the personal level. For all three scales, higher scores indicated more positive views.

Attitude toward the ad was made up of three Likert response statements where higher scores indicated more positive attitudes toward advertising. This scale had a reliability of .65.

Two models were available for developing a scale to measure purchasing involvement. Zaichkowsky (1985) used a seven-point semantic differential, context neutral scale. However, the scale measures involvement as a state, not a trait, variable; it has been validated mostly for products and more recently for advertising (Zaichkowsky, 1995), but not as much for purchase decisions; and it has come under some criticism (Mittal, 1995). To its credit is the fact that it does not operationalize involvement as a process, i.e., it does not confuse the effects of being involved (resulting behaviors) with the state of being involved. Tashchian and Slama used a 21 question Likert scale to measure involvement with the task of purchasing in their 1984 study and a 33 item Likert scale in their 1985 study. The scale included items which could be classified as consequences of purchasing involvement rather than as trait items, i.e., they dealt with associated behaviors such as knowledge of alternatives, importance of brands, and particularly price consciousness. Given that these associated behaviors very clearly define the conceptualization of purchasing involvement in this and other studies, this study used Taschian and Slama's scale as the starting point. Six items were removed from the 33 item scale because they were not suitable for South Asia. The 27 item scale used in the questionnaire was pared down to 16 items after iterative reliability tests. The resulting scale was parsimonious and more reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .80) than the full 27 item scale. Higher scores indicated a higher level of purchasing involvement.

To answer Research Question 1 mean scores were calculated. To answer Research Question 2, analysis of variance was used, with Scheffe as the test for finding which means were significantly different from others. And, to answer the third research question, a regression analysis was done. Variables were entered into the regression equation in a single step in order of decreasing tolerance using listwise deletion of cases with missing values.

Results

A total of 852 useable questionnaires was available. A majority of the respondents (62%) were Bachelor students; 18% were fourth year, 17% were third year, 11% were second year, 16% were first year. Master's students made up 36%, and 2% were working on doctoral degrees. Women made up 53 % of the sample (378 men, 449 women). The mean age of the respondents was 23.2 years, the standard deviation was 4.9 years. Mean age and gender distribution by country are given in Table 1.

The respondents' media use included a per day average of 2.5 hours for television, 1.4 hours for radio, 1.4 hours for newspapers, and 1.2 hours for magazines. Mean media use was 6.2 hours per day. Of the three belief scales—economic, social, and hedonistic—

respondents' economic and hedonistic beliefs about advertising were more likely positive than their beliefs about social aspects. The average level of agreement for the social scale was 2.7 (slightly negative since 3 is neutral). The average for the economic and hedonistic scales was 3.50 and 3.9 respectively (slightly positive). Mean AG was 3.8, above average on the positive side. Mean purchasing involvement was 3.41, indicating that these consumers had some involvement (above neutral) in purchasing.

For media use, while the overall test for differences by country was significant, a Scheffe test to reveal differences between each pair of countries was non-significant indicating no differences (Table 1). Respondents' media use differed by gender with females using less media than males (Table 2).

Respondents' economic beliefs differed by country. Students from Pakistan had more favorable economic beliefs than students from Sri Lanka, and students from Bangladesh had more favorable economic beliefs than students from Sri Lanka and India. But economic beliefs for these groups were still above the midpoint of three indicating slightly positive economic beliefs in all groups. Economic beliefs did not differ by gender, however.

Respondents' social beliefs differed by country. Students from Nepal had more favorable social beliefs than students from Sri Lanka and India. Social beliefs differed by gender too, with females having more favorable beliefs than males. Mean social beliefs were still below the midpoint of three for each country and gender indicating slightly negative social beliefs for all groups. Respondents' hedonistic beliefs did not differ by country, but did differ by gender with females having more favorable beliefs than males. Mean hedonistic beliefs were still close to four for each gender indicating positive hedonistic beliefs in both groups.

While the overall test for differences in AG by country was significant, a Scheffe test to reveal differences between each pair of countries was non-significant indicating no differences. Respondents' AG differed by gender with females having a more positive AG than males.

Respondents also differed in their purchasing involvement by country with Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi students less involved than Indian, Pakistani, and Nepali students. Respondents' purchasing involvement differed by gender with females being more involved than males.

Attitude toward advertising, social, economic and hedonistic beliefs, and media use were all significant predictors of purchasing involvement (Table 3). However, two predictors--media use and economic beliefs--had negative signs. Hence, lower media use and less positive economic beliefs were related to a higher level of purchasing involvement. For the other independent variables, more positive social and hedonistic beliefs and a more positive attitude to advertising in general were related to higher purchasing involvement. The regression equation explained 22 percent of the variance in purchasing involvement. Of this, 16.6% was the sum of unique contributions made by the independent variables; the rest was their combined contribution. The independent variable making the largest unique contribution was attitude toward advertising in general (sr^2=.05).

Discussion and Conclusion

As far as beliefs are concerned, the findings of this study differ little from those of other studies. The relative ranking of social and economic aspects of advertising is similar to the findings of many other studies in other countries (Bauer and Greyser 1968; Greyser and Reece 1971; Reid and Soley 1982; Dubinsky and Hensel 1984; Petroshius 1986; Muehling 1987). Studies in the United States and elsewhere have shown consumers separate their beliefs about the economic impact of advertising from the social impact. They think advertising has economic value, but they also believe it has a negative effect on societal values and morals and that the consumerism it brings will result in social disintegration.

Respondents in this study, in general, believed that at the macro level advertising was useful to the country's economy and at the micro level it was useful to consumers in terms of being an information source. They also believed that advertising was somewhat of a social evil. Paradoxically, at the same time, respondents of this study enjoyed advertising and found it pleasurable to view. Also, their attitude toward advertising was positive.

The main variable of interest to this study was purchasing involvement. The purchasing involvement scale, borrowed from Tashchian and Slama (1984), worked reliably in South Asia, indicating its cross-cultural transferability. This study used 27 of the original 33 items because six items were not suited to South Asian conditions. This 27 item scale had a reliability of .77 (Cronbach's alpha). It was further pared down to 16 with a reliability of .80. It appears that future cross cultural comparison of purchasing involvement can be successfully attempted using this scale. Such research can be expanded to peg purchasing involvement to explanatory vairables such as the economic, social, or media development indicators. Such information would be useful to marketers and advertisers seeking to enter new territory internationally.

Currently, little research has been done, particularly across different cultures, to provide any comparative framework for the findings of this study. The purchasing involvement of respondents of this study was above the neutral value of 3 indicating some involvement with purchasing. This is not surprising given the generally low per capita income in these countries. Cross country differences in purchasing involvement (as well as beliefs and AG) were found but they do not form a pattern that can be explained. Gender differences were also found with females being more involved. This might be explained by the larger role women play in purchasing, particularly in South Asia.

The major goal of this study was to explore the relationship between purchasing involvement and beliefs, AG, and media use. Respondents who were more involved in purchasing were also less likely to think of advertising as a social evil, more likely to find pleasure value in it, and more likely to have an overall positive evaluation of advertising. At the same time, these respondents had less positive economic beliefs about advertising and were less likely to consider it a useful information source. And, surprisingly, lower levels of media use were associated with higher levels of purchasing involvement.

It appears that high purchasing involved consumers may be less critical of advertising when it comes to its influence on values and morals, they may in fact even enjoy it, and evaluate it positively, but because they are such careful shoppers they do not give it as much credit at the micro level as a source of information or at the macro level as being economically useful for society. And, in fact, it is possibly for that reason that lower levels of media use are associated with higher levels of purchasing involvement. These consumers might be seeking information from personal search or word of mouth. This explanation particularly applies to South Asia where the explosion of and therefore experience with advertising is relatively new, and strong familial and friendship ties make word of mouth an important medium of information.

MacKenzie and Lutz's (1989) attitude toward the ad model theorizes that beliefs are antecedents of AG which in turn is an antecedent of attitude to the ad and attitude to the brand. The authors explain that antecedents such as beliefs and AG are stronger influences on ad/brand attitude when ad involvement is low. This study found that purchasing involvement is related to beliefs and AG. It is possible that purchasing involvement may also moderate ad and brand attitude. The results of this study suggest that high purchasing involvement may lead to less favorable ad attitude, at least in South Asia at this point in time. Whether this reasoning holds will have to await testing in a future study.

Finally, a limitation of this study—the use of a convenience sample of college students making results not generalizable to other population groups—needs to be kept in mind.

Table 1
Distribution of Respondents' Gender, Age, Media Use,
Economic, Social, and Hedonistic Beliefs, AG, and Purchasing Involvement by Country

	India	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh	Nepal
Gender					
Female	105 (49.3)	171 (67.9)	53 (54.1)	74 (41.8)	47 (54.0)
Male	108 (50.7)	81 (32.1)	45 (45.9)	103 (58.2)	40 (46.0)
Mean Age	23	21	30	23	25
Mean Media Use*	6.41	6.22	7.43	6.40	6.86
Economic Beliefs**	3.44	3.56	3.30	3.60	3.48
Social Beliefs***	2.63	2.69	2.45	2.68	2.94
Hedonistic Beliefs****	3.93	3.94	3.73	3.90	3.92
AG*****	3.75	3.89	3.66	3.71	3.90
Purchasing Involvement******	3.21	3.21	2.92	3.00	3.32

Note:

*F = .4678, p. = .7594.

**F = 9.4011, p = .0000. Pakistan is significantly different from Sri Lanka. Bangladesh is significantly different from Sri Lanka and India (using Scheffe).

***F = 5.9971, p = .0001. Nepal is significantly different from Sri Lanka and India (using Scheffe).

****F = 1.8186, p = .1232.

*****F = 3.12, p. = .01.

*****F = 8.0, p. = .00. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are significantly different from India, Pakistan, and Nepal.

Table 2
Distribution of Respondents' Media Use, and
Economic, Social, and Hedonistic Beliefs, AG, and Purchasing Involvement by Gender

	Female	Male
Mean Media Use*	345 (5.86)	286 (6.92)
Economic Beliefs**	381 (3.51)	329 (3.84)
Social Beliefs***	388 (2.73)	323 (2.61)
Hedonistic Beliefs****	425 (3.99)	353 (3.79)
AG*****	433 (3.86)	361 (3.71)
Purchasing Involvement******	367 (3.23)	308 (3.06)

Note:
*F = 6.2733, p = .0125.
**F = .6677, p = .4141.
***F = 5.3017, p = .0216.
****F = 17.5965, p = .0000.
*****F = 8.90, p. = .00.
******F = 15.06, p. = .00.

Table 3
Results of Regressing Beliefs, Attitude Toward Advertising, and Media Use on Purchasing Involvement

Multiple R	.47
R square	.22
Standard Error	.52
F	24.37*

	df	sum of squares	mean square
regression	5	32.96	6.59
residual	429	116.06	.27

variables in the equation	b	SE b	Beta	t
AG	.204	.039	.261	27.7*
Media Use	-.010	.003	-.125	8.6*
Hedonistic	.100	.040	.111	6.2**
Economic	-.146	.065	-.103	5.0***
Social	.264	.042	.290	38.8*
(Constant)	1.88	.262		51.26*

* p<.00.

** p<.01.

***p<.02.

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Appendix

The statements below were used to form the scales used in the study. Statement order was intermixed in the original questionnaire and each was followed by a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Economic Beliefs

Advertising is essential
Advertising helps raise our standard of living
Advertising results in better products for the public
In general, advertising results in lower prices
In general, advertising provides a true picture of the product advertised
Advertising is a valuable source of information about local sales
Advertising tells me which brands have the features I am looking for
Advertising helps me keep up to date about products/services available in the marketplace
From advertising I learn about fashions and about what to buy to impress others
Advertising tells me what people with lifestyles similar to mine are buying and using
Advertising helps me know which products will or will not reflect the sort of person I am
In general, advertising helps our nation's economy
Mostly, advertising is wasteful of our economic resources
In general, advertising promotes competition which benefits the consumer

Social Beliefs

Advertising persuades people to buy things they should not buy
Most advertising insults the intelligence of the average consumer
Advertising is making us a materialistic society--overly interested in buying and owning things
Advertising makes people buy unaffordable products just to show off
Advertising makes people live in a world of fantasy
Because of advertising, people buy a lot of things that they do not really need
Advertising promotes undesirable values in our society
Most advertising distorts the values of our youth
Some products/services promoted in advertising are bad for our society
In general, advertising is misleading

Hedonistic Beliefs

Quite often, advertising is amusing and entertaining
Sometimes advertisements are even more enjoyable than other media contents
Sometimes I take pleasure in thinking about what I saw or heard or read in advertisements

Attitude towards Advertising in General

Overall I consider advertising a good thing
Overall I dislike advertising
My general opinion of advertising is unfavorable

Purchasing Involvement

I have little or no interest in shopping
I am not interested in bargain seeking
I am not interested in sales
You can't save a lot of money by careful shopping
I usually am not annoyed when I find out I could have bought something cheaper than I did
Sales don't excite me
I am not really committed to getting the most for my money
The brands of goods I buy make very little difference to me
On most purchase decisions the choice I make is of little consequence
Usually reading about products or asking people about them won't really help you make a decision
I view the purchasing of goods and services as a rather petty activity, not relevant to my main concerns in life
I am too absorbed in more personally relevant matters to worry about making smart purchases
If I were buying a major item it wouldn't make much difference which brand I chose
Thinking about what you are going to buy before going shopping won't make much difference in your long run expenditures
It does not make sense to get upset over a purchase decision since most brands are about the same
I don't like worrying about getting the best deal when I go shopping; I like to spend money as I please

Western Romance Fiction As Urban "English Popular Culture" In Postcolonial India

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International Communication Division
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AEJMC Conference, Chicago, July 31-August 2, 1997

Western Romance Fiction As Urban "English Popular Culture" In Postcolonial India

The consumption of Western media products in the Third World has been analyzed by many media scholars through the theoretical lens of cultural imperialism. Although the various existing theories of cultural imperialism have been discussed and critiqued by media scholar John Tomlinson (1992) who conducts a comprehensive and through review of various approaches to cultural imperialism, very few scholars have argued for providing a historical and cultural context to the presence of Western media in the Third World. In this paper, I show that examining the history of European colonialism in some Third World countries can not only illuminate the class dimensions of the consumption of certain Western media, but can also provide insight into postcolonial readers' particular interpretations of these media as "English popular culture."

In postcolonial India, Western media are very much sought after by mainly urban upper- and middle-classes, especially print media such as romance novels that are published in English, since these media require literacy in English. While it is difficult to get exact sales figures for these romances, we can get a glimpse of the popularity of Western romances in urban India through the comments of Vijay Joshi (1994), an Indian journalist who writes:

> Bashful Indian teenagers for years have lived out their secret fantasies in the pages of romance novels imported from Britain . . . Known among aficionados as "MBs," the British publishers series has provided a daily fix to a generation of Indian women who devoured the novels between classes, at beauty parlors or while commuting to work on buses. (p. 7A)

One of the most interesting aspects of popular romance reading in India is the fact that "Mills & Boon" romances are read in English by middle-class urban Indian women and not as translations in Indian languages. In most other countries such as China and Japan and countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe where there is considerable exporting of Western popular romance fiction, romance novels are translated into and read in the indigenous languages. The fact that popular Western romances are read in English in India automatically places them in the realm of middle- and upper-class popular culture because in India's postcolonial situation fluency in

English is a privilege of the urban upper- and middle-classes. The consumption of Western print media such as novels among urban elites shows us that in discussions of cultural imperialism, we cannot envisage monolithic Third World audiences but instead have to remember that in some cases audiences are segmented by class, gender, and by urban or rural locations.

Since English was first introduced in many postcolonial countries in Asia and Africa, which were colonies of Britain, English has become the language of commerce and administration and therefore the language that promises success and class mobility. My initial discussion of the history of English in India will show the historical formation and association of the English language with the urban upper- and middle-classes--this history will explain the circulation of Western romance fiction among urban upper- and middle-class Indian women. My subsequent analysis of readers' interpretations will show that the contemporary link between English and economic success, a link that was first initiated and promoted by the British, exerts a strong influence on readers' interpretations of Western romance novels. Through my historical contextualization and my analysis of Indian readers' interpretations of Western romance fiction as "English popular culture," I attempt to argue that discussions of media consumption for certain audiences in postcolonial situations should be strongly influenced by the historical context of European colonialism.

Background

My analysis in this paper, which is a small part of a much larger project, is based on an ethnographic approach to romance reading by young Indian women. This paper represents a fraction of the interview material I gathered over four months spent at Hyderabad, India during the summer months of 1996 from May until August. My ethnographic approach encompassed the following; reading romances, interviews with 42 women in group sessions, individual interviews with 30 romance readers, participant observation, interviews with family members, college teachers, library owners, publishers, and used-book vendors. The ages of the women I interviewed fell in the range of 17 to 20 years old, they were all single, and they were all attending all-women's colleges for their intermediate or undergraduate degrees.

The romances that young women in Hyderabad read in English are referred to as "Mills & Boons" after the British publishing company Mills & Boon, which publishes and exports these books to India. The British company Mills & Boon is a subsidiary of the Harlequin company in Toronto, which publishes the well-known Harlequin romance fiction. While Indian women do occasionally buy Mills & Boon romance fiction from bookstores, the primary source for these books are lending libraries because the price of these romances in India puts them beyond the level of products that can be regularly purchased. These lending libraries that I am referring to here are not similar to public libraries in the United States. Lending libraries in India are small shops/rooms, which are located in busy shopping areas alongside the streets, where only popular fiction and occasionally popular videos are stocked and readers check out books for a daily rental fee (similar to video stores in the United States).

Historical Context: The Formation of Audiences for "English Popular Culture"

The significance of reading romances in English as a phenomenon that occurs within urban middle- and upper-class structures in India becomes apparent when we understand the presence of the English language in urban India as a part of postcolonial history. The use of English by the urban middle- and upper-classes is only one piece of evidence that points to the stronger impact of British colonialism in the urban areas than in rural areas in India.[1] Due to the colonial history of English, the more modern phenomenon of the consumption of Western romance fiction in English by urban Indian women is historically linked to colonialism. This historical understanding of English as a postcolonial legacy should be linked to "English popular culture" such as romance reading in contemporary conditions in urban India where fluency in English is seen as the "cultural capital" of middle- and upper-class urban Indians who often consider themselves as more modern and sophisticated than those who do not have an English education.[2]

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[1] Discussing the influence of colonialism in India Ashis Nandy (1983) writes, "In spite of the presence of a paramount power [colonialism] which acted as the central authority, the country was culturally fragmented and politically heterogeneous. It could, thus, confine the cultural impact of imperialism to its urban centres, to its Westernized and semi-Westernized upper and middle classes, and to some sections of its traditional elites" (p. 31-32).

Understanding English as a part of India's postcolonial history requires us to visualize the history of the rise of English in India as intimately tied to the ideological imperatives of British colonialism.[3] While it is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment when English became a part of the official apparatus, it is with the passing of the famous Macaulay's minute on March 7, 1835 by Lord Macaulay, a member of the Supreme Council (the law-making body), that the official colonial machinery began concerted efforts to introduce English to the natives (Sridhar, 1977; Khubchandani, 1991; Sunder Rajan, 1992).[4] The imperial mission was to introduce English to the vast number of Indian colonial subjects by "converting" the upper-class native elite who in turn would act as a filter for the percolation of English to the masses" (Sridhar, 1977, p. 18).[5]

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[2] In her essay "English in a literate society," Gauri Viswanathan (1992), a literary scholar, describes a personal story to illustrate the link between class and English. Viswanathan vividly recalls her encounter in India with a young construction worker, a woman, on her way back and forth from home to the library. One day the construction worker, curious about the books Viswanathan was carrying, stopped to ask her if she knew English. When Viswanathan replied in the affirmative, the young woman asked her if she would be willing to teach her English. Surprised by her request Viswanathan asked the young woman the reason for her desire. The woman promptly replied, "Because I want to live in these houses rather than help build them" (p. 40-41).

[3] Before the creation of official colonial policies that would encourage the spread of English, there were British missionaries in India who, in their proselytizing efforts, had set up schools where the medium of instruction was English (Sridhar, 1977, p. 16). It was, however, only with the formal insertion of English into educational policies by the British that its role as a strategy of containment and as a form of indoctrination became well-defined.

[4] Intending to expose the upper class of natives to English first, Lord Macaulay envisaged, ". . .a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions who govern . . . a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect" (Sharp, 1920 as quoted by Sridhar, 1977, p. 18). Discussing this declaration by Lord Macaulay to expose the "natives" to English education, Homi Bhabha (1994), the postcolonial theorist, suggests that it was the intention of the British to create out of the colonized "mimic men." Bhabha describes the "mimic man" (the British construct) as one who can be Anglicized but can never be "English" like the British themselves.

[5] British efforts to strengthen and consolidate their rule in India can by no means be conceived of simply as a diabolical and direct form of domination over the natives. Gauri Viswanathan's detailed and theoretically

Although Lord Macaulay intended that English education would eventually encompass the entire Indian population, when this did not take place as rapidly as they expected, the British decided instead, barely two decades later, to concentrate on training the elite groups among Indians to assist them in administration. Accordingly, Sir Charles Wood's dispatch, outlined in 1854 in the British parliament in India, departed from existing policy and stressed that western higher education through the English language would focus on the elites who could then be given "offices of trust" (Raina, 1991, p. 275).

The introduction of education in English to elite Indian classes would secure for the British a group of natives who would not only ensure the supply of raw material necessary for manufactured goods, but would also, due to the desire for a western lifestyle as a consequence of their education, be consumers of British goods (Raina, 1991, p. 275; Viswanathan, 1989, p. 146). The British policy to extend the use of English as the language of commerce and administration had far reaching consequences--it led to further to the stratification of Indian society by class and caste and divided the urban populations from the rural (Sridhar, 1977, p. 20; Viswanathan, 1989, p. 116, Joshi, 1991, pp. 22-23). Enamored of the advantages of English education since it promised access to the corridors of power and intimacy with the powerful, Indian members of the upper castes and classes themselves began to seek an English education. Kamal Sridhar

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sophisticated work on the colonial conditions that enabled the rise of English studies in India avoids precisely this simple model of domination as direct control and instead begins from the Gramscian notion of hegemony, which allows for ideology to be understood as a form of "masking" or illusion. Arguing that cultural domination often works by consent and in the colonial context by persuading the natives of the moral superiority of the colonialists, Viswanathan (1989) cites a minute issued in the Bombay Presidency which stated, "The Natives must either be kept down by a sense of our power, or they must willingly submit from a conviction that we are more wise, more just, more humane, and more anxious to improve their condition than any other rulers they could possibly have." The British thus felt the need to turn to subtle and ideological forms of control to consolidate white prestige and to assert their authority. The decision to fortify their position as colonial rulers—and to quell rebellion—through English emerged not only out of strong ethnocentric assumptions of superiority, rather it also revealed an instrumental, administrative application of language, ultimately motivated by a sense of frailty in the colonial position. Stressing the proposition that British educational measures were introduced out of a fear of rebellion by illogical, unstable, and irrational natives, Viswanathan writes that for the British who inhabited this world of "imminent rebellion and resistance," English became a way to contain rebellion; by masking and concealing economic exploitation and racial oppression under the benevolent guise of introducing them to the world of wise Englishmen, the British hoped to inculcate awe and wonder of the Raj (Viswanathan, 1989, p. 11).

(1977) observes that one of the important factors that contributed to the spread of English in as a medium of instruction in the educational system in the late nineteenth century was the desire of groups of Indians themselves to acquire knowledge of Western science, technology, and culture (p. 16).[6]

Since India achieved Independence from the British in 1947, the presence of English has continued to grow not only in educational institutions, but also in commerce and the mass media. The Government has declared Hindi, one of the Indian languages spoken by the largest group of Indians (bout 30-35% of the population) as the declared official language with English as the associate official language.[7] However, as Sridhar Kamal (1977) points out, government interventions and decision-making on language affects only the disadvantaged urban populations and rural poor who are forced to get their education in government institutions. In the urban areas, the upper- and middle-classes continue to send their children to institutions where English is the medium of instruction and universities continue to offer education predominantly in English. The strong association of English with British colonialism in India and its intimate links with the urban, upper- and middle-classes in India's postcolonial phase have been noted and discussed by several scholars (Ahmad, 1992; Joshi, 1991; Khubchandani, 1983; Nandy, 1983; Sheth, 1990; Sridhar, 1977; Sunder Rajan, 1992).

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[6] Religious reformers like Raja Rammohun Roy and Dwarka Nath Tagore in nineteenth century India viewed English as the language to attain Western science and rationality, which would help to combat superstition. Kamal Sridhar (1977, p. 110) points out that some of the top nationalist leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Subash Chandra Bose, Mahatma Gandhi, and Sardar Patel received education in India in English and then lived in England to pursue higher education. Aijaz Ahmad (1992) writes that members of the English elite of India, who were active in the nationalist movement to overthrow British rule, arose from sites closest to the institutions of colonial power--"administration, law, commerce, English-language journalism, teaching staffs of colleges and universities" (p. 76).

[7] Following independence, when confronted with a multi-lingual and pluralistic society, it was decided that the Indian nation would be divided into twenty four states based on linguistic stratification (p. 3). While the division of the country into states on a linguistic basis was not difficult to achieve, it is in prescribing a national language, in setting up a language as the standard medium of instruction in education, and in establishing a language as the link language of commerce and government administration that the Indian government has faced insurmountable problems. The debate over the national language, a debate that is very much alive even today, continues to be a located within conflict and controversy. Succinctly summarizing the language debate in postcolonial India, Sunder Rajan (1992) identifies the chief parties in the conflict over the national language: "the first is between the opposed advocates of a national language, the second is between linguistic regions, and the third is between the privileged and less-privileged classes (p. 14)." For those who support Hindi, the use of English is seen as slavery to colonialism and as anti-national due to its Western origins; for the linguistic regions where Hindi is not spoken and whose people are familiar with English, English is preferable to Hindi as the "lesser evil"; and finally for the English-speaking upper-classes, loss of English would imply loss of power (pp. 15-16).

After independence, the English language in India continues to be the language associated with economic success. Aijaz Ahmad (1992) identifies the strong presence of English in India in the dominant systems of administration and education with a profound--almost genetic--cultural link between the colonial and post-colonial phases of the bourgeois state. He observes that the inability of the Indian state to invent or devise forms of unity that may be more appropriate than the colonial model, given the plural and complex nature of Indian society, has meant that "those earlier semiotics of administration and profession, with English at their epicentre, have merely reproduced themselves on an extended scale." Connecting the expansion, consolidation, increased leisure, and increased sophistication of the bourgeois middle classes, who inhabit locations of power, with the expansion of English, he writes:

> Among all the countries of Asia and Africa which gained their independence after World War II, India has numerically by far the largest professional petty bourgeoisie, fully consolidated as a distinct social entity and sophisticated enough in its claim to English culture for it to aspire to have its own writers, publishing houses, and a fully fledged home market for books (p. 75).

Noting the proliferation of English in urban India, Svati Joshi also makes similar links between the growth of English and the "increasing concentration of the privileged English-speaking class with greater leisure in the metropolitan cities (p. 21)." The spread of English is also connected to "the job market, social mobility, and cultural superiority" (Joshi, 1991 p. 21) and people who speak/write only in Indian languages strongly associate knowledge of English with material success. English, despite government policies to promote regional languages remains the language that provides access to higher education and economic benefits (Khubchandani, 1983, p. 67; Joshi, 1991, p. 2).

The participation of urban Indians in cultural practices such as romance reading in contemporary India is therefore a part of the history of the project of literacy in English that was initiated during British colonialism in the nineteenth century. The strong association between English and access to social and economic power in independent India is therefore a product of the British initiative to create a class of Indians that would help them govern India and become consumers for British products--the consumption of Western romances by English-educated Indians is thus a process that can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Audiences for printed media such as Western romance novels in India are therefore very different from audiences for television programs such as soap operas from the United States, which are relatively more accessible to people from different class backgrounds and from both rural and urban areas. To analyze audience preferences for Western (English) print media in postcolonial countries such as India, scholars who participate in the debate over cultural imperialism will have to recognize the impact of the history of colonialism on current media consumption.

Romances as Contemporary "English Popular Culture"

Given the colonial history of English in India, we can see that romance fiction from the West circulates among the urban Indian middle- and upper-castes and classes who were, as we saw in the earlier section, historically shaped by India's experience with British colonialism.[8] In my extended interviews with young English-educated Indian women Indian women about Mills & Boon romances, one strong element that stood out was the construction of these romances as "English popular culture." Such a construction of Western romances as "English popular culture" emerged out many discussions with readers regarding the pleasure they experience in reading these romances. My analysis of readers' interpretations identifies three ways in which romances function as "English popular culture." I first show that romances are pleasurable because they are an extension of middle-class Indian readers' already established previous leisure reading history in English. Secondly, I argue that in a culture where the English language has become a prerequisite for economic mobility, Western romances are viewed as books that improve English-language skills. Finally, I discuss readers use of romance reading in a symbolic way to distinguish themselves from others as belonging to the more elite English-educated classes.

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[8] While there have been numerous analyses of the content of English-language news media in India, very little work has been done on historicizing the media to understand how contemporary media discourses intersect with social formations such as class. For an analysis of the links between class and caste interests and the English-language mass media in India see Radhika Parameswaran (1997). Parameswaran interrogates the relationship between the English language, introduced during colonialism, mass media, class formation, and social and economic power in India. She focuses her analysis on English-language newspapers and newsvideo's tendencies to articulate and support the interests and ideology of the upper/middle-classes, who as a consequence of colonial interventions in the nineteenth century today seek Westernized popular cultural forms.

In my discussions with young Indian women about their reading history, it became apparent that romance reading in English was embedded within reading tastes that had gradually been shaped over the entire course of their lives. Many of my informants spoke with pleasure about the books they read as children: fairytales from the Grimm brothers and Hans Andersen such as Snow White and Cinderella; paperbacks from Britain such as the Enid Blyton series books (Secret Seven, the Five Find-Outers, Mallory Towers, and the Carlotta series); books and comics from the United States such as the Nancy Drew and Hardy Boys books,[9] Archie, Wendy the Witch, Casper the Friendly Ghost, and Dennis the Menace comics;[10] and the famous

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[9] Twenty of the thirty women I interviewed mentioned Nancy Drew books as being books for smart and intelligent girls. In addition, some of them argued that their fondness for Nancy Drew books when they were younger was proof that they were not just women who indulged in stupid fantasies because they now read Mills & Boons. They presented the fact that they had read Nancy Drews earlier as evidence of their basically "sensible" nature. Many of my informants therefore legitimated their current romance reading as reading that smart women did by citing their enjoyment of Nancy Drew books as girls. Some informants implied that they had admired "Nancy Drew" who was independent, smart, and unconventional for a girl and therefore their current reading of Mills & Boons, which were also about independent career women, but did include a heavy emphasis on sex and romance, was not deviant. For an anecdotal glimpse of girls' reading of Nancy Drew books in India, see Radhika Parameswaran's short, personal essay about her reading Nancy Drew books as a young girl in India. Although the essay is primarily a humorous story about how her brother began reading Nancy Drew books, she also writes about the popularity of Nancy Drew books in her neighborhood among her peers, a popularity which allowed her to start lending these books out to other children for a minimal charge (Parameswaran, 1994).

[10] The evidence of the wide-spread popularity of comics from the United States and United Kingdom in India is also evident from many English-language newspapers, which publish these comic strips in the entertainment section. For example, the local paper in Hyderabad called *Deccan Chronicle*, regularly publishes strips from Archie, the Flintstones, Beetle Bailey, and Tarzan comics in its weekend entertainment section.

"Asterix and Obelix" and "Tintin" series that are translated into English from Europe.[11] Many of these books and comics that these young women read were available not only at lending libraries but also at the libraries in their schools. Anuradha and Beena who had been neighbors all their lives and attended the same Catholic schools and colleges spoke about the fun times they had at school during the library periods:

> Anuradha: We always got into the line first so that when we reached the library room we could be ahead of the others. That way we could pick our favorite books to read before anyone else could get to the shelves. I loved the Secret Seven series and Beena really liked the Five Find-Outers so even if one of us was late we made sure we picked out a book for the other.
>
> Beena: Sister Lucy who was our librarian was very strict and always watching out to make sure we did not hide our favorite books in odd places on the shelves--we did that so no one else could find the books.

Some other informants spoke fondly of reading certain favorite children's books even now as young women, especially during periods of high stress such as exams and tests.[12] Dipali who

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[11] The series books written by the British author Enid Blyton are popular all over the world. Describing her popularity, the largest local paper in Hyderabad, India, *Deccan Chronicle*, which caters to the local English-educated readers writes, "For decades children have lapped up Enid Blyton's Noddy stories and jolly tales about precocious, wealthy children. Her books have been translated into 27 languages and still sell eight million copies a year worldwide" (Diary, Deccan Chronicle, May 2 1996, p. 8). The same short article on the Enid Blyton books then goes on to warn readers about accusations of racism, sexism, and insensitivity toward minority groups in these popular books. One other series, which has also been similarly criticized for ignoring and stereotyping minorities such as African-Americans and Asians in the United States is the Nancy Drew series books. See chapters by Donnarae MacCann and Njeri Fuller in the book *Rediscovering Nancy Drew* edited by Carolyn Dyer (1996) for a critique of racism in Nancy Drew books.

[12] Examinations in India are particularly stressful periods for adolescents and young adults in their late teens. All over India, for rural and urban Indians alike, state examinations arouse extreme anxiety and fear since the exams are often delayed or canceled due to the leaking of questions and other bureaucratic lapses. In addition, these exams also predominantly test skills of rote memorization, are graded anonymously by examiners outside the state who grade hundreds of papers, and finally the state examination board provides little opportunity for re-evaluation. Lamenting the frustrations of bright students who do well on the exam but end up with bad results, Bhamy Shenoy (1996, June 25), an education writer for *The Hindu*, one of India's largest English-language dailies, writes, "In many instances, good and sometimes even brilliant students fail in these inhuman and mindless examinations. The system has not developed any mechanism to help such students. Even the Supreme Court has observed that since the original rule by the examination boards did not allow for re-evaluation, only retotalling (the marks) can be enforced" (p. 25). For an excellent analysis of the problems with the examination system in India see Bhamy Shenoy (1996).

For an example of how the consumption of popular culture in India can be related to stress arising from audiences' feelings of lack of control over their lives see the unpublished manuscript of Steve Derne (1997) where he discusses many Indians' frustrations with inept state bureaucracies and corrupt government officials. Derne (1997, pp. 123-129) who argues that Hindi films provide opportunities for viewers to reverse reality writes that these said she felt more stress than any of her friends during exams said, "I read them because they help me forget that I am an adult now with adult pressures to do well on exams." When I start reading my favorite Five Find-Outers books and read about George, Kirrin Island, and the adventures the five cousins have with their dog Timothy, I forget my stress so easily." Childhood books that were collected over a period of time were often passed on to younger siblings, cousins, nieces, and friends.[13] The colonial history of English-language publishing in India[14] coupled with the fact that it is only recently that children's books and general books in English are being written by Indians means that for many young people in urban India today series books and comics from the United Kingdom and United States formed the staple of their childhood reading material.

Mills & Boon romance fiction that were read by Indian women in their early teens and later as adult women thus existed on a continuum of reading tastes that were shaped by readers' preferences for Western series books as children. The same lending libraries where Mills & Boon romances are available for checking out are also the libraries which many young women visited as children with their parents and older siblings to check out their favorite childhood

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frustrations often lead to the consumption of popular culture such as films, especially films where the corrupt acts of government officials and the police are exposed unlike in reality where officials and the police are rarely are caught for corruption or for harassing citizens.

[13] Series books such the Nancy Drew books are also a part of generational links between readers in the United States. See Bonnie Sunstein (1996) for Nancy Drew readers' testimonials about Nancy Drew books being passed on from aunts to nieces, from mothers to daughters, and between friends. Discussing the generational links between Nancy Drew readers, Sunstein writes that shared stories about reading become a way for women to connect across generations. For another study of intergenerational links among Nancy Drew readers in the United States see also Linda Christian-Smith's research based on the reading patterns of women in two families across generations (Christian-Smith, 1996).

[14] English-language book publishing in India began in the British colonial period and strong links between British and Indian English-language publishers exist even today. Since English-language publishing in India is a relatively recent phenomenon, especially in the area of fiction for children, it is only in the last decade that we find children's literature being produced in the English language by Indian authors. Children's books written by Indian authors have yet to make inroads in urban India though and children's books from Britain and the United States continue to be enormously popular. For analyses of the colonial history of English-language publishing in India see Philip Altbach (1975) and Shamanna Kesavan (1988).

books. Testifying to the changing tastes of readers, one library owner who had been running his library in a very busy neighborhood for 30 years said that the best part of his business was his interaction with the neighborhood children as they grew up:

> Shailaja and Priya are two of my favorite customers who come here almost everyday. I have known them since they started on Enid Blytons and now they are reading Mills & Boons. I know everyone in the family, including the relatives who visit them. I hope they stay in town when they get married. That is the worst part of my job--I miss my old customers when they move away.

Apart from enjoying reading Mills & Boon fiction in English and occasionally books by authors Danielle Steele, Ken Follett, and John Grisham, readers also said they liked to read English-language women's magazines such as *Femina* and *Women's Era*, general interest magazines such as *Readers' Digest* , and less frequently local and national English-language newspapers.[15]

From my discussions with informants, librarians, selected teachers, and some parents, I also found that Mills & Boon romances are viewed as resources to improve English language skills--readers claimed that romances enhance vocabulary and writing skills and help them perform better on exams that test vocabulary and reading comprehension. In my discussions with young romance readers, one of the joys of romance reading that all the readers I interviewed unanimously spoke about with strong conviction was the opportunity romances provided them to learn new words and new phrases in English. Stressing that romances were not just entertaining but also educational, many readers' enthusiastically reeled off lists of words to me that they had recently learned. Smriti and Shailaja who were never without at least two Mills & Boon romances in their bags, quickly pulled out with delight a couple of Mills & Boons to show me examples:

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[15] A glimpse of the prevalence of Mills & Boon romance reading among female readers of English-language media is provided by an article written by Radha Rastogi in *Femina*, one of India's most popular English-language magazines for women. In the September 8, 1995 issue of *Femina*, Radha Rastogi reflects on Indian women's preferences for certain genres of popular culture such as Mills & Boon romance fiction and soap operas. She argues that readers enjoy these genres not because they are passive and stupid but because women are the central characters in these genres. At the end of her article, she urges the magazine's readers not to be ashamed of reading Mills & Boon romances: "What stops us from openly admitting, yes, nothing like a good Mills & Boon read when you are tired. Nothing to be ashamed of. We must be able to square feminist perceptions with our enjoyment of Mills & Boons and soap operas (p. 80).

> Smriti: Here is a book *A Wedding to Remember* by one of my favorite authors Emma Darcy. I love her writing and I always learn new words from her books. Actually I don't just learn new words, but also how I could use them. (Quickly opening to a page). Look, look here on these two pages are some words I came across (pp. 76-77): "gesticulations," "volatile," "fastidious," "diatribe," "recalcitrant," "interjected," "acceded," "proviso," . . . Some of these words I maybe had heard of but I did not know how and where to use them. Look on this page now (p. 80): "lugubrious" and "outlandish." (Darcy, 1993)
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> Shailaja: Yes, I like that too in M& Bs (short for Mills & Boons, my words), people think they are just romantic nonsense but actually they can be useful too. I like Emma Darcy too but I actually think Catherine George is even better (said this with a challenging look at her friend). I am reading *Fallen Hero* by Catherine George and look here on this page (George, 1990, p. 96)--"catapulted," "androgynous," and "metamorphosed." Hey, I knew the word catapult before as a toy that children play with, but I never knew you could use it to say that someone "catapults" into my life.

Just as Smrithi and Shailaja seemed to take great pleasure in learning new words and in learning new ways to use words they already knew many other readers too expressed their opinions on the "usefulness" of Mills & Boon romances to expand their vocabulary.

In addition to the joys of enriching their vocabulary, readers also stressed that these words they learned and understood contextually from the Mills & Boons were very helpful to them in the present in the writing they did in their English classes. In addition, they were also confident that the words they learned from Mills & Boons would be helpful to answer questions pertaining to vocabulary and reading comprehension in various tests and exams that they had to take under a lot of pressure. One reader Latha had a cousin who read Mills & Boons and she expressed the most direct and useful value of the words learned from these romances:

> Oh these books are not just useful for our English classes, but in fact they are very useful for the most difficult and biggest exam of all, the GRE (Graduate Record Exam, my words)! My cousin goes through the M & Bs she reads and in fact writes down in her note book the new words she comes across. The M & Bs she actually owns are all marked up in red. She said that many of the words she comes across are also in the Barron's Guide to the GRE.

Latha's friends chimed in when she started discussing the GRE and one friend Priya added:

> Oh not just the GRE, many other entrance exams like all the MBA entrance exams such as the IIM (Indian Institute of Management) entrance, the XLRI (Xavier Labour Research Institute) entrance, and the university entrance exams test vocabulary and reading comprehension. Because I read so many M & Bs in English, I have learned to read really fast and maybe that will help on the reading comprehension part of the exams.[16]

Many other readers too emphasized the value of the ability to read quickly and echoed Priya's observation regarding the advantage "speed reading" offered them to get through the reading they had to do for their classes and for their exams.

My conversations with English teachers and library owners also highlighted the value of Mills & Boons as encouraging literacy in English. Supporting the claims of students, two English teachers I interviewed at one college when asked about their students' Mills & Boon reading responded that they actually did not disapprove of their students reading Mills & Boons because any time students spent on reading in English was according to them better than time spent with television:[17]

> We know the students who read those Mills & Boons and some of them are very good students who write well and speak fluently during class discussions. We are happy that they are reading in English and also as long they are not fixated on the television and reading something, we teachers are happy. With this cable television, MTV, STAR TV, etc., many students have stopped reading.[18]

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[16] Entrance exams are exams that students have to take in order to secure admission into various graduate programs in universities in all subject areas. These entrance exams are often modeled after exams such as the GMAT and GRE, which are administered in the United States for admission into graduate school in the areas of liberal arts, business, and science.

[17] The concern of these teachers for the disappearance of reading due to the attractions of television, especially with the recent advent of a spate of popular programming on television such as mainstream films, soap operas, popular music, and MTV is a concern that was also expressed in the women's magazine *Femina* (1995, September 8, pp. 39-41). Purnima Goswami, the author of the article, pulls together various arguments and opinions from parents, teachers, librarians, publishers, and other adults regarding the negative impact of television on reading. Goswami also includes tips and suggestions for parents to encourage reading in the face of the rising popularity of television for children.

[18] An interesting issue related to Mills & Boon romance fiction and the college teachers I interviewed is that some teachers, especially the younger teachers in their late twenties and early thirties , read Mills & Boon romances themselves. The library owner of one lending library, which was situated right outside this particular women's college, volunteered the information that many of the teachers checked out Mills & Boons on a regular basis, although they did it more surreptitiously and not during rush hours. She said: "Most of the readers are the college students, but the teachers also read M & Bs. They will come to the side window if students are crowding the door and ask me for new books of their favorite authors." When I asked her why the teachers preferred to check out their Mills & Boons more discreetly, she said, "Look, these books are all about love and romance and that stuff is

All the English teachers I spoke to at the four colleges I visited stressed the fact that in general many of their students who read Mills & Boons were intelligent, hardworking, and strongly interested in careers. Dismissing their reading as a little bit of harmless escapism, one teacher said, "We know many parents think these books are a bad influence and so I occasionally will discourage my students from reading them. But honestly, I don't know what to say sometimes because many of the students who read these books speak and write so well in English and do quite well in their studies so I am not sure why I should bother." These teachers assessment of many of their students who read Mills & Boons as "smart, diligent, and good at English" contrasts with Linda Christian-Smith's sample of midwestern romance readers (girls between the ages of 12-15 years old) in the United States who were classified as "academically unsuccessful" by their school (Christian-Smith, 1990).[19] To some extent, my sample of readers who read romance fiction in English may be different because they belonged to the middle- and upper-classes, an elite group, and therefore could have been privileged by their class situation through access to good educational resources throughout their lives; for example, two out of the four colleges I visited were known for their image of catering to elite English-educated urban women.

In my discussions with library owners, three of the seven library owners I spoke with talked proudly of their business as being different from other businesses because they were in the "English literacy" business and one said:[20]

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seen as appropriate only for young women and teachers feel embarrassed because most of them are in their thirties and are respectably married and even have children."

[19] Linda Christian Smith's findings cannot be generalized to all adolescent readers in the United States; the school girls she focuses on are slow readers from remedial and low-ability reading classes. For a perspective that challenges the equation of simple-minded reader with romance fiction see Ginger Brent's unpublished study of adolescent reading histories of Duke University's undergraduate women, a large percentage of whom had read romances as girls (Brent, 1989).

[20] Many library owners did stock vernacular fiction in Telugu and Hindi in their lending libraries. But they did not refer to these novels at all when they spoke about their businesses as being "educational," probably because literacy in Indian languages such as Hindi and Telugu is not rewarded with high-paying jobs. During the many hours I spent in these lending libraries, I noticed that the primary readers of Telugu and Hindi fiction were women in the ages of 35 years and above. On speaking with some of these older women, I found out that although some of these women could speak and write English, they had been educated until the 10th grade in Telugu and

> Concerned parents sometimes come and ask about these Mills & Boons. I tell them not to worry and ask them to be happy that their children are reading English books. I tell them about so many smart career women and other respectable women who read these books. In fact the daughter-in-law of a retired Supreme court judge comes here and checks out ten books a week. She speaks beautiful English.[21]

Scholars such as Janice Radway (1984, p. 116) and Margaret Jensen (1984, p. 68) also report that the readers they interviewed in the United States talked to them about romance fiction being a source of education and instruction, however, both these scholars only make passing references to their informants claiming use of romances to improve language skills and vocabulary. While it is difficult to know exactly why Radway and Jensen chose not to dwell at length on this issue, it is possibly because their informants themselves did not belabor the issue. In the case of my informants in Hyderabad, India, their insistence on romances being a tool to improve their vocabulary in English and thus to enhance their chances of success at exams and tests is connected to the economic mobility and upper-class stability that knowledge of English in a India's postcolonial situation promises. Readers' assessment of romances as improving their English testifies to the value placed by the educational system and the job market on English-language skills. Yasmeen Lukmani (1992), a sociologist surveyed college students, who had been educated in the Marathi language until high school, about their attitudes towards English and found that they wanted to learn English primarily to achieve material success; their

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Hindi and were therefore more comfortable with fiction in these languages. Some other older women did not speak or write English at all and had been educated in the rural areas throughout their formal education in Telugu and therefore read for pleasure only in Telugu.

[21] All the library owners I spoke to reiterated the point that Mills & Boons are read by many successful career women in India who read them currently or read them in the past as young women. A good example of one such woman who is a public figure is Achala Moulik who is the chief executive officer and additional director-general of the Archaeological Survey of India. Moulik was profiled in *Indian Express*, a national English-language newspaper (June 16, 1996, p. 6). The author of the article, Kaveree Bamzai (1996) begins by introducing Moulik as a reader of Mills & Boons and as the author of a Mills & Boon novel; Moulik wrote a Mills & Boon romance novel in English under the pseudonym of Angela Morrel in 1985. Describing her education, Bamzai writes, "Born in Calcutta, she was educated in Washington, New York, London, and Rome. She graduated in London University in 1963 (p. 6)." Achala Moulik, who has worked for the elite Indian bureaucratic services most of her life, is now planning to write her biography and has already written another novel called *The Conquerors* which is historically based fiction set in nineteenth century India.

perceptions of the English-speaking community as well-to-do and comfortable seemed to be an important factor that influenced their choice to pursue English in college. Thus English Mills & Boon romances in India's postcolonial situation become a source for improving one's vocabulary in English, a valuable asset in a country where knowledge of English has become a prerequisite for economic mobility.

Romance reading as "English popular culture" is part of the leisure activities of the upwardly mobile and materially successful urban English-educated Indians who represent for some the success that can be achieved with an English education. As many popular culture scholars have pointed out, the consumption of popular culture is an integral part of the ways in which people express their identities. Romance reading I found through my discussions with readers is one leisure pursuit that they used as a symbolic activity to distinguish themselves from those that they perceived as less sophisticated. I found that reading romances in English serves to bolster readers' image of themselves as belonging to the elite English-educated urban classes. Some of my informants, especially young women whose parents disapproved of their romance reading, contrasted romance reading with watching Indian films to underscore the higher value of Mills & Boon romances vis-à-vis Indian films. Payal, who resented her mother's constant monitoring of her romance reading, argued:

> Look, she should be really happy I don't watch every new Hindi or Telugu film. Yes, I like watching them once in a while but I prefer Mills & Boons. They're not as trashy or stupid. They are useful at least. Even my bus conductor who notices me reading them says, "You're so lucky you can read English books. Because I am not educated, the only English I get close to is English in the English films."

Shanti and Sonali, two friends from another college expressed similar thoughts when they discussed the superior value of romance fiction, "Instead of watching those three hour long cheap Telugu and Hindi films or Chitrahaar [song and dance sequences from films] on TV we're reading M & Bs, which are much better. Those girls who watch those films did not read in English when they were young so they watch those useless films." Discrediting Indian films by contrasting the superior cultural value of reading Mills & Boons versus watching Hindi and

Telugu films is thus a strategy that readers use to assert their identity as more sophisticated than their peers who preferred film-watching.

The opinions that my informants expressed about Indian films as "trashy" and as low culture is not unique to them, in fact, Indian films, despite their huge popularity, are widely discredited as useless fantasy and as morally corrupting by many others in Indian society (Derne, 1997, pp. 54-58; Khare, 1985, p. 142).[22] In his ethnographic research, Steve Derne, a sociologist, found that many of the men he interviewed in Banaras, India actively criticized commercial Hindi films as promoting "vulgarity, intoxications, and neglect of family responsibility. Derne (1997) argues that it is precisely because of this strong cultural disapproval of Hindi cinema that viewers perceive films, especially those films that seem to challenge established cultural norms as merely exaggerated fantasy and not as material that could be applied to their own lives.

One other way that some informants argued for their cultural sophistication as consumers of "English popular culture" was to connect their reading preferences for Mills & Boons with other leisure pursuits they enjoyed such as reading more serious fiction and watching and reading the news. Speaking for her group of friends, Mythili argued:

> We like Mills & Boons the best but we also watch STAR TV, Zee TV, and good English films, which are usually shown at Sangeet Theatre. We also read other fiction by authors like John Irving and Agatha Christie. And apart from all this fun stuff we read newspapers like *The Hindu* and *Indian Express* and magazines like *India Today* once in a way and watch the news. We try to keep up with current events. So we read M & Bs but we also do other things.[23]

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[22] Vishnu Khare (1985) writes, "From childhood on Indians are discouraged from seeing films." He reports that Indians see films as containing "lascivious and immoral behavior," propagating "smoking, drinking, [and] vulgar speech and manners" and stimulating "passion" and "sexual promiscuity" (p. 142).

[23] Many informants mentioned this particular cinema theater, which exclusively showed selected Hollywood films, as being the most respectable and safe theater for women to watch films. Some of them told me that many young men of the lower classes came to this theater to watch English films even though they did not understand English because it was a status symbol to be seen there. Watching English films for some lower-class men, argued a few of my informants, was a way for these men to feel like they belonged in the circles of the English-educated elite and also to "watch" or "ogle" young women.

Romance novels, which were primarily about courtship and romance and therefore susceptible to be viewed as "useless" were thus given respectability for my informants by including romance reading on a continuum with other forms of more culturally acceptable English popular culture such as longer and more serious fiction and the news media. By connecting their preferences for entertainment such as romance reading and television watching, especially STAR TV and Zee TV, to their preferences for more "educational" English-language news media such as The Hindu, Indian Express and India Today, readers wanted me to understand that romance reading for them was only one activity among many other more "useful" activities. In their interviews with romance readers in the United States, Janice Radway (1984, pp. 108-11) and Margaret Jensen (1984, p. 82) also write that readers emphasize the instructional value of romances to convince skeptical family and friends about the educational value of their leisure reading.

Mill & Boon romances are therefore legitimized by readers as useful and valuable by constructing them as "English popular culture" and this construction is in part shaped by the fact that romance fiction requires a more active process such as reading in English unlike television or film. We see that romances are pleasurable because they exist on a continuum along with readers tastes for other Western media such as fairytales, children's series books, and comics, that they consumed during their childhood. In addition, since the English language has become a prerequisite for economic mobility in postcolonial India, Western romances are viewed as books that improve English-language skills and allow readers to compete better on exams and tests. Finally, English-educated readers use romance reading as a form of cultural capital in order to set themselves apart from others who they see as less sophisticated consumers of mainstream Indian films.

Conclusion

Mills & Boon romances as English popular culture circulate primarily among young English-educated middle-class urban women; these readers' preferences for Western romances is not just a contemporary phenomenon but is actually a part of the colonial history of English education in India. Historicizing the reading of romances in English in India shows us why romances are read in English in India by the urban upper- and middle-classes. The brief history of English education in India shows us how colonial interventions divided Indians further by class and explains to some extent why English-language media are consumed primarily by urban upper- and middle-class English-educated Indians. The colonial history of English and its link to economic and social success during colonialism has continued in postcolonial India to constitute and reproduce class differences in media consumption. The link between English, its colonial history in India, and its contemporary characteristic as an urban upper- and middle-class resource influences Indian women's interpretations of Western romance fiction as "English popular culture."

My analysis of readers discussions of the pleasure they get out of reading romances gives us a glimpse of how romances fit into the broader cultural milieu of English popular culture that readers are exposed to since their childhood. Readers directly identify romances as English popular culture by speaking about romances as resources to improve their vocabulary and reading skills in English. In addition, we saw that romances also function as a cultural resource for readers to assert their identity as part of the larger group of consumers who prefer English popular culture and thus visualize themselves as cultural elites.

Thus, in some third world situations such as postcolonial India, the consumption of Western media takes place primarily among urban middle- and upper-classes and therefore we cannot envisage monolithic audiences for all cultural products from the West. Given the colonial history of some third world countries, it is also important to understand how colonial history not only shapes readers' preferences for certain media but also guides their interpretation of the content of Western media, especially if these media are seen as products that can help to maintain and advance their class status.

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Getting the News: How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Their Sources

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July 1997

A paper presented to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in Chicago, Illinois.

Getting the News: How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Their Sources

Abstract: A questionnaire, supplemented by structured interviews, was used to compare the source dependency of Japanese correspondents in Washington and American correspondents in Tokyo. The study was to help answer the question of who sets the media agenda. It found that the Japanese rely on government sources significantly more than the Americans. Although the American and Japanese journalists shared professional concerns such as having credible, accessible sources, the Japanese were more likely to choose a source for partisan reasons.

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A paper submitted to the international division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, April 1997.

Introduction and Literature Review

No one can have direct knowledge of the full range of international affairs, so that information generally reaches individuals through the media.[1] As a result, Bernard C. Cohen argues, "the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read."[2] When the nations involved are the United States and Japan -- two economic powerhouses with strained trade relations and a security alliance that provides the "foundation of peace, security and stability in the Asian Pacific region"[3] -- the work of international correspondents becomes that much more important.

A major factor influencing the images and information imparted by the media is the journalists' sources. This paper examines the sourcing practices of American and Japanese correspondents to augment the literature on how source dependency influences media content. This examination also relates to agenda-setting theory as it has evolved to include the question of who sets the media agenda.

Shoemaker and Reese define sources as "external suppliers of raw material, whether speeches, interviews, corporate reports, or government hearings."[4] Journalists are dependent on sources because, without them, reporters would have little to report.

Gans and Sigal found that official, government sources were among those most frequently quoted by the American media they studied.[5] Sigal concluded that reporters rely mainly on

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[1] Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 12-13.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[3] Federal News Service, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense William Perry, the Hudson Institute Forum, the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.," December 5, 1996, via Lexis-Nexis.

[4] Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, *Mediating the Message, Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, New York: Longman, 1991, p. 105.

[5] Herbert Gans, *Deciding What's News, A Study of the* CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, *and* Time, New York: Pantheon Books, 1979, p. 9., and Leon Sigal, *Reporters and Officials, The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking*, Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1973, pp. 123-124.

"routine channels of newsgathering," such as official proceedings, press releases, press conferences and other staged events.[6] Several researchers have found that accessibility, power and proximity are key issues in source dependency. "Organizations' regular office hours and full-time staff members make it easy for journalists to access information."[7] In addition, Gans finds that the "economically and politically powerful can obtain easy access to, and are sought out by, journalists; those who lack power are harder to reach by journalists and are generally not sought out until their activities produce social or moral disorder news."[8] Proximity also affects sourcing practices. Martin found that the newspaper closest to the issue at hand "not only carried a wider variety or greater range of sources, but inversely, the news organization farthest from the event community tended to cite only high level and official sources."[9]

In a direct comparison of U.S. and Japanese news coverage, Atwood found that the Japanese newspapers cited a wider variety of sources and used more attribution.[10] He also found that news reported on the trade issue reflected the point of view of the country for whom the journalists were writing.[11] In their study, Budner and Krauss found that Americans are more likely to cite sources[12] and that "those Japanese news stories that cited substantive arguments are far more likely to be one-sided ...."[13] In a study of international correspondents in Washington, Ghorpade found that other media were rated among the most regularly used sources, primarily because of staff and budgetary restraints.[14]

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[6] Sigal, p. 125.

[7] Shoemaker and Reese, p. 152.

[8] Gans, p. 81.

[9] Shannon Rossi Martin, "Proximity of Event as Factor in Selection of News Sources," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 65, 1988, p. 989.

[10] L. Erwin Atwood, "News of U.S. and Japan in each other's papers." *Gazette* 39 (1987), p. 79.

[11] *Ibid., p. 86.*

[12] Stanley Budner and Ellis S. Krauss, "Newspaper Coverage of U.S.-Japan Frictions, Balance and Objectivity," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, April 1995, pp. 340-341.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 342.

[14] Shailendra Ghorpade, "Sources and Access: How Foreign Correspondents Rate Washington, D.C.", *Journal of Communication*, 1984, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. *35, 39*.

Examining journalists' use of sources is key to understanding media content and the media's agenda. The basic agenda-setting hypothesis stated that the pattern of news coverage influences public perceptions of what are the important issues of the day.[15] By the 1980s, agenda-setting research had evolved to include questions about who sets the media's agenda. McCombs likens exploring the issue to peeling an onion: "The outermost layer is the array of sources routinely used by journalists to obtain news."[16]

Some scholars believe pressure groups and special interest groups sometimes push an issue on the media agenda.[17] In addition, the elite media appear to be able to set the agenda for others.[18] In their work, Shoemaker and Reese identified several major influences on media content: individual media workers, media routines, the news organization, external forces and ideology.[19] Who journalists choose as sources may be influenced by all of the above.

Some research on sourcing practices has explicitly linked to agenda-setting theory. One study found that "a prominent news source can have a major influence on the subsequent media agenda, but the selective processes and news judgments of journalists also play a significant part ..."[20] In another study, VanSlyke Turk and Franklin found that U.K. journalists were more likely to use second-hand information from government than were Americans.[21] They suggested newspaper staffs in the United Kingdom were more dependent because they had fewer resources and that American journalists are more prejudiced against relying on others.[22]

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[15] Maxwell E. McCombs, "Explorers and Surveyors: Expanding Strategies for Agenda-Setting Research," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 813.
[16] Ibid., p. 816.
[17] Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard Jr., *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, and Uses in the Mass Media*, New York: Longman, 1992, p. 223.
[18] McCombs, pp. 816-817.
[19] Shoemaker and Reese.
[20] David Weaver and Swanzy Nimley Elliott, "Who Sets the Agenda for the Media? A Study of Local Agenda-Building," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 1, p. 94.
[21] Judy VanSlyke Turk and Bob Franklin, "Information Subsidies: Agenda-Setting Traditions," *Public Relations Review*, Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 1987, p. 29.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

To examine the source dependency of American and Japanese international correspondents, we must first know who they are and how they do their jobs. At this point, more research is available about the Americans than the Japanese. In neither case is the information definitive.

In late 1995, U.S. media organizations had 303 accredited correspondents covering Japan, of whom 166 were American and 137 Japanese.[23] Neilan says the "new" correspondent "travels more in Japan, less in the regions than predecessors and is probably a bilingual university graduate, a specialist in economics or technology...[24] He estimates the median age is the early 30s.[25] Of the American journalists working in Japan whom Hess surveyed, 49 percent said they had no Japanese-language proficiency, while 28 percent said they were able to conduct a serious interview in Japanese.[26] As for how the correspondents do their jobs, most reports have focused on how non-Japanese are often excluded from the Japanese *kisha kurabu*, or press clubs, but do not explain how the journalists find other sources or how the language barrier affects their work.

Even less information is available about Japanese journalists working in Washington. However, some research indicates Japanese journalists overall are more likely to subscribe to self-censorship. The Japanese live in a Confucian culture that places great value on the group over the individual and on harmony over conflict. In such a culture, the "Japanese media attempt to preserve harmony in society by refraining from disturbing the status quo"[27] and "senior Japanese newspaper editors view themselves as public guardians, entrusted to help maintain a disciplined society with a maximum of order and a minimum of conflict."[28]

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[23] Edward Neilan, "The New Foreign Correspondent in Japan," *Japan Quarterly*, July-September 1995, p. 308.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 307.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 309.
[26] Stephen Hess, "Speaking in Tongues, More Foreign Correspondents Know Language of the Country They Cover," *Nieman Reports*, Fall 1994, pp. 30, 32.
[27] Masahiko Ishikawa, "Journalism Education in a Japanese Newspaper: A Case Study of the *Asahi Shimbun*," a thesis presented to the faculty of the graduate school at the University of Missouri-Columbia, May 1995, p. 101.
[28] Karel van Wolferen, "Japan's Non-Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 1993, p. 54.

Socialization can especially be seen in the hiring and training process, where systematic early recruitment allows for a long period of common socialization.[29] Kim says loyalty to one's organization and its norms is also reinforced by "the virtual absence of lateral entry into or mobility between news organizations; the practice of permanent employment with a single employer; and the traditional norms concerning 'group orientation' and 'conformity.' "[30]

From this literature review, it is clear that little systematic research has been conducted on international correspondents, their sourcing practices and how the media agenda is set abroad. In this paper, the following research questions will be addressed:

Research Question No. 1: Whom do the American and Japanese correspondents perceive to be their most important, or most often used, sources and how do those sources differ? Research Question No. 2: Is the Japanese correspondents' use of official, government sources significantly greater than that of the American correspondents? Research Question No. 3: How much do Japanese and American correspondents use other media as news sources, and is there a significant difference in their usage? Research Question No. 4: How do Japanese and American foreign correspondents compare in their use of Japanese vs. American news sources? Is there balance in their use of sources from both countries? Research Question No. 5: Does a source's ideology or a correspondent's perceived duty to country influence the Japanese correspondents' decisions about which sources to use more than the Americans' decisions? Research Question No. 6: What do Japanese and American correspondents perceive to be the most important influences on their decisions to use news sources, and how do their perceptions differ? Research Question No. 7: Is there a correlation between American journalists' Japanese-language proficiency and the types of sources they use? Research Question No. 8: To what extent do correspondents' news organizations influence the journalists' use of sources?

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[29] Young C. Kim, *Japanese Journalists and Their World*, Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1981, p. 209.
[30] Ibid.

Methodology

The majority of studies testing the concept of source dependency appear to be content analyses, which can provide hard, empirical data about the types of sources journalists quote and the frequency with which those sources are quoted. However, a content analysis can say nothing about *why* journalists use the sources they do. For a deeper understanding, a questionnaire supported by structured interviews was chosen as the methodology for this research.

The questionnaire was designed to highlight attitudinal and other differences in how full-time Japanese and American international correspondents approach and conduct their jobs when working in the capitals of Washington and Tokyo. The questionnaire was modeled primarily after a 1992 survey conducted by Powers and Fico, who examined the influences on reporters' use of sources at elite U.S. newspapers.[31] Although many of the same questions were used, others were added to make a distinction between the use of Japanese and American sources and to examine the influence of nationality and language.

The journalists were asked in the first section of the questionnaire to indicate on a five-point, interval scale how often 27 different sources were used in their news stories.[32] In the second part of the questionnaire, closed-ended questions asked the journalists to indicate on a five-point, interval scale how often 24 various influences affected their decision to use particular sources.[33] The questionnaire was administered only in English. However, Japanese journalists must pass rigorous entrance examinations, which include tests of English proficiency, to even be considered for employment at Japanese newspapers, so this was not expected to affect participation.

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[31] Angela Powers and Frederick Fico. "Influences on Reporters' Use of Sources at High Circulation U.S. Newspapers." A paper presented to the Association of Education in Mass Communication and Journalism, 1994.

[32] These questions have been adopted from Part II of the Powers and Fico "Sources of News" survey.

[33] Powers and Fico, p. 7.

Using information in the USIA Directory of Foreign Correspondents, questionnaires were mailed to all 76 Japanese news correspondents based in Washington. Unlike the United States Information Agency, however, Japan's Foreign Press Center declined to supply a list of American correspondents in Japan. Instead, a list of American correspondents was provided by Professor Kliesch at Ohio University, who conducted a 1990 census of American journalists abroad,[34] and updated with phone calls. Seventy-seven full-time correspondents were identified and mailed questionnaires.

The first mailing of the questionnaires was in June 1996, a postcard reminder was sent a month later, and a second mailing was conducted in August 1996. Of the 76 questionnaires mailed to Washington, 25, nearly 33 percent, were returned. One survey was not usable, however, because the correspondent listed his nationality as non-Japanese. Of the questionnaires sent to Japan, 32 were returned, for a response rate of nearly 42 percent. Of the 32 questionnaires returned, three were not included in the quantitative analysis, however, because they were completed by either non-Americans or correspondents who were not full time.

The primary statistical tool for this research was the t-test, which was used to compare the mean scores of the Japanese and Americans. In all the statistical tests used, missing data were excluded from the analysis.

Results

Questionnaires were received from correspondents from four of Japan's five national newspapers, the *Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nihon Keizai Shimbun* and *Yomiuri*

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[34] Ralph E. Kliesch, "The U.S. Press Corps Abroad Rebounds, a 7th world survey of foreign correspondents." *Newspaper Research Journal*, Winter 1991, pp. 24-33.

Table 1

Demographics	**American correspondents**	**Japanese correspondents**
Gender	23 men, 6 women	22 men, 2 women
Age (mean)	39.071	39.958
Education level	11 with bachelor's degrees, 18 with master's degrees	16 with bachelor's degrees, 8 with master's degrees
Years as reporter (mean)	14.259	16.037
Number with politics beat	12	18
Number with economics beat	19	10
Number with science/technology beat	12	2
Number with diplomacy beat	9	15
Number with other beats	14	4
Number of years on current beat (mean)	4.434	8.208
How many years with current news organization (mean)	9.060	15.750
How many years covered Tokyo/Washington (mean, median)	5.460, 3.500	2.266, 2
Language ability (mean) 0= no language skills, 1=able to order a meal, 2=able to understand TV news, 3=able to conduct an interview	2.131	2.913

Shimbun, as well as several other Japanese news organizations. The Americans who completed the questionnaire worked for such organizations as the Associated Press, Bloomberg Business News, *Business Week*, CBS News, the *Christian Science Monitor*, Forbes, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. Questionnaires were also completed by journalists with more specialized news organizations. For more demographic information, see Table 1 above.

Research Question No. 1: Whom do the American and Japanese correspondents perceive to be their most important, or most often used, sources and how do those sources differ?

The correspondents were asked, "How often do you use the following sources," and given a list of 27 different types of sources in Part 1 of the questionnaire. Of the sources listed, the American correspondents gave their news organization's morgue, library or reference file the highest rating, a mean score of 4.241 on a scale of 5=always use such sources and 1=never use such sources. For the Japanese correspondents, the top-rated source was news conferences called

Table 2

Ranking the Use of News Sources

American Correspondents		**Japanese Correspondents**	
Source	**Mean**	**Source**	**Mean**
1. Your news organization's morgue, library or reference file	4.241	1. News conferences called by governmental authorities	4.458
2. Japanese academic, scientific or other experts in specific fields	3.931	2. English-speaking sources	4.250
3. Japanese-speaking sources	3.914	3. News releases issued by groups or organizations	4.167
4. English-speaking sources	3.879	4. American academic, scientific or other experts in specific fields	4.125
5. Stories from other reporters/news organizations	3.793	5. Material issued by governmental bodies or agencies	4.083
6. Online databases	3.621	6. American elected or appointed governmental officials, their staffs	3.958
6. Japanese business leaders, their staffs, public relations officials	3.621	7. Formal meetings of governmental bodies or organizations	3.792
8. Material issued by governmental bodies or agencies	3.534	8. Japanese-speaking sources	3.750
9. American academic, scientific or other experts in specific fields	3.448	9. Documented sources such as census reports or academic studies	3.625
10. Documented sources such as census reports or academic studies	3.414	10. Stories from other reporters/news organizations	3.583
11. Ordinary Japanese citizens	3.321	11. Online databases	3.542
12. Japanese elected or appointed governmental officials, their staffs	3.310	12. Material issued by governmental bodies or agencies	3.500
12. Material issued by governmental bodies or agencies	3.310	12. News releases issued by nongovernmental groups	3.500
14. American business leaders, their staffs or public relations officials	2.931	14. Japanese elected or appointed governmental officials, their staffs	3.435
15. News conferences called by governmental authorities	2.862	15. Your news organization's morgue, library or reference file	3.292
16. News releases issued by governmental groups	2.793	16. American interest groups	3.087
17. News releases issued by nongovernmental groups	2.759	17. News conferences called by American interest groups	3.042
18. Formal meetings of governmental bodies	2.655	18. Japanese academic, scientific or other experts in specific fields	3.000
19. Japanese interest groups	2.643	19. Official law enforcement activities	2.917
20. American elected or appointed governmental officials, their staffs	2.621	20. Anonymous sources	2.833
21. Anonymous sources	2.584	21. American business leaders, their staffs or public relations officials	2.792
22. Official law enforcement activities	2.296	22. Japanese business leaders, their staffs or public relations officials	2.750
23. News conferences called by Japanese interest groups	2.241	23. News conferences called by Japanese interest groups	2.583
24. Marches, protests or other events staged by activists	2.214	24. Ordinary American citizens	2.542
25. American interest groups	2.069	25. Japanese interest groups	2.304
26. News conferences called by American interest groups	2.034	26. Marches, protests or other events staged by activists	2.208
27. Ordinary American citizens	1.636	27. Ordinary Japanese citizens	2.087

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by governmental authorities, which had a mean score of 4.458. For the complete rankings, see Table 2 on previous page.

What is immediately striking about the rank ordering is the Japanese correspondents' greater use of government sources. Although the Americans cited only one government source among their top 10 most-used sources, the Japanese correspondents included four -- government news conferences, government-issued material, American elected or appointed governmental officials, and formal meetings of governmental bodies or organizations. The correspondents' use of government sources will be examined further in the next section, but these results already suggest the potential the American government has for shaping the Japanese correspondents' agenda.

Correspondents from both countries also indicate they frequently use text, rather than individuals, as sources. Five of the Americans' top 10 most-frequently used sources involve databases, stories in other media and other documents. Four of the Japanese correspondents' most-often used sources include news releases, stories in other media and other documents. Whether the correspondents choose these sources based on their perceived credibility and/or their accessibility is an issue to consider.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the Japanese and Americans rate nearly identical sources as the least frequently used. Neither apparently puts much stock in marches, protests or other events staged by activists; Japanese interest groups; or citizens of their own country. Of course, the journalists may not cover marches and other protests that frequently because many of those protests are directed at a domestic audience.

Table 3

The use of government sources
T-tests for independent samples (A = American, J = Japanese)

Variable	**Number of Cases**	**Mean**	**Standard Error**	**t value**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**2-tailed Probability**
1-a American gov't officials, staff	A - 29	2.6207	.152	-5.49	51	.000*
	J - 24	3.9583	.195			
1-b Japanese gov't officials, staff	A - 29	3.3103	.186	-.45	50	.657
	J - 23	3.4348	.207			
1-k Formal meetings of gov't. organizations	A - 29	2.6552	.194	-4.51	51	.000*
	J - 24	3.7917	.147			
1-m News conferences called by government authorities	A - 29	2.8621	.203	-6.27	51	.000*
	J - 24	4.4583	.134			
1-r Material issued by government bodies or agencies	A - 29	3.5345	.140	-2.60	51	.012*
	J - 24	4.0833	.158			
1-t Government news releases	A - 29	2.7931	.182	-5.35	51	.000*
	J - 24	4.1667	.177			

Research Question No. 2: Is the Japanese correspondents' use of official, government sources significantly greater than that of the American correspondents?

T-tests were conducted to compare the American and Japanese mean scores on six variables, all of which mentioned the word government. The correspondents were asked, "How often do you use the following sources?" on a scale on which 1=never and 5=always. On each of the variables tested, the Japanese correspondents rated their use of government sources higher than the American correspondents did. On all but one of the variables -- Japanese government officials (1-b) -- the differences in the correspondents' scores were statistically significant. Overall, the hypothesis that Japanese correspondents would use official, governmental sources more often than the Americans was supported. (See Table 3 above.)

The hypothesis also was supported in interviews. The Japanese journalists said they considered using government sources a key part of their jobs. "Of course, it's encouraged," said

Kohei Murayama, who covers economics and diplomacy for the Kyodo News Service.[35] "I don't know any organization in Japan that discourages it (using government sources)," said Eiji Toshi, a correspondent for the Jiji Press news service.[36] Toshiro Ikemura, a correspondent for the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, said he considers it "very, very important" to go to news conferences.[37] He said he encourages the younger correspondents to attend the daily briefings so the correspondents will "know how American diplomacy works." Although he encourages attendance at government news conferences, "That does not mean we write a story every time," Ikemura said. Yasuhiko Ota, a correspondent for the business newspaper *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, called government "the primary source of news."[38]

To the American correspondents interviewed, on the other hand, using government sources was considered much less important. Only one of the eight journalists interviewed said his news organization encouraged the use of government sources. Most said their news organizations had no policy. "Being so far from the office, I don't get a lot of direction, and certainly no one is telling me or guiding me to use certain sources or avoid others," said Michael Lev, the *Chicago Tribune's* Tokyo bureau chief and lone correspondent there.[39] Said Michael Zielenziger, Knight-Ridder's correspondent in Tokyo: "My office does not issue 'rules' on how one reports. Obviously, the views of any government are not irrelevant, but they are not the Bible either."[40] Of the American correspondents interviewed, only Dennis Normile of *Electronic*

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[35] Telephone interview with Kohei Murayama, correspondent for the Jiji Press, week of Oct. 14, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Murayama is from the telephone interview.

[36] Telephone interview with Eiji Toshi, correspondent for the Jiji Press, week of Oct. 14, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Toshi is from the telephone interview.

[37] Telephone interview with Toshiro Ikemura, correspondent for the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, week of Oct. 14, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Ikemura is from the telephone interview.

[38] Telephone interview with Yasuhiko Ota, correspondent for the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, week of Oct. 14, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Ota is from the telephone interview

[39] Email response from Michael Lev, Tokyo bureau chief for the *Chicago Tribune*, on Oct. 17, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Lev is from his email response.

[40] Email response from Michael Zielenziger, Tokyo correspondent for Knight-Ridder Newspapers, on Oct. 13, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Zielenziger is from his email response.

Business Asia said his news organization encourages the use of government sources. "Government policy is very important," said Normile, who reported that he has had no problems arranging interviews with mid-ranking officials at various government agencies.[41]

Lev said he uses government sources, including news releases and news conferences, but his coverage is "rarely dictated by them." Said Barry Petersen of CBS News: "As for government sources, we use them extensively when it's appropriate to the story. Sometimes, an outside expert (Japanese or American) may be better and we seek that person out. Each story is different, so -- alas -- it always seems to vary."[42]

The differences in the American and Japanese journalists' reported use of government sources likely stems partly from how journalism is practiced in their home countries and partly on the practices of government.

The Japanese are accustomed to the press club system in Japan in which every major governmental agency or business group has its own press clubs, or *kisha kurabu*. The clubs "function as almost exclusive channels of information regarding the pertinent institutions and it is within the confines of the club walls that much of the reporter/official interaction takes place."[43] The *kisha kurabu* tend to encourage uniformity in reporting and discourage critical reporting. Under this system, the Japanese journalists have come to depend on the Japanese government as a news source. Given this reliance on government at home, it is not surprising that Japanese correspondents depend heavily on government sources abroad as well.

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[41] Email response from Dennis Normile, correspondent for *Electronic Business Asia*, on Oct. 12, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Normile is from his email response.

[42] Email response from Barry Petersen, Tokyo correspondent for CBS News, on Oct. 12, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Petersen is from his e-mail response.

[43] Roya Akhavan-Majid, "The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 1010.

Unlike their Japanese counterparts, the Americans have not worked under an extensive press club system in the United States. Although there has been plenty of research that indicates American journalists are reliant on official sources,[44] they also have been found to be more independent (than British journalists, at least) and more prejudiced against relying on others for help with news gathering.[45] How might those two different traits apply to Americans working in Tokyo? Access to government officials is likely to be a factor, as is the type of stories the correspondents cover.

In their interviews, the American correspondents generally said they had less access to Japanese government sources because they are not members of the *kisha* clubs. Lev said the American correspondents are invited to two English-language briefings a week at the Foreign Ministry but are not encouraged to attend the Japanese briefings. Knight-Ridder's Zielenziger described the difference between access to government officials in Tokyo and access in the United States as "night and day." Zielenziger said:

> Japanese officials are usually not available to foreign reporters, and often only available to the ... press club that covers that ministry. Sometimes, with sufficient yelling and screaming, foreigners get access to top officials, but it is quite rare. On the other hand, powerful but invisible bureaucrats are sometimes helpful in explaining ministry policies, etc. ... but the notion of picking up the phone and doing a telephone interview with a Japanese bureaucrat ... that is almost impossible.

He said American journalists are often actively kept away from news conferences held for the domestic media.

Other journalists report some improvement in access to Japanese government officials. Petersen of CBS said access to government officials in Japan seems no better or worse than access in the United States and reported some "minor loosening" in American journalists' access to the press clubs. But, he said, "It's still uphill. When a high American official (secretary of defense or such) visits the prime minister ... the U.S. Embassy battles to get us in for the photo op and is usually successful. For the other, Japanese-only events, forget it." If, overall, American correspondents find access to Japanese government officials difficult to obtain, it is little wonder they report using those sources less often than do the Japanese correspondents and it is less likely the Japanese government influences the correspondents' agenda.

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[44] Sigal, pp. 123-124.
[45] VanSlyke Turk and Franklin, p. 38.

Research Question No. 3: How much do Japanese and American correspondents use other media as news sources, and is there a significant difference in their usage?

On a scale of 1=never (use the source) to 5=always (use the source), the American correspondents' mean score for how often they used stories from other reporters/news organizations was 3.7931, compared with the Japanese correspondents' mean score of 3.5833. The mean scores fell between 3=about as always as not (use the source) and 4=very often (use the sources). A t-test found that the difference between the Japanese and American mean scores was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, stories from other reporters/news organizations were among the top 10 most frequently used sources for both the Japanese and American correspondents.

Weinberg said reading the local Japanese newspapers and magazines helps him "find some stories before they percolate into the foreign press." Lev said his Japanese editorial assistants helps him read the Japanese newspapers and magazines, and Normile said a part-time Japanese staffer in his office searches Japanese-language databases. Shinichiro Sakikawa of *Hokkaido Shimbun* said, "We are always cross-checking the sources, such as Reuters, AP, *Washington Post*, *New York Times* and *L.A. Times*, CNN, ABC, NBC News in order to be objective."

Table 5

T-tests for paired samples -- The American Correspondents							
Variable	**Number of Cases**	**Mean**	**Difference in mean**	**Standard Error**	**t value**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**2-tailed Probability**
1-a American gov't officials, staff 1-b Japanese gov't officials, staff	29	2.6207 3.3103	-.6897	.165	-4.17	28	.000*
1-c Japanese business leaders, staffs 1-d American business leaders, staffs	29	3.6207 2.9310	.6897	.141	4.88	28	.000*
1-e Japanese interest groups 1-f American interest groups	28	2.6429 2.0714	.5714	.149	3.83	27	.001*
1-g Japanese citizens 1-h American citizens	22	3.0455 1.6364	1.4091	.225	6.27	21	.000*
1-i American academic, scientific experts 1-j Japanese academic, scientific experts	29	3.4483 3.9310	-.4828	.162	-2.98	28	.006*
1-n News conferences called by Japanese interest groups 1-o News conferences called by American interest groups	29	2.2414 2.0345	.2069	.135	1.53	28	.136

Research Question No. 4: How do Japanese and American foreign correspondents compare in their use of Japanese vs. American news sources? Is there balance in their use of sources from both countries?

To examine this issue, two series of t-tests were conducted. The first examined whether there was a statistically significant difference in the American correspondents' reported use of Japanese vs. American sources. The second series looked for significant differences in how the Japanese correspondents rated their use of Japanese and American sources. For each variable tested, the correspondents were asked "How often do you use the following sources?"

Table 6

T-tests for paired samples -- Japanese correspondents

Variable	N	Mean	(Difference) mean	Standard error	t value	D.F.	2-tailed probability
1-a American gov't officials, staff 1-b Japanese gov't officials, staff	23	3.9565 3.4348	.5217	.250	2.08	22	.049*
1-c Japanese business leaders, staff 1-d American business leaders, staff	24	2.7500 2.7917	-.0417	.153	-.27	23	.788
1-e Japanese interest groups 1-f American interest groups	23	2.3043 3.0870	-.7826	.177	-4.41	22	.000*
1-g Japanese citizens 1-h American citizens	23	2.0870 2.4783	-.3913	.137	-2.86	22	.009*
1-i American academic, scientific experts 1-j Japanese academic, scientific experts	24	4.1250 3.000	1.1250	.211	5.33	23	.000*
1-n Japan. interest groups' news conferences 1-o American interest groups' news conferences	24	2.5833 3.0417	-.4583	.225	-2.04	23	.053 *for one-tailed test

In the first series of t-tests, the correspondents' responses to questions about six American sources were compared to their responses on six equivalent Japanese sources. In each pair of questions, the American correspondents indicated they used the Japanese source more often than the American source. (See Table 5 on previous page.) Intuitively, this makes sense. For correspondents working in Tokyo, there should be more available Japanese sources than American sources. When the difference between the mean scores was tested for statistical significance with a t-test, the differences proved significant in all but one case -- news conferences called by Japanese interest groups vs. conferences called by American interest groups.

In the second series of t-tests, the Japanese correspondents' responses to the same pairs of questions were analyzed. (See Table 6 on previous page.) For each pair of questions, the Japanese correspondents indicated they were more likely to use the American source than the equivalent Japanese source. Again, this makes sense. These correspondents are working in Washington, so it's logical that they would be more likely to use American sources than Japanese sources, who are less likely to be available. The differences in the mean scores were statistically significant for all but one pairing, that comparing the use of American vs. Japanese business sources.

Although the results suggest the correspondents' use of Japanese vs. American sources is not balanced, the research method is too limited to make judgments about the significance of that finding. Numbers alone cannot tell the story. Ken Belson of Bloomberg Business News, for example, made an interesting point on his questionnaire: "It's a tough case for me because I cover macroeconomic news. I depend on government bureaucrats for stats, economists for opinions, business leaders for both. Because I'm on deadline, the quickest, wittiest and most accurate gets quoted. Often these are NOT Japanese." In addition, from a journalistic standpoint, not every story written by an American or Japanese correspondent needs to include both American and Japanese sources. Unfortunately, the questionnaire design did not allow correspondents to distinguish between the types of sources they use for various types of stories. Said Lev: "My choice of source depends on the story -- sometimes heavily academic or government, sometimes heavily business or man on the street. My guidelines: seek out the experts, use Americans/foreigners only for perspective, not as a lazy substitute for the Japanese, be honest and objective, serve the reader and the truth."

Table 7

Sources and ideology
T-tests for independent samples (A = American, J = Japanese)

Variable	**Number of Cases**	**Mean**	**Standard Error**	**t value**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**2-tailed Probability**
2-3 Agree with source's position	A -29 J- 24	2.0345 2.9167	.161 .169	-3.76	51	.000*
2-6 Nationality of source	A- 29 J - 24	2.3793 1.1967	.224 .190	1.54	51	.121
2-16 Political stance of source	A- 28 J-24	1.8214 2.5000	.171 .170	-2.79	50	.007*
2-20 Responsibility to country	A - 27 J - 24	1.7778 2.5417	.202 .225	-2.53	49	.015*

Research Question No. 5: Does a source's ideology or a correspondent's perceived duty to country influence the Japanese correspondents' decisions about which sources to use more than the Americans' decisions?

Perhaps more important than whether the correspondents balance the use of American and Japanese sources is whether there is balance in the viewpoints of the sources tested. To examine this issue, t-tests were used to compare the Japanese and American correspondents' responses on how often the following items influence their use of sources: agree with the source's position, nationality of the source, political stance of the source and responsibility to country. (See Table 7 above.)

On all but one of the four variables -- nationality of the source -- the Japanese correspondents' mean scores were significantly higher with $p < .01$. The difference between the American and Japanese correspondents' responses on the nationality of the source was not statistically significant. The comments of Peter Landers, an Associated Press correspondent in Tokyo, illustrate how some correspondents may have interpreted the question. He said the nationality of the source never influences a decision whether to use a source, "unless, of course, the subject is one on which a certain nationality is in a better position to speak."

In an interview, Forbes' Weinberg said: "In selecting a story, its relevance to our readers is a top priority. Beyond that, I try to tell the story the way I see it regardless of who it might offend or hurt. I definitely would not change my approach because of some negative impact in the U.S." Similarly, Rob Magee of CONUS Communications said, "Whether the impact will be positive or negative for one side or the other does not enter into the decision-making process as much as 1) Is it news our viewers will care about; 2) Is there video? That's about it."[46] Petersen said, "Whether stories have a positive or negative impact is something, I must confess, I gave up wondering a long time ago."

As for the Japanese, Toshi, for example, said he worries about the effect of his reporting on financial markets and tries to be careful not to distort officials' comments. But Ota said readers, including some Japanese officials, think his stories in the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* are too biased toward the American side. Why? "I understand my role is to carry the voice of the United States to Japan," Ota said. Murayama's response was more like what one would expect from an American: "Do I write a story if it hurts Japan? I don't care about that. I just write the facts."

Despite the fact that their comments varied, the hypothesis that the Japanese would be more influenced by such factors as the source's political stance, whether they agree with the source and responsibility to country was supported by the statistical tests. Although those results support the findings by Budner and Krauss that "Japanese news stories that cited substantive arguments are far more likely to be one-sided than equivalent American reports,"[47] one must be careful not to draw overly broad conclusions. One cannot conclude that the Japanese journalists are quick to choose sources based on whether they agree with the source, the source's political stance and their feeling of responsibility to country. They may be more quick to do so than

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[46] E-mail response from Rob Magee, Tokyo correspondent for CONUS Communications, on Oct. 19, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, any other information attributed to Mr. Magee is from his email response.

[47] Budner and Krauss, p. 342.

American journalists, but, on average, the Japanese journalists did not say those factors "always influence" or "very often influence" their sourcing decisions. Instead, the mean score for their responses fell between "rarely influences" and "influences about as often or not." In addition, not all journalists, whether they are Japanese or American, are alike.

Another reason to be wary of drawing too broad a conclusion from the results is that correspondents may have interpreted the questions differently. "If you're doing a political story and need to talk to the opposition party, obviously the political stand is important," one American correspondent said. "But my answer does not mean I have my own personal political agenda."

Research Question No. 6: What do Japanese and American correspondents perceive to be the most important influences on their decisions to use news sources, and how do their perceptions differ?

The correspondents were asked, "How often do the following items influence your use of sources" and given a list of 24 items on Part II of the questionnaire. The responses could range from 1=Never influences to 5=Always influences. (See Table 8 on following page.)

For both the Japanese and American correspondents, credibility was ranked as the most important influence on their decisions to use news sources. The Americans' mean score was 4.586, compared with 4.708 for the Japanese. Their mean scores fell between 4=Very often influences and 5=Always influences. In addition to credibility, both the Japanese and Americans also ranked the following factors among the top 10: responsibility to yourself, accessibility of source, responsibility to your news organization, cooperativeness of source, articulateness of the source, the prominence of the source and time pressure. The commonality of the Japanese and American responses indicates that they share some of the same professional values and concerns.

Table 8

Ranking the influences on correspondents' use of sources

American Correspondents		**Japanese Correspondents**	
Influence	**Mean score**	**Influence**	**Mean score**
1. Credibility of source	4.586	1. Credibility of source	4.708
2. Responsibility to yourself	4.375	2. Articulateness of source	4.250
3. Accessibility of source	3.931	3. Responsibility to yourself	4.083
4. Responsibility to your news organization	3.920	4. Personal connection with source	3.609
5. Cooperativeness of source	3.862	5. Time pressure	3.542
6. Articulateness of source	3.759	6. Accessibility of source	3.500
7. Prominence of source	3.655	7. Cooperativeness of source	3.333
8. Time pressure	3.586	8. Prominence of source	3.042
9. The source speaks English	3.052	9. Responsibility to your news organization	2.958
10. The source speaks Japanese	2.768	10. You agree with source's position	2.917
11. Personal ambition to succeed	2.760	11. Personal ambition to succeed	2.667
12. Personal connection with the source	2.759	12. You like the source	2.583
13. You like the source	2.621	13. Responsibility to your country	2.542
14. Nationality of the source	2.379	14. Political stance of source	2.500
15. You agree with source's position	2.034	14. Readers' response to the source	2.500
16. Readers' response to the source	1.926	16. Fear of lawsuits	2.250
17. Political stance of source	1.821	17. The source speaks English	2.042
18. Responsibility to your country	1.778	17. The source speaks Japanese	2.042
19. Fear of lawsuits	1.690	19. Nationality of the source	1.917
20. Pressure from managers/editors	1.655	20. Pressure from managers/editors	1.833
21. Gender of the source	1.414	21. Pressure from peers/colleagues	1.792
22. Pressure because of news organization's politics/policy	1.310	22. Pressure because of news organization's politics/policy	1.583
23. Pressure because of news organization's financial interest	1.241	23. Gender of the source	1.458
24. Pressure from peers/colleagues	1.172	24. Pressure because of news organization's financial interest	1.333

Among the Americans' top 10 influences also were whether the source speaks English and whether the source speaks Japanese. Included in the Japanese correspondents' ranking of top 10 influences were personal connection with the source and agreeing with the source's position.

The five least influential factors in determining which sources to use were the same for the Japanese and American correspondents, although they were ranked in a slightly different order. The least influential factors were pressure from managers/editors, gender of the source, pressure because of the news organization's politics/policy, pressure because of the news organization's financial interest and pressure from peers/colleagues.

Research Question No. 8: Is there a relationship between American journalists' Japanese-language proficiency and the types of sources -- Japanese vs. American, Japanese-speaking vs. English-speaking -- that they use? Because most Japanese correspondents are expected to be fluent in English, it is unlikely this research question applies to them.

As expected, the Americans were less fluent in Japanese than their Japanese counterparts were in English. Using Hess' scale of 0=no language skills, 1=able to order a meal, 2=able to understand TV news and 3=able to conduct an interview, the American correspondents' mean score on their Japanese-language ability was 2.131. The Japanese correspondents' mean score for their English-language ability was significantly higher at 2.913. Twelve of the American correspondents, fewer than half, indicated they can conduct an interview in Japanese, while 20 of the 24 Japanese correspondents said they could do an interview in English.

To answer the research question, two hypotheses were tested. H1: There is a positive correlation between American correspondents' Japanese-language skills and their use of Japanese sources and Japanese-speaking sources. H2: There is a negative correlation between correspondents' Japanese-language ability and their use of American sources and English-speaking sources.

Tests showed a positive correlation between the American correspondents' Japanese-language skills and their use of four of the seven types of Japanese sources tested. (See Table 9 above.) However, the positive correlation was significant only in the case of Japanese-speaking sources, which had a correlation coefficient of .4973, and Japanese business leaders/staff, which

Table 9

Language vs. use of sources
Correlation coefficients for American correspondents

	1-a American gov't officials/ staff	1-d American business leaders/ staff	1-f American interest groups	1-h American citizens	1-i American academic, other experts	1-o American interest groups' news confs.	1-z English-speaking sources
3-o Language skills	-.2533	-.0873	-.0279	-.1862	-.2890	-.2554	.0798
	1-b Japanese gov't officials/ staff	1-c Japanese business leaders/ staff	1-e Japanese interest groups	1-g Japanese citizens	1-j Japanese academic, other experts	1-n Japanese interest groups news confs.	1-aa Japanese speaking sources
3-o Language skills	.1436	.4583*	-.0438	-.1242	-.1115	.1307	.4973**

* significant at LE .05 ** significant LE .01 (2-tailed)

had a correlation coefficient of .4583. The correlation between Japanese-language skills and the use of Japanese-speaking sources provides support for the hypothesis, but the other results do not. Perhaps there are enough Japanese sources who speak English that correspondents need not speak Japanese well to have access to at least some Japanese nationals as sources. In addition, several correspondents said they use Japanese editorial assistants to help them overcome the language barrier.

For Hypothesis 2, none of the correlations between the journalists' Japanese-language ability and their use of American or English-speaking sources was statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Research Question No. 7: To what extent do the correspondents' news organizations influence their use of sources? The Japanese correspondents are expected to consider themselves to be more influenced by organizational pressures.

The journalists were asked, "How often do the following items influence your use of sources?" on a scale of 1=never and 5=always. T-tests were conducted to compare the American

Table 10

Organizational pressures
T-tests for independent samples (A = American, J = Japanese)

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	Standard Error	t value	D. F.	2-tailed Probability
2-9 Pressure from peers, colleagues	A - 29 J - 24	1.1724 1.7917	.071 .180	-3.41	51	.001*
2-10 Pressure from managers/editors	A - 29 J - 24	1.6552 1.8333	.167 .177	-.73	51	.469
2-11 Pressure because of news organization's policy/politics	A - 29 J - 24	1.3103 1.5833	.141 .133	-1.38	51	.172
2-12 Pressure because of news organization's financial interest	A - 29 J - 24	1.2414 1.3333	.128 .115	-.52	51	.603
2-21 Responsibility to news organization	A - 25 J - 24	3.9200 2.9583	.244 .259	2.87	47	.006*

and Japanese correspondents' mean scores on five variables designed to measure organizational pressure: pressure from peers, colleagues; pressure from managers/editors; pressure because of the news organization's policy/politics; pressure because of news organization's financial interest; and responsibility to news organization.

With the exception of the last variable tested -- responsibility to your news organization -- the Japanese correspondents had a higher mean score than the Americans. However, on only one of those variables -- pressure from peers/colleagues -- was the difference in mean scores statistically significant. (See Table 10 above.) The mean score for the Japanese correspondents was 1.792, between 1=Never influences and 2=Rarely influences. The Americans' mean score on pressure from peers/colleagues was 1.172. Contrary to the hypothesis, the Japanese reported that responsibility to their news organizations influenced their use of sources to a lesser degree than the Americans reported. The Americans' mean score was 3.920, close to 4=Very often influences, compared with a mean score of 2.958 for the Japanese, close to 3=Influences about as often or not. A t-test found that the difference between the mean scores was statistically significant. Overall, the hypothesis that the Japanese would indicate they were more influenced by organizational pressures was not supported.

The results here were surprising. Perhaps the Japanese journalists do not realize the extent to which they have been socialized within their news organizations. Perhaps the American journalists have been socialized more than they acknowledge. At any rate, the issue is worth further study. The relatively high importance the Americans placed on their responsibility to their news organization in making decisions about sources also was somewhat surprising. Rather than indicating great loyalty to one's news organization, however, it may just reflect professionalism -- wanting to do the best job possible for one's employer.

Discussion

The methodology used for this research brought with it some fundamental limitations, including the scope of the data gathered and the small population size. The strength of the survey method -- that it provides an overview of a population -- is also a weakness. A questionnaire that asked journalists which sources they used for which stories and for what reasons at what times would be too unwieldy. The manageable survey, on the other hand, does not allow for as much nuance in the respondents' answers. Making distinctions between the types of sources used for various types of stories would put this research in better perspective. A content analysis of the journalists' quoted sources could also be used to test the validity of the self-reporting here.

Of course, the survey results can only be taken as a snapshot in time of 53 full-time correspondents' attitudes toward sources and use of sources. The results do not address the sourcing practices of free-lancers, part-time employees or editorial assistants. Also, although many news organizations were represented in the survey, the relatively low response rate, 32 percent for the Japanese and 42 percent for the Americans, must be kept in mind before making any broad generalizations. On the other hand, the low sample size may have made finding statistical significance more difficult to detect even if it existed.

Some unresolved questions include the role of language skills and, partly as a result of the Americans' overall poor Japanese-language ability, the role of editorial assistants. Even though fewer than half of the American correspondents said they can conduct an interview in Japanese, the relationship between a journalist's language proficiency and the sources he or she uses was not clarified with this quantitative research. In interviews, the correspondents acknowledged that at the least, not knowing the language slows them down. Not knowing the language also appears to force them to depend somewhat on the news judgments of others -- their editorial assistants. The roles those individuals play, both in the United States and in Japan, must be understood better to truly understand how the media agenda is set.

Another issue that deserves more attention is the importance of nationality and culture in influencing the journalists' practices. In examining the data after the fact, P factor analysis was conducted to determine how the correspondents grouped together. Four factors were identified, and they broke down almost perfectly by nationality, with two "American" factors and two "Japanese" factors. The two Japanese factors placed a great deal of importance on government sources and were highly correlated at .747, the highest correlation among the four factors. The second highest correlation, a coefficient of .610, was between the two factors on which most American correspondents were located. Nationality, and the way in which journalists in various countries are socialized, appears to be a good predictor of how the journalists approach their jobs.

The fact that four factors were identified -- not just one American and one Japanese -- also serve as a reminder that correspondents are not alike. For the two "American" factors, there was a real split on how the journalists rated the influence of responsibility to self and responsibility to their news organizations, for example. For one factor, those responsibilities were highly influential; it seems the journalists on the other factor were asking themselves, "What responsibility?" A more in-depth analysis of the journalists' values and motivations would prove fascinating -- and shed light on how the media's agenda is set. Remember McCombs' onion metaphor for media agenda-setting. He says the innermost layer "consists of the professional core of journalism itself, those practices, values and traditions into which every journalist is socialized, beginning with his or her college days and continuing through daily experiences on the job. These attitudes and behaviours are the ultimate filters shaping the nature of the news agenda."[48]

This research -- the first to systematically compare and contrast Japanese and American correspondents' approaches to getting the news -- starts to examine those innermost layers. The correspondents were found to share many professional values, but there are shades of important differences in what influences their decisions about using a particular news source. A source's ideology and whether they agree with a source's position, for example, were more important to the Japanese. The journalists also indicated they turned to different sources most frequently, with the Japanese correspondents relying more heavily on government sources. Examining these differences in sourcing patterns and values allows for deeper understanding of how the media agenda is set in both countries.

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[48] McCombs, pp. 816-817.

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Fujimori Puts the "PR" in Perú and PromPeru Leads the Way:

How the President is Projecting his Administration's Neoliberal Policies

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Fujimori Puts the "PR" in Perú and PromPeru Leads the Way: How the President is Projecting his Administration's Neoliberal Policies

Abstract

A relatively small government agency called PromPeru is behind an aggressive, comprehensive, corporate-style communication campaign that is channeling the message of Peru's extraordinary President Alberto Fujimori in an effort to recast Peru's image in the global arena. This paper examines that agency and analyzes its techniques and output within the context of the political and economic forces that underpin Fujimori's objectives. The agency is employing classic PR techniques to attract international investment on a grand scale; its efforts may signal a major step forward in Latin America's PR evolution.

Fujimori Puts the "PR" in Perú and PromPeru Leads the Way: How the President is Projecting his Administration's Neoliberal Policies

INTRODUCTION

In the center of one of the world's most prestigious English-language news magazines, a 22-page advertising supplement touts a product through the use of splashy graphics, high-quality photographs, tables demonstrating the quantitative attributes of the product, "exclusive" interviews with the "CEO" and other top "executives," a litany of the products successes, testimonies of "satisfied customers," and page after page of high-impact prose aimed at capturing the reader's attention and imagination, motivating him or her, it is obviously hoped, to "invest" in this exciting product. The expensive and extraordinary ad is a case study in marketing and public relations. It is image making writ large. Even on a much smaller scale it is a technique reserved for only the most exceptional of products or services -- the major redesign of a an automobile, the launching of a new airline, the birth of a new media conglomerate.

This product, though, is very different from those things. It is a country. It is Perú. The advertising supplement is an essay with pictures, charts and tables redefining the nation which had been associated for 12 years with violence, fear, death squads, an economy irretrievably lost, four-digit inflation, a place nobody went and from which everyone who could, left. The ad supplement epitomizes a new message emitting from Perú since 1990. It's a message of welcome to foreign investment, to tourists, to professionals. It's also a statement of stability, promise and potential, putting the world on notice that Perú intends to become an economic force to be reckoned with, a player in the post-Cold War global dynamics that are transforming Latin America into a major producing and consuming engine.

The purpose of this paper, though, is not to address Perú's economic renaissance, but rather just one easily overlooked aspect of the program's design -- a relatively small government agency called PromPerú. It was PromPerú that contributed to the design and placement of the 22-page supplement in *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Further, it is PromPerú that is behind an aggressive, comprehensive corporate-style communication strategy that is channeling the message of Perú's flamboyant President Alberto Fujimori through a host of conduits in an effort to recast Perú's image as part of a larger plan to restructure completely the nation's economy and politics.

In order to examine PromPerú with any degree of thoroughness, some underpinning is necessary. First, an analysis of the message itself is needed. What are the tenets of neoliberalism that define the new Perú? Second, simply, what is PromPerú? Third, and most important, how do PromPerú and its products and programs reflect and project, in text and sub-text, the policies of the Fujimori administration? The first task requires some brief, contextual scene-setting in order to appreciate the scope of Fujimori's reforms.

OFF-THE-SHELF NEOLIBERALISM AND FUJIMORI'S MODIFIED DESIGN

The "neo" in neoliberalism is probably at risk of losing its credibility since an argument can be made that the political and economic philosophy bearing this sobriquet first emerged with Chile's authoritarian dictator, Augusto Pinochet, and his "Chicago Boys" in the years following the U.S.-backed coup that brought Pinochet to power in 1973 (Cockcroft, 1996, pp. 554-561). Pinochet's "shock" programs were along the lines of the International Monetary Fund's recommendations aimed at restoring economic solvency, regardless of the social costs. They included wage freezes, consumer product price rises, currency devaluations, lower tariffs on imports, privatization of government-owned enterprises, and reduced government spending, all aimed at getting control of the economy, reducing inflation and harnessing free market forces. Despite Pinochet's fall from power in 1989,[1] the appeal of neoliberalism spread quickly throughout Central and South America as it was adopted by a host of nations smitten by the lure of an expanding free market in a post-Cold War world, and by the hope that infusions of wealth from foreign investments would permeate their populations, raising living standards across the board.

The reality, at least in the near term, has been mixed. Some point to Chile, Argentina and Bolivia (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994), and even Mexico as evidence that neoliberal economic measures are working. Others cite the social costs that have accompanied neoliberal austerity measures wherever they have been employed (Cockcroft, 1996). Those social costs include escalating unemployment, reduced social spending by the government with a resulting spiral of poverty for the most disenfranchised of the population, and a widening chasm between the few, powerful elite who benefit from infusions of foreign investments and the vast majority who are too far down the economic chain to receive those benefits.

But it has been more than 20 years since Pinochet first imposed neoliberalism, and the concept has undergone some changes in the interim, at the very least around the margins. Too, the tenets of neoliberalism have perhaps been found guilty by virtue of their association with coincidental phenomena such as corruption and feckless leadership as in Brazil, and with cosmetic democracies as in Argentina and Chile (Mainwaring, 1995).

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[1] While Pinochet's candidate lost the election to Patricio Aylwin Azócar, Pinochet retained his position as head of the Chilean military along with the authority to appoint individuals to key government positions.

Perú, on the other hand, has been redefining neoliberalism to suit its own peculiar historical, political and economic situation -- a situation which has resulted in internal policy changes related to neoliberalism as the environment has developed and unfolded in the past decade. An in-depth review of Perú's history is not necessary, but a brief overview will help set the stage for Fujimori's dramatic entrance in 1990.

BACKGROUND

Roughly the size of Alaska, Perú includes three basic regions -- rain forest in the east (about 60 percent of the nation's land area, but home to just 11 percent of the population, mostly Indians), some of the world's driest desert along the Pacific coastline from Ecuador to Chile, and the "sierra" region comprised of Andean peaks and fertile valleys. About half the population is Indian (most of whom are monolingual in languages and dialects other than Spanish), and the remainder a combination of European, mestizo, Asian, black and mulatto. The result is "an immense geographical, linguistic, and cultural gap" that "divides Perú in half (Cockcroft, 1996, p.456)."

The colonial experience in Perú was dramatically different from that of the United States. Early in the 16th century, Francisco Pizarro stormed brutally into what is now Perú, slaughtering or enslaving the indigenous Incas. Lima became "the center of the South American branch of the Spanish Empire and the seat of the Inquisition." The social structure was paternalistic and ruthlessly oppressive. Into the 19th century, Europe withdrew Perú's resources, primarily silver, establishing a dual society of elite whites and oppressed Indian peasants (Cockcroft, 1996, pp.459-461). The dominant feudal system resulted in conditions under which a disproportionate share of the wealth and power was concentrated at the top of the hierarchy while the vast majority was relegated to poverty and dependency (Sharpe and Simoes, 1996, p.279).

Independence from Spain arrived violently in 1824 with the aid of the armies of Argentina's José de San Martín and Venezuela's Simón Bolivar. There followed 40 years of a relatively chaotic Republic marked by 34 presidents. The economy shifted from silver to fertilizer and the focus from Spain to Great Britain, but societal dualism remained a hallmark.

In the final quarter of the 19th century, U.S. investment (and influence) surpassed that of Great Britain. The "aristocratic republic" from 1895 to 1919 included elections limited to a "small male electorate based on literacy and property qualifications (Cockcroft, 1996, p.161)." By now the pattern was well established of a dependent economy, lacking production capability for internal consumption -- a society in which only the elites could afford the high cost of imported manufactured goods, and one characterized by company stores, child labor and foreign ownership.

It's not surprising, then, that labor unrest began to emerge in the early 20th century, exacerbated by the Great Depression in the 1930s. Bloody confrontations between the army and labor movements ensued. The dictatorship of General Manuel Odría (1948-1956) saw increasing U.S. influence, severe repression of labor movements, and the dominance of an export-oriented oligarchy.

Elections in 1956 and subsequently saw some modest reforms, but social unrest continued to grow, occasionally turning violent. Lesser government appointments were routinely handed out to family members and friends in an environment which accepted patronage as a privilege of office (Sharpe and Simoes, 1996, pp.279-280).

A brief ruling military junta in 1963 returned authoritarian measures, but the election of President Belaúnde (1963-68, first term) saw the reinstatement of some reforms.

The cycle of military rule continued with a coup in 1968, but this time the thrust was nationalistic, even to some extent reformist and populist. Breaking with the past, this military government, under General Juan Velasco Alvarado, reflected more middle class values and saw themselves as reformers who could lead Perú to its full potential. For the first time, the military leaders recognized the need to influence public support through the media (Alisky, 1981, p.73) -- an extremely important development in the context of this paper.

In 1975, a deepening economic crisis led to strikes, violence and repression as conservative elements of the ruling junta came to the fore. Velasco was forced aside and replaced by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez who reversed earlier reforms and came down hard on labor. Some industries were privatized, but most remained under government ownership. Morales adhered to IMF economic austerity measures with commensurate rises in consumer costs and escalating inflation leading to more social unrest (Cockcroft, 1996, pp.474-475).

When Belaúnde recaptured the presidency in the 1980 elections he attempted to implement economic policies similar to those of Pinochet's "Chicago Boys" -- fundamentally neoliberal. Three basic problems precluded the realization of any success, however. First, corruption became the stock and trade of the Belaúnde regime. Second, the global recession of 1982 drove down Perú's export income. Third, drug trafficking became a very serious drain on Perú's budget through the loss of legitimate revenue. Further, the emergence of Sendero Luminoso, a group of Maoist fanatics began to exact enormous costs in terms of dramatically reduced agricultural production in a countryside gripped by fear and through government costs incurred fighting the insurgency (Cockcroft, 1996, pp.476-477). In addition, Belaúnde failed to recognize that neoliberalism required more than merely establishing programs -- the programs needed to be supported with proactive ideological campaigns if they were to be embraced by political parties, by business interests, and by the population (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994, pp.184-185).

President Alan García Pérez (1985-1990) stepped back from neoliberalism with relatively arbitrary policies including nationalization of banking. He enjoyed initial success, manifested by a 20 percent growth rate during his first two years, but the economy quickly faltered, and rampant inflation, coupled with his own corruption and the continuing battle with Sendero Luminoso, led his party into deep disfavor by the 1990 elections (Cockcroft, 1996, pp.478-479; Conaghan and Malloy, 1994, pp. 226-227).

All this prologue is necessary to distinguish the Peruvian experience from that of the United States, especially as it relates to the development of what has come to be called public relations. Molding of public opinion -- mobilization of public support -- through the use of even the most rudimentary of communication strategies, simply does not have consistent precedent in Perú or, for that matter, in Latin America generally. Culturally and historically, persuasion has been characterized and defined by personal interaction as opposed to the employment of U.S.-style, mass communication techniques (Culbertson, 1996, p.6).

But in 1990 the stage was set for enormous change. Inflation stood at an unbelievable 7,650 percent. Prolonged depression and high foreign debt were conspiring to exacerbate the lingering poverty that permeated the historically dual society. Tax revenues had dropped from 15 percent of gross domestic product to 3 percent under President García. Public disorder was dangerously explosive. From 1980 to 1988, 12,870 Peruvians had died in political violence and the number would climb to 26,000 by 1993 (Cockcroft, 1996, pp.478-479; Conaghan and Malloy, 1994, pp. 226-227; Graham, 1994, p.93; Sheahan, 1994, p.912).

FUJIMORI POSITIONS HIMSELF AS THE CANDIDATE OF CHANGE

The electorate was faced with a difficult dilemma. To remain fused to traditional forms of government and policies would mean a continuation of the worsening economic spiral and the attendant risks of corruption and civil unrest. On the other hand, radical changes aimed at improving long-term economic conditions would require a considerable leap of faith along with the likelihood of considerable personal sacrifice, including the sacrifice of personal freedoms (Bishop, 1973).

A relative unknown, Alberto Keinya Fujimori, 52 and the U.S.-educated son of Japanese immigrants, seized upon the economic crisis facing Perú and upon the feckless leadership of the established policies. Moreover, his newly created "Cambio" (change) party ran in opposition to the neoliberal programs President Garcia had attempted, with little success, to implement. Fujimori's populist appeals captured voters' imaginations and he was swept into the statehouse (Roberts, 1995, pp.93-94).

Within weeks of his inauguration, though, Fujimori imposed a sweeping economic stabilization program incorporating the very neoliberal tenets he decried during his campaign. First, price subsidies and social spending were drastically cut along with public sector employment. He increased interest rates and taxes on government services. He deregulated financial and labor markets, reduced tariffs and began the privatization of publicly owned enterprises. He took steps to reduce tax evasion and began efforts to tap international financial assistance (Roberts, 1995, p.96; Sheahan, 1994, p.912).

While the economy improved under Fujimori's neoliberal policies, evidenced especially by the drop in inflation from 40 percent per month to 1-2 percent per month, social costs included sharp increases in unemployment and poverty. Nevertheless his peculiar mix of populism and neoliberalism propelled his administration to unprecedented popular support, permitting him to launch a "self coup" (*autogolpe*) in April 1992 which suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Congress and all regional governments, and purged most of the judiciary. While the coup enjoyed enormous popular support, Fujimori also had cultivated favorable relations with key components of the military which backed the coup as well (Roberts, 1995, p.98).

In addition, the coup and the resulting Constitution which voters narrowly approved in 1993 (Cockcroft, 1996, p.482) permitted Fujimori to be re-elected to the presidency in 1995. In the interim, however, he fell back on more traditional populist techniques such as ensuring he was present (with attendant media coverage) for dedications of new schools and other community improvement projects, especially those in poorer sectors of the country. Those projects, and other substantial increases in social spending in recent years would not have been possible without the successes of his neoliberal programs, primarily privatization, but also crackdowns on tax evaders (Roberts, 1995, p.102).

President Fujimori has broken new ground in his unique blend of neoliberalism and populism, made all the more effective by his skillful employment of classic public relations techniques. As a result, he enjoys continued popularity at home and admiration abroad. A looming question, however, pertains to the sustainability of the programs which support his popularity -- those social programs implemented in the past three years such as vast housing construction programs, school construction, health care and sanitation initiatives, transportation efforts, and even promotion of small businesses. The cash which funds these programs is finite, based heavily on privatization efforts. What happens when that money runs out? Clearly, the task is to build a sustainable agricultural, manufacturing, service and small business infrastructure that will carry the burden through generated revenues once privatization income is drained.

While some degree of that infrastructure may come through internal investment, the bulk will have to come from foreign sources. The challenge is to attract that outside investment. Fujimori has demonstrated his ability to build public consensus through skillful communication techniques which stressed the benefits of his policies while enlisting public patience with the associated downsides. What remains to be seen is his degree of success in conveying a global image of economic stability and confidence for a nation whose extant image is characterized more by association with hyperinflation, periodic military dictatorships (with attendant "expropriation" of businesses), and with violent guerrilla movements.

A COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN FRAMEWORK

While there had been some past efforts at mobilizing public support through mass communication, such as during the military dictatorship of the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was no precedent for the scale of the campaign that would be necessary to achieve Fujimori's lofty goals. Perhaps one could look for an example to the populism of Juan and Eva Perón in Argentina during the late 1940s and early 1950s when they made especially effective use of radio. Even today, Argentina's President Carlos Saúl Menem has become something of a "media hound" (Sarlo, 1994). But in both those cases the audience was internal and the aims cosmetic. Fujimori faced a far more challenging task -- a global audience and a substantive, enduring message. That brings us to PromPerú.

Assuming the president understood the mechanics of what was needed in terms of a comprehensive communication campaign, the simplest route would have been to retain the services of one of the giant U.S. public relations firms accustomed to designing and implementing projects of this scale. The problem then would have been one of subtext. Why would potential foreign investors accept a message of confidence in the Peruvian economy when the president himself did not exhibit confidence enough to entrust his own people with the task of conveying that message? To his credit, Fujimori opted instead to "invent" a government agency to carry that message -- PromPerú.

Other nations have agencies which project and shape their own national image. Britain's BBC World Service brings British culture and character throughout the globe. The Voice of America puts a U.S. "spin" on events for a world audience. Most countries operate national tourist and/or information bureaus. Still, PromPerú is unique. It incorporates the latest technologies and proven public relations techniques to project a positive image of Perú in an effort to instill confidence in potential investors, tourists and business interests. It is pro-active, serious but lively, polished, and vibrant.

Here's what they say of themselves:

> Welcome to the Worldwide Web of the commission for the promotion of Perú (PromPerú). It is a pleasure for us at PromPerú, to open this window of instant communications and be part of the Internet virtual community.
>
> PromPerú is the government agency in charge of fostering the image of Perú abroad. We provide information about investment opportunities, potential exports, tourist attractions, and our ancestral culture.
>
> Through a variety of publications, videos, CD ROM, missions abroad and special events, PromPerú disseminates the wealth of a centuries-old country reborn as a modern nation open to the world. Today, Perú shows rapid growth combined with solid business foundations. We hope that you enjoy your virtual visit to Perú (Web site:welcome).
>
> Promperú...is the state entity that, in coordination with the private sector, fulfills the task of making Perú's new image known abroad.
>
> Through its publications, PromPerú provides the international community and foreign investors with valuable information about Perú, the vast opportunities it offers, and the regulations applicable to the different economic activities.
>
> We invite you to discover Perú's new image through our publications and videos (Web site:catalog).

The somewhat traditional style permeates dozens of well-designed and information-filled Web pages which PromPerú maintains. The "Welcome" page features a photo of the PromPerú staff -- a group of just 20 people, mostly young, and looking very much like the eager, competent executives of any thriving, forward-looking corporation. Their leader is Dr. Beatriz Boza, an energetic woman constantly alert for additional opportunities to convey her nation's message.[2]

PromPerú, then, is essentially a public relations agency with one client. Its task is to recraft the image of Perú, conveying a climate of peace, safety and stability making it attractive to foreign investors and to tourists. In subtext, it is to tout the successes of President Fujimori's brand of neoliberalism. That is the thrust of the remainder of this paper -- to assess the degree to which PromPerú's products and activities support the president's policies.

THE PROMPERÚ COLLECTION

PromPerú's products include printed materials, videos, and a very sophisticated battery of Worldwide Web pages. Because of their immediate availability to potential users around the world, the Web pages offer perhaps the most valuable insight into the agency's potential impact. A review of their variety and content will be useful.

Following the style of many Web "home" pages, the initial screen contains merely a simple "welcome" design and a menu of optional topics to pursue, depending upon the Web user's preferences and interests (Web site:index). This home page also offers the user the option of viewing pages in English or Spanish. Menu path options permit pursuit of further pages related to the following topics: business; figures; legal; tourism; current issues; women; and tourism. Other "buttons" will take the user to something called "El Dorado Magazine," "Perunet al dia," a "Catalogue," and "The Peace Offering Ritual." Since this paper is most interested in political policies, especially those related to investment, a look at the "business" pages is the most obvious place to start.

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[2] For example, in 1995, while awaiting a flight at the Miami airport enroute to a promotional visit to Europe, she seized the opportunity to address a group of American scholars passing through the airport on their way to a Fulbright-sponsored tour of several Latin American nations (Walker, discussion, 1996).

Here again, the first business page offers additional menu choices: investing in success; investing opportunities in manufacturing; forestry industry; investment opportunities in mining; and investing in Perú (Web site:business). Space does not permit an in-depth analysis of every Web page; rather an examination of key pages will illustrate main points.

"Investing in success" provides an overall view of the investment climate in Perú, addressing economic conditions, legal framework, privatization, and a cursory assessment of particular industries such as mining, agriculture, manufacturing, fishing and tourism. The page appears to be aimed at planting the seed of consideration in the mind of a potential investor without burdening him or her, at this early stage, with ponderous facts and figures. The page is replete with references to traditional neoliberal hallmarks, stressing Perú's attractiveness to "foreign and domestic investors," "freely determined prices," "elimination of all barriers on international trade," and "freedom of remittance of capital and royalties to their country of origin." The page touts Perú's "impressive turnaround," "stable legal framework," and refers to a "consolidated democracy" -- an oblique allusion to Fujimori's *autogolpe*.

Regarding the stable economy, the page highlights the dramatic drop in inflation to 15.4 percent in 1994 and an anticipated rate of 10 percent for 1995. Also cited are an annual GDP growth rate of 12.9 percent for 1994 and a "significant increase in tax revenues" -- a result at least in part, we may assume, from Fujimori's policy of cracking down on tax delinquency as part of his neoliberal program. These statistics, however, reveal a problem with this and other pages. Several entries are clearly out of date and likely reflect the inability of PromPerú's small and heavily tasked staff to maintain the pages' currency. A page viewed by a potential investor in late 1996 should not include economic figures "anticipated" for 1995.

The brief description of the new legal framework clearly reflects neoliberal philosophy. Perú, the page says, treats foreign and domestic investors equally in terms of rights and obligations, and promises stable tax laws. It boasts that there are no longer any taxes on exports and just a 15 percent tax on 97 percent of all imports. Also stressed is the deregulation of banking and insurance.

Perhaps the most prominent element of neoliberal economics is the privatization of industry. Though other pages provide greater depth, this "investing in success" page offers an excellent summary. It allows that most privatization still lies ahead, but says now is the time to become involved, citing anticipated privatization of government-owned companies in oil and mining, energy generation, agribusiness and fishing. The difficulty of maintaining currency of the pages is apparent here as well, though the page accurately represents the spirit of Fujimori's privatization efforts.

For example, by the date this page was viewed, firms already privatized included major enterprises engaged in mining, petroleum distribution, salt, cement, banking, telecommunications, and power generation. Even national airline Aeroperú had been sold. The government had realized U.S.$2.8 billion in privatization proceeds in 1994. In spring of 1996 the government announced an accelerated three-year "divestment blitz" expected to generate an additional U.S.$15 billion.

However, while Fujimori may be enjoying public relations success abroad as a result of this privatization effort, his public at home is less enthusiastic. The oilworkers' union has mounted protests against the sale of a major refinery -- obviously fearing that private (stockholder) ownership will lead to streamlining and resultant loss of jobs. The workers, in fact, are pressing to have the issue put to a referendum, which the administration opposes. Fujimori has conceded that a 40 percent stake in the refinery will remain in government hands (Region begins new privatization drive, 1996).

A major sale conducted a few months ago was that of Telefónica del Perú. Here, too, Fujimori encountered public relations challenges. While the sale of stock on the New York Stock Exchange generated a greater international (especially U.S.) response than anticipated, raising U.S.$1.1 billion, the oversubscription compelled the government to halve the number of shares available to domestic investors. However, Fujimori had once again demonstrated his public relations savvy by appointing earlier a *defensor del pueblo* -- literally a "defender of the people," but essentially an ombudsman representing the public's interest before the administration. This ombudsman seized upon the Telefónica issue and demanded more transparency in any future privatization-related stock offers. Fujimori sensibly conducted some damage repair by announcing the domestic sale of a portion of the Telefónica stock still held by the government (Peruvians disappointed, 1996).

Returning to the PromPerú Web pages, delving deeper into business page options we find more detailed descriptions of specific neoliberal economic measures. For example, the page (actually 18 pages when printed) concerning "investment opportunities in manufacturing" provides extensive information on legislative and institutional frameworks for the serious investor. It describes, for instance, the National Commission of Foreign Investment and Technology (CONITE) which is empowered to contract with foreign investors, granting assurances of guaranteed income tax rates, currency conversion procedures, and capital and profit repatriation. The page stresses that exchange rates are driven strictly by "free supply and demand" -- a pillar of neoliberalism. Investors are even given guarantees against "non-commercial risks," the page maintains. The page also alludes to the "deregulation of labor" -- likely a cause for concern among miners and other workers who fear they may be being disarticulated by Fujimori's pro-business policies (Web site: mnfctrng).

Again and again, Web pages like the one covering manufacturing, and others covering forestry, agriculture, mining and industry, are peppered with references to "opening up of trade," "deregulation," "simplified and lower tariffs," "open and free trade," and "competitiveness." The pages express support for the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and embrace other global economic initiatives aimed at the free market paradigm such as the European Union's Generalized Preferences System as well as those of Japan and the United States. The pages cite the value of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and its effort toward a common Latin American market. They also cite tariff-preference trade agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. In short, the business pages are at pains to convey the Fujimori-designed image of Perú as a nation reborn in the neoliberal image. Extensive details appear throughout the various PromPerú pages, covering, for example, specific export products and international corporations which have already invested in Perú. The reader with access to the Worldwide Web may study these pages easily and at leisure. However, several other page groups warrant brief descriptions here.

Associated with the page group concerning investment opportunities is a page entitled, "*Perú al dia*" ("Peru up-to-date"). The page is kept very current and includes brief business news items in wire service style (Web site: al dia). The page cited, for example, contains stories about a Peruvian mining company's accord with Korean automotive manufacturer Hyundai, the investment of U.S.$16 million in a petroleum processing plant, the establishment of a branch office of Morgan Guaranty Trust in Perú, even the decision of a Greek tourism firm to construct a U.S.$3.5 million casino. The effect of the news-style pages is to lend credibility to PromPerú's messages of stability and confidence, and to project excitement and immediacy, with the subtle effect of suggesting to the potential investor that the train is leaving the station and it would be unwise to be left standing on the platform.

Still another Web page group within the PromPerú stable is a series called, "Perú in Figures (Web site:tables)." Here the browser can access more than 150 separate tables and charts in categories matching those addressed in the business page group -- agriculture, fishing, mining, natural resources, manufacturing, tourism, etc. There is a host of additional statistical graphics including traditional subjects like gross domestic product, farm production, mining products, crude oil reserves, manufacturing capacity, tourism revenues, export and import products, interest rates, employment, and air cargo traffic. Additionally, there are charts with intriguing titles like "Lakes and lagoons by basin and capacity," "Consumption of drinking water in metropolitan Lima," and "Biomass of major hydrobiological resources."

Tables and charts appear to provide in excruciating detail every bit of statistical information a potential investor might find useful in assessing Perú's economic condition. The investor may find here, for example, a profile of the educational system including enrollment, number of teachers, and size of libraries. He or she may also learn which universities offer which degrees, or how many children under one year receive vaccinations. The number and type of private housing is graphically described along with the ownership and types of water vessels in operation. While the figures and trends portrayed through these 150-plus graphics are significant, more important is the secondary message that all of Perú is open to inspection to the potential investor. It appears President Fujimori, through PromPerú, is going to great lengths to convey an image of utter transparency in an effort to overcome many years of concealment bordering on the sinister.

Yet another block of PromPerú pages provides a detailed agenda of major political, cultural, educational and other events involving Perú (Web site:Agenda). These pages, too, are updated regularly and seem to have the purpose of elevating the nation's status through descriptions, in straight-forward, diary-style entries, of key events. Sample entries for September and October 1996 include the following:

- Participation in an agribusiness tour in Los Angeles, Calif.
- Observation of "Perú Week" at the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.
- A presidential summit for the Rio Group in Bolivia
- Participation in a forum on social development in Chile
- Operation of a display on commercial Lima for the Taipei International Fair
- Operation of a display on Perú for the Korean World Travel Fair
- Participation in the International Market for Crafts and Light-to-Medium Industry in Italy
- Participation in the meeting of the American Society of Travel Agencies in Bangkok
- Participation in the meeting of ministers of defense of the Americas in Argentina
- Conduct of a seminar on Latin American economic opportunities held in Jakarta, Indonesia
- President Fujimori's visit to Bonn, Germany
- Participation in a meeting on rural agricultural financing held in Brazil

Again the message here is more one of subtext. The point is clearly that Perú is taking a pro-active approach to integration with the global economy and culture. The events reflect a broad scope of activities and a geographical spectrum encompassing the rest of Latin America, Europe, Asia and North America, though Africa and Eastern Europe fail to make an appearance in this instance.

An additional category of PromPerú pages to be discussed here is the group including lengthier and often more scholarly articles concerning Perú's recrafted image. This group features research-length essays on a variety of subjects directly related to those addressed in the previously discussed business and investment pages. Again, versions are available both in

English and Spanish. The essays, like chapters in a college text, frequently conclude with recommendations for further reading. The contents page lists more than 50 in-depth articles by experts in each field. Categories include trade and investment, banking and finance, market regulation, labor law, taxation, intellectual property and others (Web site:contents).

Two articles particularly merit brief discussion as prime examples of PromPerú's embodiment of Fujimori's neoliberal policies. The first is entitled, "Reforms for a better future," by de Zevallos (1996). The author opens by citing a study by a Washington, D.C.-based agency that found Perú to have had an economic environment less conducive to foreign investment during the 1980s than even the (former) Soviet Union. Since 1990, the author points out, however, Perú has attained status as one of the most "market-friendly" nations in the world. De Zevallos points to Fujimori-sponsored legislation such as the 1991 Promotion of Foreign Investment Law that guaranteed principles of nondiscrimination against foreign capital and of transfer abroad of profits, lifted restrictions on foreign investment, and guaranteed tax stability for foreign investors. The author also describes bilateral investment treaties Perú has established with Thailand, South Korea, Bolivia, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Czech Republic, Romania, Paraguay, Colombia, Sweden and Switzerland. A key segment of de Zevallos' essay concerns the neoliberal linchpin -- privatization. Here again, the author cites legislation supporting privatization and provides a litany of successful privatization efforts since Fujimori initiated his program. He stresses the new tax structure and reform of the stock market, both of which favor foreign investment and stimulate savings. The labor market, too, is characterized as being "flexible" and conducive to business. The author cites the popularity of Fujimori's actions in dissolving the Congress in 1991 and touts the holding of elections for a new Congress in 1992 along with a referendum approving the new Constitution in 1993.

The second article, "Private investment regime," by Muñiz, is similar to that of de Zevallos in its positive, upbeat tone, but focuses more on price structures, property rights, and insurance as they pertain to foreign investment (1996). The author states simply: "Prices are established by supply and demand. The only prices that may be fixed by the government are fees for public utilities." The only government control on capital, Muñiz tells the reader, is that "capital contributions must be channeled through the Peruvian banking system;" that system, too, has been largely privatized. The author also describes in detail the newly established duty-free zones for tourism, commercial, and development interests.

BEYOND THE WEB

While PromPerú's Web site articles, photos, features, statistics and other elements offer a refreshing glimpse into a culture, a country, and its emerging image (there is even an audio page which permits the browser to listen to an excerpt of authentic, Peruvian flute music), and are representative of the messages the agency is projecting on behalf of Fujimori, the effort is certainly not limited to this new medium. We've already discussed magazine inserts and the schedule of promotional activities around the globe, but PromPerú has a more extensive media mix as well.

Dozens of slick brochures, pamphlets and information kits tout everything from the tenets of neoliberalism already discussed to *Pisco*, the traditional grape brandy -- "a miracle born from the fertile Peruvian desert and the mixture of Indians and Spaniards."

One of the brochures reveals another side to the agency. It's a 60-page, high-quality, full-color magazine of more than a hundred photos of pre-Hispanic Peruvian art. The publication includes a forward/dedication by President Fujimori, and was prepared for a PromPerú-coordinated display of the depicted artifacts in Miami's central library in 1994 and

1995. While the brochure and the event promote understanding and appreciation for Peruvian culture and history, Fujimori, again in a classic application of public relations techniques, relates the event to his neoliberal program in the brochure's forward:

> By presenting this exhibition in Miami we also wish to give the visitor the opportunity to take a closer look at the values that nurture Peruvian identity in the hemispheric context. As Perú becomes a global player it does so as a bearer of modernity in change that is deeply rooted in Peruvian history and culture.

Other publications are less subtle in their message packaging, with titles like:

- Freedom to invest in a country of opportunities
- Perú: new horizons
- Investing in Perú: guide to business law
- Opportunities to invest in export industries
- Opportunities for investment in industrial timber
- Opportunities for investment in manufacturing (others cover mining, tourism, etc.)

Other publications, and parts of many, also engage in a sound public relations tactic -- being up front about negative information. The border dispute with Ecuador is a good example.[3] A separate publication is entitled simply, "The Peruvian position regarding recent events on the border with Ecuador." The essay is obviously slanted toward the Peruvian view, but nevertheless offers considerable historical background on the issue and articulates clearly Perú's position; this public airing is not a tack that would likely have been taken during the previous decades of isolation.

Similarly, the issue of endemic poverty and maldistribution of wealth is addressed, if briefly, in a number of Promperu products. Attention is usually drawn to statistics which show that the percentage of the population living below the poverty level fell from 54 percent in 1990 to 49.6 percent in 1994. They also point out that annual per capita social spending has climbed from roughly U.S.$18 in 1990 to more than U.S.$80 in 1994, and that social spending constituted 27 percent of the total budget in 1994, but had climbed to 35 percent by 1995. And in a break from standard neoliberal philosophy, PromPerú products acknowledge that publicly-funded social programs must be improved and that increased participation at the grassroots, community level must be encouraged. They often add that more public support is needed for basic needs like health, nutrition and education. They boldly predict, in fact, that social spending will soon represent 50 percent of public expenditures (The Peruvian economic program, 1995).

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[3] Ecuador and Perú waged a war over an unmarked Amazon border region from January 26 - February 28, 1995 (FBIS, October 3, 1995)

One final PromPerú product worth an examination is a video, one of several the agency produces and distributes. Entitled "Perú: a country moving to the future," it neatly encapsulates in roughly 10 minutes virtually all the elements of the neoliberal message in visuals and narration. The images include the bustle of a modern city, the vibrant stock exchange, native craftsmen weaving, the muscles and sweat of hard-working factory laborers, drilling operations, scenes of modern agriculture, medical laboratory research, even high fashion. The rapid sequences and up-tempo music convey a subtext of a nation on the move. The deep baritone narrator stresses the size of the Latin American market to which Perú is the gateway. He talks of a "solid democracy with a government strongly supported by the people, with international credibility...successfully controlling the problems which affected the country in the last years," going so far as to cite "the economic crisis, terrorist violence, and the isolation from the international trust." The reassuring words are heard over a visual first of people marching in amiable solidarity, then of a *Wall Street Journal* headline boasting, "Perú's progress: Fujimori has tamed terrorism and inflation." As the camera tilts down the headline, the image quickly fades before the reader can read the rest: "but means still rankle."

Quick flashes of colorful shots show the reader how major companies are already investing; large neon signs for Goodyear, Sony, Toyota, Hyundai, Samsung, Pizza Hut and others bear witness to an apparent flood of major investors. The narrator reminds the viewer that there are no more restrictions on profits or foreign investment. We see skilled and semi-skilled laborers as the voice stresses "competition and private initiative."

One of the criticisms of neoliberalism, and generally of Latin America's approach to agriculture for the past 150 years, has been the emphasis on export crops at the expense of staple food crops, resulting in increased revenue for wealthy landowners, but insufficient basic food for the poor majority (Booth and Walker, 1993, p.4). Unfortunately, the video does little to contradict the charge. Scenes of abundant farm products include primarily cotton, grapes and tobacco and stress the "strong demand in the world market" for such products.

There are other elements of the video which lay the administration open to additional common criticisms of neoliberal economics. The narrator boasts that "the majority of the coast is still to be *exploited*" (emphasis added). Using a word like that is a hot button for those who accuse neoliberalism of neglecting ecological concerns. Similarly, images of mining operations depict a scarred landscape in the otherwise stunningly picturesque Andes as the narrator adds that there are opportunities for conversion of rain forest to production of resins, dyes, spices, rubber, and medicine, though he stresses they are "maintaining the ecological balance of the Amazon."

Even public infrastructure projects are tied to commerce and investment, emphasizing road construction, and sea- and airport facility expansion.

Overall, the video is positive, fresh and flashy. It acknowledges briefly a troubled past, but brushes it aside as it seeks to instill confidence and exuberance for a nation on its way to a bright, shining future. It is quintessential PromPerú, and quintessential Fujimori.

THE ROLE OF THE "CEO"

All this discussion of PromPerú's efforts is not to say that President Fujimori has delegated to the agency complete responsibility for a national public relations campaign, eschewing a personal role. Far from it. The President has been a highly visible player in this drama, taking an extremely active role in projecting and shaping the national image while cultivating his own. Though perhaps somewhat flamboyant, he is certainly not the eccentric character typified by his neighboring president, Abdala Bucaram, who is known as "El Loco" and who is described as a "shameless self-promoter." Among Bucaram's peculiar brand of showmanship are a compact disc he recorded entitled "A crazy man in love" and rock concerts in which he sings songs from the disc (El Loco, 1996). That is not Fujimori's style.

Fujimori is more like the consummate, high-profile chief executive officer -- the Lee Iacoca of Latin America. His public appearances and meetings, especially with foreign dignitaries, are no-nonsense, all business affairs. He comes across as a man who does not suffer fools gladly. Telling are his comments regarding his dissolution of the Congress: "The democracy of political parties is over. We have a democracy that brings benefits to people, in contrast to the other democracy, which was party-ocracy" (Serrill, 1995).

His own people call him "*El Chino*",[4] and his foreign visits with attendant media coverage have garnered considerable achievements. During his 1994 visit to China, Fujimori obtained more than U.S.$100 million in soft loans with which to purchase Chinese products such as tractors, construction equipment and civilian aircraft (Kaye, 1994). He personally visited New York and hosted a lunch for 300 institutional investors in May 1996, promoting the sale of Telefónica shares; the successful results were described earlier (Fujimori, 1996).

The president has been surprisingly, and effectively, open regarding his negotiations with foreign investors. By releasing weeks in advance a letter of intent concerning his endorsement of IMF-prescribed economic targets, Fujimori secured a U.S.$2.7 billion natural gas contract with the Shell-Mobil consortium -- Perú's biggest foreign contract yet. As a result of this and other successes, the important Swiss Bank Corporation generated a glowing report on Perú's economic prospects (Fujimori, 1996). The contribution of adroit public relations techniques to Perú's and Fujimori's string of economic successes cannot be overstated. Those techniques have included openness, coordinated communication efforts, and responsiveness to feedback and program evaluation.

There are, recall, the common charges leveled against Latin American neoliberalism that the economic reforms come at tremendous social costs including growing unemployment, a widening gap between the few elite and the poor majority, drastic reductions in government-supported social programs, and environmental sacrifice (Walker, 1996). Fujimori seems to be aware of that and appears to be trying to dispel such charges, though it's too early to gauge results fully. For example, promising to spend more than U.S.$400 million on the poorest sectors in 1990, he spent just U.S.$90 million. An agency he established in 1991 to oversee

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[4] "El Chino" does not mean, as some have said, "The Chinese." Rather, the term appears to mean Nissei or Sansei, as "Turco" refers to anyone of Arab extraction. He would not be called "El Japoneso" since that would refer to someone who is not a Peruvian citizen (LaSor, 1996).

poverty relief programs (FONCODES) was spending just 20 percent of its budget in 1992, though it had reached the 50 percent level by 1994 (Roberts, 1995, pp.102-103).

However, Fujimori has apparently turned the corner and has increased social spending, as PromPerú products claim. FONCODES in 1993 funded 10,000 small-scale initiatives in agriculture, health care, education, nutrition and other social infrastructure arenas. Fujimori became visibly associated with efforts to alleviate poverty, escalating visits to public works projects in poor communities. He even "personally dedicated 71 schools, mostly in lower-class urban districts" (Roberts, 1995, pp.103-104). Needless to say, such activity has garnered enthusiastic media coverage.

President Fujimori is either well schooled in the techniques of public relations and political communication, or he is getting excellent advice. Personally, and through his PromPerú agency, he is very effectively conveying the messages of his policies to the external audience and, though it has not been the subject of this paper, apparently to an internal audience as well. While Latin American public affairs efforts have traditionally been limited to tourism promotion and to some extent investor relations, we are seeing signs of increased sophistication, especially in the government sector (Strenski, 1996). Perú is clearly a prime example.

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Al dia --	gopher://gopher.rcp.net.pe:70/00/n...mperu/noticias/dia/1996/octubre/04
Business --	http://apu.rcp.net.pe/promperu/negocios/business.html (Oct. 7, 1996)
Catalog --	http://ekeko.rcp.net.pe/promperu/catalogo/catalogo-i.html (Sept. 26, 1996)
Contents --	http://ekeko.rcp.net.pt/promperu/inversiones-i/summary.html
Home --	http://apu.rcp.net.pe/promperu/index-i.html (Oct. 7, 1996)
Mnfctrng --	http://ekeko.rcp.net.pe/promperu/negocios/manufacturing.html (Sep. 26, 1996)
Tables --	http://apu.rcp.net.pe/promperu/cifras-i/cifras-i.html (Oct. 7, 1996)
Welcome --	http://apu.rcp.net.pe/promperu/welcome.html (Oct. 7, 1996)

Terrorists on the Web:

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CYBERSPACE

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Terrorists on the Web:
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy in Cyberspace

Abstract

When rebels captured 450 international hostages in Lima, Peru, on Dec. 17, 1996, they also elevated the level of sophistication of correlated mass media techniques aimed at maximum impact on the global stage. Part of their plan included a slick, extensive, multi-language site on the Worldwide Web. This paper analyzes that site within a dual framework of propaganda and public diplomacy theories, concluding that circumspection is needed to understand fully the potentially manipulative effects of this surprising use of the new mass medium.

Introduction

Weiman argued as much as ten years ago that media-oriented terrorist events were on the rise (1987), and some scholars maintained that media coverage itself was feeding the flames of terrorism through contagion and imitation (Alali and Eke, 1991). Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called upon the media to deprive terrorists of "the oxygen of publicity" in a now oft-quoted speech. The argument posits that media coverage serves the purposes of terrorists in two ways: it educates other potential terrorists in the strategy and tactics of terrorist acts; and it provides substantial publicity, conferring (even if unintentionally) legitimacy to the terrorists and their cause.

Dopkin disputes the tenets of contagion theory, and says rather that media coverage precipitates repressive counter-terrorist responses by governments, especially authoritarian ones, and that repression often includes suppression of press freedom (1992). Dobkin also lamented that media coverage often lacked context and history, presenting terrorist events merely as isolated melodrama. Harmon agrees and calls this superficial coverage inappropriate, warning that terrorists are "deadly serious," well-educated, and committed to their ideology (Harmon, 1992).

Despite extensive coverage, some researchers have found that terrorist groups, using terrorist events as a violent form of communication, may not be achieving their goals, since coverage is often superficial, limited to description of the event and portraying the terrorists merely as criminals (Cox, 1981, Cooper, 1991, Crelinsten, 1987, Kelly, 1981, Paletz, 1982, Simmons, 1991).

If these and other scholars are correct, then terrorists are achieving the publicity they seek, but generally only in quantitative, mediated terms, not qualitative. What if terrorists had the technical means to circumvent the media and somehow take their messages directly to the public, establishing the means for direct, interactive discourse on issues of their choosing? What if they could bypass all the filters and gatekeepers that might dilute, distort, or even ignore their text streams? Enter "The Web."

The Worldwide Web has opened a new conduit through which terrorists may seek the "oxygen of publicity." In one sense it behaves like broadcasting with its audio and visual elements, disseminated digitally and available to anyone with the proper equipment to decode it. On the other hand, it behaves a little like print media, at least in the United States, where it is subject to virtually no restrictions, licensing procedures, noble calls to act as a trustee of the public interest, or bothersome content rating schemes. In fact, the Web seems to comply more with the "common carriage" model described by McQuail (1992, p.106).

A unique aspect of the Web, though, is its phenomenally low cost relative to its potential reach. With a few hundred dollars' worth of equipment, access to a server, and a bit of computer savvy, any terrorist organization can establish a global presence via the Web, with no pressure from an outside publisher and no dependence upon advertisers sensitive to the marketplace. It's not surprising, then, that a number of terrorist organizations are establishing their presence on this new medium.

Wrapped within this milieu of propaganda and persuasion is the phenomenon of public diplomacy -- the practice of taking significant political issues, foreign policy matters, civic debates, and other weighty matters directly to the public, particularly through the mass media. Politicians and activists have recognized for a long time the efficacy of entering the court of public opinion. From John Quincy Adams (Russell, 1996), to Jesse Jackson (Stanford, 1995), to Greenpeace (Dudley, 1996), the power of public diplomacy has been well established.

The image of Gerry Adams, of the Irish Republican Army, broadcast globally as he met with President Clinton in the White House, dramatically elevated the credibility of Adams and his organization ("Gerry and the Peace-Makers," 1995). The U.S. Information Agency, and especially its subsidiary the Voice of America, are charged with what amounts to public diplomacy (Blackburn, 1992). Even the quadrennial Olympics provide an ideal platform. The 1988 games in Seoul, for example, served as a powerful incentive for both the government of South Korea and student activists to engage in a pitched battle of public diplomacy (Manheim, 1990).

Similarly, terrorist events, as a violent form of communication, can be viewed as an exercise in public diplomacy. The group that has most captured the attention of the world's media public in recent months is Tupac Amaru, the Peruvian organization that garnered enormous global coverage when on December 17, 1996, it conducted a daring raid on the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru, in the process capturing more than 800 hostages representing more than 25 nations. At this writing, nearly three months following the start of the event, 72 hostages remain in captivity as delicate, complex negotiations continue.

What may be a first in this instance, is that in addition to global mass media coverage of the event, the Tupac Amaru organization is maintaining an extremely sophisticated Web site which concerns, nearly exclusively, the hostage situation. According to a Reuters News Service report ("Peruvian Rebels Wage Propaganda War on the Internet," 1997), the Tupac Amaru group created the page, entitled "Voz Rebelde" (Rebel Voice), the day following the storming of the ambassador's residence.

The purpose of this paper is to look at that Web site, analyzing it contextually against a dual framework of propaganda theory and public diplomacy, to determine whether devices employed permit categorizing this new phenomenon as propaganda, which carries with it implications regarding our understanding of it.

Questions asked include: Using Lasswell's four objectives of propaganda as a common standard, to what degree do the pages comply with the propaganda paradigm (1927, p.195)? What traditional persuasive devices are employed to effect attitude and behavioral change? Do traditional cautions concerning recognizing and evaluating propaganda apply to this medium as it is being used by terrorist organizations?

Lasswell defined propaganda as "the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations" (1937, pp.521-2). He said the technique could be in spoken, written, pictorial, or even musical form. If the devices and apparent objectives of propaganda are present on terrorist Web sites, Lasswell's broad definition would permit us to qualify those pages as propaganda, providing the necessary theoretical underpinning for this study.

A note of semantic caution is in order, however. As Hitchins points out, the use of terms like "terrorist" and "terrorism" are extremely subjective (1989). They cannot be universally defined. Let us agree, though, that the group represented by the site selected for this study provides at least an implied operational definition of the terms (supporting details appear in the *Background* section).

Additionally, and importantly, Morris and Ogan (1996) make a forceful case for the Web to be considered a mass medium and subject to research under that rubric.

Literature Review

Brown distinguished between persuasion and propaganda, declaring it a matter of judgment by the receiver, rather than a matter of technique by the message sender (1958). Herman and Chomsky proposed a propaganda model for media/state relations, claiming that the U.S. government uses propaganda in support of its foreign policy objectives (1988). So while the term "propaganda" carries a pejorative flavor, perspective seems to be an important element as well.

Nevertheless, Lasswell identified four objectives of propaganda (1927, p.195):

- To mobilize hatred against the enemy
- To preserve the friendship of allies
- To preserve the friendship and, if possible to procure the cooperation of neutrals
- To demoralize the enemy

Lee and Lee took the process one step further, identifying seven specific propaganda devices (1939):

- Name calling
- Glittering generality
- Transfer

- Testimonial
- Plain folks
- Card stacking
- Band wagon

McQuail submits his own list of propaganda devices including innuendo, vaguely attributed sources, and suspicious juxtaposition of items, and suggests that recognition of propaganda requires a critical view of the media (1992, pp.193-194).

In the last several decades, a variety of research efforts have tested both Lasswell's purposes theory and Lee and Lee's devices construct, while history has provided a number of salient examples of the dynamics at work, which demonstrate both the near-term intended, and long-term unintended consequences. Severin and Tankard, for instance, cite the successful propaganda effort by the United Fruit Company in the early 1950s which led to enduring instability in Guatemala, along with civil war and eventual involvement in drug trafficking (1992, p.95). Bell cited efforts to use the word "credit" instead of "debt" which successfully sold the installment plan to millions of Americans and arguably resulted in financial problems on individual and national levels (1976).

The power of even subtle propaganda efforts can be considerable, too. Durán and Urzúa cite the use of propaganda in a Chilean newspaper (1978). Articles linked left-wing activity with atrocity merely by juxtaposing reports on its pages, fostering a climate of fear in order to undermine the Allende government.

More recently, however, Herman published a vigorous defense of the propaganda model he and Chomsky proposed (1996). He stresses that propaganda models address media behavior and performance, and any assessment of effectiveness is speculative. He emphasizes that propaganda campaigns are circumscribed by the "interests of those controlling and managing the filters (p.117)," including owners, advertisers, and sources, and dismisses the Internet as a force to break "the corporate stranglehold on journalism" (p.124) since it, too, is driven by market forces.

In searching for and measuring the effectiveness of propaganda/persuasion devices, Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield demonstrated the effectiveness of two-sided versus one-sided messages, at least for educated publics (1949). Janis and Feshbach (See Severin and Tankard, 1992, p.158) and Hill (1988) demonstrated that mild or moderate fear appeals are more effective than strong fear appeals. Sherif showed that the band wagon effect works, but only in limited cases (1958). And Hovland and Weiss showed that high-credibility sources giving testimonials are more effective than low-credibility sources, but that even high-credibility sources appear to achieve only limited effectiveness. For a more detailed review of literature addressing techniques of persuasion, see Severin and Tankard (1992, pp.172-176).

Turning to the issue of public diplomacy, Wick, long before the proliferation of the Web, cautioned that accelerating systems of global communication constituted a potential force for decisive influence on government policies and conduct (1989). He added that this capability offered considerable promise for the use of moral persuasion to enhance security. The question now is whether that same capability can become an effective destabilizing force.

Several authors have stressed the U.S. government's use of public diplomacy, especially as an element of foreign policy. Tuch argued that public diplomacy was a major factor during the Cold War, for instance when the United States and the Soviet Union vied for Western European opinion regarding the placement of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, but mattered less during the Kuwait tanker escort crisis in a region of the world where public opinion was much less an influence on government policy (1990). The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy called upon the USIA to exercise increasing vigor in its support for U.S. foreign policy ("Public Diplomacy Integral to Foreign Policy," 1989).

Propaganda, persuasion, public diplomacy and the Web -- a healthy manifestation of the evolution of media freedom, or a lethal prescription for affective and behavioral manipulation? This paper aims to raise the corner of the tent to gauge the initial direction of the combination. It was the generally recognized father of pubic relations, however -- Edward L. Bernays -- who advised coldly, "It is the intelligent minorities which need to make use of propaganda continuously and systematically" (1928, p.9). With that somewhat ominous recommendation, and with the purposes, devices, and effectiveness gauges cited, we can shape an approach to analyzing and evaluating terrorist Web sites.

Method

This effort is, at its heart, a case study. The aim is to examine the selected Web site thoroughly and with vision aided by pertinent additional sources such as background materials and previous research related to the selected group and to the environment within which it operates. In turn, content of the site will be evaluated for the presence of apparent communication purposes, particularly as they relate to propaganda theory, as well as specific propagandistic devices.

As stated, the Tupac Amaru hostage situation presented an ideal research opportunity, and its Web site a perfect research laboratory. The highly sophisticated site provided more than 100 pages of printed documents and images using only the primary "home page" and first iteration links. That is, items were viewed, printed and analyzed only if they were removed no more than one generation from the initial page. Doing so permitted the use of only "official" material as opposed to other Web sites linked by the Tupac Amaru Web authors because of relational subject matter. All pages cited were viewed and printed on a single day, February 21, 1997, in order to obtain a cohesive snapshot of the site. Each referenced page is identified in this text by key title words, and full addresses are provided at Appendix A following the **Reference** section.

The vast potential of this embryonic research field -- propaganda on the Web -- clearly presents possibilities of considerable directions. For that reason, this limited effort may be considered a pilot study for a more exhaustive work.

Background

According to the U.S. State Department, Tupac Amaru is a "traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983." It is engaged in a struggle, the State Department reports, to remain viable, having suffered from defections and from successful government counterterrorism efforts. Infighting and diminishing leftist support have also taken their toll. Their objective remains to "rid Peru of imperialism and establish (a) Marxist regime" (Wilcox, 1996).

Tupac Amaru activities have included bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations. Many attacks have a distinct anti-U.S. bent, though activity had fallen off precipitously prior to the December 17, 1996, hostage taking, largely because many of its members had been jailed. Still, its history permits its classification as a terrorist group.

Its numerical strength is a mystery, though it has likely been decreasing. Some reports claim membership to range from 300-600 (Sims, 1996). It operates almost exclusively in Peru, though it has apparently provided some assistance to another group in Bolivia. There is no evidence of external aid.

A more violent and widely recognized terrorist group in Peru is Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. This organization first surfaced in 1980 under the leadership of Abimael Guzmán Reynoso and has been associated with much more violence, especially against the peasant population. Guzmán was captured and jailed in 1992 and the group's activities have diminished dramatically. Tupac Amaru is generally at pains to distinguish itself from Sendero Luminoso (Poole & Rénique, 1992).

Peru's President Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990 as a political outsider and quickly instituted sweeping neoliberal reforms and an aggressive counterterrorism campaign. In 1992, dissatisfied with lack of adequate economic progress, he dissolved the Congress and the judicial system in an *auto golpe* or self-coup, successfully pushed for the approval of a new Constitution through a referendum, and was subsequently re-elected in 1995. Among his counterterrorism policies was the transfer of terrorist trials to secret military tribunals, and the transfer of authority for counterterrorist campaigns to the military with a considerable degree of impunity (Tulchin & Bland, 1994).

The tenets of neoliberalism include the privatization of government-owned industry, the de-centralization of government, and the reduction of federal spending and bureaucracy, with attendant reduction in social spending.

Site Description

The Tupac Amaru home page, in Spanish of course, presents a striking and somewhat ominous appearance with its stark black background and liberal use of red and yellow graphics and fonts. Labeled at the upper left, "Página Oficial del MRTA en Europa" (Official page of the MRTA in Europe), the viewer may accept or reject that claim, though the content of this and remaining pages lends strong credence to its "official" nature. MRTA refers to the complete name of the organization, "Del Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru." Tupac Amaru was the Peruvian Indian who led an 18th century uprising against Spanish conquerors. The reference to Europe may simply indicate the location of the server storing the Web site files; those files, in turn, could be maintained from any location.

Also on the page is a counter, indicating that this represents the 16,508th "visitor" to the site, though a subsequent English version of the page indicates nearly 70,000 visitors.

Attention is immediately drawn to the MRTA symbol emblazoned at the top of the page. In red, black and white, it features the head of Tupac Amaru, and a five-pointed star at the top of, perhaps, a scepter, converging at its base with the butt of an automatic rifle to form a "V" cradling the head of Tupac.

The home page, though, is merely the launch pad, providing direct links to a variety of materials Tupac Amaru views as contributory to its effort. There is also a link permitting immediate e-mail connectivity to the Web author, and another to the committee supporting the release of MRTA prisoners. Direct links to other materials include access to versions in English, Italian, German, Japanese, and Danish. It is the English version upon which the remainder of this analysis is based.

This English version of the MRTA home page is apparently maintained by a supportive group called Arm the Spirit. The site includes a disclaimer of sorts which says it is merely a group in solidarity with the MRTA, serving as an "information collective." Cross-checks with MRTA's Spanish versions of material available in English confirm that the latter is merely a translation and warrants "official" status.

Direct links include the following general categories, each of which contains a number of separate pages or sites: communiqués; interviews; press statements; background information; articles; actions; and news updates.

PROPAGANDISTIC OBJECTIVES

Lasswell's objectives of mobilizing hatred, preserving friendship, procuring cooperation of neutrals, and demoralizing the enemy, if present, would permit classifying the site as propaganda.

Mobilizing hatred would imply providing courses of action sympathetic viewers could take to demonstrate support. Included among the pages, predictably perhaps, are invitations to subscribe to a variety of publications with titles like *Love & Rage Newspaper* or *Arm the Spirit*, "the Canadian radical journal," and to e-mail a number of contact points to garner additional information. None of these measures, however, is likely to entice the neutral viewer. There is, though, one page which offers concrete, rational activities in which a viewer, convinced and co-opted by the contents of the site, can engage in support of the MRTA ("Peaceful Solution" site). In very straightforward, but no less impassioned prose, the viewer is urged to participate in protests in front of Peruvian embassies and consulates, and to send letters and e-mail to President Fujimori, to human rights organizations, to the Red Cross, and to the media expressing support. The site even provides a sample letter. Also included is an extensive list of mailing addresses, voice and facsimile phone numbers, and e-mail addresses for 60 such potential recipients. It is classic mobilizing information, though its tone does not fit Lasswell's "hatred" criterion.

Perhaps the example above more neatly fits Lasswell's *procuring cooperation of neutrals* criterion, which is more subtly employed on another page addressing the current stand-off ("The hostages of Peru" site) which states, "The MRTA does not wish a confrontation with the international community and it respects the integrity of its representatives." It goes on to assert, "We respect the decisions of the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala to end the armed struggle...we think they know the situation in their countries best." Language like this is clearly aimed at projecting a moderate position (presumably as opposed to the strident government position), preserving alliances with other Latin American guerrilla movements (while mildly criticizing their lack of conviction and solidarity), and pursuing the appreciation of neutrals for the MRTA's rational justification for the hostage action.

The same page includes passages which appear to be aimed at *demoralizing the enemy* -- in this instance, the Peruvian government and especially the Army which has been charged with conducting counterterrorism efforts, and which has been accused by the

MRTA of brutal repression. One such passage refers to the MRTA as one of a number of "popular...armed organizations which are like needle points in the side of the government." The MRTA remains strong, the site claims, "and has not, like the government propaganda says (sic), been destroyed." The group, it continues, "has dealt more losses to the Peruvian army in war than the government of Ecuador" -- a reference to a bloody flare-up of a border dispute between the two nations in early 1995. "In the past 3 years," the page adds, "2 military barracks and 4 army helicopters were destroyed."

The case can be made then, it would seem, that the site satisfies Lasswell's propaganda model. One need not dig too deeply to uncover illustrations of each of the four benchmarks. The next step is to search for the employment of specific devices.

PROPAGANDISTIC DEVICES

Specific devices often listed by Lasswell and others in the exercise of propaganda include use of atrocity stories, name calling, "just plain folk" appeals, flattering terms used for self reference, diverting attention from the issues, glittering generality, transfer (comparing self to something or someone highly regarded), testimonial, bandwagon, card stacking (selective presentation of the facts), fear appeals, and threats. The field, in this case, is rich.

The primary, stated objective of the MRTA in taking the hostages was to obtain freedom for MRTA members in Peruvian prisons. *Atrocity stories* concern the conditions in those prisons; accurate or not, their inclusion constitutes employment of a propagandistic device. One page, for example, describes a prison located 4,000 meters high in the Andes, where cold air constantly blowing through the cells has resulted in many prisoners suffering from respiratory illnesses ("Free all political prisoners in Peru!" site). The site speaks of total isolation; lack of medical care; horrible, rotten food sometimes mixed with glass; rats and cockroaches. The page reports prisoners are limited to two liters of water per day for all purposes, and that women prisoners are subject to sexual assaults and intimidation. Another page says 80% of all prisoners suffer from digestive disorders or liver problems, and that a majority now has vision problems ("Letter from MRTA political prisoners" site). A third page speaks of the massacre of 250 prisoners at prisons at Lurigancho, El Fronton and Callao in 1986 ("The lives of political prisoners in Peru are in danger" site).

Name calling is subdued, but evident. One page repeatedly refers to President Fujimori as "the dictator" and to his administration as "the dictatorship" ("The situation of MRTA political prisoners In Peru" site). On the other hand, references are often, almost respectfully, to "President Fujimori." Another page, however, accuses the current administration of "the greatest economic genocide conceived by the ruling classes since the conquest" ("Neo-liberalism and globalization" site). Still, the overall tone of site documents could hardly be called strident or visceral in that regard.

Just plain folks appeals are abundant, though with a distinct Marxist flavor. For example, a page cited earlier speaks of the prisoners they hope to free as "farmers, students, women, union members" ("The hostages of Peru" site). Additionally, there are frequent references to the minority, ruling elite whom the MRTA, as representatives of the ordinary people, oppose.

It would not be surprising to find MRTA *referring to itself in flattering terms.* This is, after all, their own page. In detailing its history, for instance, one site speaks of the MRTA as "an important crystallization point for many armed organizations" ("Interview with the MRTA - December 30, 1996" site). There are references to the MRTA's humanitarian release of selected hostages, and one of their statements declares, "We proceed to liberate people who are not directly or indirectly linked to the policy of the regime as a Christmas gesture" ("Peru rebels issue statement with released hostages" site). Even the ransom they are demanding is referred to as a "war tax," with claims that the money "will be used to give back some of these profits (taken from Peruvians exploited by the rich) for the good of the people, and the money will be donated to popular organizations. A small amount will (be) used to keep up the struggle by the MRTA" ("Interview with the MRTA - December 24, 1996" site).

The entire site represents an attempt to *divert attention from the issue* of the hostages themselves. In more than 100 pages of material, no mention is made of their identity or their condition. No statements from the hostages appear.

Glittering generalities appear to be an ingredient as well. Noteworthy is a statement concerning the MRTA's vision for a new society. It will include, it explains, "the participation of all the men and women who make up the core of Peru, with its communities of the countryside and of the jungle, people's kitchens, neighborhood committees, and unions in general will be those who, in a National Assembly, will decide the destinies of the country." Tanks and guns, the page predicts, will be converted into "tractors and museum pieces" ("Communiqué #5" site).

Transfer, or what Culbertson and others refer to as *linkage* (1992), is also an element present in the MRTA's site. For example, one page permits the viewer to "click" to mainstream news reports that, based on their headlines, appear to place the MRTA in the best light, while providing a psychological "link" between the terrorists and respected news agencies ("Mainstream news" site). Headlines are listed boldly along with the source agency: "Peruvian Rebels Free 2 More Hostages" -- CNN; "Peruvian Rebels Ease Standoff Demands" -- *The Washington Post*; "Peru's Inhuman Jails Behind Dispute" -- *Toronto Star*; "Some Hostages Sought Rebel Leader's Autograph" -- Agence France-Presse; and "Rebels Disciplined, Freed Hostages Say" -- *The Yomiuri Shimbun*.

Testimonials come from a number of sources, though none could be described as high-credibility. For example, one linked page is a supportive statement by a group called "Ya Basta" which apparently staged sympathetic demonstrations outside the Peruvian consulate in Milan, Italy ("Solidarity Action in Milan, Italy" site). Another unnamed group provides support via a linked page of support describing a similar action in Rome ("Against neo-liberalism" site). Similar pages report statements of solidarity from Germany's Red Army Faction ("Red Army Faction" site) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey ("DHKC" site).

Similarly, *bandwagon* appeals are in evidence. One page claims, "Many social sectors are represented within the MRTA: men and women from the cities and rural areas, intellectuals, religious people, indeed the whole society" ("Interview with the MRTA - December 30, 1966" site.

Card stacking is apparent in the many links to mainstream news reports, some of which were described above. Each linked report is clearly aimed at building up the reputation of MRTA and strengthening its case. At the same time, reports which place the government in the bleakest light are also included.

Fear appeals are equally obvious, but relatively sophisticated. For instance, one statement not so subtly aims at President Fujimori's heritage, implying an inherent risk of undue and worrisome external influence. It points out that:

> Japan today is a major economic power, which has the luxury to be able to afford to purchase parts of Wall Street. Many major U.S. corporations are made up largely of Japanese capital. That's why Japan will play an increasingly important role in Latin America, and Japan regards President Fujimori as its primary supporting figure.... Japan, in order to strengthen its position (in Peru), has financed the dirty war.... Japan is deeply involved in supporting this murderous regime" (Interview with the MRTA - December 30, 1996" site).

Finally, *threats* are employed rather directly. One page says forebodingly that the MRTA "will not spare the lives of the hostages if the situation so demands." It goes on to say, "There may be deaths," and that "The MRTA are prepared to respond by attacking political and economic targets all across Peru" in the event of a military assault against the compound where the hostages are being held ("Interview with the MRTA - December 24, 1996" site). The same threat is repeated on other pages.

Discussion

There can be little doubt that this site complies with Lasswell's propaganda framework, and that the techniques of propaganda and persuasion are present to no small degree. That is not to say the MRTA has violated international standards of "truth in advertising," or that their exercise of the means of public diplomacy ought to be abridged, were that even possible. On the contrary, what this means is that there is a clear need to educate Web users on how to view and think about Web material, particularly that which falls under the propaganda rubric. In that sense, what is true for terrorist organizations would be true for sites posted by major automobile manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, religious organizations, foreign ministries, and any individual or agency with a biased message.

It would be difficult, though, to overstate the significant implications of what the MRTA has done -- combined a terrorist act as violent communication with the transmission of unmediated messages via the Web. That they have done so skillfully, employing many of the proven techniques of persuasion, is likely a barometer of the potential use of this new mass medium to focus attention on an issue on a grand scale. It is public diplomacy writ large. Can anyone question the impact of the event, based upon extraordinarily extensive coverage in the world's press, including major media references to the Web site itself?

Of course, Bramsted said that propaganda backed by force is more effectively coercive, but that terrorist force is limited (1965). And the Web, by its nature, brings with it tremendous plurality and diversity of channel and message choice, diminishing the potential effectiveness and impact of Web propaganda. Effectiveness, studies have shown, also depends on factors such as the educational level of the receiver (Hovland, Lummsdaine and Sheffield, 1949).

That suggests potential directions for continued research regarding Web propaganda. For example, how can we measure the effectiveness of this combination? Is there a reason to suspect that the combination will accelerate the effects of contagion theory, or the perception of its effects? How might cultural and national differences among terrorist organization environments affect the content of Web sites? Will we find evidence that traditional mass media news outlets are including information garnered from terrorist Web sites in their own reports?

This is an interesting new field of research, and undoubtedly a significant one. As McQuail says, "The more that 'propaganda' (intentional, but concealed, bias) or 'ideology' are suspected to be present, the more likely we are to need methods which can deal with *latent* meanings and the less easy it may be to generalize" (original emphasis) (1992, p.200).

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APPENDIX A

MRTA Web Site Addresses

Against neo-liberalism: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/rome. htm

Communiqué #5: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mrta-c5.htm

DHKC: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mrtadhkc.htm

Free all political prisoners in Peru: http://burn.ucsd.edu /~ats/MRTA/mrta-lnr.htm

The hostages of Peru: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mumia. htm

Interview with the MRTA - Dec. 24, 1996: http://burn.ucsd. edu/~ats/MRTA/-in2.htm

Interview with the MRTA - Dec. 30, 1996: http://burn.ucsd. edu/~ats/MRTA/mrta-in3.htm

Letter from MRTA political prisoners: http://burn.ucsd.edu /~ats/MRTA/pris-jw.htm

The lives of political prisoners in Peru are in danger: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/libertad.htm

Mainstream news: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/mrta2.htm

MRTA home page (Spanish): http://users.cybercity.dk/~ccc 17427/

MRTA solidarity page (English): http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/ mrta.htm

Neo-liberalism and globalization: http://burn.ucsd.edu/ ~ats/MRTA/neo-lib.htm

Peaceful solutions: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mrtasoli. htm

Peru rebels issue statement with released hostages: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mrta-s1.htm

Red Army Faction: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mrta-raf. htm

The situation of MRTA political prisoners in Peru: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA/mrta-pp.htm

Solidarity action in Milan, Italy: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats /MRTA/milan.htm

Television Viewing and Perceptions of the 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Cultivation Analysis

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Submitted to the 1997 Call for Papers
Leslie J. Moeller Competition of the International Communication Division
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Abstract

This study is aimed at examining the effects of exposure to television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games on the public perception of Olympic athletes and their performance. A telephone survey of a random sample of 397 adult New York residents from late September to early October of 1996 reveals that there is no significant relationship between television exposure and the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance, but cultivation effect is found in the public perception of American athletes and their performance.

INTRODUCTION

The Atlanta Olympic Games have been over for several months, while controversies over what kind of communication behavior should be acceptable in the context of the Olympic Games are still under way. Since the opening ceremony of the Atlanta Olympic Games was held, Chinese students, scholars and professionals currently in the United States have been protesting against some NBC commentators who are assumed to have given irresponsible and unfair comments on the Chinese athletes, especially Bob Costas. They even jointly published paid ads in the Washington Post and the New York Times [1] and demanded a public apology from NBC or Bob Costas.[2] The war between Chinese in the United States and NBC is still going on.

This project is designed to examine the effects of exposure to television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games on the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance. It is aimed at exploring how Americans perceive Chinese athletes and their performance during the Atlanta Olympic Games, whether television exposure affects the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance, and if it does, how television exposure affects the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance.

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[1] The Washington Post of August 14, 1996 carried the first protest advertisement against NBC. The New York Times of September 1, 1996 carried another protest advertisement titled "Costas Poisoned Olympic Spirit, Public Protests NBC".

[2] Bob Costas' comment on the opening ceremony of the Atlanta Olympic Games has been under severe criticism. Bob Costas is assumed by the Chinese communities in the United States to single out Chinese Olympians for criticism about performance-enhancing drug use. ("...of course, there are problems with human rights, copyright disputes, the threats posted to Taiwan. And within the Olympics, while they have excelled, 4th in the medal standings in Barcelona, with 54 medals, 16 of them gold. This after 30-year-absence, which ended in 1984, they've excelled athletically, they're building into a power, but amidst suspicions, especially concerning their track athletes, and their female swimmers possible using performance-enhancing drugs. No one caught in Barcelona. But since those games of 1992, several have been caught.")

Meanwhile, previous literature reveals that there exists disagreement in the exploration of the roles of specific programs and genres on the social conceptions in cultivation process. A study of the public perception of how athletes performed in the recently concluded Olympic Games will contribute to the elaboration of the genre-specific relationship.

THEORY

Cultivation Hypothesis

Cultivation hypothesis has been constantly used in the studies of relationship between television exposure and social conceptions since the 1970s. The central argument of the cultivation hypothesis is that television contributes to viewers' conception of social reality. In its simple form, the cultivation hypothesis argues that heavy television viewers are predicted to be more likely than light television viewers to exhibit estimates, perceptions, attitudes, feelings and values that reflect the television world message. More sophisticated form of the cultivation hypothesis posits that because people believe the world view that television reflect, and base their judgments of the real world on it, television cultivates or creates a world view for viewers, although possibly inaccurate. (Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner, 1994; Wright, 1959; McQuail, 1987; Baran & Davis, 1995).

Continuous efforts in this area have enriched and extended understanding of television's contribution to conceptions of social reality. Cultivation has come to be employed to describe television influence as a multidirectional, dynamic, and gravitational process:

> "...Cultivation is not conceived as a unidirectional process but rather more like a gravitational process. The angle and direction of the 'pull' depends on where groups or viewers and their styles of life are with reference to the center of gravity, the 'main stream' of the world of television. Each group may strain in a different direction, but all groups are affected by the same central current. Cultivation is thus part of a continual, dynamic, on-going process of interaction among messages and contexts..." (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1994, p.24)

Although the cultivation analysis has become more and more sophisticated both conceptually and methodological, there are still many questions concerning assumption, methodology, and definition open to discussion (Potter, 1994). For example, given the many intervening and powerful social background factors, cultivation hypothesis might not be able to convince us of the posited relationships between symbolic structures and audience views and conceptions. Even if in the United States, where the pervasiveness of television is distinctive and unprecedented, the higher opportunity of exposing to TV can't necessarily assure audience's intense attention to TV. In addition, TV programs and demographic features, which are always taken into consideration as third variables, can't give overall explanation of audience's interpretation of social reality.

As far as methodology is concerned, Potter (1994) revisited a large body of early literature, and found that the measurement on the exposure variable and cultural indicators are still ambiguous. Evidence for cultivation is still not strong enough to conclude that there does exist relationship between television viewing and perceptions of social reality.

Although the assumptions, methodologies and definitions of the cultivation analysis are still under heavy criticism, it does offer a theoretical framework for the studies exploring the relationship and television viewing and social perceptions.

Prior Research

Early empirical studies of the cultivation hypothesis focused on television's portrayals of violence, crime, and the judicial system. For example, many studies suggested that the more exposure people have to television, the more likely they will overestimate the crime rate in real life; the more exposure they have to television, the more likely they will overestimate the number of people working in law enforcement, and their own chance of being victims, (Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner, Gross, Eleey, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1977; Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1978; Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan, & Jackson-Beeck, 1979; Elliott & Slater, 1980.) Consequent cultivation research has been conducted in a wider field, including sex roles, marital and family difficulties, physical disability, health, attractiveness, age-role stereotypes, science, educational achievement, politics, and religion, etc. dealing with the relationship between television viewing and viewers' estimates, perceptions, attitudes, feelings and values (for example, Morgan, 1986; Perse, 1986; Potter, 1990; Sparks & Ogles, 1990; Morgan & Shanahan, 1991).

Substantial cultivation studies have been conducted on the public perceptions, and how people see the world. The foci of topics range from perceptions about a mean world, doctors, traditional sex roles, sexism, American stereotypes, to those about black groups, black self-esteem, black group identification/mainstream, the black separatist perspective, etc. (Wober, 1978; Volgy & Schwarz, 1980; Bryant, Carveth, & Brown, 1981; Tan, 1982; Rouner, 1984; Morgan, 1986; Allen & Hatchett, 1986; Shrum, 1995). Those studies revealed the correlation between television viewing and the public perception. For example, by constructing a mean world index, Gerbner and his colleagues (1980) found that heavy viewers were much more likely to perceive the world as a mean place than light viewers, and the hypothesis was still supported when some social background factors were controlled. Attempts to identify how television viewing influences social perception are also made.

Noticing practical problems involving in the operationalization of the concepts in cultivation analysis, Potter (1994) pointed out that the cultivation effect should be assumed to be a complex non-linear relationship that is influenced to differential degrees by different "third variables" at different points in the curve. He also suggested that improvement could be made in designing the measures and analyses once higher level of measurement, continuous distributions in scaling, and more sophisticated statistical techniques be employed.

Most cultivation studies consider audience as non-selective viewers, which is not always the case in the real life. Individual's interpretation of social reality is always a very subjective process, and personal experience, judgment, temperament or feeling play an important role in many circumstance. It still remains unanswered to a large extent whether TV exposure affects personal perception of social reality, or perceived social reality from personal experience or other sources induces audience to watch such programs, or TV exposure and perceived social reality are interrelated and interacting on each other.

Hypothesis

The Atlanta Olympic Games, held from mid-July to early August 1996, received intensive media's attention as the previous Games did. During the 17 days of the Olympic Games, mass media were flooded all kinds of information concerning the proceedings of the Games. Among them, television, which televised various sports live, played a significant role in presenting the Games to the public. The public depended upon television as a main source of information, idea and impression of the Games. Television was considered to be the source of the most broadly shared images and messages of the Games.

The Olympic Games are more than international sports events. As Riggs, Eastman, and Golobic (1993) pointed out, "twin images of internationalism and national interests in conflict" have been embedded in the modern Olympic Games ever since the 1936 Berlin Games (p. 254). The Olympic Games have been found to be used as political forums, nationalist positioning arenas, tools of foreign policy and symbols of cultural superiority (Riggs, Eastman, & Golobic, 1993). The roles of mass media, especially television, in the formulation of nationalistic images within the Olympic milieu have been identified as vehicles for internationalism and nationalism. Through a textual analysis of CBS and TNT coverage of the 1992 Winter Olympics, Riggs, Eastman and Golobic argued (1993) that no matter how the U.S. media claimed the 1992 Winter Olympic Games as non-political, how they redefined the post-Cold-War Olympic/media milieu, they still presented the international sports events in a political frame.

Among the televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games, some negative comments were presented regarding Chinese athletes and athletes from some other countries.[3] Given the lack of direct experience, the public might base their judgment on the television coverage. In this project, it is hypothesized that the more people were exposed to television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games, the less favorable their evaluation of Chinese athletes and their performance is.

Method

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[3] The New York Times, September 6, 1996, page B21, Cultural Views: Different Outlooks.

A telephone survey was conducted in a city of New York, from late September to early October of 1996, approximately two and a half months after the Atlanta Olympic Games[4].

Residents were randomly selected from the area to take part in the study. All telephone numbers within the local calling area of a university in this city were initially selected from CD-ROM database. After eliminating all business and duplicate telephone numbers, all the household numbers were randomly ordered based on a computer generated list of random numbers and divided into fifty telephone numbers to create twenty-six replicates of 50 numbers each for a total of 1300 telephone numbers for the study. In addition, the Kish method was used to randomly identify individual male and female members of the household to be included in this research.

One week before the survey officially began, a pretest of the survey instrument was conducted. Based on its results, survey instrument was modified and coding scheme was set up. Coding scheme was further modified after the first 101 instruments were coded.

Interviewers were students in a local university. All went through not only a training session before interviewing began, but also another follow-up training session after they completed their first shifts. The process generated 397 completed interviews, and yielded a procedure response rate of 79%.

To gauge the public perception of Chinese athletes, respondents were read the statement "Some Chinese athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs", then they were asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were neutral, disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement; they were also asked how they thought the Chinese athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games, and whether they would say Chinese athletes performed in the 1996 Olympic Games very well, well, average, poorly, or very poorly.

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[4] Questions used in this study were a part of a larger telephone survey.

Parallel questions concerning the public perception of U.S. athletes and athletes from Eastern Bloc countries and their performance were also asked in order to see how exposure to the television coverage of the Olympic Games influenced the public perception.

To determine levels of exposure to the Olympic coverage, respondents were asked whether they watched any of the Opening Ceremonies of the Atlanta Olympic Games; they were also asked for how many days they watched some of the televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games of the 17 days of Olympic coverage on television, and for how many days they read information concerning the Olympic Games in newspapers of the 17 days of Olympic coverage in newspaper.

The hypothesis was tested in two ways. First, independent t-tests were used to see whether viewing the Opening Ceremonies of the 1996 Olympic Games affected the public perception of Chinese athletes, U.S. athletes, athletes from the Eastern Bloc countries and their performance. Second, pearson correlation coefficients were computed to examine if exposure to the television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games was correlated to the evaluation of the Chinese athletes, U.S. athletes, athletes from the Eastern Bloc countries and their performance.

RESULTS

This study attempted to test the relationship between exposure to TV coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games and the public perception of Chinese athletes, and their performance. The results failed to show that exposure to TV coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games was statistically significant to the public perception of Chinese athletes, and their performance. The extended cultivation hypothesis was not supported.

According to Table 1, among 395 respondents, 52.9% watched, while 47.9% didn't watch any of the Opening Ceremonies of the Atlanta Olympic Games, where some negative comments against Chinese athletes and athletes from other countries were presented.

Table 1 about here

Table 2 shows that the average time respondents spent watching the Atlanta Olympic Games amounted to 8 days; the public perception of Chinese athletes differed from each other most (.90 or .88), while the public perception of American athletes has reached more agreement (.56).

Table 2 about here

As Table 3 reveals, people's exposure to TV coverage of the Opening Ceremonies of the Atlanta Olympic Games (t-value of 3.68, $p<.001$) correlated significantly only with the public perception of American athletes' performance. People who watched the Opening Ceremonies of the 1996 Olympic Games are more likely to hold a more favorable evaluation of the American athletes than those who didn't. Although negative comments against athletes from different countries were made at the Opening Ceremonies of the Atlanta Olympic Games, viewing the Opening Ceremonies or not didn't affect significantly the public perception of either Chinese athletes or athletes from Eastern Bloc countries and their performance.

Table 3 about here

According to Table 4, people's exposure to the televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games didn't correlate significantly with their perception of Chinese athletes and their performance. The effect of exposure to the televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games on the public perception was again found significant only for the public perception of American athletes and their performance, but the correlations, like most of the cultivation research, were somewhat weak. The study shows that the more exposure people had to televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games, the less likely they believe that American athletes participating in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs ($r = -.12$, $p < .05$); the more exposure people had to televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games, the more likely they think American athletes performed well in the Atlanta Olympic Games ($r = .25$, $p < .001$). In addition, the public perception of American athletes' performance in the 1996 Olympic Games was found to be correlated with people's overall amount of TV viewing ($r = .12$, $p < .05$) regardless of what programs people watch. A further analysis shows that the public perception of American athletes is correlated with people's viewing of live sports or sports news on TV ($r = .112$, $p < .05$). People's exposure to newspaper coverage of the Olympic Games also affected significantly their perception of American athletes and their performance in the same way ($r = .11$, $p < .05$).

Table 4 about here

According to Table 4, factors which are correlated with the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance were the public perception of American athletes and athletes from Eastern Bloc countries. The results demonstrated that the more likely people believe that American athletes and athletes from other countries who participating in the Olympic Games were taking drugs, the more likely they believe that Chinese athletes were taking drugs ($r = .45$, $p < .001$; $r = .51$, $p < .001$, respectively); the more favorable people's evaluation of the performance of American athletes and athletes from other countries in the Atlanta Olympic Games is , the more favorable their evaluation of Chinese athletes' performance is ($r = .20$, $p < .001$; $r = .26$, $p < .001$, respectively).

In sum, this project fails to support the hypothesis that the more exposure people had to the televised coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games, the less favorable their evaluation of Chinese athletes and their performance. It reveals that television exposure to the 1996 Olympic Games, live sports or sports news on TV as well as TV exposure in general cultivated the public perception of American athletes and their performance, but not that of Chinese athletes and athletes from the Eastern Bloc Countries.

DISCUSSION

Many studies have been done to explore whether there is relationship between TV exposure and the public conception of social reality; if a relationship does exist, how does TV viewing affect it? What are the roles of specific programs and genres in cultivation? How does the exposure to specific programs affect social conception? This study is another attempt to test the basic cultivation hypothesis. Based on the survey conducted from late September to early October in a city of New York, results failed to show cultivation effect in the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance. Exposure to television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games was not found to be correlated significantly with the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance. However, the results did indicate cultivation effect in the public perception of American athletes and their performance. Television exposure to the 1996 Olympic

Games, live sports or sports news on TV as well as television exposure in general cultivated the public perception of American athletes and their performance, but not that of Chinese athletes and athletes from the Eastern Bloc Countries.

The long-term nature of cultivation effect might serve as a possible explanation. Television has been cultivating the public perception of American athletes and their performance, and the television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games just reinforced the cultivated perception.

The reason why this study couldn't establish the relationship between exposure to television coverage of the 1996 Olympic Games and the public perception of Chinese athletes and their performance may lie in many confounding factors. For example, compared with U.S. athletes, and athletes from some Eastern Bloc countries, especially Russian athletes, Chinese athletes were not of great interest to U.S. mass media. Meanwhile, Chinese athletes didn't receive as much media salience as their counterparts from the United States and the Eastern Bloc Countries did. In addition, the fact that American audience might not pay intense attention to television coverage of Chinese athletes may have interfered with the cultivation effects. Since athletes from the Eastern Bloc countries, especially the former Soviet Union, and East Germany had been perceived as major competitors of American team, they received not only a lot of media attention but also audience attention. People obtained large amount of information from television coverage, which might make them might project their perception of American athletes and athletes from Eastern Bloc countries on athletes from other countries, about whom they had less knowledge.

According to Table 4, we can see the correlations between the public perception of American athletes and that of athletes from Eastern Bloc countries are quite high ($r = .63, p < .001$; $r = .36, p < .001$), when compared with relationships between media exposure and public perception. People who believe that some U.S. athletes who participated in the 1996 Olympic Games were taking drugs are more likely to believe that some athletes from Eastern Bloc countries were taking drugs. The projection of perception of U.S. athletes upon athletes from other countries is also manifested in the survey results that baseball teams were considered by most respondents as being the teams which were most likely to get involved in drug-taking.

Some of the limitations of the study should be noted. First, the self-reported media exposure was adopted. Inaccurate self-reports are potential problems with all surveys and thus are unavoidable. In addition, the survey was conducted approximately two months after the 1996 Olympic Games concluded, when people's memory of the Olympic Games has faded, which might also increase the risk of obtaining inaccurate data concerning media exposure. Meanwhile, the protest advertisements of Chinese communities in the United States, which were published in the Washington Post and the New York Times after the Olympic Games, and news coverage of this event might have confounding influence on the public perception.

The reliability of this study is also limited by the sample size. Although the survey yielded 397 complete interviews, there existed a large number of missing values for the public perception variables. Except the question concerning American athletes' performance, valid answers to other perception questions only accounted for less than three fourths.

As Pott (1994) pointed out, previous cultivation studies only showed that TV exposure variables usually can only predict the variance in the cultivation estimates, beliefs and perceptions to a very limited extent, with Pearson correlation coefficients less than .30. Future research should explore better measurement for cultivation indicators as well as media exposure.

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Table 1 Percentage for media use variable during the Opening Ceremonies of the Atlanta Olympic Games

Variable	Percentage
Did you watch any of the Opening Ceremonies of the Atlanta Olympic Games?	
Yes	52.9
No	47.1
	100.00% (N = 395)

Table 2 Means and standard deviations for media use, and perception variables of athletes and their performance.

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviations	N
Of the 17 days of Olympic coverage on the television, how many days did you watch some of the televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games?*	7.72	5.88	396
Of the 17 days of Olympic coverage in newspapers, how many days did you read information concerning the Games in newspapers?*	6.02	6.69	395
Some Chinese athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs.**	3.10	.90	300
Some U.S. athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs.**	2.75	.84	301
Some athletes from Eastern European countries were taking drugs during the Atlanta Olympic Games.**	2.90	.76	286
How do you think the Chinese athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?***	3.77	.88	314
How do you think the U.S. athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?***	4.61	.56	363
How do you think athletes from the Eastern Bloc countries performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?***	3.95	.829	323

* Responses were coded from 0 to 17 days.

** Responses were coded: 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly disagree.

*** Responses were coded: 5 = very well, 4 = well, 3 = average, 2 = poor, 1 = very poorly.

Table 3 **Independent t-tests for public perception variables by media use.**

	Did you watch any of the Opening Ceremonies of Atlanta Olympic Games?				
Variables	Yes Means (&SD)	No Means (&SD)	t value	df	significance
Some Chinese athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs.*	3.12 (.97)	3.10 (.79)	.19	294.99	ns
How do you think the Chinese athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?**	3.77 (.90)	3.77 (.86)	-.01	311	ns
Some U.S. athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs.*	2.70 (.89)	2.81 (.77)	-.1.19	294.63	ns
How do you think the U.S. athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?**	4.71 (.52)	4.49 (.58)	3.68	323.28	p<.001
Some athletes from Eastern European countries were taking drugs during the Atlanta Olympic Games.*	2.91 (.75)	2.89 (.77)	.32	281	ns
How do you think athletes from the Eastern Bloc countries performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?**	3.95 (.88)	3.96 (.76)	-.13	320	ns

* Responses were coded: 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly disagree.

** Responses were coded: 5 = very well, 4 = well, 3 = average, 2 = poor, 1 = very poorly.

Table 4 Pearson correlation coefficients for media use, and public perception variables of athletes and their performances

Variables	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Of the 17 days of Olympic coverage on the television, how many days did you watch some of the televised coverage of the Atlanta Olympic Games?*	$.31^{c}$ (396)	.01 (298)	.02 (312)	$-.12^{a}$ (299)	$.25^{c}$ (361)	.02 (284)	.07 (321)
2. Of the 17days of Olympic coverage in newspapers, how many days did you read information concerning the Games in newspapers?*	–	-.01 (298)	.05 (311)	-.06 (298)	$.11^{a}$ (286)	-.03 (283)	.04 (320)
3. Some Chinese athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs.**		–	-.12 (259)	$.45^{c}$ (283)	-.12 (286)	$.51^{c}$ (269)	-.05 (262)
4. How do you think the Chinese athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?***			–	-.05 (260)	$.20^{c}$ (313)	-.02 (248)	$.26^{c}$ (297)
5. Some U.S. athletes who participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games were taking drugs.**				–	-.08 (289)	$.63^{c}$ (277)	$-.12^{a}$ (269)
6. How do you think the U.S. athletes performed in the Atlanta Olympic Games?***					–	-.08 (274)	$.36^{c}$ (322)
7. Some athletes from Eastern European countries were taking drugs during the Atlanta Olympic Games.**						–	-.05 (256)
8. How do you think athletes from the Eastern Bloc countries performed in the 1996 Olympic Games?***							–

$^{a}p < .05$, $^{b}p < .01$, $^{c}p < .001$

* Responses were coded from 0 to 17 days.

** Responses were coded: 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly disagree.

*** Responses were coded: 5 = very well, 4 = well, 3 = average, 2 = poor, 1 = very poorly.

SOLD AMERICAN:

THE INFLUENCE OF U.S. NEWS CONSULTANTS ON NEWSCASTS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

by

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Sold American:

The Influence of U.S. News Consultants on Newscasts in Great Britain and Germany

ABSTRACT

With little fanfare, American news consultants recently have made major inroads into the news media abroad. In the first examination of international news consulting, consulted newscasts in the UK and Germany were found to have most of the characteristics of consulted local TV newscasts in the United States. Further investigation revealed that U.S. consultants operate not just in these two countries but in at least eighteen others. Because issues in domestic TV news have transferred overseas, more study of international news consulting is indicated.

Sold American:

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News consultants are applied research firms that maintain exclusive relationships with many U.S. news media. They are hired by those media, often at very high fees, for guidance that can increase audiences and maximize profits. Although practically all local TV newsrooms, a growing number of newspapers and magazines, and larger organizations such as the Cable News Network are among their clients, news consultants work under a proprietary cover and reveal little in public about their role and function. Because of or despite a secrecy factor, news consultants have remained a subject of great curiosity among scholars concerned with news communication. Critics argue that the spread of research-consulting in the United States has fostered news content that panders to the audience (Jacobs, 1990, pp. 60-61; Gitlin, 1993). Adding fuel to the debate is sentiment that news consultants do not belong in newsrooms, that outside advisors who are not journalists can influence those who are (Barrett, 1975, pp. 89-112; Diamond, 1975, pp. 91-100; Powers, 1977, pp. 1-7).

Although news consulting has remained difficult to study empirically, scholars have an important new reason for redoubling such efforts: confirmed reports that the three largest U.S. consulting firms have been invited into numerous broadcast organizations overseas. Within five years of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Detroit-based McHugh & Hoffman had extended its reach into a half-dozen Eastern European countries and subsequently added still newer clients in Latin America. Following this, in 1993, the Dallas-based Audience Research & Development, the second-largest consultant, signed a lucrative long-term contract with the world's largest broadcast consortium, the Luxembourg-based CTL, which on nine networks beams news and entertainment programs to about 200 million people from Spain to the Czech Republic. In the meantime, Frank N. Magid Associates of Marion, Iowa, by 1994 had entire divisions based in London and Kuala Lumper, Malaysia, for service to clients in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Broadcast deregulation and private ownerships have propelled these expansions, which alone can help U.S. scholars better grasp the magnitude of global media privatization. Yet news consulting represents a wholly new phenomenon in international communication, as for the first time American advisors have actually penetrated foreign broadcast organizations and established themselves as an indigenous force. International consulting is meaningful not only because of its possible impact on foreign news. Because technically they export nothing and instead have a hands-on function that is physically based overseas, news consultants potentially complicate on-going discussions of American "cultural imperialism," which to date have stressed broad and sweeping U.S.-directed information "flows." Not widely considered is the significance of indigenously-prepared news, which news consultants are set up to affect.

The paper that follows is an exploratory study that sheds the first light on international news consulting and establishes parameters for further research. The major part of the paper consists of a content analysis of consulted and non-consulted newscasts in Great Britain and Germany, two countries at the cusp of privatization and the first to actively solicit American advising. From a methodology developed in the U.S. that isolates characteristic features of consulted newscasts, findings from both countries indicate that news consultants may influence foreign national newscasts much as they have influenced local newscasts in the U.S. The remainder of the paper maps the overseas movement of the three largest U.S. news consultancies, Magid, AR&D, and McHugh & Hoffman, and briefly describes some of the conditions under which these expansions have taken place. Interviews with representatives of the firms and their clients round out this final phase. Evidence that U.S. news consultants now operate inside at least 36 different foreign broadcast organizations in 20 countries, and that these facilities are located not just in Great Britain and Germany but in numerous less developed locales, affirms a need for further investigation. The Discussion argues that while many U.S. scholars have taken a lead in understanding important changes affecting the media abroad, those engaged in the study of TV news should not persist with a "fortress America" perspective. Matters in TV news long studied and debated in the U.S. have relevance now because they may operate all over the world.

Background

Magid and AR&D are the two largest of about seven U.S. news consulting firms that started in the 1960s and 1970s by selling research to local television stations before gradually expanding into other news media. Still catering mainly to local TV stations, Magid and AR&D together currently list about 250 domestic clients (Butler, 1988) and spearhead a $50 million news consulting industry (Dun and Bradstreet, 1990, pp. 95, 200). News consultants typically sign clients to three and five-year contracts for a combination of advising and research, the latter usually surveys that each cost around $50,000. The data lead to recommendations aimed at helping each client newsroom maximize its share of the audience and, thus, income. Importantly, news consultants do not limit their advising to the submission of written reports to management but rather maintain a physical presence inside their client newsrooms. They can counsel newsworkers during periodic seminars, clinics, critiquing sessions, and one-on-one interactions (Magid, 1996a). At their headquarters in the U.S., both Magid and AR&D operate talent schools, where selected newsworkers gather for specialized instruction (Bock, 1986, pp. 62-71). No client is obligated to follow the recommendations, although compliance usually occurs because of the high fees the recommendations and instruction command. While consultants cannot dictate specific news content, they urge adherence to general story topics, those demonstrated to be the most appealing, and they communicate these preferences to newsworkers through a newsroom's managerial chain of command (Berkowitz, 1994). Historically, news consultants have been in greatest demand where two or more news media vie for the same audience, as is characteristic of the U.S. system of television.

As late as 1983, this American system--with a multitude of commercially-supported networks and stations and only one public outlet (PBS)--was unique. With the exception of Italy, no other country then had more than three television channels. Because of tight governmental controls most had one-channel systems, and throughout the world government-supported public

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As late as 1983, this American system--with a multitude of commercially-supported networks and stations and only one public outlet (PBS)--was unique. With the exception of Italy, no other country then had more than three television channels. Because of tight governmental controls most had one-channel systems, and throughout the world government-supported public services were dominant. Broadcast privatization, which Caristi (1996) aptly has likened to the reallocation of a nation's resources, was a function of the multi-national spread of videocassettes and satellite-delivered services in the 1980s. Because foreign governments could not control the distribution of these new media, they were forced to reconsider policies that had constrained television and protected the public channels (Chavance, 1994; Rondinelli, 1994; Csaba, 1994; Heath, 1993). A turning point came in 1986, when the French government sold to private investors its dominant public network, TF1 (Porter, 1993, pp. 61-63). Two subsequent developments in Great Britain and Germany greatly expedited the current worldwide rush toward privatization.

In 1990, the British government as a means of generating badly-needed revenue opted to put up for competitive bid the sixteen licenses of its commercial Independent Television system. Although ITV already was private, a 1988 "White Paper" commissioned by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher removed virtually all previous restrictions. The Thatcher White Paper became a model statement on public-to-private broadcast conversions and its provisions have been emulated in many other countries (Home Office, 1988). In exchange for a large, one-time-only franchise fee, ITV licensees were promised unprecedented latitude for maximizing profits and for competing against Britain's two public TV networks, BBC1 and BBC2. Eleven of the twenty-four companies that applied for the ITV licenses in 1990 turned to the United States and hired Magid for research and consulting that could bolster their bids. At the conclusion of this franchise "auction," eight of the Magid-backed bidders were victorious. Among them was a venture called Carlton TV, which claimed the London license from Thames TV, previously the key ITV outlet (Davidson, 1992, pp. 221-240). At present, twelve of the sixteen ITV units, which broadcast regionally, are Magid clients.[1] In addition, starting in 1992 Magid has served a London-based entity called Independent Television News, a newsgathering consortium sponsored by the sixteen ITV companies. ITN is responsible for the news seen on the main national ITV network (Channel 3) as well as on a newer companion network called Channel 4. Integral to the fortunes of ITN is a commercialized national newscast in prime-time called "Channel 4 News," which was entered into indirect competition with "The Nine O'Clock News," the prime-time newscast on non-commercial BBC1.

The other harbinger of privatization was the rise of democracy and the institutionalization of market systems in the former Eastern bloc nations of Europe. Germany, where the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized this change, moved rapidly to deregulate what had been a two-channel public system in West Germany and a one-channel Communist-based system in East Germany. After reunification in 1990, the German government continued to respond both to business interests seeking expansion in the region as well as to the demands of citizens that more TV be available, the latter having been an impetus behind the democratic revolutions (Frederick, 1993, pp. 234-236). The creation and expansion of five new private networks began. The largest of these were RTL, owned by the Luxembourg-based CTL, and Sat 1, likewise financed mainly by non-German interests including Disney-ABC; both specialize in movies, sports, and entertainment. Another entrant was a movie-oriented network called Vox. The two other new ventures were RTL2, RTL's sister network, and a German-held network belonging to the Kirsch conglomerate called Pro 7. Because RTL2 and Pro 7 were the latest and smallest entrants in an increasingly crowded entertainment marketplace, both financed extensive commitments in news and placed national newscasts in head-to-head competition. In 1994, CTL hired AR&D for research and consulting that could give the RTL2 newscast, "Action News," an advantage over the competing newscast, "Nachrichten," on Pro 7.

Thus is Great Britain, the newscast on BBC1 competes in prime-time with the newscast on Channel 4, produced by ITN, the Magid client. Similarly in Germany, the Pro 7 newscast opposes the nightly news on RTL2, the AR&D client. Structurally, these four news programs have many similarities. The British and German newscasts all appear in prime-time (Channel 4 at 7 p.m., BBC1 at 9 p.m.; RTL2 and Pro 7 both at 8 p.m.), all contain roughly between fifteen minutes and a half-hour of news (Channel 4's within an hour-long news-and-interview format), and like network newscasts in the United States all work from identical national news agendas. Further, they have comparable resources and can reach the same number of potential viewers, nearly 100 percent in their respective countries. But while matched in terms of these structural factors, audience ratings as of mid 1995 suggested quite different internal priorities. In Great Britain, BBC1, with a 32 percent share of the audience, had three times the viewership of Channel 4, which drew about 10 percent (IP Groupe, p. 350). In Germany, where twice as many networks as the UK results in smaller shares, Pro 7 drew 9 percent of the audience and was far ahead of RTL2, which had 3 percent (IP Groupe, p. 121).

Because of confidentiality provisions, the exact role of the two consultants in Great Britain and Germany has remained unclear. Officially, Magid was enlisted by ITN as an advisor to programs appearing on Channel 3, not Channel 4, although a larger role was suggested in press reports linking Magid to format changes on numerous ITN productions. In the followup interviews, Magid representatives conceded a wide range of responsibilities and that their recommendations to the ITN newsroom were implemented by both British networks (Joe George, personal communication, July 17, 1996). Similarly, AR&D was hired by CTL-RTL for consulting at its broadcast center in Luxembourg. Followup conversations with AR&D representatives in the United States, however, confirmed ongoing travel itineraries between Dallas and Munich, the location of the RTL2 studios and newsroom (Elizabeth Anderson, personal communication, July 28, 1996; Ed Bewley, personal communication, July 2, 1996). Although the presence of the consultants in the ITN and RTL2 newsrooms was established, little more about their specific activities was disclosed. Yet because the Magid (Channel 4) and AR&D (RTL2) clients were underperforming in the ratings, they were likely candidates for strategies news consultants in similar situations are known to have advanced in the U.S. Although strategies vary, they have been shown to be uniform in at least one key respect: the handling of individual news stories. Moreover, consulted newscasts frequently have been identified by just four news story characteristics: length, mode of presentation, geographical orientation, and topic.

Consultants are known to favor short stories. Compressed news stories, which enable more items to be presented, result in faster-paced newscasts, pace, in turn, a presumed viewing attraction (Mayeux, 1991, pp. 358-361). Manipulating a story's mode of presentation is another means for achieving a more appealing pace. News on television, unlike worded stories in print, can assume one of several "formats." The simplest and most conventional formats are the "reader," in which a news anchor appears on the screen and merely reads out loud written information, and the "interview/soundbite," in which newsmakers appear and essentially serve the same "talking head" function. Consultants, however, reject "talking heads" and are known to favor additional formats because of their conduciveness to compressed content, visualization, and personality projection. The three most common consultant-backed formats are the "voice over," in which an anchor narrates a visualized video clip; the "package," in which an on-camera field reporter in a longer segment similarly narrates visuals; and the "live remote," in which a reporter appears live from the scene of a news event and converses with the anchor (Shook-Lattimore, 1992, pp. 160-162, 277-282; American University, 1979, pp. 21-23). Another presentation mode advocated by consultants is the "tease," not a news story per se but nonetheless a content component that previews upcoming items (Rickel, 1995, pp. 129-147).

Impacting more directly on actual news selection is the geographical orientation of news stories. Owing to their roots in local news media, consultants are known proponents of localism and strongly encourage news that is "close to home" (Jacobs, 1990, pp. 29, 58). Although internationally consultants are involved not in local but in national newscasts, there is nothing to indicate that a similar local philosophy would not prevail. Consulted newscasts in Great Britain and Germany would be expected to favor news from inside those two countries rather than from other European countries, elsewhere in the Eastern Hemisphere, and the rest of the world. Further, consulted newscasts should feature a preponderance of national news not strictly from the capitals and major cities such as London, Berlin, and Bonn, but from outlying regions where the majority of viewers reside.

Expectations for story topic, the most direct news selection criterion, should follow somewhat similar priorities. Consultants reject news that is remote and abstract to viewers and favor stories which are proximate, timely, interesting, and gut-level, and which most fit the description of "news you can use" (Berkowitz, 1994; Hardman, 1990). Topics exemplifying the former include government, politics, national business and the economy, education, distant wars, and disasters; these should receive diminished treatment on consulted newscasts. In contrast, topics consulted newscasts would be expected to stress include crime, personal economic matters, health, human interest, weather, and sports (Berkowitz, 1994; Peale-Harmon, 1991; O'Donnell, 1978). Crime news, which includes crimes against people, arsons, manhunts, prison escapes, and ongoing law enforcement investigations, is believed to evoke not just interest but personal attention because of concerns among viewers that they might be victims (Jim Willi, AR&D, personal communication, October 9, 1995). Personal economic matters, health, human interest, weather, and sports are explained in terms of their proximity to viewers and/or the capability for directly affecting a viewer's lifestyle. Further, these topics assume core viewership in middle and lower socio-economic strata, where the majority of regular TV viewers reside (Maier, 1986).

In addition to news stories, several other elements which can loosely be called "aesthetic" factors should further distinguish consulted newscasts. These would include male-female "co anchors," extensive use of electronically-generated graphics, intimate living room-like studio sets, specialty reporters, and the application of accompanying musical themes. Potentially a key discriminator is the regularity by which individual newscasters are seen. Non-American newscasts traditionally have employed rotating teams of "presenters," in which a different newscaster is seen each night. In contrast, consulted newscasts would be expected to have a fixed and regularly-appearing "anchor," as this time-honored American practice is deemed elemental toward fostering viewer response (Allen, 1995).

To test these expectations, the study established the following research questions:

RQ1: Relative to those with no consultants present, do consulted newscasts in Great Britain and Germany stress short stories and devote more time to modes of presentation that include voice overs, reporter "packages," live remotes, and teases?

RQ2: Do consulted newscasts devote relatively more time to national news subject matter, particularly that with a regional character, and less time to news from the rest of the world?

RQ3: Do consulted newscasts devote relatively more time to tangible and/or gut-level topics such as crime, unrest, weather, and health, and less time to more abstract or distant topics such as politics, government, and war?

RQ4: Do consulted newscasts, relatively speaking, feature a preponderance of aesthetic elements that might further suggest any influences the consultants may exert?

Methodology

To address the first three research questions, the study adapted a methodology introduced in 1978 by O'Donnell and advanced in 1991 by Peale and Harmon in projects that examined the effects of news consultants on local TV newsrooms in the United States (O'Donnell, 1978; Peale-Harmon, 1991). Stipulating that the most valid method for measuring consultant influences was by direct observation of consultants, these researchers conceded that because of proprietary restrictions that rendered observational opportunities impossible measurements could be facilitated indirectly by a content analysis of opposing newscasts--one in which news consultants were present, the other in which they were not. That this method presupposed the non-consulted newscast as a baseline was a justifiable assumption given much evidence in the United States that similar groups of newsworkers tend to "think alike" unless acted upon by an outside force (Robinson-Levy, 1986, pp. 211-219; Harmon, 1989). The current study was conducted in the U.S.; most of the analyzed material was acquired through satellite receivers at the AR&D consulting complex in Dallas, some through an associate in Europe who recorded and shipped off-air recordings. Two seven-day survey periods, one for each of the countries, were specified. Analyzed were the RTL2 and Pro 7 newscasts seen in Germany between September 28 and

October 5, 1995, and the BBC1 and Channel 4 newscasts televised in Great Britain between January 28 and February 3, 1996.

Only news stories and parts of the newscasts relating to the stories were coded. Commercials, promotional segments, musical interludes, and closing credits were excluded. Also excluded were long interview features of up to fifteen minutes in duration that appeared in Channel 4's hour-long newscast. Minus mainly the commercials, the two German newscasts carried about fifteen minutes of news nightly. Being non-commercial, each half-hour BBC1 newscast carried close to thirty minutes of news. Minus the commercials and the interview features, each Channel 4 newscast also contained about thirty minutes of news. The teases, a mode of presentation criterion, were broken down for inclusion in the geographic and topical analyses.

Story length was assessed with a procedure nearly identical to that of Peale-Harmon, who for reference reported each newscast's shortest and longest stories and then divided the total amount of examined airtime by the total number of stories. Compared was the result, a simple average story length for each of the four news organizations. Assessing mode of presentation was a similarly straightforward procedure of identifying readers, interview/soundbites, voice overs, packages, live remotes, and teases, and comparing the amounts of time devoted to each. The assessment of geographic orientation paralleled but necessarily diverted from the procedure of Peale-Harmon, who analyzed strictly local newscasts. While important was preserving a set of geographic categories that progressed from the most to the least proximate, national newscasts required different variables. Stories with the greatest proximity were placed in one of two "national" categories; "national/cities" were stories situated in the national capitals, while "national/regional" were stories situated in the interiors of the countries. "National/cities" was regarded as a non-consultant criterion in order to distinguish it from "national/regional," a highly likely consulted newscast characteristic. Remaining stories were categorized based on whether they were situated in other EC countries, elsewhere in Europe, elsewhere in the Eastern Hemisphere, or in the Western Hemisphere. Although a case could be made that because they are not proximate stories from the Western Hemisphere would not be recommended by consultants, it seemed likely that because the consultants are from the Western Hemisphere they would encourage stories from that part of the world. Because past literature gave no indication either way, Western Hemisphere stories were considered a consulted newscast trait. As had been true in the previous studies, a few stories had more than one geographic focal point. In such cases, a determination was made based on which geographic locale was treated for the greatest length of time in the item. Comparisons were based on time increments and reported as percentages.

The assessment of story topic closely followed the framework developed by Peale-Harmon, in which items were placed in one of eleven content categories. To reflect the national orientation of newscasts here, part of this framework was adapted. News about foreign wars was included in a category Peale-Harmon had called "disasters." An additional category called "unrest" was added; in it were placed stories about labor unrest, strikes, and protests, which, if they had appeared, probably were included in the "government" or the "national economy" categories in past studies. Because stories about unrest were proximate and gut-level, they were considered a consulted newscast trait. The final topical framework included the non-consulted topics of government, politics, national economy, disasters-wars, and education; and the consulted topics of crime, personal economy, health, human interest, sports, and weather. In cases where stories reflected content in more than one category, such as a report on health policy that involved the actions of government, a determination was made based on the overall thrust of the item. Stories on government were defined as those that focused on governmental procedures and reforms or dealt with policy debates covered extensively in a parliament, a council, or a similar venue.

To address the final research question on aesthetic elements, the study departed from quantitative analysis and relied on description. Taken into consideration in the viewing of the twenty-eight newscasts formally analyzed, and about sixteen additional newscasts adjacent to the survey periods that were not part of the formal analysis, were the noted non-content factors that had identified consulted newscasts in past studies. Simply put, the goal was to assess the extent any of the programs, particularly those of the consultants, discernably looked like local newscasts seen in the U.S. In addition to aesthetic devices, attention was given to whether the news organizations relied on rotating "presenters" or employed a fixed and regularly-appearing "anchor."

Results

The purpose of the content analysis was to determine if differences that may exist in the handling of news stories by consulted and non-consulted news organizations in Great Britain and Germany can be explained by the presence of news consultants. It was proposed that characteristics in news coverage that resembled patterns observed among consulted newscasts in the U.S. were indicative of the consultants' presence. Although expected results were not achieved in all cases, most of the findings indicated that U.S. news consultants do impact newscasts in the two countries.

Because of preceding evidence that consulted newscasts carry shorter news stories than their consulted counterparts, an analysis of story length was conducted. In both countries, results fit the expected patterns. As can be seen in Table 1, the Channel 4 newscast in Great Britain, consulted by Magid, had an average story length of one minute, one second; this compared to one minute, nineteen seconds on BBC1. Similarly in Germany, the AR&D-backed newscast on RTL2 limited stories to an average of 47 seconds, much shorter than the nearly one-minute time frame allowed by Pro 7. Contradicting this outcome were several very long items on Channel 4, including one of seven minutes in length that was more than twice the duration of BBC1's longest item. Still, both RTL2 and Channel 4 had the greatest number of items, and thus the shortest items, and this fit the pattern established in past research on consultants.

The analysis of mode of presentation, seen in Table 2, produced mixed results. Here it was proposed that consulted newscasts would carry more voice overs, reporter packages, and live remotes, while non-consulted newscasts would hold to readers and interview/soundbites, the so-called "talking heads." While Channel 4, as expected, had half as much reader material as BBC1

(7 percent to 16 percent), it nevertheless carried three times as much interview/soundbite content (14 percent to 3 percent). Moreover, the dominant format on both British newscasts was the package, a trait of consulted programs. Unexpectedly, almost three-fourths of BBC1 newscasts were comprised of packages, with only 55 percent of the Channel 4 content conveyed through this technique. While the preponderance of long interviews would tend to suggest minimal consultant influence at Channel 4, closer examination of Table 2 revealed that that network devoted 12 percent of its newscast to teases, far and away the largest proportion of any of the four analyzed newscasts and strong evidence of the consultants' presence. In Germany, the overall results were even more definitive. RTL2 devoted only 18 percent of its news to the two "talking head" formats, compared to 40 percent at Pro 7. Further, RTL2 carried three times as much voice over material and a larger proportion of packages (48 percent to 40 percent) than its non-consulted competitor.

The analysis of geographic orientation more clearly suggested the presence of consultants at RTL2 and Channel 4. As Table 3 shows, Channel 4 scheduled more "national/regional" and fewer London-based stories than BBC1. In addition, a marked proportion of Channel 4's news, 11 percent, emanated from the Western Hemisphere, a finding that might further indicate an American influence. In Germany, RTL2 devoted almost one-half of its content to national/regional developments and used only 17 percent of its airtime to report happenings in Berlin and Bonn. In contrast, Pro 7 directed only 23 percent of its coverage to the regions and devoted almost one-third of its airtime to events in the major cities. Like Channel 4, RTL2 gave not overwhelming but marked notice to news of the Western Hemisphere; stories from America outnumbered stories from the nearby EC countries by almost a two-to-one margin. Notable was the newscast of October 4, 1995, in which RTL opened with a series of reports from Los Angeles on the acquittal of former U.S. football star O.J. Simpson, who had been on trial for murder. Differently, Pro 7 carried only one short item on the Simpson verdict. While Western Hemisphere news was prominent, its proportion nevertheless was very small relative to national news of both types. That by a ratio of six to one national news exceeded Western Hemisphere news on all four networks would tend to question the prominence of American news "flow" into these two countries.

The analysis of story topic further pointed to the consultants' presence. In Great Britain, the non-consulted network excelled in non-consulted topics, and the consulted network excelled in consulted topics, in 8 of the 12 items. In Germany, this was true in 11 of the 12 items. A key item was government, a subject consultants are known to disfavor. As expected, only 6 percent of the Channel 4 newscast and only 7 percent of the RTL2 newscast was concerned with government; this compared to 16 percent at BBC1 and 26 percent at Pro 7. Unexpectedly, though, the consulted newscasts featured a relatively high proportion of political news (14 percent on Channel 4, 10 percent on RTL2), and they did not emphasize weather to the levels indicated in past research performed in the United States. Still, RTL2 devoted substantial proportions of its newscast to human interest (17 percent), crime (16 percent), and sports (11 percent), while one-third of Channel 4's news consisted of unrest, health, and human interest. While the proportion was small, Channel 4 and RTL2 were the only networks to have carried reports on personal economic matters. The prominence at Channel 4 and RTL2 of crime, unrest, health, and human interest, indicating at the consulted newsrooms a priority for proximate information and/or "news you can use," definitely fit the anticipated pattern.

The final research question relating to aesthetic elements called for a descriptive assessment of the four newscasts. As expected, differences in the styles and on-air "look" of the various programs were pronounced. Essentially, the non-consulted newscasts on BBC1 and Pro 7 maintained a conservative approach that in some ways resembled "The Newshour With Jim Lehrer" on PBS in the United States. In contrast, the newscasts on Channel 4 and RTL2 were laden with aesthetic elements and featured an approach that was more eye-catching, urgent, immediate, and personable. Attention was given to the regularity by which main newscasters appeared. As expected, both BBC1 and Pro 7 featured different newscasters and otherwise adhered to the European "presenter" system, although at BBC1 the assignment was rotated between just two figures, Michael Buerk and Peter Sissons. Also as expected, Channel 4 and

RTL2 had adopted fixed and regularly-appearing newscasters, an indication they had been swayed into adopting an American-style "anchor" system. A further indication of this was a male-female anchor arrangement, consisting of Jon Snow and two alternating young women, Zeinab Badawi and Dalgit Dhaliwal, on Channel 4. The RTL2 newscast was anchored by a figure named Nicola Sengelmann. Although all four newscasts demonstrated state-of-the-art technical sophistication, the consulted versions had a far greater number of electronic graphics, visual effects, and picture manipulations. Particularly visible were differences in the newscasts' studio settings. Viewers tuning to BBC1 saw before a panorama of dark blue a huge studio desk large enough to seat 10 newscasters, although only one appeared. In contrast, viewers to Channel 4 saw a more intimate setting, in which the anchors while not side-by-side were in close proximity. In terms of the aesthetic devices, the most conservative of the four newscasts was that of non-consulted Pro 7, which rarely showed the entire studio and stressed instead a head-and-shoulder view of the presenter, this seen virtually for the entire duration of the newscast. The boldest design was that of AR&D's RTL2, which had established a red, white, and blue color scheme, a background diorama containing a multi-colored map of the world, and a five-piece modular studio, lit from underneath, that permitted the main anchor to interact with other individuals. In its outward appearance, RTL2's "Action News" was indistinguishable from local newscasts in the United States.

Followup Investigation

The further explore factors that might have contributed to the results and to learn more about the overseas activities of the U.S. news consultants, interviews were conducted with representatives of Magid and AR&D as well as with McHugh & Hoffman, the third consultant although without a client examined in the content analysis. Additional input was obtained from employees of RTL, ITN, and other overseas news organizations that had hired consultants. While timely information came from RTL, the ITN contacts proved less fruitful as it was learned that just prior to the content analysis Magid's contract with ITN had lapsed and that ITN had chosen not to renew it. Although Magid continues to consult regionally for ITV, the parent of ITN, the loss of the national ITN contract enabled Magid to assume a small role within the BBC, an organization that at the time of the content analysis was non-consulted. Some implications from these newer developments in Great Britain are treated ahead.

A major objective of the followup investigation was mapping the extent of the consultants' overseas outreach. As near as could be determined, the three firms have contracts with 36 broadcast entities in 20 different countries. In addition to RTL in Germany, AR&D consults for RTL4 and RTL5 in The Netherlands, RTL-Lorraine in France, RTL-Luxembourg, RTL-TV1 in Belgium, and the Prime Network in Australia (AR&D, 1996). From its base in London, Magid consults for a regional unit of the BBC, the twelve regional ITV companies, Antenna 1 TV in Greece, Tel-Ad in Israel, TV2 in Norway, and MTV3 in Finland. Magid's Kuala Lumper office coordinates consulting for RCTI in Indonesia, BiTV in India, Mega TV and TV3 in Malaysia, and the Ten Network in Australia (Magid, 1996b, p. 9). McHugh & Hoffman consults for Tele Nova in the Czech Republic, 1A in Germany, Media Pro in Romania, Pro Plus in Solvenia, Gravis Television in the Ukraine, FR3 in France, TV Nova in Portugal, SBT in Brazil, and TeleOnce in Puerto Rico (John Bowen III, personal communication, April 15, 1996; McHugh & Hoffman, 1994). In early 1997, AR&D was negotiating a contract with Channel 5, a new British network expected to begin operations in March 1997 (Elizabeth Anderson, personal communication, July 28, 1996). Although Magid was the only firm with divisions based abroad, AR&D was planning an office in Paris and McHugh & Hoffman was considering offices in Berlin and Sao Paulo.

The consultants were quite open in vouching for the findings reported in the content analysis. They related ongoing contacts with newsworkers at their clients overseas; spoke broadly of recommendations for shorter stories and soundbites, visualized material, and proximate news coverage; and insisted these actions were supported by the research, mainly surveys and focus groups, they had performed in the respective countries. While conceding that many of the consulted programs do "look American," the consultants denied the exportation of a "magic formula" and maintained that newer provisions in overseas newscasting are those preferred not just by Americans but by indigenous audiences in foreign countries. As AR&D's Ed Bewley related, "We came to Europe because of our research experience. Prior to this there was no need for research because there was no competition . . . [But] once privatization hit, clients knew they had to have a channel of communication with their audience." According to Bewley, average viewers in Germany and other locales did not favor what they perceived as "stuffy, cold, [and] detached" newscasts (personal communication, June 10, 1996). More specific were the observations of Brent Magid, who speaking from London noted that at the time of his arrival in 1991 TV news in the UK had changed little in thirty years. "You saw an older man read news stories with few visuals or production effects," he stated. Rather than with "warmth and interest," program elements such as "segments [that] concluded with 'End of Part One,' 'End of Part Two,'" repelled viewers, according to Magid. "The first thing we did when we got here was to go out and ask the people whether they preferred newscasts that were livelier, more human, and gave you more of a reason to tune in." The affirmative responses coupled with steadily increasing news ratings, maintained Magid, "have started to alter the concept of TV news in every country we have entered" (personal communication, October 9, 1995).

Although the ratings gains at Great Britain's Channel 4 actually have been modest, Magid claimed considerable proprietary success after helping reformat ITN's evening national news and morning breakfast news on the main ITV network (Channel 3). Meanwhile, AR&D's German client, RTL2, recently has added appreciably to its share of the audience, which stood at only 3 percent in mid 1995, just prior to the content analysis. In mid 1996, RTL2 had an average audience of 5 percent, and a peak audience of 9 percent, and had narrowed the advantage of its non-consulted rival Pro 7, which still had a 9 percent share (Ratings and Programming: Germany, 1996). Yet it was further learned that the most dramatic ratings increases have occurred not in the UK or Germany but in developing countries where new private networks have entered into competition with long-established systems that previously were state-run TV monopolies. In

Greece, the network called Antenna 1, which as a startup venture hired Magid in 1991, currently draws one-third of the total audience and about one-half of the national news audience, while Greece's forty-year-old monopoly, ET, now struggles with about 10 percent (IP Groupe, 1995, p. 132). Perhaps most indicative has been the commercial success of McHugh & Hoffman and its client Tele Nova in the Czech Republic. Two years after its sign-on in 1994, Tele Nova commanded seventy percent of Czech viewers and had left the once-dominant state-supported CT network with slivers of the audience (IP Groupe, 1995, p. 70). One of the highest-rated programs on Tele Nova is a McHugh & Hoffman-consulted nightly newscast which features a male-female co-anchor arrangement, a team of specialty reporters, and a person-on-the-street news segment. "After the revolution," McHugh & Hoffman's Jacques de Suze related, "the Czech people were crying out for access to the media. The vox populi segment was the centerpiece of our recommendations at Tele Nova" (personal communication, May 4, 1996).

Yet unclear is the direction attitudes toward U.S. consultants may take. Of five overseas newsworkers contacted, none disparaged the consultants and all were positive in their remarks. "The Americans try very hard and they help us make the news stronger. They always have ideas and are easy to work with," commented Germany's Marion Gruntman (personal communication, December 19, 1995). Gruntman, who was employed by Germany's 1A system at the time of the interview, had had direct contact with both McHugh & Hoffman and AR&D. Another German newsworker who asked to remain anonymous felt the American input was "necessary" because "they are up to date." An ITN newsworker in Britain named Clive Jones concurred: "Consultants are helpful because when you are close to a project you sometimes can't see the wood for the trees. They often tell you things you already know, but they can help you confirm your own prejudices and instincts" (Miller, 1993). Vic Reuter, a former RTL radio reporter subsequently elevated into a managerial position in television, was particularly candid. Speaking from RTL headquarters in Luxembourg, Reuter noted RTL's restlessness with its ratings and an initial "mistrust [of consultants] by the news members" when the AR&D representatives first arrived. "We had never had any coaching, and we were not used to the role-playing" and the other AR&D exercises "they said would help us adapt to the people's needs," Reuter recalled. But because the consultants spent long hours working individually with staff members, "things got better." Reuter added that most of the discussions with newsworkers were keyed to research AR&D had performed. Further, once relations had stabilized, a sort of "halo effect" followed the consultants, this because they were Americans. "Everybody asked, 'Why did you go to the States [for assistance]?' Then the people realized, 'That's the country of TV,'" stated Reuter (personal communication, Jan. 31, 1997).

It was apparent, though, that those contacted were reacting to the newness of the relationships and to the special attention many of them currently had been receiving. As has been the case when American newsworkers have been queried, those overseas did sense but could not explicitly articulate the commercial imperatives that explained the consultants' presence. Nor did they blame consultants for the job dissatisfactions and stresses some did feel, another pattern that parallels findings in the United States. On the other hand, relative to their counterparts in the U.S., newsworkers abroad appear to have had fewer philosophical differences with consultants over news values. Recalling more restrictive systems that previously existed, which apparently caused journalists to assume a "pro-establishment" stance, some feel that consultants by pressing new news values actually have liberated the news process.

One instance in which this was not the case apparently came at the beginning of the Magid-ITN relationship in 1993. After succeeding with several recommendations, Magid representatives met resistance after urging ITN producers to reevaluate their heavy emphasis on government and politics. As Magid's Charles Munro recalled, "When we arrived everything they covered were the machinations of government. It was so extreme that we called their newscasts 'MPs parade.'" Magid's vehement recommendation that governmental coverage be balanced by other types of news was not finally implemented until ITN's upper management had intervened. Still, according to Munro, "We never saw a greater difference between the priorities of a news staff and those of the research respondents [than at ITN]. . . . We never said 'Don't cover Parliament.' We told them exactly what the respondents had told us: 'Cover it in a way that helps the viewer relate'" (personal communication, July 15, 1995). Although a budget shortfall served as the official explanation, these tensions described by Munro probably contributed to the severing of the Magid-ITN relationship.

Yet the underlying theme in all of these interviews was an expectation that international news consulting, while new, is permanent. As Reuter put it, "No TV in Europe can now be allowed to operate without news consultants." Moreover, at least for the foreseeable future, this expertise is certain to come mainly if not exclusively from the United States. Further, the three U.S. firms appear to be past the point at which their services are merely invited overseas, as all report the first concerted sales activities. A more aggressive sales posture should expedite further expansions, particularly given that new private TV services, such as Britain's Channel 5, are projected in virtually every foreign country. By all accounts, the consultants have acclimated to the fact that TV news abroad is not yet as extensive or as publicly accepted as that in the U.S.; the offering of not just news but financial, managerial, and technical advising is an important reason the consultants seem assured an expanding foreign clientele. Magid, in fact, anticipates that by 2010 one-half of all its business will be conducted overseas. Representatives of all three consultancies noted the fortuitous timing of these events, as Frank Magid, the founder of his firm, summed up: "Our foreign clients recognized that there was no television system more competitive than in the United States. We had been at the center of that competition for thirty-five years. So it was quite apparent that those in foreign countries would come to the United States, and to us, because we had the research expertise they had to have" (personal communication, July 10, 1995).

Discussion

Although its findings are preliminary, this study nevertheless provides the first measure of understanding into a new and meaningful phenomenon in international communication. In news, the prevailing model for assessing American influence is information "flow," in which at issue is material interpreted and generated in the U.S. that subsequently crosses international boundaries through large organizations such as Associated Press, Voice of America, and more recently CNN (Frederick, 1993, pp. 49-51, 127-131). There is no model for the situation treated here, in which American advisors cross the boundaries and establish presence inside foreign newsrooms. Propelled by privatization, American news consultants currently operate in 20 foreign countries and, as shown, have influenced news broadcasts in two. Granting that Great Britain and Germany resemble the United States, it is significant that U.S. consultants also have entered the less-developed countries where concerns about American influences have been most acute. While scholars outside the United States can benefit by insight into new factors that can influence the handling of their news, a greater challenge faces their counterparts here, who have tended to view the process of television as if the rest of the world did not exist. The time-honored emphasis on Associated Press, Voice of America, and CNN may in the end be meaningful because of a U.S. bias it exposes. In establishing a relationship between market factors and the rise of the consulting industry, past domestic studies have served an important purpose. Yet at a time when more and more foreign countries rush to adopt a U.S. system of TV, much will be missed if American scholars engaged in TV news research fail to internationalize their views.

An important outcome was affirming the validity of past U.S. methodologies in evaluating indigenous news broadcasts overseas. Studies of information "flow" have been deep in the analysis of potential channels of communication, comparatively shallow in bringing this down to the bottom line: what viewers in foreign countries actually watch. As in the U.S., foreign viewers are kept informed mainly by indigenous newscasts. Not only do these newscasts apparently have the same components as those in the U.S., and thus are easy for Americans to study. Researchers can proceed with increasingly assurance that limitations here can be overcome. Difficulties encountered in acquiring recordings of indigenous overseas programs, which resulted in a relatively small number of analyzed newscasts, will be alleviated by the continued expansion of satellite transmission. Of note in this regard has been the initiation of a U.S.-based enterprise called Satellite Communication for Learning (SCOLA), which collects and redistributes overseas newscasts by satellite in the U.S.[2] The study's major limitation, its indirect method for assessing the consultants without access to their research reports, written recommendations, and advising sessions, will remain the key obstacle. Still, the relatively high level of cooperation exhibited by the consultants, including in the acquisition of the newscasts, offers hope that the long-standing secrecy factor can be circumvented.

One question that beckons is whether the spread of news consulting is another manifestation of U.S. "cultural imperialism." This possibility emerged in several findings, notably by the decision of RTL to title its newscast "Action News," an American newscast name not even translated into German, the native language. Such examples are indicative of media imperialism as defined by Boyd-Barrett, who notes any "process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one county are . . . subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country without proportionate reciprocation" (1979, p. 117). Still, the broader pattern suggests that while American influences are in play something other than imperialism may be at work. American news consultants neither facilitate nor advocate the exportation of movies, entertainment series, or other entertainment fare but rather function on site, usually with the express purpose of helping foreign clients originate their own programming. Further, Magid, AR&D, and McHugh & Hoffman were invited into these foreign countries; as their priority is conquering competitors, not nations, they seem to display little that approaches an imperial impulse. It is possible that the infusion of U.S. programs and programming concepts, including those in news, no longer results from a type of imperialism but rather from a demand for such programming by overseas TV users who now have choice. Privatization, resulting for the first time in a multiplicity of TV services, may have unleashed this demand, with the culture and lifestyles of those overseas already more multi-national than many suspect. As a concern born in the pre-privatization era of the 1980s, the notion of cultural imperialism may require revision in order to meet the newer realities of the 1990s. Further studies should address whether American concepts are pushed into foreign countries, as many argue, or whether they are pulled there by viewers, as the new competitive TV environment allows, and as the enlistments of U.S. news consultants may indicate.

On a more microscopic level, much can be learned through more content analysis, particularly of consulted newscasts in the less-developed countries, as well as through attitude studies of overseas newsworkers. Unclear are the conditions and the extent to which foreign TV journalists welcome news consultants; evidence they unknowingly cleave to organizational and marketplace norms would square with findings reported in the U.S. (Berkowitz, 1994; Harmon, 1989; McManus, 1990), and this is meaningful. While consulted newsrooms should center such research, not to be overlooked are the indirect effects of consultants on non-consulted news operations. Examination of U.S. local newsrooms has suggested that because of competitive expectations non-consulted newsrooms often play "follow the leader" once a consulted newscast has been established (Frankola, 1990; Norris, 1987; Barrett, 1975, pp. 98-103). Great Britain was selected with this in mind. BBC1 was the world's first television network and remains known for what Britons call the "up market" quality of its news broadcasts. BBC newscasts examined here did keep with this serious, elite tradition, but not nearly to the degree as BBC newscasts televised just five years earlier. That the BBC has striven for a much greater popular appeal was underscored here by news stories that were not much longer than those of the consulted outlets, by its preponderance of visualized news content, and, notably, by a relatively small proportion of government stories. It once was not uncommon for BBC newscasts to carry nothing but governmental and political news. While here government did emerge as the dominant BBC story topic, only 16 percent of its content fit that category. It is possible that by pressing a more popular approach to news coverage in the ITV system, Magid could have swayed like priorities at the BBC. This is because despite continuing as a non-commercial public network the BBC no longer is sheltered from competition. Indeed, maintaining high ratings against challengers like

Channel 4 has become crucial to the BBC, currently under political pressure to justify its use of public money in a private and increasingly diversified marketplace (Wittstock, 1992). The opportunity to observe several non-news programs on the BBC, which included an on-location celebrity beach show hosted by a figure named Ruby Wax, a MTV-style rock music series called "Top of the Pops," and a prime-time soap opera called "EastEnders" that serves as Great Britain's No. 1 program, suggests that today's BBC bears little resemblance to the elite institution celebrated by authors in the past. The same changes undoubtedly expedited that contract between the BBC and Magid, previously an inexplicable development.

A final question simply is why techniques advanced by news consultants in the end do increase ratings. A principal technique is the selection of fixed and regularly-appearing news anchors, which at the urging of consultants cleared the way for TV news "stars" in the U.S. (Bock, 1986). Further evidence of a conversion from a European "presenter" system to an American-style "star" system warrants considerable attention in light of the rearranged priorities and escalating salaries that accompanied the latter in the United States. Scholars have tended to reduce ratings-building techniques to show business elements that detract from good journalism. It is possible, however, that such techniques have utility in the minds of average TV viewers, who may have no other reason to regularly tune to a nightly newscast because of the multitude of alternatives available. Given the certainly that news consulting and privatization will continue to expand, scholars should reconsider whether consultants anymore pervert journalism or whether some worthwhile purposes are served.

While their affairs remain difficult to pursue, this study has turned yet another set of findings suggesting that news consultants are situated close to if not at the center of the TV news universe. The study further suggests that a day may come when the term "universe" will have to be taken literally. News consulting no longer is an American thing. With consultants moving abroad it is important that scholars not be far behind.

Notes

[1] Magid's ITV clients include Carlton, London Weekend Television, Good Morning TV, Westcountry TV, Yorkshire TV, Central TV, Ulster TV, Tyne Tees TV, Grenada TV, HTV, Anglia TV, and Meridian TV.

[2] More information on SCOLA can be obtained by contacting Satellite Communications for Learning, P.O. Box 619, McClelland, Iowa 51548-0619, 712-566-2202.

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TABLE 1

Story Length of Non-Consulted and Consulted Newscasts

(by time)

	BBC1	**Channel 4**	**Pro 7**	**RTL2**
	NonConsultd	**Consulted**	**NonConsultd**	**Consulted**
Minimum	0:00:10	0:00:15	0:00:17	0:00:03
Maximum	0:03:43	0:07:18	0:02:37	0:02:15
Total Time	2:53:20	3:12:00	1:44:25	1:48:25
Items	137	198	106	138
Average Story Length	0:01:19	0:01:01	0:00:59	0:00:47

TABLE 2

Mode of Presentation of Non-Consulted and Consulted Newscasts

(by percent of airtime)

	BBC1 NONCONSULTD	**Channel 4** CONSULTED	**Pro 7** NONCONSULTD	**RTL2** CONSULTED
Non-Consulted Characteristics				
Reader-On Camera	16.2	7.0	15.2	14.4
Interview/Soundbite	3.2	13.8	26.1	3.2
Consulted Characteristics				
Voice Over	6.0	9.7	11.1	31.1
Package	72.8	55.1	40.8	48.1
Live Remote	0.0	2.2	5.5	1.2
Teases	1.8	12.2	1.3	2.0
TOTAL AIRTIME	2:53:20	3:12:00	1:44:25	1:48:25

British Newscasts
$X^2=23.48$
df=5
p<.001

German Newscasts
$X^2=30.88$
df=5
p<.001

TABLE 3

Geographic Orientation of Non-Consulted and Consulted Newscasts

(by percent of airtime)

	BBC1 NonConsultd	Channel 4 Consulted	Pro 7 NonConsultd	RTL2 Consulted
Non-Consulted Characteristics				
EC	16.7	5.3	10.8	9.2
Rest of Europe	3.0	8.8	13.8	8.6
Eastern Hemisphere	14.9	14.0	11.2	7.0
National/Cities	31.3	25.4	29.3	17.3
Consulted Characteristics				
National/Regional	27.6	35.8	23.2	43.2
Western Hemisphere	6.5	10.7	11.7	14.7
TOTAL AIRTIME	2:53:20	3:12:00	1:44:25	1:48:25

British Newscasts
$X^2=11.48$
df=5
p<.05

German Newscasts
$X^2=11.74$
df=5
p<.05

TABLE 4

Story Topic of Non-Consulted and Consulted Newscasts

(by percent of airtime)

	BBC1	**Channel 4**	**Pro 7**	**RTL2**
	NonConsultd	Consulted	NonConsultd	Consulted
Non-Consulted Characteristics				
Government	15.7	5.8	24.8	6.6
Politics	6.3	14.1	10.0	9.7
National Economy	14.2	10.3	4.9	0.0
Disasters-Wars	12.0	13.2	21.9	16.7
Education	3.2	2.1	1.0	0.0
Consulted Characteristics				
Crime	8.4	11.0	9.2	16.5
Unrest	10.3	16.4	6.0	6.1
Personal Economy	0.0	4.0	0.0	3.4
Health	7.1	8.4	2.5	3.3
Human Interest	7.0	7.7	5.1	16.7
Sports	6.9	3.4	2.7	10.9
Weather	6.1	3.0	10.3	7.3
Other	2.8	0.6	1.6	2.8
TOTAL AIRTIME	2:53:20	3:12:00	1:44:25	1:48:25

British Newscasts
$X^2=20.02$
df=12
$p<.001$

German Newscasts
$X^2=31.66$
df=12
$p<.001$

Through the Dragon's Eyes: News of the United States in the Press Releases of the New China News Agency

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Through the Dragon's Eyes: News of the United States in the Press Releases of the New China News Agency

Abstract

News coverage research was conducted to explore how the U.S. was portrayed in the press releases of the New China News Agency. Content analysis was used to examine content and presentation features of news items about the United States issued in the 1950s and 1980s. A comparison of time periods indicated a more positive and objective image of the United States in the latter period. Changing standards of professionalism were also indicated in content and presentation style differences.

Introduction

It has been said that what Americans do best is to know themselves and what they do worst is to know the rest of the world. What falls somewhere in between this continuum is the fair to poor understanding Americans have of the way the world understands America. Research indicates that in their consideration of international news, Americans are quite insular (Lent, 1977, p. 46). One particularly rich area of communication research that attempts to break through this insularity by revealing what we don't know about what we don't know is news coverage research.

News coverage research examines what is said in the press and as a basic research area, it undergirds many realms of communication inquiry. It informs the conceptualization of media-government relations (Siebert, et. al., 1963). It is the engine that drives the theory of news content (Shoemaker and Mayfield, 1987). It validates developing countries' claims of imbalanced flows of communication. It is a window to understanding the mind of the organization and society that produces news as well as providing the basis for evaluation of world opinion about a particular nation. (McNelly & Izcaray, 1986).

An overview of the literature of news coverage research indicates four basic areas that have been explored. Most extensive is the work examining how news is covered in the press of the United States. This may take the form of events (Hartgen, 1979, Shipman, 1983, Simon, 1983, Turnbull, Jr., 1957; Kobre, 1953, e.g.) topical areas (Buddenbaum, 1986, Thomas, 1984), images (Beikaoui, 1978, Tadayon, 1980, Pratt, 1980) or news of the world in general (Potters, 1987, Kaplan, 1979, Semmel, 1977) or by specific area (Mishra, 1979; Charles, Shore, & Todd, 1979; Hauser, 1938; Hachten & Beil, 1985; and Mujahid, 1970). Another way news coverage research has been explored has been by comparison of the U.S. and other areas' presses. This too has seen extensive amounts of coverage in the literature (Hachten, 1961; Markham, 1961; Kayser and Tannenbaum, 1962; Hart, 1966; Vilanilam, 1972; Rosengren, 1974; Hicks & Gordon, 1974; Sunderland & Schmitt, 1986; Ogan, 1987). A third way of organizing news coverage research is by considering non-U.S. press studies. This area examines the news content of the world's presses excluding the United States (Irbe, 1963; Lindley, 1967; Olsson, 1973; Stark, 1968; Warr & Knapper, 1965; and Garvner, 1962). Finally, there is news coverage research that looks at representations of the United States in the foreign press.

News coverage research of representations of the United States in the foreign press is by far the poor cousin in this family of research. Very little attention to this realm of research is found in recent literature. Over the past several decades, spurts of activity can be seen, especially after World War II, when the desire to understand the image of America abroad (especially in countries considered potential threats) stimulated investigations in this area (Dallin, 1947; Bassow, 1948; and Barghorn, 1954). However, interest has also motivated research to explore how the United States appears in the press of its neighbors (Wolfe, 1964; Merrill, 1962; and Montgomery, 1988) and friends (Budd, 1964; and Zaharopoulos, 1989).

The basis for all these studies is grounded on the idea that the image or news presentation created by a country's press about the United States has great influence in several ways. It influences those who consume that information, especially if they have no other contact with the U.S. or its people. It identifies the dimensions a country gives America: what is important, what is bad, what is to be learned from or about the United States. And finally, it has the potential to influence the relationship the United States can have with that country and its people. Therefore, understanding how the rest of the world sees the United States is an area of consideration long under-explored that has great practical potential for international and intercultural communication.

What has been evident in studies of how the rest of the world sees the United States? While studies differ due to what is evaluated, some generalizations can be made. News of the United States tends to take up a great proportion of the international news hole in the press of the world. One study described this by noting that the people of Australia have access to as much American news as people in the U.S. get about the whole world combined. (Budd, 1964, p. 55). Whether it is Latin America, or Europe or Russia, the U.S. grabs a great deal of attention around the world.

The kind of news that is reported is found to be consistently off-balance, skewed more to the official and less towards the ordinary. Typically, the type of news the world learns of the U.S. is about government and diplomatic efforts, business, sports and entertainment. What gets little coverage is religion, education, labor, arts and culture. Overall, what is missing is "news items about the domestic identity of the United States and its people" (Zaharopoulos, 1989, p. 191).

The reasons offered for this situation are varied. Some countries emphasize what the U.S. press itself emphasizes (Heindel, 1939, p. 322). Others have a political agenda that influences the selection of news (Dallin, 1947; Bassow, 1948; and Barghorn, 1954). Still others vary coverage as the climate towards the U.S. changes (Wolfe, 1964).

The news about the United States also varies in terms of favorability. Some places offer generally positive presentations of news (Budd, 1964, p. 55). Others are mixed, changing their representations as the pendulum of feelings towards the U.S. change (Wolfe, 1964). And there are even some that are favorable in the presentation of the news of United States for unfavorable purposes. Bassow (1948) noted news coverage of the U.S. in the old Soviet press was often mostly positive as the Americans cited were carefully chosen to show that average citizens upheld the same policies as the Soviet Union in stark contrast to their own misguided American government.

Much of the research examining how the world press sees the U.S. looks south to Mexico and South America or east to Europe and Russia. Lacking in this news coverage research is a consideration of how Asia considers the United States in its news representations. While there have been considerations of the U.S. in the news from this part of the world (Oliphant, 1964), the effort has not been systematic nor comparative. And more current investigations are needed to understand what exists since the radical changes of the past decade. Specifically, in this regard, given what news coverage research is able to contribute, it is important to consider China and how it represents the United States in the news. China is an increasingly important player in the international scene. Its relationship with the United States has fluctuated dramatically from estrangement in the 1950s to the rapprochement in the 1970s to a tense stand-off in the 1990s. Understanding how China has represented the United States over time would give insights to how this relationship was changing and in what way.

This research was conducted to understand how the United States was represented in the press releases of the New China News Agency, the official news agency of China. Specifically, the research questions asked in this regard were:

1. How has the United States been covered in the news transmitted by the New China News Agency? and,
2. How has that image changed over time?

Method

In order to understand how China's coverage of the U.S. changed over time, content analysis was used to examine the content and presentation of news about the United States in the decades of the 1950s and the 1980s. This was considered an appropriate method because it is effective as a means to "reflect cultural patterns of groups, institutions, or societies; reveal the focus of individual, group, institutional or societal attention; and describe trends in communication content" (Weber, 1990. p. 9).

In this research, the unit of analysis selected was the individual news item presented in the English press releases of the New China News Agency (NCNA). The NCNA releases the news each day through a wire service which operates 24 hours a day. The wire carrying foreign-language news for overseas clients delivers 60,000 to 100,000 words per day (combined) in English, French, Russian, Spanish and Arabic (Howkins, 1982, p. 172; Chang Won Ho, 1989, p. 68). The news item is the individual story carried in the press release each day. The number of these news items varies over time. In the early years of the People's Republic, the individual news items were fewer in number than in more recent years. A collection of the NCNA press releases in English from 1949 to the present is contained in the University Service Center at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Frequency was the unit of enumeration used to measure the content categories. News items were counted for the number of times that they contained elements in the each of the designated categories.

"No content analysis is better than its categories" (Budd, et al., 1964, p. 39). For this research effort, the categories were developed from other research along similar lines or as suggested from the literature. In order to understand the news China constructed about the United States, basic information about what was presented in the press releases of the NCNA over time was gathered. Categories that identified key characteristics defined in the literature were selected from previous research or were created from the literature to measure simply whether a concept was apparent in the press release.

The categories used in this research examined content and presentation features. All news was analyzed to determine content traits such as time orientation, positive/negative orientation, objectiveness, conflict-orientation, function, contextualization, dominant actor, story topic and the use of outside sources of information. Content categories were used to measure these factors to describe what China's news about the U.S. contained in these categories to understand how this image has changed over time.

The universe for this study was defined as all press release items dispatched in English for international distribution by the New China News Agency during the period from January 1, 1950 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1980 to December 31, 1989. Press releases from the first decade of the People's Republic of China as well as the decade of the 1980s were available with only a few days from the beginning of 1950 missing. These were secured from the headquarters of the New China News Agency in Beijing to complete the universe of days from which to sample. From the available material, a random sample of days was selected to examine the research questions

Given the bulk of the content in this research, 4% of the universe was selected as a manageable proportion which still provided an adequate sample size for the classification of this material. This represents approximately 15 days per year to be considered. According to research conducted by Stempel, as few as six days in a sample to represent a year was sufficient for legitimate generalization and "that increasing the sample sizes beyond twelve does not produce marked differences in the results" (Stempel, 1952, p. 333). This has been confirmed as valid in an Asian context as well (Ahmed, 1996). Fifteen was the number selected for each year despite Stempel's assertion that smaller numbers of randomly selected subjects were legitimate because as Kerlinger (1973, p. 128) notes, larger numbers allow randomness the opportunity to work.

Random sampling was employed to select the dates in which the news items transmitted by the agency would be analyzed. A random starting place was selected for each year and intervals of 25 were used until the sample size was achieved. As the skip interval was 25, a bias towards one day of the week was avoided.

This sample was selected to provide a means to explore the changes in content of China's press releases about the United States at the beginning of the country's existence as the People's Republic of China as compared with a more recent construction of news. Therefore, the first decade and the latest complete decade of its existence was considered for analysis. From the period of the 1950s, 5 days had no materials released and five days were missing from the universe. In the 1980s, 23 days had no news items released. The number of days without press releases issued is greater in this latter period than in the 1950s because no press releases were issued on Sundays until 1989.

Table 1: Sample

Time	# Days Sampled	# Days w/Releases	Total # Press Releases	Total # US News Items
1950-1959	150	140	5,602	297
1980-1989	146	123	15,480	702
Total	296	263	21,082	999

The data examined in this research represents part of a broader exploration of news presented from the NCNA since the 1950s. As Table 1 indicates a total of 21,082 items from both time periods were analysed. Press releases in which the United States was a primary component of the news story were isolated for examination in this research. For the 1950s, 297 news items transmitted by the New China News Agency contained the United States as an actor in the news. In the 1980s, the number of news items with this defined U.S. reference was 702 items. A total of 999 news items were evaluated to understand the news of the U.S. as put forward in the press releases of the NCNA.

In order to establish reliability of this study, intra-coder and intercoder reliability were evaluated. Each of the six coders was assigned to periodically recode earlier coded material to measure stability over time. In addition, more than one coder coded a small sample of the material in order to determine the reliability of different individuals coding the data. Holsti's intercoder reliability equation was used to determine the level of agreement in both cases. The average coefficient of reliability for the news content area among the six coders was .84. Though six coders were used to code data, a majority of the work was completed by one coder over a period of time. In order to maintain reliability with the consistency required for this research to be meaningful, intracoder reliability was measured on the coder over time. The average coefficient of intracoder reliability for the news content area was .92. As both the intercoder and intracoder reliability rates met a level of .80, the material gathered was considered appropriate for analysis.

Before coding was initiated, however, the method of analysis was presented to a panel of communication research experts who considered the scope and application and provided feedback on potential problems and areas needing modification. Major portions of the category section of this research were adapted from previous research efforts measuring the same basic concepts, thus indicating potentially highly valid means of measurement. The content categories were adopted from earlier research in other news content studies and either taken from or adapted to Chinese mass media research as well. Content categories included time orientation of the news, positive/negative emphasis, objective/subjective emphasis, conflict/harmony emphasis, function, context, topic, dominant actor, and use of outside sources of information. A complete list of these categories is included in the appendix to this research.

After the material was gathered by the coders, a database was created. The data were cleaned and the database was transferred to a VAX system where SPSS-X was used for analysis. Frequency analysis was used for descriptive information while chi square analysis was used to check for significant differences by periods of the variables.

Findings

This section will consider each period under examination in this research to understand how the United States was portrayed in the international press releases of the New China News Agency. Following this, significant differences between these time periods on the basis of these characteristics will be considered.

The NCNA's United States News in the 1950s

From the sample of the 1950s, there were 297 news items about the United States. Out of the 5,602 press releases sampled from this period, this represents 5.3% of the total. Clearly U.S. news was not swamping the NCNA's overall delivery of information. News items reported events concerning the United States with varying degrees of currency. Very few (5%) items contained news from the previous day, though almost a third of all news items related to events that had transpired two days before. Almost another 20% of items carried news that had happened three days before. About 13% of all news transmitted about the U.S. during the 1950s had a time lag of a week or more. In some extreme cases, news that had transpired more than a year was presented in the press releases.

The orientation of the news items were examined to see where the eyes of the New China News Agency were focused. In this regard, when China considered the United States, it was most often in the here and now, with 91% of all news items being about current events. Six percent of news items about the US were about the past while the remainder were about future events.

Of the 1950's news items, 83.5% were negative, 9.8% were positive and the remainder were judged to be neither negative or positive. This is not surprising in that during this time period, the United States was the enemy, the threat to the spread of international communism. It was during this time period that China backed its ally, North Korea in fighting the U.S. supported South Korean forces. Many of the press releases were extremely antagonistic during this time especially, vehemently using words as a weapon against the capitalist threat.

News in this research was also evaluated for objectivity. Objectivity was considered balanced, fair, and neutral reporting while subjectivity was defined as taking a definite position or point of view in the recording of the events. The Chinese philosophy of news at this during this time period was from the Soviet school of journalism and therefore used news to put forward correct interpretations of events, most often in heavy-handed ways that left no doubt about the value judgement being made in the news item. This approach to the news can clearly be seen in the fact that 84.2% of all news items transmitted during the decade of the 1950s about the United States had a strong subjective basis. Only a little more than 15% were objective in nature. That there were this many is interesting given the tenor of the times.

An important distinction between East and West orientations evident in the literature is the area of harmony vs. conflict. Western news philosophy defines news as emphasizing the quality of crisis and conflict (Bennett, 1988, p. 23). On the other hand, a strong emphasis in the Chinese culture has always been the need for harmony. In this research, harmony was defined as the priority of order in society, propriety or proper behavior in context, consensus and compromise, tolerance, conservatism in the world view. Conflict was characterized by competitiveness, intolerance, chaos, action, unpredictability, oddity, controversy, emotion and unexpectedness. Therefore, this dimension was considered in the news about the U.S. during this period. As might be expected, the majority of news items about the U.S. were found to hold the conflict characteristic. This was the case in just over 80% of all cases. Harmony was only found in a little more than 5% of U.S. press releases. The remainder of items didn't have either quality.

What function was served by the news items transmitted about the United States by China during the 1950s? A modified version of Wright's functional model (1986, pp. 15-17) was used to explore this. Added to Wright's four basic functional categories were ideological correlation, propaganda, and mobilization. These additions were found to be relevant in the literature on China. The results in this regard indicate that the greatest percentage by function of news items were for the purpose of propaganda. Indeed, 70.7% of all items were evaluated to serve this function. A further examination of the nature of this propaganda shows that in 93% of all cases when the function was for propaganda, the content was negative. Almost 16% of all items about the U.S. from this period were for information purposes. Wright defined a function of mass communication as correlation, an explanatory purpose whereby the meaning of the content was transmitted to the audience. This function was modified in this research to consider two different types of explanatory communication. One type was instructional communication where the audience was being educated about some aspect of life. The other was an ideological explanation in which the news story was more of a political parable than an item of news. The former, instructional correlation, was found in only 3% of all the stories about the U.S. during this time period. This makes sense because good instruction could not be learned from a United States which was so intent on destroying the very ideals for which China stood. The latter type, labelled ideological correlation represented slightly more, about 7% of all U.S. news items.

Wright (1986, p. 17) also noted that communication could serve the function of transmitting cultural ideas to the audience. In this regard, items were evaluated to determine if cultural concepts were being presented in the items about the United States. The findings here indicate that this was rarely the case.

A constant criticism of the Western press is the presentation of news as isolated incidents. With this in mind, news about the United States was evaluated to see if a context for the news was presented or if the New China News Agency likewise presented event-oriented presentations of the U.S. What was found in this regard was the fact that in slightly more cases (57.2% of all U.S. news stories), news about the U.S. was presented without the context of an ongoing news story. A context was supplied in 43% of all news items oriented towards the U.S.

A question that was considered in the examination of the way the U.S. was presented in China's press releases concerned the topic of news. Foreign relations between China and the U.S. was the topic most frequently found when considering the U.S.. This accounted for 37.7% of all news items. Close to this in frequency was news about military matters, defense and war. This topic was one that was found in a little more than a third of all items, logical given the Korean War situation previously noted.

Much of the rest of the news items were scattered over a limited range of topical areas in relative low percentages. However, noteworthy are two areas that stand out here. One is the topical area of commentary. This is a news area that sought to present information but in a highly editorial manner. Given the right political justification, one item could occupy many pages. Commentary news items accounted for a little more than 8% of all items about the U.S. The other interesting topical area to note was the presentation of economics and financial news of the United States. These items represented about 5% of all news about the U.S. during this time period, a seemingly low figure given the economic strength of the U.S. at a time period when the rest of the world was rebuilding after the impact of the Second World War.

The actor that dominated U.S. news from China was most often the U.S. government. Forty-four percent of all U.S. oriented news items were geared towards this actor in the news. U.S. individuals were found to be the focus of the news in about one-fifth of all items during this time period. Overall, the actor that dominates the Chinese representations of the U.S. during this time period was likely a collectivistic one. China did not follow the style of the West and personify the U.S. in the form of an individual like the President.

One final question was considered when evaluating China's news about the US during this time period and that was where the news came from that was presented in the press release. The source of the information was considered to determine if an outside source of information was used for the data on which the article was based. The result of this part of the analysis indicated that sources other than the New China News Agency itself were used to write articles about the United States in 56.2% of all cases. These sources represented other communist news agencies (notably TASS) but also news from Western news agencies that was restructured to fit the profile of the dominant line at that particular time.

The NCNA's United States News in the 1980s

In the 1980s, the New China News Agency transmitted far more news items than it had in the decade of the 1950s and the number of items about the United States increased as well. A total of 702 news items that had the United States as a part of the news were found in the sample from this period. Yet out of the 15,480 press releases sampled from this period, this represents 4.5% of the total, a figure slightly less than was found for the period of the 1950s. The currency of these stories was such that 76.7% of all these press releases were transmitted within three days after the news event. Only about 2% of the items about the U.S. were published 4 days or more after the event.

In considering for this period the time orientation that was given U.S. news items, news was evaluated to see if the NCNA was looking at the past, present or future. The findings indicate that as before, the majority of news items (83%) were concerned with the present, very few (10%) with the past and even fewer (7%) with the future. China seemed to be keeping an eye fixed on where the U.S. was at this point in time rather than remember or speculate.

In the 1980s news about the U.S. in China's official news agency was more balanced in terms of positive/negative orientation. Indeed, the greatest frequency of news about the U.S. during this time period was positive, with 46.6% of all U.S. news categorized in this orientation. Only a little more than a third of all U.S. news items were negative. The remainder were not found to fall into either of these orientations. This is interesting because even news in the United States about the United States by the very definition of news is highly negative in orientation.

News items reporting the U.S. in the 1980s were also surprisingly objective in their coverage. Eighty-five percent of all U.S. stories covering the United States were considered objective while only 15% were considered to have a definite subjective orientation. This finding is important because it marks a dramatic change in emphasis and philosophy. A Marxist philosophy of the press has, as one of its basic tenets, the concept that the press should put forward correct views. Therefore subjectivity is a given. That objectivity rates so high in this regard is a very interesting change.

Since the New China News Agency not only offers an alternative voice to Western news, but one in which the cultural concepts of the Chinese heritage might enter in as well, it was considered important for this research to look at the orientation towards harmony or conflict. The findings indicate that most news stories about the U.S. did not stress either of these orientations. Slightly less than half of all items about the U.S. were found to emphasize neither conflict or harmony. When these orientations did manifest themselves in news about the U.S., conflict orientations were found in 30% of the items while harmony was found 22% of the time

What was the purpose in reporting the news of the United States in this period? An examination of the press releases of America by function of the item revealed that in slightly more than three-quarters of the news about the U.S. there was a straight informative function evident. Teaching information was found in 7.7% of all items and transmission of values was found in 6.6% of all items. It appears that the purpose of news in the 1980s had become one in which information was important and practical lessons could be learned from it. These values were such that they taught what not to do from the U.S. example as well as what to do.

Noteworthy is the low percentage of news with the function of propaganda. In the 1980s, less than 5% of all items about the U.S. were used to push forward propaganda goals as the major purpose of the news item. And the same is seen for ideological teaching which was found as the function for only 1.1% of all U.S. news items. This is not to say that the New China News Agency was completely devoid of using news for putting forward its positions on world events as it had in the past. This still continued, but in less obvious ways. What can be seen in this finding is that the blatant use of U.S. news as examples indicating what was wrong, in contrast with the good of the Chinese Communist system, was not as apparent.

The topics of news China considered when it reported the U.S. in the 1980s exhibited an interesting set of results. Diplomacy was the category in which the majority of news about the United States was found and this represented 30% of all news items. Military and defense orientations to the news was the second category, and represented 16% of all stories about the U.S. The interesting part of these findings is the size of the percentage. Both of these areas represent a lower percentage of coverage than was apparent in the past.

The NCNA was broadening its news orientation when it looked at the U.S. in the 1980s. It was interested in the economics and finance of America as it focused on this in 15% of it's U.S. news items. Attention was also given to U.S. science (8.1% of all news items), politics (6.4% of all news items), sports (4.7% of all news items), and crime and legal matters (4.6% of all news items). On the other hand, commentaries and ideological topics were found in very small percentages of news items. This indicates that officially, the United States was taking on dimensions in the Chinese ways of representation through news that belied the old simplistic portrayals.

In terms of the actor that was represented in China's news of the U.S., the government was still the major figure seen in the news. In 43.2% of all U.S. news items, the government was the primary figure reported. However, individuals get a sizeable amount of attention in the news of America in this period which is an interesting development. Individuals were found to be the primary actor in 23% of all items relating to the United States in New China News Agency press releases during this period. Organizations were also frequently found as the dominant actor in U.S. news items occurring in 19% of all items analysed. Possibly this represents the developing economic ties that were initiated to a large extent during the Open Door policies initiated by Deng Xiao-ping in this decade. Actors that accounted for small percentages of news items included the Communist Party, families, and the military.

Finally, in reporting about the United States, a consideration of the source of the news was examined. Did the New China News Agency gather its own news or did it take news about the U.S. from other sources and rework it? In the majority of cases (68.7%), no outside sources of information were cited in the news items about the U.S. Only in a little less than a third of all cases was an outside source of information cited. This indicates that a greater reliance on information gathered by the New China News Agency itself from which to present the image of the United States.

Significant Differences Between Periods

How then does China differ in its news presentation of the United States from the period of the 1950s to the period of the 1980s? Across all the variables examined in this study, a statistically significant difference was found to exist between time periods in the representations of U. S. news. Each of these will be considered in its own right to determine what the difference was and what that difference says about communication of the U.S. from the Chinese point of view.

A significant difference was found between the time periods under investigation in this research on the basis of time orientation of the news item about the U.S. (x^2=10.31, p<.01). Table 2 shows the distribution of news items about the U.S. according to the primary orientation of the news. The difference between the 1950s and the 1980s is seen in the fact that while the overwhelming majority of news about the U.S. in the 1950s was about current events (91% of all news in this time period), in the 1980s slightly less was current news (down to 82.8% of all news), and more emphasis placed on future events. Emphasis on past events likewise increased in the 1980s when compared to the 50s but only to a slight degree. Yet while there is a statistical difference here, the basic pattern remains the same for both periods. Both the 1950s and the 1980s have most of the news dealing with current events much less on past events and very little on future events.

Table 2: Time Periods By Past Present Future Orientation

```
                     |past     current    future    other     Row
                     |        |         |         |         | Total
Period       --------+--------+---------+---------+---------+
                     |    18  |   269   |     9   |     1   |   297
  Fifties            |        |         |         |         |   29.7
                     +--------+---------+---------+---------+
                     |    70  |   581   |    46   |     5   |   702
  Eighties           |        |         |         |         |   70.3
                     +--------+---------+---------+---------+
             Column       88      850        55         6        999
              Total      8.8     85.1       5.5        .6      100.0
```

There is also a striking difference by period in the news of the United States reported by the New China News Agency on the variable of positive/negative presentation of news ($x^2=188.69$, $p<.001$). What is apparent in Table 3 is a dramatic change in orientation from highly negative news in the 1950s, where 83.5% of all U.S. news was negative, to the 1980s where the proportion of negative news was 36.2% of all news items. Positive news increased from just 9.8% of all 1950s U.S. news items to 46.6% of all 1980s news items. Overall, the presentation of the United States became less negative as China moved into the 1980s, a logical change given the transition of diplomatic relations that had taken place in the 1970s.

Table 3: Positive/Negative Orientation by Time Periods

```
                     | Fifties Eighties  Row
                     |        |        | Total
Orientation----------+--------+--------+
                     |    20  |   121  |   141
  Not applicable     |        |        |   14.2
                     +--------+--------+
                     |    29  |   327  |   356
  Positive           |        |        |   35.6
                     +--------+--------+
                     |   248  |   254  |   502
  Negative           |        |        |   50.3
                     +--------+--------+
            Column       297      702      999
             Total      29.7     70.3    100.0
```

Table 4 indicates another area where there was a significant difference between the two time periods considered in this research: objective/subjective dimensions of the news ($x^2=434.15$, $p<.001$). And the difference here is a stunning one. In considering whether the news about the United States contained bias or a definite point of view rather than being substantially a statement of facts, the situation in the 1980s is the exact reverse of the situation in the 1950s. In the earlier decade, a little more than 15% of all stories about the United States were objective. Most carried a point of view. But in the 1980s, only 15% of stories about the United States were subjective. This finding reflects a dramatic change in the way China was reporting news about the U.S. to the rest of the world. It must be remembered that this finding considers the individual news item on this measure. Other factors of subjectivity, such as the selection of the news topic or its positioning, were not considered. Yet despite the fact that other levels of subjectivity may have been at work, this result indicates that reporting from China had undergone incredible changes over thirty years.

Table 4: Time Periods By Objective/Subjective Orientation

```
                  |Objective Subjective  Row
                  |        |        |  Total
Periods   --------+--------+--------+
                  |     47 |    250 |    297
  Fifties         |        |        |   29.7
                  +--------+--------+
                  |    596 |    106 |    702
  Eighties        |        |        |   70.3
                  +--------+--------+
          Column      643      356       999
           Total     64.4     35.6     100.0
```

News items about the United States transmitted by the New China News Agency were also evaluated on the basis of conflict/harmony orientation. Again, chi square analysis revealed a significant difference between time periods on the basis of this orientation (x^2=226.73, p<.001). Table 5 illustrates this difference by showing a decrease in the proportion of conflict-oriented news about the United States (from 81.5% of all news in the 1950s to only 29.6% of all news in the 1980s). The proportion of news where there was neither a harmony or conflict orientation rose over the two time periods from 13.1% of all news in the 50s to 48.2% of all news in the 80s. The harmony-orientation in U.S. news also increased from only 5.4% in the 50s to 22.2% in the 80s. The period of the 1980s shows a great change on this measure. China was less likely in this later period to focus on conflict and drama in the U.S. news items whereas in the earlier period this had been the rule.

Table 5: Time Periods By Conflict/Harmony Orientation

```
                  |conflict    n/a     harmony   Row
                  |        |        |        |  Total
Periods   --------+--------+--------+--------+
                  |    242 |     39 |     16 |    297
Fifties           |        |        |        |   29.7
                  +--------+--------+--------+
                  |    208 |    338 |    156 |    702
Eighties          |        |        |        |   70.3
                  +--------+--------+--------+
          Column      450      377      172       999
           Total     45.0     37.7     17.2     100.0
```

A dramatic difference between the period of the 50s and the period of the 80s is seen in the function of the news about the United States by period. The change is one from a dominant propaganda orientation to one of surveillance. This is seen in Table 6 in the fact that in the 1950s, propaganda was found as the primary function for the presentation of news about the United States while in the 1980s this category only accounted for about 5% of all news items for the period. On the other hand, presenting straight information about the United States as the purpose of the news items changed from 15.4% of the total in the 50s to 77.5% of the total U.S. news stories in the 80s. This is a dramatic turnabout and once again is revealing about the state of journalism as it was developing in the 1980s as well as the change in China's perception of the U.S.

Other changes are worth noting regarding function. Using news about the United States to teach the audience changed from the 50s to the 80s. In this regard, practical teaching increased in terms of the proportion of the total while instruction about ideology decreased. Transmission of cultural ideas also increased in the presentation of U.S. news items. Finally, news with an entertainment function appears, though ever so slightly, as a function U.S. news is found to play. Evident in these findings is a switch from news as a weapon of propaganda to news as an informing agent. Also, a variety of dimensions of purpose were found in contrast to the old dominant goal of changing the way the world saw the United States in the 1950s.

Table 6: Function of News by Time Periods

Function	Fifties	Eighties	Row Total
Surveillance	46	544	590 59.1
Instructional Correlation	8	54	62 6.2
Ideological Correlation	20	8	28 2.8
Transmission	10	46	56 5.6
Entertainment		12	12 1.2
Other	1	2	3 .3
Propaganda	210	34	244 24.4
Mobilization	2	2	4 .4
Column Total	297 29.7	702 70.3	999 100.0

In considering if a context was presented in the representation of news concerning the United States, once again a significant difference was seen between the period of the 1950s and the 1980s ($x^2=10.52$, $p<.01$). Table 7 shows how news items from these two time periods differed on this measure. In the 1950s, more context was provided on news items about the United States. Forty-two percent of all news items about the U.S. in the 50s were set in background information. In the 1980s, this had dropped to 31.8% of all news items. This may indicate a slight shift to a style of reporting that is similar to Western press orientations, of presenting news as episodes rather than part of an ongoing process. As such, it is revealing about the changes in that took place in journalism in China over this 30 year period.

Table 7: Time Periods By Context Orientation

Periods	no context	context	n/a	Row Total
Fifties	170	126	1	297 29.7
Eighties	475	223	4	702 70.3
Column Total	645 64.6	349 34.9	5 .5	999 100.0

By topic, differences were found between the 50s and the 80s in the content of U.S. news stories. The differences between the two times periods is seen in Table 8. Fewer different news topics areas are found about the U.S. in the period of the 1950s. Indeed, stories about government and foreign relations account for almost three quarters of all the news items in this time period. In contrast, these two categories still account for a sizeable chunk of the news about the U.S. in the 80s (46% of all items in this time period) but much less so than previously. The proportion of news items about economics tripled from 5.1% of all news about the U.S. in the 1950s to 15% of all news about the U.S. in the 1980s. News about the sciences increased as well from less than 1% of all 1950s U.S. news to 8.1% of all 1980s U.S. news.

Some topical areas that had received little attention in the 1950s, were found to get much more attention in the 1980s. Examples of these included news about the arts, the judicial system and the domestic government of the U.S. And there were some areas that had not been considered newsworthy about the U.S. in the 50s that were deemed relevant in the 80s. These included agriculture, education, environment, construction, telecommunications, human interest and especially sports. Topical areas that decreased in proportion over time were items about labor, religion, memorials, commentaries, and communism.

Table 8: Topics by Time Periods

TOPIC	Fifties	Eighties	Row Total
military	103	113	216 21.6
foreign relations	112	210	322 32.2
population	1	2	3 .3
domestic govt	11	45	56 5.6
labor	6	6	12 1.2
economics	15	105	120 12.0
agriculture		5	5 .5
science, medicine	2	57	59 5.9
education		11	11 1.1
industrial	2	6	8 .8
disasters	1	8	9 .9
judicial, legal	6	32	38 3.8
environment		6	6 .6
construction		5	5 .5
telecommunication		6	6 .6
sports		33	33 3.3
arts	2	15	17 1.7
religion	1	1	2 .2
ideology		1	1 .1
communism	2		2 .2
social		13	13 1.3
sports scores		7	7 .7
commentary	25	8	33 3.3
memorials	2	1	3 .3
other	6	6	12 1.2
Column Total	297 29.7	702 70.3	999 100.0

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What is important to see here is the fact that a broader view of the United States is appearing in the 1980s than was evident in the 1950s. More areas of life that define what America was like were entering the news presentations.

As this research considered a collectivist culture reporting news about an individualistic culture, it was important to determine how this manifested itself. Therefore, another form of measurement found useful for this research was consideration of the dominant actor in the news about the United States by China. A significant difference between the 1950s and the 1980s was found on this variable (x^2=74.46, p<.001). Table 9 illuminates the differences that occurred on this variable across time. What can be seen is that while government remained the dominant actor in the news of the U.S. in both periods with around 43% of all news items in each period, changes took place with the inclusion of other types of actors. Individuals, nature and society as dominant actors increased slightly in the proportion of all news items in the 1980s but organizations increased a great deal, from 11.9% of all items in the 1950s to 19.2% of all items in the 1980s. Once again, the 1980s represents a period with more diversity in the presentation of news about the United States. The official orientation is still found, but other actors are being seen as well.

Table 9: Dominant Actors by Time Periods

ACTOR	Fifties	Eighties	Row Total
individual	60	161	221 22.1
organization	35	135	170 17.0
party	1	2	3 .3
society	7	32	39 3.9
govt	130	303	433 43.3
family, clan		2	2 .2
nature	1	20	21 2.1
military, army		10	10 1.0
other	63	37	100 10.0
Column Total	297 29.7	702 70.3	999 100.0

A final consideration of differences between periods was considered on the basis of whether outside sources were used in reporting the news of the U.S. Chi square analysis revealed a significant difference in this regard (x^2=56.27, p<.001). and the differences by period can be seen in Table 10. In the 1950s, a larger proportion of the stories about the United States used outside sources. The 1950s saw 56.2% of all U.S. news stories using other resources for at least part of the information presented. By contrast, in the 1980s, 31.1% of all news had outside sources of information. This indicates an increased sophistication in the ability of the NCNA to operate as a news provider. No longer just an interpreter of some other gatekeeper's work, in the 1980s the NCNA was getting more of its news on its own.

Table 10: Outside Sources Used by Time Periods

```
                      | Fifties Eighties  Row
                      |        |        | Total
SOURCE       ---------+--------+--------+
                      |        |    2   |     2
  not applicable      |        |        |    .2
                      +--------+--------+
                      |  130   |  482   |   612
  No                  |        |        |  61.3
                      +--------+--------+
                      |  167   |  218   |   385
  Yes                 |        |        |  38.5
                      +--------+--------+
             Column      297      702       999
              Total     29.7     70.3     100.0
```

Discussion

The United States presented in the news transmitted by China in the 1950s had a much different face than the one found in the 1980s. The picture seen in the 1950s was negative, official and limited in scope. The historical context goes far in explaining this fact. The 1950s was a time when the United States was the antithesis of the goals of the new communist state. It supported the enemy of China's friends and threatened the natural development of the world towards a classless society. Representations therefore conformed to this dark reckoning in ways seen in this research.

This 1950s time period was one in which political rightness was important, in ways that would foreshadow the coming Cultural Revolution years. Following policy as a branch of the government was seen in the high use of news as propaganda during this period. The importance of government and diplomacy as topics of the news about America also indicate a high tendency for official use of news in the political realm.

Yet another reason for these dark findings of the 1950s might be due to the state of journalism in China during this time period. In the early stages of the People's Republic, journalism would have to seek out its way within the new system and find its proper place in the new China. These first years probably placed high demands on staff not only to put out the news but to do so in ways that fit a structure that was also changing to find its way. The result, seen in these findings, is a news presentation of the United States that is limited in many ways professionally This was found to some extent in the fact that high proportions of U.S. news items came from other sources of information and in reliance on ideology over other types of news presentations.

The change apparent in the 1980s is, in many ways, quite dramatic. The content is broader and more even in tone in the 1980s. The picture transmitted of the United States has more facets to define it. There is much less overt manipulation of the news and more effort to be professional in ways similar to Western journalistic standards.

Again, the context explains this somewhat. The Open Door policies of Deng Xiao-ping allowed more flexibility to approach the West in ways unthought of in the 1950s. The change in philosophy from Mao to Deng dramatically switched what was taboo to be something that could be approached and considered. Therefore it is logical that the changes noted in this research have resulted.

At the outset of this study, it was noted that news coverage research can provide insights for practical application. In this regard, this research attempts to do that as well. It can be seen that while relations between the United States and China have become tense and that China is frequently criticized by the West for lack of progressiveness, major changes have resulted in China over the past few decades. China, in its representations of America, is dramatically different. This signals the potential for a hopeful situation in terms of diplomatic relationships.

The results of this research also indicate a change in the flow of information coming from China. While the 1950s showed a distinctly political news structure churning out news that was views through and through, the 1980s presents a different picture evident in the way the US is presented in the news. What seems to be the case is that the NCNA as a news agency has evolved into a different kind of purveyor of news from its 1950s version. And this new NCNA operated in the 1980s in ways that that were comparable in many ways with Western professional standards. While many of the advances made in journalism were set back in the aftermath of the events of June, 1989, what is clear in these findings is that journalism was developing and the old ways of the 1950s were not relevant any more in the new China that had developed.

In examining the image of the US in the news of China, Oliphant (1964, p. 416) remarked, “the relationship between the United States and Red China has tremendous implications for the entire world, and the way these two countries see each other may largely determine what that relationship will be.” This assessment was valid 33 years ago and remains a vital rationale today. This study has attempted to look at the United States through the eyes of the dragon to see the US as China sees it. More work is needed in this regard so that realistic expectations and evaluations will result to the benefit of enhanced international communication.

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Appendix

Content Categories

Time Orientation

Check in the text to see if a date is noted for the event mentioned. Compare this with the date of the press release. Subtract the two to obtain the amount of days after the event that the news was reported.

Past/Present/Future Orientation

News content is predominantly concerned with either past, present or future events. If it is none of these use the other category.

Positive/Negative Emphasis

Negative--those items that report social conflicts and disorganization

1. International tension: conflict between nations-military, political, and economic.
2. Civil disruption: conflict between groups-political, economic and social.
3. Crime and vice.
4. Accidents and disasters

Positive--those items reflecting social cohesion and cooperation

1. International cooperation: normal communications between nations
2. Government at work: information(noncontroversial) on affairs of gov't
3. Society at work: information of groups cooperating in non-gov't affairs.
4. "Life goes on": news items about individuals. (Gieber, 1955)

Objective/Subjective Emphasis (Markham, 1967, p. 150).

Objective- Balanced, fair, neutral reporting, does not take a position but states the facts for the reader.
Subjective- Takes a definite position or point of view in the recording of the events. This may be oriented to any number of different approaches such as Marxist-Leninist (Party guided state for the benefit of the masses), Development (establishment of modernization), Traditional Chinese (Confucian values of relationships & harmony), or a bias for or against someone.

Conflict/Harmony Emphasis

1. **Conflict/Drama** - Competitiveness, intolerance, chaos, action, unpredictability, oddity, controversy, emotion and unexpectedness. (Bennett, 1988, p.35; Straughan, 1989, p. 95).
2. **N/A** - Neither conflict/drama nor harmony/consensus.
3. **Harmony/Consensus** - the priority of order in society , propriety or proper behavior in context, consensus and compromise, tolerance, conservatism in the world view. (Samuelson, 1972, pp. 40-41; Cheng, 1946, pp. 147-151)

Dominant Function: What is the main purpose of the news item's inclusion? (Wright, 1986, p.5).

1. **Surveillance** - "collection and distribution of information concerning events in the environment."
2. **Instructional correlation** - nterpretation of info about environment to teach
3. **Ideological correlation** -Interpretation of info about environment to provide a point of view
4. **Transmission** -Passing on values, norms, and cultural components to other members of society
5. **Entertainment** - "primarily...considered for amusement" (Wright, 1986, p.6).
6. **Propaganda** -Actively pushing forward a point of view, or ideology
7. **Mobilization** -a call to stimulate the public to action, movement, or way of thinking.
8. **Other** -none of the categories noted here

Context (Bennett, 1988, p.26)

1. **No context** - item is presented as an isolated event; not backgrounded
2. **Context** - item placed in the on-going conditions; backgrounded
3. **Not Applicable**

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Topic of News (Schramm and Atwood, 1981), (Fung, 1982), and (Vilanilum, 1972).

1. Military, defense, war, intelligence operations, political violence
2. Foreign Relations, Political; Diplomacy
3. Population and Family Planning
4. Domestic Government, Political
5. Labor and Employment
6. Economic, Business, Finance, Trade
7. Agriculture and Food production
8. Science, Medicine, Health, Technology
9. Education and Literacy
10. Industrial
11. Accidents, Disasters
12. Judicial, Legal, Crime
13. Energy, Environment, Conservation
14. Housing, Construction
15. Telecommunication, Postal, Tourism, and Transport
16. Sports
17. Arts, Culture, Entertainment, Mass Media
18. Religion
19. Ideology, History
20. Communism: bureaucracy , International
21. Social, Human Interest/Bizarre
22. Weather Forecasts
23. Sports scores
24. Financial figures
25. Commentary
26. Safety
27. Memorial , Obituary, Goodwill (greetings, commendations, etc.)
28. Other

Dominant actor in the news (Gans, 1979, pp. 8-15)

individual
organization, institution, group, community
Party
society
gov't
family/clan
nature
military, army
other

Outside source of information cited?

No
Yes
N/A